Thank you, that answers my curiosity question from earlier.
How quickly can a commercial plane land?
- Thread starter wavinwayne
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Even though they don’t have terminal facilities for a 747, do you know if FWA has all the other requirements (runway mainly)? It’s over 11k’ and the Indiana ANG shares the airport. Just wondering… and I miss the weekend flyovers of the ANG A10s
@Just a civilian pilot - I think that we are using suitable to mean different things -
So, nearest possible when in extremis. Nearest suitable when time permits. Is that how you use the words?
I am adding elements of suitability to the nearest possible definition, and calling it suitable, which is where the differentiation lies.
Point is, to even make it possible, it has to be long enough, you have to have sufficient instrument approach capability for the current weather, you have to be able to clear terrain. All part of possible.
For suitable - it would be nice if it had some other things beyond what makes it possible.
Moreover, I spend most of my time in ETOPS - so, in those cases, suitability has a lot of considerations and what is filed, and what is nearest, are not always the same.
So, when we start talking about places like Narsarsuaq, a 6,000 foot strip in Southern Greenland built for flying boats in WW II, for which I don't have charts - and which has mountains all around - it may be the nearest, but that doesn't always make it possible. 757s have flown in and out of there.
In the daylight? When I can see it? And I know I can miss the mountains? And flames are licking up my backside? I will take that chance.
At night? In the snow? I'm better off continuing on to an airport that allows me to land without hitting mountain. Yes, there is risk on continuing with a real, confirmed, fire.
There is also risk in descending into uncharted terrain.
Aviation is often about managing risk.
So, nearest possible when in extremis. Nearest suitable when time permits. Is that how you use the words?
I am adding elements of suitability to the nearest possible definition, and calling it suitable, which is where the differentiation lies.
Point is, to even make it possible, it has to be long enough, you have to have sufficient instrument approach capability for the current weather, you have to be able to clear terrain. All part of possible.
For suitable - it would be nice if it had some other things beyond what makes it possible.
Moreover, I spend most of my time in ETOPS - so, in those cases, suitability has a lot of considerations and what is filed, and what is nearest, are not always the same.
So, when we start talking about places like Narsarsuaq, a 6,000 foot strip in Southern Greenland built for flying boats in WW II, for which I don't have charts - and which has mountains all around - it may be the nearest, but that doesn't always make it possible. 757s have flown in and out of there.
In the daylight? When I can see it? And I know I can miss the mountains? And flames are licking up my backside? I will take that chance.
At night? In the snow? I'm better off continuing on to an airport that allows me to land without hitting mountain. Yes, there is risk on continuing with a real, confirmed, fire.
There is also risk in descending into uncharted terrain.
Aviation is often about managing risk.
Well - Google tells me that Air Force One landed there, so, sure, it'll handle a 747!Even though they don’t have terminal facilities for a 747, do you know if FWA has all the other requirements (runway mainly)? It’s over 11k’ and the Indiana ANG shares the airport. Just wondering… and I miss the weekend flyovers of the ANG A10s
But I would need the charts to get in there in any other conditions beyond day/VFR.
There's is a second level to these kind of situations that anyone in command of such aircraft never want to ever have to consider, but always have to be intelligent enough to execute. If your aircraft is not going to make it to an airport and you don't have any safe alternative (think Hudson River) you have to minimize deaths on the ground where it's going to go in. Very few have had to face that, but there are a few examples of those that did. The most notable I can recall from a long time ago is a fighter pilot who could of saved himself by ejecting but chose to ride it down to protect buildings occupied by civilians. That was a long time ago, and I barely remember it. I think at the last seconds he had it safely awy from occupied areas and did eject safely.
There was a twin engine passenger jet that lost both engines while low and climbing out from Allegheny county airport several years ago and the two experiences pilots did a hard belly landing without hitting occupied structures. It's thought they survived the landing but we're so badly hurt that they were unable to get out of the burning plane. A terable way to go, that says a lot about the quality of those men. They had little unoccupied space to chose from, but managed to not harm anyone on the ground.
