Originally Posted By: billt460
I'm not a pilot. So perhaps Astro, or others who are, can help me in understanding how things like this can possibly happen? I can understand making mistakes because I've made them. I can understand moderate carelessness because at times I've been so. But how can certified pilots do such things?? Then there was Air France 447 that crashed because the pilot induced a stall for over 4 minutes! All he had to do was nose it over and he would have easily recovered. But instead he pancaked the aircraft with the yoke in his lap, all the way down from over 30,000 ft. to impact with the water. Yeah, his pitot tubes froze up. But don't these guys have even some stick and rudder skills that would allow them to feel the airplane, along with how it is acting? It just doesn't make sense how stuff like this can happen.
Then there was the Asiana Air 214 crash in San Francisco that landed short. There was nothing wrong with the airplane. The guy flat out didn't know how to land it. He stalled out and landed short. How did he ever get certified in that airplane? And while we're at it why didn't JFK Jr. look at his artificial horizon? It stares you right in the face on the instrument cluster on most every plane made. In all that instruction is it even possible someone never pointed it out to him? Or what it is for? Hard to believe he never even said, "What does this thing do?"
And then you have the other extreme. What I like to call the "Miracle Men". Guys like Sully, Al Haynes and Denny Finch, (United Sioux City crash, landing with zero hydraulics). I can't understand how there can be such a difference in talent in the left seat of these aircraft, that range from superstars, to idiots. We are all human. And we all make mistakes. But there are mistakes.... and then there are MISTAKES. And with so much at stake you wonder how such things can happen with supposedly skilled people who are in charge of hundreds of millions of dollars of airplane, and hundreds of peoples lives. (With the exception of Kennedy who snuffed 3 including his own). It's hard to make sense of it.
Bill - I've talked about these events in other threads, but I will respond directly here.
There is no excuse for the Air India. They failed to do the "after takeoff checklist" - which exists for every airliner, including the A-320, in which I have a type rating and over 3,000 hours. They failed to understand why the airplane wasn't performing properly. They failed to get any assistance in understanding the problem. Failure in procedures, failure in training, failure in situational awareness, failure in leadership. They shouldn't be flying an airliner with passengers, period.
Air France 447 isn't as simple as folks make it out to be. The critical failure in my opinion was the decision to fly through severe weather. Once that happened, a cascade of failures coupled with poor training and a design philosophy (Airbus) that disconnects pilots from direct control led to the disaster.
When the pitot-static system iced up, they lost airspeed and other critical information. The part that failed (iced up) was in the process of being replaced on all A-330 airplanes because it was known to ice up too easily. When you lose airspeed in an airliner, it's not like losing a speedometer in a car, you have almost no way to tell your airspeed. It's like losing a speedometer in your car, at the same time a bag is placed over your head.
In the Airbus airplanes, the pilot is a voting member of a system of flight control computers designed to protect the airplane from a bad pilot. If the pilot tries to exceed normal bank, pitch, or G limits, the system WILL NOT LET HIM because the computers, and not the pilot, move the flight control surfaces. Like driving your car with a mousepad on a PC that then tells the steering rack which way to turn. No mechanical connection at all.
If those computers fail, then the system gives the pilot direct control of the surfaces again. When the pitot static system iced up, that's what the system did - the control laws changed and the airplane went to direct control. BUT the indication in the cockpit is subtle and on a dark & stormy night (seriously), they didn't note that change in airplane response.
In a normal stall, in a normal airplane, a pilot has to input nose down to break the AOA and get the wing flying again. But the Airbus isn't normal. It won't go to stall AOA when the flight control system is in normal law. So...
1. Stall recovery in the A-330? Stick full back, max thrust, and the airplane flies at optimum AOA.
2. Windshear recovery in an Airbus? Stick full back, max thrust, and the airplane flies at optimum AOA.
3. Ground Proximity Warning and recovery in an Airbus? Stick full back, max thrust, and the airplane flies at optimum AOA.
So, that's how pilots on Airbus airplanes are trained. They are trained to take advantage of a system that optimizes the flight path and performance of the airplane...except when it failed and they didn't know it failed...because the cockpit was full of warnings and readings that didn't make sense.
The other FO (who was in the left seat) tried to go stick forward, but not long enough to break the stall. So, they were starting to recognize the situation, but ran out of time. They responded to a difficult and unusual situation as they were trained to do...
Lots of airplanes have crashed as a result of pitot static failure, including 757s. The industry is now training to that failure - and we should. But training time is precious, and when you've added an new training item, you've got take one out. That's a challenge for the industry: what's the highest threat, defined by likelihood and severity?
