Brazil Plane Crash

[Just a civilian pilot]

This is a case where that Southwest pilot put himself and his passengers at risk. If ATC couldn’t grant deviation around the weather, then maybe it’s time to turn back, hold, or do something else. But wandering into active military airspace, particularly in Nevada, is downright dangerous.

Active military airspace means just that. Fighters, and other tactical aircraft, are maneuvering at high-speed, and under high G.

They may or may not be looking for the airliner that blunders into their war game. They may or may not see it, because they’re busy looking at the airplane at their six. There may be anywhere from one to several dozen airplanes in that airspace. The southwest pilot had no idea how many, or how close, they all were.

The risk of penetrating active military aerospace includes getting shot down, having a mid-air collision, or being too close to ordinance when it’s delivered and explodes.

Also, and I think this really important, when that airliner does blunder into active military airspace, the entire exercise will be called off for safety and every participating airplane will stop their training. Depending on the nature and size of the exercise, you just cost the taxpayers of the US, and perhaps other countries, millions of dollars in wasted sorties. And that pilot may not care, but somebody does.

Now, the military is pretty careful about all that stuff, and I’ve organized several missile shoots.

Those missile shoots took place over the ocean, in W-72 and other airspace, and we made sure that no airliner had blundered off of the prescribed jet airways before we released several missiles at the target.

My point: Declaring an emergency does not change the reality of the situation.

I’ve had this issue arise when debriefing crews after simulator training when they failed to comply with the step down fixes on an ILS in mountainous terrain. In fairness to them, they were pretty task saturated, because I’d already given them an engine failure as a result of a fuel leak or an oil leak. So they had to fly this ILS with an engine out, in addition to the terrain.

I’ve had several captains say “I declared an emergency, so I don’t have to follow that clearance.”

Well, does the terrain know that you’ve declared an emergency? Do the mountains suddenly get lower, or move out of your way, as a result of your emergency declaration?

The exercise of emergency authority can be a double edged sword. You have the authority to do lots of things with your airplane. That’s an important authority.

But just saying “Mayday” does not change the fact that you were flying towards a mountain, or towards active military airspace where you’re subject to increased risk of a mid air collision.

Yep, we have to do the safest thing which involves declaring an emergency at times to get priority handling ( fuel emergency ) or to deviate from a clearance, but risking safety by flying into active military airspace or descending too low when terrain is an issue isn’t improving safety, it’s dangerous.

I have never been too low on fuel, not yet.

I had to answer ( ATC understood ) for declaring those emergencies , the chief pilot called. He agreed I made the right call.

 

[Astro14]

Yep, we have to do the safest thing which involves declaring an emergency at times to get priority handling ( fuel emergency ) or to deviate from a clearance, but risking safety by flying into active military airspace or descending too low when terrain is an issue isn’t improving safety, it’s dangerous.

I have never been too low on fuel, not yet.

I have, both in the Navy, and as an airline pilot.

We once landed an A-320 in an eighth of a mile visibility, obscured ceiling and blowing snow, in Boston, with about 40 minutes of fuel remaining.

Very, very uncomfortable.

A series of events, without a single clear fault, or mistake, led to us being on a very long final, very low on fuel without a whole lot of other options.

It’s a story I gladly tell in training because the interesting part was the CRM and the miscommunication between the FO (me) and the Captain.

We had a very different understanding of the situation, and despite some very strong advocacy from the right seat, he proceeded on with a plan that was predicated on some faulty information.

I let him execute the plan, including a manual landing (below Cat I, an auto land is required) because the only other option was to go around, and when you’re looking at about 3.6 on the gas in an A320 in that sort of weather with no viable divert, landing, of any kind, was the safest option.

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

I have, both in the Navy, and as an airline pilot.

We once landed an A-320 in an eighth of a mile visibility, obscured ceiling and blowing snow, in Boston, with about 40 minutes of fuel remaining.

Very, very uncomfortable.

A series of events, without a single clear fault, or mistake, led to us being on a very long final, very low on fuel without a whole lot of other options.

It’s a story I gladly tell in training because the interesting part was the CRM and the miscommunication between the FO (me) and the Captain.

We had a very different understanding of the situation, and despite some very strong advocacy from the right seat, he proceeded on with a plan that was predicated on some faulty information.

I let him execute the plan, including a manual landing (below Cat I, an auto land is required) because the only other option was to go around, and when you’re looking at about 3.6 on the gas in an A320 in that sort of weather with no viable divert, landing, of any kind, was the safest option.