Flying tons of fuel at hundreds of knots of speed is a heavy responsibility.
They have to know every thing possible to safely bring all souls on board back down safely. But they also are responsible for the souls on the ground.
There was a twin engine passenger jet that lost both engines while low and climbing out from Allegheny county airport several years ago and the two experiences pilots did a hard belly landing without hitting occupied structures. It's thought they survived the landing but we're so badly hurt that they were unable to get out of the burning plane. A terable way to go, that says a lot about the quality of those men. They had little unoccupied space to chose from, but managed to not harm anyone on the ground.
Flying tons of fuel at hundreds of knots of speed is a heavy responsibility.
They have to know every thing possible to safely bring all souls on board back down safely. But they also are responsible for the souls on the ground.
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This is what I said in my post, which wasn't refuting what you stated previously:
"Obviously certain other factors have to be taken into consideration before you just head for the closest airport ( runway needs to be long enough, is the weather good enough to get in , etc )". I think that covers that stuff. I included "Etc"
And this :
LAND ASAP DEFINITION according to Airbus:
If red LAND ASAP is part of the procedure, land as soon as possible at the nearest airport at
which a safe landing can be made.
Note: Red LAND ASAP information is applicable to a time-critical situation.
If amber LAND ASAP is part of the procedure, consider landing at the nearest suitable airport.
Note: "Suitable" means an airport that is deemed suitable in the judgement of the captain.
If the airport meets those criteria, it's suitable. If it's suitable it's safe.
How a pilot determines what is suitable, depends on judgment and experience ( situational awareness also...know the route/terrain/airports en route ).
Obviously, if I am flying on any route, I have already familiarized myself with ALL the close airports along my route of flight ( I have a sheet in my flight bag as a refresher ...runway length, types of approaches, PAPI/No PAPI ) and I would already know what the en route terrain is like due to situational awareness ( ATC or IFR approach plates also ). If I am flying in the U.S or Canada, I know I can trust ATC to assist me diverting to a suitable airport that is the closest ( they know their airspace ). I enter those airports on my IPAD which has the route I am flying.
When I am flying , I select the "closest airports " page on the FMS ( can show up to 6 at a time...automatically updates the closest as the flight continues ). I already checked the en route weather for those airports before departure , so , as the flight approaches these airports, I already know where I would go if I had a time critical emergency. I already know whats suitable, and closest, in case of an emergency. Sounds like lots of work but I have been doing it like this for so long its easy and quick to be honest.
Obviously, if I am flying down to the Caribbean, the closest suitable airport might be 1 hour away ( consider ditching in extreme fire cases ).
My point with respect to the topic was, a pilot could get the aircraft down on a runway ( best case scenario: weather, runway, suitable airport ) from 35,000, safely, in 12 minutes if they had to in a worst case scenario.
Not getting the aircraft down fast enough has proven to be fatal at times. Taking too long to land can be dangerous at times.
Here’s what my iPad shows if flying from Montreal to Punta Cana, Dominican Republic.
I know all those airports by heart in case I have to divert ( and I check the weather for all before I take off. If any are unsuitable due to weather, I mention it to the FO before take off )
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Here is an example of rushing and making bad decisions. Its relevant to the discussion.
The crew received an avionics smoke warning after take off.
The first bad decision was not realizing Airbus says to ignore any avionics smoke warnings unless the pilots actually see or smell smoke ( Airbus considers the pilots senses more accurate ). Too many Airbus pilots don’t know this.
It’s important to fully understand the smoke procedures for your aircraft.
A A320 from New Orleans with 104 passengers and 5 crew, was in the initial climb when the crew reported smoke in the cockpit, levelled off at 5000 feet and returned to New Orleans. The crew reported before joining downwind that they had lost all instruments and requested to be talked down by ATC via Precision Approach Radar (PAR). The crew descended to 600 feet where they got visual contact with the water of Lake Pontchartrain and continued visually for a landing on runway 19 about 10 minutes after departure. During landing the aircraft blew both right hand main gear tyres, went left off the runway, stopped with all gear just off the paved surface north of the intersection with runway 10/28, and was evacuated via slides.