Asiana 214 was a perfectly good 777 that was flown into the sea wall by pilot error on a clear day.
The 777 (and 747, and 757/767) flight manual specifically PROHIBITS the use of an autopilot mode known as FLCH below 1500. Simply, in this case, the throttles will go to idle and the flight director will command nose down until the altitude set on the control panel is reached. It's a terrible idea to set 0 feet, and follow the flight director down in a maximum descent, because the throttles will not do anything but go to idle. That's why it's prohibited.
Yet, that's exactly what they did to fly a visual approach to SFO when the ILS was out of service. United and other airplanes were landing there day after day in the same circumstances without any issues. In fact, I was over Denver in an A-320 when it happened and we diverted to LAX. We flew into SFO a few hours after the crash happened...and it was eerie...
Why did the crew crash a perfectly good 777? Poor training. Poor understanding of the autoflight system modes. And, this is important, a culture in which the Captain is never wrong. Korean Air, Flying Tigers, and other Asian carriers have had several incidents of perfectly good airplanes being flown into the ground because the Captain made a mistake and the crew chose not to embarrass him. It's a serious issue.
So, it fascinates me that the flying public, lawmakers, and airline executives think that they can squeeze costs out of the system by cutting pilot pay and that safety won't be impacted. You want the best? Then make the career, not just a particular job, but the whole career, attractive. When my pay was cut, in 2003, to less than I had made in 1996 as a Lieutenant in the Navy, I almost didn't come back. Why would I? Long hours, lots of time gone, and low pay on top of it? I had other career options. Most good people do. And the youngsters who were considering a pilot career looked at the terrible pay, long hours, and lots of time gone, and chose other options.
Some of the people that we did get to choose the career aren't that good. They made fatal mistakes. What did everyone expect? If you, as an airline management team, can't fill the seats of airliners because you can't pay those folks, you're not getting the best, and you're going to get some who are pretty weak. Those people make mistakes. Big ones.
The airline executives are lobbying lawmakers right now to lower standards because they can't hire enough. Absolutely the wrong thing to do. Pay the pilots a decent wage over their entire career. Then you'll get good folks and you, as the flying public, will reap the reward of a safe system operated by true professionals. But, try and cut costs by lowering standards, and you'll get the results you've seen in your examples.
I'm not a pilot. So perhaps Astro, or others who are, can help me in understanding how things like this can possibly happen? I can understand making mistakes because I've made them. I can understand moderate carelessness because at times I've been so. But how can certified pilots do such things?? Then there was Air France 447 that crashed because the pilot induced a stall for over 4 minutes! All he had to do was nose it over and he would have easily recovered. But instead he pancaked the aircraft with the yoke in his lap, all the way down from over 30,000 ft. to impact with the water. Yeah, his pitot tubes froze up. But don't these guys have even some stick and rudder skills that would allow them to feel the airplane, along with how it is acting? It just doesn't make sense how stuff like this can happen.
Then there was the Asiana Air 214 crash in San Francisco that landed short. There was nothing wrong with the airplane. The guy flat out didn't know how to land it. He stalled out and landed short. How did he ever get certified in that airplane? And while we're at it why didn't JFK Jr. look at his artificial horizon? It stares you right in the face on the instrument cluster on most every plane made. In all that instruction is it even possible someone never pointed it out to him? Or what it is for? Hard to believe he never even said, "What does this thing do?"
And then you have the other extreme. What I like to call the "Miracle Men". Guys like Sully, Al Haynes and Denny Finch, (United Sioux City crash, landing with zero hydraulics). I can't understand how there can be such a difference in talent in the left seat of these aircraft, that range from superstars, to idiots. We are all human. And we all make mistakes. But there are mistakes.... and then there are MISTAKES. And with so much at stake you wonder how such things can happen with supposedly skilled people who are in charge of hundreds of millions of dollars of airplane, and hundreds of peoples lives. (With the exception of Kennedy who snuffed 3 including his own). It's hard to make sense of it.
Bill - I've talked about these events in other threads, but I will respond directly here.
There is no excuse for the Air India. They failed to do the "after takeoff checklist" - which exists for every airliner, including the A-320, in which I have a type rating and over 3,000 hours. They failed to understand why the airplane wasn't performing properly. They failed to get any assistance in understanding the problem. Failure in procedures, failure in training, failure in situational awareness, failure in leadership. They shouldn't be flying an airliner with passengers, period.
Air France 447 isn't as simple as folks make it out to be. The critical failure in my opinion was the decision to fly through severe weather. Once that happened, a cascade of failures coupled with poor training and a design philosophy (Airbus) that disconnects pilots from direct control led to the disaster.
