Air France 011 April 5, both pilots attempting to fly

Pilots normally agree before the flight who will fly which parts of it and have a 2-way verbal protocol when switch controls: "You have the controls" ... "I have the controls". That's real, not Hollywood.

A contributing factor can be airplanes like the Airbus that have a control side-stick on each side, instead of an old fashioned pair of central yokes. A pair of central yokes move together so you can't give it different inputs and it's obvious who's flying the plane. Separate side-sticks on each side can be manipulated independently and differently, so each side can give different inputs and it's less obvious who is moving it.

But the real issue is about crew resource management, cockpit communication.

BTW, this was a contributing factor to the Air France 447 crash in 2009.
 
Fly by wire has over the years, had issues like this. Gulfstream uses side stick controllers that move in unison with each other, so if pilots fight, the stronger pilot wins.

Unfortunately, the FAA is coming out with an AD for our G600, that severely limits the landing winds. This is due to pilots wildly fighting with the flight controls on landing, forcing the system into AOA limiting, resulting in a hard landing. UGH. The engineers never imagined the pilots would be doing what they are doing.

If it were mechanical, the flight controls would simply do what the pilot asked of it, good or bad. In the digital world, the pilot only makes suggestions.

We see this kind of thing with digital controls on a regular basis. There is always something the engineering staff missed, failed to understand, or never considered.
 
Pilots normally agree before the flight who will fly which parts of it and have a 2-way verbal protocol when switch controls: "You have the controls" ... "I have the controls". That's real, not Hollywood.

A contributing factor can be airplanes like the Airbus that have a control side-stick on each side, instead of an old fashioned pair of central yokes. A pair of central yokes move together so you can't give it different inputs and it's obvious who's flying the plane. Separate side-sticks on each side can be manipulated independently and differently, so each side can give different inputs and it's less obvious who is moving it.

But the real issue is about crew resource management, cockpit communication.

BTW, this was a contributing factor to the Air France 447 crash in 2009.
This was a 777.

So, it had yokes, and both pilots were making inputs.
 
According to the article, the 777 has what looks like traditional Boeing controls, but there is a clutch in the link between the two sticks. If the pilots push hard in different directions, they uncouple and then it would work a lot like an Airbus.

At 1600 feet with something going wrong, it is probably hard to look at or think about anything other than the ground.
 
First thoughts tell me there was a lack of communication between the two pilots. I thought the person monitoring had their hands in a specific position and away from the controls? They have their tasks as well with various commands and controls but not the yoke.
 
A 50 pound clutch spring arrangement. Once broke over I'm not sure if the PFC looks at both inputs and selects the median or what. Who know what happens if the FC system is in direct mode. I had read that a 767 would allow the elevator to split function, L elevator follows the captains inputs and the R elevator would follow the F/O commands. Similar scheme on the ailerons. Interesting!
 
According to the article, the 777 has what looks like traditional Boeing controls, but there is a clutch in the link between the two sticks. If the pilots push hard in different directions, they uncouple and then it would work a lot like an Airbus.

At 1600 feet with something going wrong, it is probably hard to look at or think about anything other than the ground.
Eh, not exactly. It’s a bit more subtle.

The Airbus will electronically mix the flight control (stick) inputs. The net command is sent to the flight controls.

It will be symmetrical pitch commands to the elevators, for example.

If the yoke is split (> 75lbs, I think) then each yoke commands the respective elevator on that side. So, you would have, by definition, asymmetric elevator, which will result in a mix or net pitch, but it’s not as clean as the Airbus.

I’m not certain how roll work in that case.

When two stick inputs are made, the flight control system has an aural warning “Dual input” as well as display warning.

No such warning or annunciation exists in the Boeing, though, you would think they would feel the other pilot moving the controls.
 
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No such warning or annunciation exists in the Boeing, though, you would think they would feel the other pilot moving the controls.
That's an interesting question, which never arises when the crew has proper CRM and communication.
 
Good CRM can prevent things from going wrong in the first place. Indeed, this case is an example - nothing in the airplane failed; this incident was caused entirely by poor CRM. And when things do go wrong, good CRM improves the outcome.
 
According to this article both pilots were attempting the landing. I am not a pilot but dont they always say I have control of the plane or something like that, or is that Hollywood?

This sounds similar to an Air France Airbus crash from years ago.

From what I've read, the pilots giving opposite control inputs contributed to the crash of the Air France Airbus that went down in the middle of the Atlantic a number of years ago when the pitot tubes froze over and put the aircraft into a stall and rapid flat descent. I read that at least at that time, the Airbus (A300 I think or A310?) would not respond when getting opposing control stick inputs. It appeard that the co-pilot panicked and was pulling the nose up while the pilot was pushing nose down, which was the correct move to regain lift and controlled fllight.

I would imagine and hope that some of the warnings, as Astro pointed out, came about from lessons learned from that crash. Maybe other fixes were implemented, as well.

(I'm no expert, but am just summarizing the conclusions I had read from several sources. They might not be accurate.)
 
This sounds similar to an Air France Airbus crash from years ago.

From what I've read, the pilots giving opposite control inputs contributed to the crash of the Air France Airbus that went down in the middle of the Atlantic a number of years ago when the pitot tubes froze over and put the aircraft into a stall and rapid flat descent. I read that at least at that time, the Airbus (A300 I think or A310?) would not respond when getting opposing control stick inputs. It appeard that the co-pilot panicked and was pulling the nose up while the pilot was pushing nose down, which was the correct move to regain lift and controlled fllight.

I would imagine and hope that some of the warnings, as Astro pointed out, came about from lessons learned from that crash. Maybe other fixes were implemented, as well.

(I'm no expert, but am just summarizing the conclusions I had read from several sources. They might not be accurate.)
Air France 447 was an A330 and no, the flight control system doesn’t go to neutral, or freeze, with dual inputs, it mixes the input, takes the average, and moves the controls accordingly.

The accident started with an over speed warning, caused by the pitot probes icing up in weather. The over speed warning was false, based on false information.

The FO, who was flying, pulled the throttles to idle and raised the nose in response to the over speed. Naturally, idle thrust and a climb at high altitude resulted in a stall.

I talked more about it, here:

 
This sounds similar to an Air France Airbus crash from years ago.

From what I've read, the pilots giving opposite control inputs contributed to the crash of the Air France Airbus that went down in the middle of the Atlantic a number of years ago when the pitot tubes froze over and put the aircraft into a stall and rapid flat descent. I read that at least at that time, the Airbus (A300 I think or A310?) would not respond when getting opposing control stick inputs. It appeard that the co-pilot panicked and was pulling the nose up while the pilot was pushing nose down, which was the correct move to regain lift and controlled fllight.
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That's essentially correct. Too many cooks in the kitchen. The issue of CRM and communication exists at all levels of aviation from commercial and military complex multi-crew airplanes all the way down a pilot & flight instructor flying a little 2-seater. Do it right and the extra crew is a benefit. Do it wrong and it's a hazard.
 
That's essentially correct. Too many cooks in the kitchen. The issue of CRM and communication exists at all levels of aviation from commercial and military complex multi-crew airplanes all the way down a pilot & flight instructor flying a little 2-seater. Do it right and the extra crew is a benefit. Do it wrong and it's a hazard.
I think it’s quite wrong actually.

Flight control logic is misstated.

The pilot response is oversimplified.

The aircraft failure is ignored.

The human factors are misunderstood.

 
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