A number of passengers needed medical attention due to smoke inhalation.
Post landing photos showed the RAM Air Turbine (RAT) deployed. Runway 01/19 was closed for about 10 hours.
The crew told passengers that they had lost all electronics and were flying on minimal backup systems, landing would occur overweight with minimal braking and minimal steering ability.
At the time of the emergency runway 10/28 at New Orleans was not available and was closed. Frantic attempts by tower to get the runway clear during the emergency proved unsuccessful, the runway was cleared and opened about 10 minutes after UA-497 had landed.
The NTSB reported on Apr 4th that the crew received automated warnings and observed smoke in the cockpit while climbing through 4000 feet, subsequently they reported the loss of primary instruments. Upon landing they experienced the loss of anti-skid and nose wheel steering and went off the left side of the runway about 2000 feet down the runway. The right forward slide did not inflate. The NTSB have opened an investigation.
On Apr 6th the NTSB reported the airplane went off the left side of the runway about 2000 feet before the runway end after the aircraft experienced electrical problems and smoke in the cockpit.
On Apr 7th the NTSB said the crew recalled receiving an auto-throttle related ECAM message while climbing through 4000 feet shortly followed by an avionics smoke warning with the instruction to land. Despite this message neither crew recalled smelling smoke or fumes during the flight. The captain worked the electronic checklist for the avionics smoke warning, which included shutting down some of the electrical systems. The first officer's display screens went blank, the ECAM messages disappeared, the cockpit to cabin intercom stopped functioning and the air driven generator (RAT) deployed. The captain took control of the aircraft and managed the radios while the first officer opened the cockpit door to advise flight attendants. The crew requested runway 10 but was advised runway 10 was unavailable due to construction vehicles on the runway. The captain was able to use airspeed, altimeter and attitude information during the return to the airport and ordered an evacuation after landing. Cabin crew did not smell smoke or fumes nor did they observe haze, but noticed the cabin lights were turned off and the intercom ceased functioning. Cockpit Voice and Flight Data recorders were downloaded, they both stopped recording prior to landing.
Following the landing ATIS announced a disabled aircraft 300 feet northeast of the threshold runway 28 (editorial note: putting it 2000 feet before the runway end, also observe the 2000 feet distance marker in the picture below, rather than 2000 feet down the runway).
Some time in the past the NTSB released their final report concluding the probable cause of the accident was:
the captain's failure to properly recognize and manage the abnormal condition, resulting in it escalating to an in-flight emergency.
The NTSB described the sequence of events:
The first officer (FO, 51, ATPL, 11,500 hours total, 1,154 hours on type) was the pilot flying for the flight and the captain (50, ATPL, 15,000 hours total, 1,487 hours on type) was the pilot monitoring. According to flight crew statements and recorded data, the incident flight takeoff began at 0708. At about 0710:10, the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recorded the captain began the after takeoff checklist and stated, "…wait a minute what do we got here." The captain then states, "okay ECAM I got the uh—uh you got the jet. I got this." The CVR then records the captain beginning the Avionics Smoke ECAM checklist procedure.
The FO stated that about that time he became aware of an "avionics smoke" warning electronic centralized aircraft monitoring (ECAM) message and the captain stated that he noticed a "yellow" autothrust ECAM message. The FO reported he pushed the autothrust (ATHR) button on the mode control panel (MCP), but this did not succeed in re-engaging the autothrust. The captain said the autothrust message was followed by a red "LAND ASAP" ECAM message accompanied by the electrical page synoptic display and the "AVIONICS SMOKE" ECAM procedure.
The FO leveled the aircraft at 5,000 feet in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) and retarded the thrust levers to slow the aircraft. The captain stated that the first item on the avionics smoke ECAM procedure was to don oxygen masks, but that he and the FO agreed not to don the masks because there was no smell of smoke. The captain did not recall seeing any conditional statements or a timer in the ECAM procedure.
