Alaska Airlines AS1282 door blow out!

[Dave Hess]

Unfortunately lots of companies are doing this.

I only want the best folks on my team.

 

[javacontour]

Ethiopian Airlines may be a top notch company. But, the First Officer of the flight only had 361 flight hours and 207 hours on a 737. Is that typical?

Was it really a pilot issue or how that particular aircraft was configured?

IIRC, a carrier could go with a single AOA sensor.

I'm thinking one needs three. Two is not enough if one fails, which is bad. If you have three, you can "throw out" the reading that doesn't correlate with the other two.

With a single sensor, how do you even suspect it's bad?

I'm not saying there wasn't a failure in crew training. I am asking if a single sensor should never have been offered?

 

[350Rocket]

The MCAS system was certainly known by operators and US pilots in particular would have been able to deal with the MAX8 issues. Training is the responsibility of the airlines, but the system was not “secret and sneaky”. Boeing isn’t blameless here, but look at the operators first.

What?? That's not what I concluded after a bunch of research on the subject. I remember right after the crashes people making this statement right here on this forum....that it wouldn't have happened to American pilots... but that was before everything came out about Boeing covering it up so that extra training wouldn't be required. I feel like you're missing something here?

 

[MolaKule]

Thanks for your response.

The 2 Boeing 737 Max crashes were due to this sick culture. Boeing put the big fuel efficient engines on the old 737 design that was never designed for them as a hack so they could have a short term super fuel efficient plane solution they could offer to Boeing's customers as an alternative to Airbus who came out with those fuel efficient larger engines. Since Boeing had that hack, those larger engines made the plane top heavy, so they had to put in that sneaky MCAS system to compensate (that they didn't even tell the airline pilots about). And, of course, Boeing didn't do the proper quality assurance on their sneaky and secret MCAS system. After 2 tragic plane crashes where everyone died, Boeing has lost my trust forever.

What Boeing should have done instead of using that hack, they should have designed a new plane that was designed to carry the larger fuel efficient engines, not retrofit existing old 737 design with 2 new large engines. They saved a lot of money and time to market was fast, but the end result of that decision was catastrophic, both in loss of life, and loss of Billions of dollars to Boeing's balance sheet.

In my humble opinion, the company has a sick culture where profits and avoiding assembly line delays take priority over safety. Once my trust is lost in a company, it's usually impossible for anything to change that. Boeing's management never learns and sadly History is likely to repeat itself. Hence, It's only Airbus planes for my family.

Your choice of words are inaccurate and are meant to elicit emotion instead of fact. First of all, it wasn't a hack. I did aerospace structures design and analysis at Boeing and customer specifications drive every design.

Have you paid any attention or understood the explanations from anyone on the aerospace side of things who have explained the reason for the engine placement and the need for MCAS?

I could name a lot of companies with sick cultures but Boeing is not one of them. The past culture showed a new culture was needed for sure, but it was not a sick culture.

See Astro14's post above for some accurate and historical data on the airline industry.

When was the last time you had a choice as to what aircraft you flew in? When you check in, do you specify the aircraft in which you shall be a passenger? And what is the airline's response?

 

[mk378]

Pilots were not even told of the existence of the new MCAS system, how it normally works (which is different from the automatic stabilizer system on previous 737), and how to recognize and mitigate a failure. At the time the first MAX aircraft were being delivered to airlines, no simulator existed which included MCAS functions. Several foreign airlines had asked about training their pilots in a MAX specific simulator, and they were brushed off.

 

[TheLastWord]

I have taken the liberty to repost the Astro 14 post mentioned above.

A very good read.


[IMG alt="Astro14"]https://bobistheoilguy.com/forums/data/avatars/m/38/38203.jpg?1702267189[/IMG]

Astro14​

$100 Site Donor​

Staff member
JoinedOct 10, 2010Messages19,447LocationVirginia Beach

• Oct 4, 2023
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• #37

My comment is not specifically about the stretch … It’s about the ability to get the nacelles they need for PP - and even the 319 has more room than 37‘s … Bothers me to see Boeing let this happen

Edit: would also seem a new plane could bring the efficiency and comfort that the 87 brought to the entire sector …

A319neo​

As one of the shorter-fuselage versions in Airbus’ single-aisle A320 jetliner family, the A319 offers excellent versatility with its seating options ranging from a 110-seat configuration to 160 seats, with all offering the highest levels of passenger comfort.

aircraft.airbus.com
Click to expand...

And on that we agree, the max was a strategic mistake.