When the pitot-static system iced up, they lost airspeed and other critical information. The part that failed (iced up) was in the process of being replaced on all A-330 airplanes because it was known to ice up too easily. When you lose airspeed in an airliner, it's not like losing a speedometer in a car, you have almost no way to tell your airspeed. It's like losing a speedometer in your car, at the same time a bag is placed over your head.
In the Airbus airplanes, the pilot is a voting member of a system of flight control computers designed to protect the airplane from a bad pilot. If the pilot tries to exceed normal bank, pitch, or G limits, the system WILL NOT LET HIM because the computers, and not the pilot, move the flight control surfaces. Like driving your car with a mousepad on a PC that then tells the steering rack which way to turn. No mechanical connection at all.
If those computers fail, then the system gives the pilot direct control of the surfaces again. When the pitot static system iced up, that's what the system did - the control laws changed and the airplane went to direct control. BUT the indication in the cockpit is subtle and on a dark & stormy night (seriously), they didn't note that change in airplane response.
In a normal stall, in a normal airplane, a pilot has to input nose down to break the AOA and get the wing flying again. But the Airbus isn't normal. It won't go to stall AOA when the flight control system is in normal law. So...
1. Stall recovery in the A-330? Stick full back, max thrust, and the airplane flies at optimum AOA.
2. Windshear recovery in an Airbus? Stick full back, max thrust, and the airplane flies at optimum AOA.
3. Ground Proximity Warning and recovery in an Airbus? Stick full back, max thrust, and the airplane flies at optimum AOA.
So, that's how pilots on Airbus airplanes are trained. They are trained to take advantage of a system that optimizes the flight path and performance of the airplane...except when it failed and they didn't know it failed...because the cockpit was full of warnings and readings that didn't make sense.
The other FO (who was in the left seat) tried to go stick forward, but not long enough to break the stall. So, they were starting to recognize the situation, but ran out of time. They responded to a difficult and unusual situation as they were trained to do...
Lots of airplanes have crashed as a result of pitot static failure, including 757s. The industry is now training to that failure - and we should. But training time is precious, and when you've added an new training item, you've got take one out. That's a challenge for the industry: what's the highest threat, defined by likelihood and severity?
Asiana 214 was a perfectly good 777 that was flown into the sea wall by pilot error on a clear day.
The 777 (and 747, and 757/767) flight manual specifically PROHIBITS the use of an autopilot mode known as FLCH below 1500. Simply, in this case, the throttles will go to idle and the flight director will command nose down until the altitude set on the control panel is reached. It's a terrible idea to set 0 feet, and follow the flight director down in a maximum descent, because the throttles will not do anything but go to idle. That's why it's prohibited.
Yet, that's exactly what they did to fly a visual approach to SFO when the ILS was out of service. United and other airplanes were landing there day after day in the same circumstances without any issues. In fact, I was over Denver in an A-320 when it happened and we diverted to LAX. We flew into SFO a few hours after the crash happened...and it was eerie...
Why did the crew crash a perfectly good 777? Poor training. Poor understanding of the autoflight system modes. And, this is important, a culture in which the Captain is never wrong. Korean Air, Flying Tigers, and other Asian carriers have had several incidents of perfectly good airplanes being flown into the ground because the Captain made a mistake and the crew chose not to embarrass him. It's a serious issue.
So, it fascinates me that the flying public, lawmakers, and airline executives think that they can squeeze costs out of the system by cutting pilot pay and that safety won't be impacted. You want the best? Then make the career, not just a particular job, but the whole career, attractive. When my pay was cut, in 2003, to less than I had made in 1996 as a Lieutenant in the Navy, I almost didn't come back. Why would I? Long hours, lots of time gone, and low pay on top of it? I had other career options. Most good people do. And the youngsters who were considering a pilot career looked at the terrible pay, long hours, and lots of time gone, and chose other options.
Some of the people that we did get to choose the career aren't that good. They made fatal mistakes. What did everyone expect? If you, as an airline management team, can't fill the seats of airliners because you can't pay those folks, you're not getting the best, and you're going to get some who are pretty weak. Those people make mistakes. Big ones.
The airline executives are lobbying lawmakers right now to lower standards because they can't hire enough. Absolutely the wrong thing to do. Pay the pilots a decent wage over their entire career. Then you'll get good folks and you, as the flying public, will reap the reward of a safe system operated by true professionals. But, try and cut costs by lowering standards, and you'll get the results you've seen in your examples.
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