At about 0711:22, the captain stated "line one off" followed by "okay emergency electrical power man on when uh emergency generator available. gen two off." Concurrent with the second generator being switched off, the flight data recorder stopped recording and there was about a six second power interruption of the CVR. When the CVR resumed recording, the captain is discussing the ram air turbine (RAT) and that the airplane is in emergency electrical configuration. The FO then lost his flight instrument displays and began using the captain's primary flight display for altitude, heading and airspeed. A short time later, the captain took control of the airplane.
The FO said that once the captain had taken control of the airplane, he stated that he thought they were in the emergency electrical configuration but he didn't know what the ECAM steps were for that configuration. He said he did not follow up on the ECAM actions, and he did not use the Quick Reference Checklist (QRC) while in flight.
The first officer then tried to alert the flight attendants (FA), but he said he "did not hear the bell" when he called and the FAs did not respond. He used the pedestal handset to call the FA's, but he got no response. He then opened the cockpit door and told the FAs that they were in an emergency and would be landing immediately.
The pilots both stated in interviews that they did not conduct an approach briefing, tune the navigation radios, enter an approach in the FMGC, check the ECAM status page, use the flight manual to determine what systems were affected or lost, conduct an approach descent checklist, conduct an overweight landing checklist, determine the applicable approach speed or landing distance from the FMGC or flight manual, or attempt to repower the electrical system. The captain later said that there was no time to do these things because of the severity of the emergency.
The captain said he knew he would be in direct law with no antiskid or nose wheel steering, but he did not recall telling the first officer this. He estimated that the approach speed should be 160 knots, based on the takeoff V2 of 147 knots, rounded up for wind additive. He said that normal landing distance was 3,500 to 4,000 feet and was confident the airplane would stop on the runway. Both pilots stated that they wanted to keep the approach speed above 140 knots in order to avoid stalling the ram air turbine (RAT).
The captain told ATC that they would need a vector back to the airport and requested "the longest runway." ATC advised that runway 10, which was 10,104 feet long, was still closed due to the equipment on the runway, but that airport personnel were attempting to clear the runway. At about 07:16:03, as the flightcrew lowered the landing gear, the CVR stopped recording.
The captain stated that he could hear the tower on the radio talking to the operations personnel working on runway 10 and he realized that they would not be able to clear that runway in time for the flight to land. The captain then told ATC "we've lost all our instruments, we need a PAR." The captain stated during his interview that he had attitude and compass information but no localizer, and that the screens started to fade during the approach. ATC told the flight that they would provide a no-gyro surveillance approach. The captain did not advise the FO as he continued the descent through the cleared altitude of 2000 feet.
The FO stated that he did not recall if they were cleared to descend out of 2000 feet. According to the ATC recording, the crew reported they "we're at 1000 feet now and we've got water contact, where are we from the airport?" The controller replied that he was at 330 degrees from the airport and said on their present heading they would be "set up for the shoreline 19." After some additional communication with ATC, the captain said "I've got it" and the controller replied "wind 180 at 16 gusts to 20, cleared to land." The captain stated that he landed with full flaps and used the PAPI for vertical guidance.
The captain stated that he landed on the centerline, approximately 1,500 feet down the runway. He also state that he "got on the brakes," used full reverse, and used right rudder to keep the airplane in the center of the runway. The FO stated that on touchdown the cockpit door swung open and that he turned and shouted "remain seated, remain seated." He said that when the engines came out of reverse the captain went to the tiller but the aircraft pulled to the left. The captain had said "I can't control it," and "we're going to evacuate." The airplane continued to veer to the left and the captain indicated he stepped harder on the right brake pedal. The airplane departed the left side of runway 19 approximately 5000 feet from the threshold at a low speed, and the nose gear sank into the soft groundoff the side of the runway.