Boeing took a 1967 design, a design it’s been flying for over 50 years, and tried to turn it into a modern airliner.

The bottom line is that the landing gear doesn’t allow enough room for modern engines. So, despite the new wing, and the new engines, it’s still like getting a 1967 Chevy nova, and saying hey, I can put a turbo four-cylinder in this and some new Bluetooth and leather seats and it’s every bit as good as a modern car.

We all know that’s not true.

Boeing was caught in a difficult spot. Airbus was able to spend about $1 billion on R&D to re-engine the 320 series aircraft, and the NEO is a good airliner.
O
To compete economically, Boeing tried to do an update to the 737. What they really needed was a clean sheet aircraft, but the cost of R&D would’ve been around $10 billion.

The critical problem with the 737 is that it was designed as the regional jet of its day. The stubby landing gear, both saved money, and allowed the aircraft to be serviced from the ground without equipment like belt loaders, so baggage handlers, at small airports that the airplane was designed to service, could throw the bags directly into the cargo compartment. Every other aircraft of that size requires ground support equipment, you can’t just go chucking bags into the back of the 320 without having a belt loader.

But that 1967 design goal has severely hampered the airplane since.

Short landing gear means that long fuselages will impact the tail at very modest angles, requiring ridiculously high approach speeds and ridiculously high takeoff speeds. That short landing gear caused all the handling problems when they tried to stick bigger, more modern, more fuel, efficient engines on the wing of the Max.

20 years ago, Boeing was committed to designing what was known as NMA, the new midsize airplane. A fuel efficient 757 replacement, instead, they committed to turning a sow’s ear into a silk purse. Boeing was under tremendous pressure from one particular airline that operated only 737. That airline needed the 737 in order to continue its business model - which included minimizing the cost of pilot training and minimizing the cost of other training by keeping that one aircraft type in production so they could buy a new airplanes, while not having to pay for a new fleet type.

I get why Boeing made the decision, they saved a lot of money on R&D, but they developed an inferior product. A deadly product in the case of Lion air and Ethiopian. The problems with the MCAS system have been fixed, but you will never fix the problem in that airplane’s basic design, and short landing gear.

 

[350Rocket]

Your choice of words are inaccurate and are meant to elicit emotion instead of fact. First of all, it wasn't a hack. I did aerospace structures design and analysis at Boeing and customer specifications drive every design.

Have you paid any attention or understood the explanations from anyone on the aerospace side of things who have explained the reason for the engine placement and the need for MCAS?

I could name a lot of companies with sick cultures but Boeing is not one of them. The past culture showed a new culture was needed for sure, but it was not a sick culture.

See Astro14's post above for some accurate and historical data on the airline industry.

When was the last time you had a choice as to what aircraft you flew in? When you check in, do you specify the aircraft in which you shall be a passenger? And what is the airline's response?

I was going to ask the same thing about aircraft choice. I go on Flightradar with my flight number right before the flight, to see what plane it will be. Then I sigh relief when I see 737-800 instead of 737 max LOL. Though last year on our flight to Dominican Republic with Sunwing, it was supposed to be an 800 and then at the last minute a Max 8 pulled up and I refreshed the page and it then showed the Max. We made it to our destination anyway.

 

[Astro14]

I was going to ask the same thing about aircraft choice. I go on Flightradar with my flight number right before the flight, to see what plane it will be. Then I sigh relief when I see 737-800 instead of 737 max LOL. Though last year on our flight to Dominican Republic with Sunwing, it was supposed to be an 800 and then at the last minute a Max 8 pulled up and I refreshed the page and it then showed the Max. We made it to our destination anyway.

I am far less concerned about the aircraft than I am about the pilot training and quality.

I'm happy flying on carriers that do a good job in hiring, training, and examining (checking) pilots.

The risk in commercial aviation is much more a matter of pilot error than of aircraft type.

As an example - my wife and I flew from Washington, Dulles, to Norfolk, Virginia on Tuesday night. Winds in both places were gusting over 40 knots with heavy rain (see the photo below of the radar summary on the East Coast… all of which had moved to the east and was right over our route). ORF, in particular, had runway construction, so, the runway was shortened, and it was wet, and the crosswind was at, or slightly above, the maximum for the aircraft type, which was 37 knots.

I chatted with the Captain in the gate area. Senior. Experienced. Acutely aware of weather and conditions that night. We delayed the takeoff due to reports of windshear on the departure corridor. He took ethe time to update us every few minutes of what he was doing, and why.

It was rough the entire way down, so rough that the flight attendants never left their jumpseats. I could feel the rain, and the moderate turbulence.

