Air France 011 April 5, both pilots attempting to fly

[MRC01]

I think it’s quite wrong actually.

Flight control logic is misstated.

The pilot response is oversimplified.

The aircraft failure is ignored.

The human factors are misunderstood.

Air France Flight 447 - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

It's oversimplified and omits several factors, but is essentially right in the sense that crew members were not communicating or coordinating, and unknowingly giving opposing inputs to the aircraft.
The flight control logic may have averaged instead of not responding, but that detail doesn't change the root cause or the net result.

 

[Astro14]

The opposing inputs lasted only a few seconds of a plunge that lasted for minutes.

So, no, that’s even close to accurate.

AF447 is about startle response, failure to identify a problem, loss of SA, inappropriate control inputs, inadequate training.

Dual control inputs had nothing to do with the root cause and made no difference in the outcome.

 

[MRC01]

The opposing inputs lasted only a few seconds of a plunge that lasted for minutes.

So, no, that’s even close to accurate.

AF447 is about startle response, failure to identify a problem, loss of SA, inappropriate control inputs, inadequate training.

Dual control inputs had nothing to do with the root cause and made no difference in the outcome.

I actually agree with most of that. Except your last statement.
Like any accident, they had a chain of mistakes not just one.
They shouldn't have planned the flight through a known thunderstorm.
They should have identified the instrument failures.
They should have given proper control inputs to prevent the stall.
They should have given proper control inputs to recover from the stall.
... etc. ...
However, the dual control inputs was a contributing factor because while they were stalled and descending, one pilot was giving the proper nose-down input on his stick, not aware of the other pilot who was pulling back the other stick. But for that, the proper control input might have recovered from the stall and prevented the crash.

 

[Astro14]

Please read the accident report.

The dual input lasted only a few seconds.

It made no difference.

Even if the relief pilot had held the stick full forward, with no opposing input, it would’ve taken at least 30 seconds to untrim the stabilizer from full nose up to something reasonable. Until the stab got to normal trim, the elevator lacked authority to pitch the nose down.

He only tried it for a few seconds. Not long enough to see success.

Once the airplane hit 10,000 feet, it was doomed. The altitude required to recover from the very low airspeed and fully stalled condition, with stabilizer trim at full nose up, was about 10,000’.

At the time of AF447, I was type-rated and flying the A-320. Same flight control logic. Similar performance. We studied this accident in detail.

We tried it in the simulator. Fully stalled and fully trimmed is a difficult recovery.

 

[MRC01]

...
Even if the relief pilot had held the stick full forward, with no opposing input, it would’ve taken at least 30 seconds to untrim the stabilizer from full nose up to something reasonable. Until the stab got to normal trim, the elevator lacked authority to pitch the nose down.
...

That depends on when the pilot did that. If he recognized the stall when it first happened, as he should have, then he would have had time to recover. It sounds like he didn't realize that until much too late.

...
At the time of AF447, I was type-rated and flying the A-320. Same flight control logic. Similar performance. We studied this accident in detail.
We tried it in the simulator. Fully stalled and fully trimmed is a difficult recovery.

I would call that a "well informed opinion"