Once the aircraft came to a stop, the flightcrew used the QRC to conduct the evacuation. The captain set off the evacuation signal and the first officer then silenced it. The first officer said the 1R slide did not inflate and he yelled "go the other way." He went down the 1L slide and began helping the passengers get away from the airplane. The captain came out a few minutes later with a megaphone, which he used to direct the passengers away from the aircraft.
The NTSB analysed:
According to flight data recorder (FDR) data, the Avionics Smoke warning was active at the time the recording began. Since the caution was inactive at power up, it was most likely caused from contaminants detected before the airplane was powered up. Based on this, when the crew arrived at the airplane, they should have had three primary cues alerting them of an Avionics Smoke event, including: a master caution light illuminated amber; an amber AVIONICS SMOKE warning on the upper Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor (ECAM); and Blower and Extract fault lights and Gen 1 Line smoke light illuminated amber on the overhead panel. In addition, when they viewed the status page of the ECAM (as required per the captain's Cockpit Preparation checklist), VENT BLOWER and VENT EXTRACT would have been listed under inoperative systems. It is unlikely that airline personnel would have cleared or canceled this warning without communicating this information with the crew, and the crew stated that they did not cancel the warning. Had the warning been inadvertently cleared or cancelled, the overhead panel lights would have remained illuminated and vent blower and vent extract would have remained inoperative systems. Because the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) did not contain any discussion related to any Avionics Smoke event while on the ground, or after takeoff prior to about 1500 feet (during which time both crewmembers responded with surprise), it is unlikely that the crew had previously seen the warning but purposefully ignored the available cues. It is also possible that the crew did not see the cockpit indications since the captain did not complete at least one step of his cockpit preparation checklist–pushing the recorder ground control switch. Because of this, the CVR and FDR did not begin until the time that the APU started, when it should have started much sooner in the sequence of preflight events. So, the investigation was not able to determine whether the crew completed other checklist items that should have alerted them to the Avionics Smoke warning. Finally, investigators were unable to find any condition in which the caution could be recorded on the FDR but not displayed to the crew. Therefore, although the incident flight crew was not aware of the Avionics Smoke event prior to takeoff, investigators could not determine the reason for this.
At 7:10:08.7, the captain began the after takeoff checklist. Item 3 of that checklist is "ECAM memo…checked." When completing this step, the captain detected the Avionics Smoke event on the upper ECAM. Primary cues available were the Avionics Smoke procedure and an amber LAND ASAP message. Although the crew were surprised when they noticed the alert message, there was no corresponding master caution aural warning during this time, which confirms that the Avionics Smoke alert had been active prior to takeoff. The captain then delegated crew duties, assigning the first officer as the pilot flying and indicated that he would complete the ECAM. At 07:10:30.8, the captain began the Avionics Smoke ECAM procedure and stated, "perceptible smoke", referring to the first conditional statement of the procedure "if perceptible smoke". Airbus stated that completion of the Avionics Smoke procedure is dependent on "direct detection by the crew [and] secondary detection by a detector which is considered as a help." Detection by crew can be by sight or smell. According to the procedure, "If perceptible smoke" is a conditional statement and if the crew did not detect smoke, they were not to continue the procedure. After the incident the first officer stated that if Avionics Smoke was detected by the sensor, then there was Avionics Smoke and he was not going to question that.
About 38 seconds after the flight crew became aware of the Avionics Smoke warning, the captain stated, "hey you lost your autopilot too." The FDR indicated that the crew received an autothrust message. CVR data suggests that the captain became very apprehensive about the situation. The flight crew concluded that the failure of the autopilot meant that their situation was deteriorating and they needed to land the airplane promptly. Likely adding to the captain's apprehension was the LAND ASAP [i.e. as soon as possible] message displayed on the ECAM. Although an amber LAND ASAP message was presented, discussions with instructors and pilots indicated that, to a pilot, land ASAP means land ASAP, regardless of color. After the incident, the captain stated that during his last proficiency training session, in-flight fires were emphasized. Specifically, pilots were told that delaying landing by a few minutes could be the difference between a successful landing and loss of an aircraft, such as Swissair [flight 111, that occurred September 2, 1998] and Valujet [flight 592, that occurred May 11, 1996]. The captain said, "he did not want this to be the next Valujet."