I heard, and felt, the strong gusts, and concomitant power adjustments, when we were on final approach. Reported weather was winds from 30, gusting to 48, knots, with a 36 knot crosswind, on a short, wet runway.

We touched down smoothly, safely, and turned off early after moderate braking.

We were safe, not because of the airplane design, but because we were in the hands of a true professional. I wasn't concerned, or worried. I didn't know the man, personally, but I knew the type - it was like flying with @Just a civilian pilot in command.

The hundreds of decisions made during that flight, and his skillful mastery of the airplane, is what kept us safe, despite what engineers might have you believe.

 

[eljefino]

Do you think someone was just trying to be funny and then realized it was "too soon"? Or were they really that stupid?

During live interviews the guy doing Chyron graphics will hear particular sound bytes and type them in. It helps engage people who were only half paying attention to the TV, as well as old people who are half deaf who say "what'd he say?"

It was a mindless statement, but on Star Trek the bridge crew spells out disasters ("If the warp containment fails...") so the home viewers understand as well.

 

[fdcg27]

We've had a couple of Max8 flights, one pre-grounding on Southwest MCO=SJU and a second this past September on Turkish IST-TBS. Can't say I was worried in either case and both aircraft were new and fresh, plus Turkish feeds you and gives you wine even on such a fairly short flight.

 

[eljefino]

So this is a submarine mechanic question for all the A&P guys out there, what proportion of fasteners in these planes have locking devices, what engineering evaluation determines if they do need lockwire (or cable, tabs, nylock, etc), and how granular are your work documents, so that you could get signature sign-offs for

-- correct bolt with tracability to vendor with type acceptance
-- in the correct hole
-- torqued correctly
-- nylocked/ lockwired correctly
-- independently inspected by a discrete 2nd party?

 

[ls1mike]

So this is a submarine mechanic question for all the A&P guys out there, what proportion of fasteners in these planes have locking devices, what engineering evaluation determines if they do need lockwire (or cable, tabs, nylock, etc), and how granular are your work documents, so that you could get signature sign-offs for

-- correct bolt with tracability to vendor with type acceptance
-- in the correct hole
-- torqued correctly
-- nylocked/ lockwired correctly
-- independently inspected by a discrete 2nd party?

It is SERIOUS business. It is the MOST important part of my job.

SUBSAFE - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[eljefino]

^ Yes, but what's the airborne equivalent? How does it apply to openings large enough to matter? I'm going crazy hearing that one guy gets to throw bolts in loose "because they're coming out again" and the planes are then seemingly allowed to get delivered to the customer and put in revenue service.

I mean, school busses have those little pointer things on their lugnuts so anyone can see if they're starting to work their way loose!

 

[edyvw]

Unfortunately lots of companies are doing this.

I only want the best folks on my team.

DEI hiring DOES NOT mean you are hiring someone bcs. their background, race, ethnicity etc. It means that organization makes sure it advertises jobs at outlets that might easier reach people of different backgrounds, race, ethnicity etc. That means that organization might have larger pool of applicants. That is GOOD thing. I am hiring every year people for positions that require terminal degrees, and talent is not easy to find bcs. competition. Since we started to fallow DEI guidelines, we have 30-40% higher applicant pool. HOWEVER, decision who to hire is ALWAYS based on merit!!!
I mean the amount of ignorance people are projecting around this issue, and talking about something they really don’t know anything about, like that guy on Twitter is astonishing. Than there are a lot of people who just have malicious intentions using this, like this Twitter guy.

 

[ls1mike]

I fly back and forth cross county regularly. Not a good flyer. I probably get anywhere from 20,000 to 30,000 miles a year.

I just flew back from New Orleans Christmas eve after a cruise. (It was awesome) We were on an Alaska Airlines 727-9 Max. Horrible flight one of the worst I have had in years. Lots of turbulence and the flight attendants were buckled up for a good portion of the flight.

Not a fan of flying because well I was on Submarines, I don't know who does the maintenance, their qualifications, or how it was documented. I know nothing about the planes history or the crew I am entrusting my life with. (Thanks for the OCD and unhealthy fear Navy).

So now I fly out the 22nd, according to my itinerary, on a United Airlines 727-9 Max Seattle to DC. Then Fly home the same way.
Then I fly out the 4th of Feb on a 727-9 Max from Seattle to Providence and back again. Ah good times.

I also have to fly in April, August and October. You would figure by now I would have come to terms with "When it is your time, it is your time" I have. I don't have to like it.