That’s pretty low for sure, the low fuel caution lights ( ECAM ) comes at at 3300 pounds ( 1500 KG ) on the A320 and company policy is anytime we predict landing at, or below 2200 -3000 pounds ( 1400 - 1000 KGS 30 minutes fuel left , depending on landing weight ) is a fuel emergency.

Curious why the Captain chose to do a manual landing , was the wind above the auto land limits or was it because the runway was contaminated ( auto land not demonstrated except wet and dry runway )?

I appreciate you sharing this story.

 

[Astro14]

That’s pretty low for sure, the low fuel caution lights ( ECAM ) comes at at 3300 pounds ( 1500 KG ) on the A320 and company policy is anytime we predict landing at, or below 2200 -3000 pounds ( 1400 - 1000 KGS 30 minutes fuel left , depending on landing weight ) is a fuel emergency.

Curious why the Captain chose to do a manual landing , was the wind above the auto land limits or was it because the runway was contaminated ( auto land not demonstrated except wet and dry runway )?

I appreciate you sharing this story.

Simple confusion on his part.

He chose a CAT II approach, even though the airplane was CAT III capable ( cat 3 dual) because “the weather is good enough”. Our ops manual is clear - if the weather is below CAT I - you choose the most capable (lowest minimums) approach of which the airplane and airport are capable.

I had him review the weather briefing guide with me, citing “I am new, can you walk through this with me?” Even though I was not new, and had been an instructor for years on the 747. I was doing my best to draw him into the book.

He still reached the wrong conclusion about the approach.

At 1,500 feet, he said, “if I see the runway, I’ll just click it (the autopilot) off”. I said, “You briefed an auto land, because of the weather, you can’t just click it off”. He said, “yeah, but if I see the runway, it’s VFR, so I will just do a visual landing”. I said, “it’s not VFR, and the weather is below Cat I, so auto land is required”. And he said, “not if I see the runway”. I said, “you have to have visual reference to land on a Cat 2, but it still has to be an auto land.”

And by now, we are below 1,000 feet, and this discussion wasn’t going anywhere.

He didn’t reply. Focused on the approach.

And at 80’ the autopilot came off.

He pounded that airplane onto the runway with about 1,000’ visibility in blowing snow. I said not a word, knowing that a go around with 3.6 would cause us to be in a worse situation.

I called a good friend of mine at the training center, verified that I was right about the whole situation, and filled out the flight safety report. Over dinner that night he saw no reason to fill out a report because he still didn’t think he had made an error.

I use this story as an example of different "mental models" developed by pilots despite being presented with the same data. Not about who was right, it's about "how do we get on the same page" as well as "what was the safest course of action in this circumstance?"

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

Simple confusion on his part.

He chose a CAT II approach, even though the airplane was CAT III capable ( cat 3 dual) because “the weather is good enough”. Our ops manual is clear - if the weather is below CAT I - you choose the most capable approach of which the airplane and airport are capable.

I had him review the weather briefing guide with me, citing “I am new, can you walk through this with me?” Even though I was not new, and had been an instructor for years on the 747. I was doing my best to draw him into the book.

He still reached the wrong conclusion about the approach.

At 1,500 feet, he said, “if I see the runway, I’ll just click it (the autopilot) off”. I said, “You briefed an auto land, because of the weather, you can’t just click it off”. He said, “yeah, but if I see the runway, it’s VFR, so I will just do a visual landing”. I said, “it’s not VFR, and the weather is below Cat I, so auto land is required”. And he said, “not if I see the runway”. I said, “you have to have visual reference to land on a Cat 2, but it still has to be an auto land.”

And by now, we are below 1,000 feet, and this discussion wasn’t going anywhere.

He didn’t reply. Focused on the approach.

And at 80’ the autopilot came off.

He pounded that airplane onto the runway with about 1,000’ visibility in blowing snow. I said not a word, knowing that a go around with 3.6 would cause us to be in a worse situation.

I called a good friend of mine at the training center, verified that I was right about the whole situation, and filled out the report. Over dinner that night he saw no reason to fill out a report because he still didn’t think he had made an error.

Thanks.

Strange why he took the AP at 80 feet, I guess he had enough visual reference even though it’s a requirement to auto land Cat 2 unless it fails last minute and you have the runway ( e.g auto land warning light ).