The captain continued with the Avionics Smoke procedure but did not do so with the necessary thoughtfulness and made several missed steps. For example, the procedure states action item "EMER ELEC PWR…MAN ON" followed by the conditional statement "WHEN EMER GEN AVAIL:" and action item "GEN 2…OFF". In this instance, the captain should have turned on the emergency electrical power (i.e., deployed the RAT13), and then when emergency generator power was available turned off generator 2. Data show that the captain did not manually deploy the RAT prior to turning off generator 2. As a result, when generator 2 was turned off prematurely, there was a brief disruption in the power supply and the airplane entered the emergency electrical configuration. The EMER ELEC procedure and a red LAND ASAP message appeared on the ECAM. This configuration caused the RAT to automatically deploy which restored electrical power to the airplane after about 6 seconds. The airplane remained in the emergency electrical configuration. Therefore, the captain became apprehensive about the Avionics Smoke event and hastily performed the ECAM procedure resulting in the airplane entering the emergency electrical configuration.
At 7:12:51.5, the first officer alerted the captain that he had no instruments. Two seconds later the captain took control of the airplane and told the first officer to call the flight attendants. The flight crew did not adequately transfer control of the airplane – the first officer did not brief the captain on the status of the airplane and the captain did not brief the status of the emergency procedures. Over the next two and a half minutes the crew focused primarily on contacting the flight attendants and did not discuss completing the EMER ELEC procedure. About 30 seconds later, the flight crew lowered the landing gear without restoring power to the airplane, per the EMER ELEC procedure, and the airplane began operating on battery power. As a result, the CVR recording ended and no further communications in the cockpit were available with the exception of ATC communications. Completion of the EMER ELEC procedure would have restored power to generators 1 and 2 prior to landing gear extension and maintained electrical power to the airplane. After the incident, the captain said when they lowered the landing gear, operating on battery power was not on his mind.
After touchdown, reverser 2 did not deploy, and the airplane veered to the left and exited the runway. The flight crew was not aware that reverser 2 was an inoperative system based on the electrical configuration of the airplane. Had the first officer checked the ECAM status per the Approach Descent Checklist, the inoperative system would have been identified. However, this was not completed likely due to the time constraints. After landing, engine status cues would have alerted the first officer that reverser 2 did not deploy and he should have informed the captain. While it is unknown if the first officer monitored engine status and made the required reverser call out after landing, staff believes it is unlikely because the captain stated in a post incident interview that the airplane departed the runway because of a crosswind. Therefore, the flight crew became distracted by the emergency and focused on landing the airplane without completing necessary checklist items, resulting in the airplane operating on battery power and partial loss of reverse thrust on landing.