So, you can bet I will be wondering what else wasn't properly assembled or maintained as I ride on a pressurized tube at over 500 MPH at an altitude of 30,000 feet or better. I will wait for the official report to lay blame, but based off the age of the plane, I am going with poor assembly procedure or instructions.

I have a dark sense of humor, most the guys I work with do. It is the norm among guys who served on Submarines. The whole one goes we all go thing. It only takes one mistake... So I picked up a carry on backpack that is a fake parachute...Not sure I am going to use it yet but... Also someone I worked with said. "You should get that exact seat, see if they will hire you as door gunner"

So this guy will be having some drinks. Just enough to not care.

 

[4WD]

Thanks for your response.

The 2 Boeing 737 Max crashes were due to this sick culture. Boeing put the big fuel efficient engines on the old 737 design that was never designed for them as a hack so they could have a short term super fuel efficient plane solution they could offer to Boeing's customers as an alternative to Airbus who came out with those fuel efficient larger engines. Since Boeing had that hack, those larger engines made the plane top heavy, so they had to put in that sneaky MCAS system to compensate (that they didn't even tell the airline pilots about). And, of course, Boeing didn't do the proper quality assurance on their sneaky and secret MCAS system. After 2 tragic plane crashes where everyone died, Boeing has lost my trust forever.

What Boeing should have done instead of using that hack, they should have designed a new plane that was designed to carry the larger fuel efficient engines, not retrofit existing old 737 design with 2 new large engines. They saved a lot of money and time to market was fast, but the end result of that decision was catastrophic, both in loss of life, and loss of Billions of dollars to Boeing's balance sheet.

In my humble opinion, the company has a sick culture where profits and avoiding assembly line delays take priority over safety. Once my trust is lost in a company, it's usually impossible for anything to change that. Boeing's management never learns and sadly History is likely to repeat itself. Hence, It's only Airbus planes for my family.

Humble opinion ? Not really …

 

[ls1mike]

^ Yes, but what's the airborne equivalent? How does it apply to openings large enough to matter? I'm going crazy hearing that one guy gets to throw bolts in loose "because they're coming out again" and the planes are then seemingly allowed to get delivered to the customer and put in revenue service.

I mean, school busses have those little pointer things on their lugnuts so anyone can see if they're starting to work their way loose!

I am fairly certain everything is documented, but I have never really been able to find out.

 

[ls1mike]

I am far less concerned about the aircraft than I am about the pilot training and quality.

I'm happy flying on carriers that do a good job in hiring, training, and examining (checking) pilots.

The risk in commercial aviation is much more a matter of pilot error than of aircraft type.

As an example - my wife and I flew from Washington, Dulles, to Norfolk, Virginia on Tuesday night. Winds in both places were gusting over 40 knots with heavy rain (see the photo below of the radar summary on the East Coast… all of which had moved to the east and was right over our route). ORF, in particular, had runway construction, so, the runway was shortened, and it was wet, and the crosswind was at, or slightly above, the maximum for the aircraft type, which was 37 knots.

I chatted with the Captain in the gate area. Senior. Experienced. Acutely aware of weather and conditions that night. We delayed the takeoff due to reports of windshear on the departure corridor. He took ethe time to update us every few minutes of what he was doing, and why.

It was rough the entire way down, so rough that the flight attendants never left their jumpseats. I could feel the rain, and the moderate turbulence.

I heard, and felt, the strong gusts, and concomitant power adjustments, when we were on final approach. Reported weather was winds from 30, gusting to 48, knots, with a 36 knot crosswind, on a short, wet runway.

We touched down smoothly, safely, and turned off early after moderate braking.

We were safe, not because of the airplane design, but because we were in the hands of a true professional. I wasn't concerned, or worried. I didn't know the man, personally, but I knew the type - it was like flying with @Just a civilian pilot in command.

The hundreds of decisions made during that flight, and his skillful mastery of the airplane, is what kept us safe, despite what engineers might have you believe.

View attachment 197926

I have that same flight coming up on the 22nd...Dulles to Norfolk...Thanks Astro...I need a drink.

 

[ls1mike]

The way Airbus has developed the flight controls (fly by wire) in every single airliner they sell, is that the pilot cannot override the computers limitations. Through the ergonomic failures of displaying “alternate law” as happened in AF447 the pilot can be kept from understanding what is happening to the airplane, and if the airplane decides that the pilot is wrong, the airplane wins.

I am not sure I want any equipment that I own to win...

 

[Pablo]

Have they figured it out yet?