I am a skeptic, as well, but not because the ship isn’t on the drawing board, but instead because you can buy a couple of the latest Arleigh Burke class for what this would cost - and make no mistake, procurement isn’t always about what is best, or what fits the mission, it is often about what is politically viable.Merry Christmas everyone!
Late to the thread. In my job I work with many of the organizations involved in Navy R&D, resourcing, ship design, fleet operations, etc. A few thoughts:
There is no design or specification for this ship whatsoever. Concepts of a plan at best. Several of the weapons systems listed on that "technical specifications' graphic are between non-existent and not actually operational. Maybe they will in the future. Not in 2.5 years.
DDG(X) is the actual next large surface combatant. It's already in the works and is to both replace the Ticonderoga class and follow on from DDG-51 Flight III. Expected first deliveries are 5+ years out. Suffice to say a ship of non-existent design will not be out before it.
Comments throughout the thread suggesting that Navy force structure and doctrine development is towards a greater number of lower-cost platforms is correct. A vessel such as this does not fit. As described this would be a $10B+ vessel. The frigate program managed to get botched but other systems such as LUSV are moving along. Read about Cooperative Engagement Capability and imagine how that all works.
So yeah, call me a skeptic, for a number of reasons.
jeff
And as long as we have a vocal, but uninformed, portion of the electorate that will object to new technology, politicians will listen, no matter how foolish that decision may be. The fiasco of LCS ( a surface warfare fantasy that got ruined by the “good idea fairy” and requirements creep) is still fresh.
So, older, less capable ships may continue to be built because they are an easier “sell”, but the future is in ships with a new power distribution architecture to enable the fitting of new weapons as they are developed. This proposal includes exactly that.
This feels a great deal like 1939 - when the Navy knew what was on the horizon - but the American people were decidedly isolationist - the Navy struggled to get new ships built for the fight that they knew was coming.
And just like then, there are factions in the Navy that argue over what is the best option for war at sea. Back then it was battleships v. carriers v. submarines… and today?
Not much different.
More smaller ships? Fewer larger ships? New architecture? Proven tech v. new tech? Subs? Surface ships? Carriers?