It is the captain's responsibility as a leader to set the tone in the cockpit for the entire flight, and this is even more critical when a crew is faced with an abnormal situation. CVR data suggests the tone in the cockpit was very casual. For example, prior to performing the before takeoff checklist, the first officer asks the captain "ready to read em and weep?" And just before takeoff, the first officer stated, "let's get…outta here man." The captain then stated "Brakes released. You got it man. Throttles yours. Whatever you want to do." The casual tone in the cockpit during preflight activities and the taxi did not support the creation of a functional team environment conducive to the crew's subsequent attempts to resolve the abnormal situation. This was manifested in the crew's undisciplined management of the situation in that they failed to adequately assess and understand the situation they were presented with. For example, as the captain completed the after takeoff checklist, he noticed the Avionics Smoke warning on the ECAM; however he failed to announce what the warning was. Instead, he delegated the first officer to fly the airplane and stated he would complete the ECAM. There was no discussion between crewmembers about the situation they were faced with. It is not clear if the first officer was aware of what the warning on the ECAM was. Once the airplane entered the emergency electrical configuration, the captain stopped managing the emergency and the crew's coordination deteriorated further. After the captain stated they were in emergency electrical configuration, the first officer stated "yup confirm. Let's go back." Had the captain been properly managing the abnormal, and now emergency, situation, he should have made the decision to return to the airport rather than the first officer making that decision. In addition, the captain abandoned the EMER ELEC procedure and his pilot monitoring duties. He made radio calls to ATC requesting vectors back to the airport and declaring an emergency. Upon recognizing that the first officer did not have any instruments, the captain assumed control of the airplane. At no point did he delegate the first officer to complete the EMER ELEC procedure but only to inform the flight attendants of the emergency. Completing the EMER ELEC procedure would have resulted in power restoration prior to lowering the landing gear and maintained full use of reverse thrust on landing. After the incident, the first officer stated he did not feel that he had time to be aware of the captain's actions when acting as the pilot flying and said he "took for granted" that the captain completed the ECAM procedure. Finally, during the transfer of flight duties from the first officer to the captain, the first officer stated, "I got the radios", however, subsequent radio communications were made by both crewmembers. Therefore, the captain's failure to set the tone in the cockpit and ineffective management of the emergency resulted in neither crewmember fully understanding the situation they were faced with and subsequent escalation of an abnormal situation to an emergency.
The crew received an avionics smoke warning after take off.
The first bad decision was not realizing Airbus says to ignore any avionics smoke warnings unless the pilots actually see or smell smoke ( Airbus considers the pilots senses more accurate ). Too many Airbus pilots don’t know this.
It’s important to fully understand the smoke procedures for your aircraft.
A A320 from New Orleans with 104 passengers and 5 crew, was in the initial climb when the crew reported smoke in the cockpit, levelled off at 5000 feet and returned to New Orleans. The crew reported before joining downwind that they had lost all instruments and requested to be talked down by ATC via Precision Approach Radar (PAR). The crew descended to 600 feet where they got visual contact with the water of Lake Pontchartrain and continued visually for a landing on runway 19 about 10 minutes after departure. During landing the aircraft blew both right hand main gear tyres, went left off the runway, stopped with all gear just off the paved surface north of the intersection with runway 10/28, and was evacuated via slides.
A number of passengers needed medical attention due to smoke inhalation.
Post landing photos showed the RAM Air Turbine (RAT) deployed. Runway 01/19 was closed for about 10 hours.
The crew told passengers that they had lost all electronics and were flying on minimal backup systems, landing would occur overweight with minimal braking and minimal steering ability.
At the time of the emergency runway 10/28 at New Orleans was not available and was closed. Frantic attempts by tower to get the runway clear during the emergency proved unsuccessful, the runway was cleared and opened about 10 minutes after UA-497 had landed.
The NTSB reported on Apr 4th that the crew received automated warnings and observed smoke in the cockpit while climbing through 4000 feet, subsequently they reported the loss of primary instruments. Upon landing they experienced the loss of anti-skid and nose wheel steering and went off the left side of the runway about 2000 feet down the runway. The right forward slide did not inflate. The NTSB have opened an investigation.
On Apr 6th the NTSB reported the airplane went off the left side of the runway about 2000 feet before the runway end after the aircraft experienced electrical problems and smoke in the cockpit.
On Apr 7th the NTSB said the crew recalled receiving an auto-throttle related ECAM message while climbing through 4000 feet shortly followed by an avionics smoke warning with the instruction to land. Despite this message neither crew recalled smelling smoke or fumes during the flight. The captain worked the electronic checklist for the avionics smoke warning, which included shutting down some of the electrical systems. The first officer's display screens went blank, the ECAM messages disappeared, the cockpit to cabin intercom stopped functioning and the air driven generator (RAT) deployed. The captain took control of the aircraft and managed the radios while the first officer opened the cockpit door to advise flight attendants. The crew requested runway 10 but was advised runway 10 was unavailable due to construction vehicles on the runway. The captain was able to use airspeed, altimeter and attitude information during the return to the airport and ordered an evacuation after landing. Cabin crew did not smell smoke or fumes nor did they observe haze, but noticed the cabin lights were turned off and the intercom ceased functioning. Cockpit Voice and Flight Data recorders were downloaded, they both stopped recording prior to landing.