Yeah, 80 feet is the lowest height above the runway Airbus says to disconnect the auto pilot if landing manually in order to get a feel for the aircraft.

Yup, go with the lowest approach, Category 3 ( dual ) and auto land, especially if low on fuel.

Worst case , even if you don’t have the required runway visibility ( we need min 250 feet forward visibility on Cat 3 dual ) , auto land anyways if low on fuel.

Thanks for sharing , interesting story.

I am not judging, I wasn’t there and I like to learn from stuff.

When I retire I will share a few stories.

 

[The_Eric]

Touching back on the icing topic - if icing is encountered and the prescribed course of action is to descend to warmer air, about how long would it take to remedy the situation? I understand that there are lots of variables, ie: plane design and anti-icing system type(?) and others no doubt..

Let's say that either @Astro14 or @Just a civilian pilot are at the helm of their respective airliner - about how long before it is not a concern?

What about a plane that is not equipped with anti-icing capabilities... Obviously getting out of that situation is paramount.. Are we talking seconds, minutes, tens of minutes?

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

Touching back on the icing topic - if icing is encountered and the prescribed course of action is to descend to warmer air, about how long would it take to remedy the situation? I understand that there are lots of variables, ie: plane design and anti-icing system type(?) and others no doubt..

Let's say that either @Astro14 or @Just a civilian pilot are at the helm of their respective airliner - about how long before it is not a concern?

What about a plane that is not equipped with anti-icing capabilities... Obviously getting out of that situation is paramount.. Are we talking seconds, minutes, tens of minutes?

About to hit the sack ( flying tomorrow ), but a quick reply about icing ( in flight icing ).

I have never had any issues with icing in 22 years on the Airbus. Even though leading edge slats 1 & 2 ( the entire leading edge isn’t heated ) and the tail are not heated.

The Airbus is certified for “ known icing conditions “ but no aircraft is certified to operate intentionally in severe ice ( more than 5 mm on the Airbus ). I have flown through severe icing and I never noticed any performance issues on the Airbus ( obviously I was hanging around in it ). We would NEVER take off or do an approach and landing if severe icing was at the airport. They would have severe problems trying to keep the runways clean anyways if that were the case ( chemically treat the runways ).

My comment about descending into warmer air to exit severe icing has more to do with that ATR in Brazil given the surface temperature, and lower altitudes, are not below freezing. Remember the air temperature decreases about 1.98 degrees Celsius per 1000 in the climb.

Slippery runways in the winter are a far greater concern to me than in flight icing.

More later.

 

[MrJayhawk]

Another post from airliners.net, sounds like pilots had very little time to react to situation:

TV Globo obtained reports from Brazilian Air Force experts who had access to CVR recordings. They said the recordings alone doesn't allow them to identify the cause of the accident.

The recording shows the aircraft suddenly lost altitude. The co-pilot, realizing the aircraft was losing altitude, asked the pilot what was happening and that it was necessary to increase engine power to regain lift. About a minute passed from the moment the aircraft began to lose altitude until it hit the ground. The recording ends with screams.

Experts say no alarm sounds related to failures were heard, especially eletrical failure, engine failure or fire.

https://g1.globo.com/sp/campinas-regiao ... ondo.ghtml

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

Another post from airliners.net, sounds like pilots had very little time to react to situation:

TV Globo obtained reports from Brazilian Air Force experts who had access to CVR recordings. They said the recordings alone doesn't allow them to identify the cause of the accident.

The recording shows the aircraft suddenly lost altitude. The co-pilot, realizing the aircraft was losing altitude, asked the pilot what was happening and that it was necessary to increase engine power to regain lift. About a minute passed from the moment the aircraft began to lose altitude until it hit the ground. The recording ends with screams.

Experts say no alarm sounds related to failures were heard, especially eletrical failure, engine failure or fire.

https://g1.globo.com/sp/campinas-regiao ... ondo.ghtml

I don’t think this crash had anything to do with ice.

 

[john_pifer]

I don’t think this crash had anything to do with ice.

Well, that’s certainly against the conventional wisdom.

It will definitely be interesting to read the eventual report.

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

Well, that’s certainly against the conventional wisdom.

It will definitely be interesting to read the eventual report.

Let me put it this way ; I would be very surprised it crashed due to ice unless the crew was not following ATR procedures given how much testing ATR did after the previous crashes with icing involved. I am sure ATR thoroughly reevaluated that aircraft in icing and developed updated procedures to be followed if in icing conditions. ATR has a severe ice checklist.

If it crashed due to icing , and the crew did everything right, that planes reputation is done. Even if it only operates in the Sahara desert.

Now, if they were indeed in severe icing conditions and it was effecting the performance of the aircraft but they didn’t descend , then it’s a real possibility.

Why did it stall? Yeah, severe icing could cause that to happen in an ATR if not following ATR severe icing conditions procedures given they have special procedures developed by ATR to be followed due to its history.

That’s what I am saying.

 

[The_Eric]

About to hit the sack ( flying tomorrow ), but a quick reply about icing ( in flight icing ).

I have never had any issues with icing in 22 years on the Airbus. Even though leading edge slats 1 & 2 ( the entire leading edge isn’t heated ) and the tail are not heated.

The Airbus is certified for “ known icing conditions “ but no aircraft is certified to operate intentionally in severe ice ( more than 5 mm on the Airbus ). I have flown through severe icing and I never noticed any performance issues on the Airbus ( obviously I was hanging around in it ). We would NEVER take off or do an approach and landing if severe icing was at the airport. They would have severe problems trying to keep the runways clean anyways if that were the case ( chemically treat the runways ).

My comment about descending into warmer air to exit severe icing has more to do with that ATR in Brazil given the surface temperature, and lower altitudes, are not below freezing. Remember the air temperature decreases about 1.98 degrees Celsius per 1000 in the climb.

Slippery runways in the winter are a far greater concern to me than in flight icing.

More later.

What altitude range or zone is icing most common at?

If you encountered icing on one of your flights, what would you do and how long would it take for your actions to remedy the situation?

 

[Astro14]

Well, that’s certainly against the conventional wisdom.

It will definitely be interesting to read the eventual report.

The conventional wisdom is grasping at straws because an externality (ice) is a whole lot easier for people to accept than the real cause - pilot error.

But one has only to look at Colgan Air 3407, or Air France 447, where ice was blamed.

Until the facts came out.

 

[Cujet]

In the end, the PIC is the final authority regardless of what instructions I give him.

Correct, even if a Brasher Warning (call this number when you can, possible pilot deviation) or violation is forthcoming.

 

[Astro14]

Correct, even if a Brasher Warning (call this number when you can, possible pilot deviation) or violation is forthcoming.

I have had to make that phone call once.

And once, on Boston Ground, I asked for the phone number to Boston approach, because they had made quite a few mistakes with us on final and caused a high energy go-around. The supervisor and I had a polite, professional, and constructive discussion about the mistakes that they had made. They had a new controller, in training, and the supervisor and I saw things the same way.

All good.

 

[SHOZ]

Just a coincidence there were 15 top cancer doctors on board going to a conference. Something like 7 more cancelled that flight.

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

What altitude range or zone is icing most common at?

If you encountered icing on one of your flights, what would you do and how long would it take for your actions to remedy the situation?

I have never been in icing conditions severe enough that it caused any problems even though we technically ( not intentionally ) we were in severe icing ( more than 5 mm ice on the Airbus ). If ATC would not authorize an altitude change , I would declare an emergency and change altitudes anyways if it was that severe ( use TCAS to avoid other traffic ) and it was adversely impacting performance. I cannot see that ever happening ( having to declare an emergency to change altitudes ) but it’s an option when safety is required.

Severe icing is usually at lower altitudes.

 

[Astro14]

Just a coincidence there were 15 top cancer doctors on board going to a conference. Something like 7 more cancelled that flight.

A lot of rumor, much of it false, in that statement.

 

[FowVay]

Is there any opinion or speculation based on the sound of the aircraft as it fell from the sky? The sound was that of feathered propellers slapping the air akin to the sound a helicopter makes. When I first saw the video I thought it awfully strange. I don't know enough about the dynamics of the aircraft to understand what might happen if one or both props were accidentally feathered while on approach but I did find the sound the aircraft made unusual.

 

[SHOZ]

A lot of rumor, much of it false, in that statement.

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/...ash-cancer-doctors-killed-cause-b2594898.html

8 of the passengers in the Brazil plane crash were cancer doctors/researchers. They were headed to the Brazilan Society of Bone Marrow Transplantation and Cellular Therapy Conference (SBTMO) It was initially going to be 15 of these Oncologist but 7 took a different flight.