Following the landing ATIS announced a disabled aircraft 300 feet northeast of the threshold runway 28 (editorial note: putting it 2000 feet before the runway end, also observe the 2000 feet distance marker in the picture below, rather than 2000 feet down the runway).
Some time in the past the NTSB released their final report concluding the probable cause of the accident was:
the captain's failure to properly recognize and manage the abnormal condition, resulting in it escalating to an in-flight emergency.
The NTSB described the sequence of events:
The first officer (FO, 51, ATPL, 11,500 hours total, 1,154 hours on type) was the pilot flying for the flight and the captain (50, ATPL, 15,000 hours total, 1,487 hours on type) was the pilot monitoring. According to flight crew statements and recorded data, the incident flight takeoff began at 0708. At about 0710:10, the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recorded the captain began the after takeoff checklist and stated, "…wait a minute what do we got here." The captain then states, "okay ECAM I got the uh—uh you got the jet. I got this." The CVR then records the captain beginning the Avionics Smoke ECAM checklist procedure.
The FO stated that about that time he became aware of an "avionics smoke" warning electronic centralized aircraft monitoring (ECAM) message and the captain stated that he noticed a "yellow" autothrust ECAM message. The FO reported he pushed the autothrust (ATHR) button on the mode control panel (MCP), but this did not succeed in re-engaging the autothrust. The captain said the autothrust message was followed by a red "LAND ASAP" ECAM message accompanied by the electrical page synoptic display and the "AVIONICS SMOKE" ECAM procedure.
The FO leveled the aircraft at 5,000 feet in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) and retarded the thrust levers to slow the aircraft. The captain stated that the first item on the avionics smoke ECAM procedure was to don oxygen masks, but that he and the FO agreed not to don the masks because there was no smell of smoke. The captain did not recall seeing any conditional statements or a timer in the ECAM procedure.
At about 0711:22, the captain stated "line one off" followed by "okay emergency electrical power man on when uh emergency generator available. gen two off." Concurrent with the second generator being switched off, the flight data recorder stopped recording and there was about a six second power interruption of the CVR. When the CVR resumed recording, the captain is discussing the ram air turbine (RAT) and that the airplane is in emergency electrical configuration. The FO then lost his flight instrument displays and began using the captain's primary flight display for altitude, heading and airspeed. A short time later, the captain took control of the airplane.
The FO said that once the captain had taken control of the airplane, he stated that he thought they were in the emergency electrical configuration but he didn't know what the ECAM steps were for that configuration. He said he did not follow up on the ECAM actions, and he did not use the Quick Reference Checklist (QRC) while in flight.
The first officer then tried to alert the flight attendants (FA), but he said he "did not hear the bell" when he called and the FAs did not respond. He used the pedestal handset to call the FA's, but he got no response. He then opened the cockpit door and told the FAs that they were in an emergency and would be landing immediately.
The pilots both stated in interviews that they did not conduct an approach briefing, tune the navigation radios, enter an approach in the FMGC, check the ECAM status page, use the flight manual to determine what systems were affected or lost, conduct an approach descent checklist, conduct an overweight landing checklist, determine the applicable approach speed or landing distance from the FMGC or flight manual, or attempt to repower the electrical system. The captain later said that there was no time to do these things because of the severity of the emergency.
The captain said he knew he would be in direct law with no antiskid or nose wheel steering, but he did not recall telling the first officer this. He estimated that the approach speed should be 160 knots, based on the takeoff V2 of 147 knots, rounded up for wind additive. He said that normal landing distance was 3,500 to 4,000 feet and was confident the airplane would stop on the runway. Both pilots stated that they wanted to keep the approach speed above 140 knots in order to avoid stalling the ram air turbine (RAT).
The captain told ATC that they would need a vector back to the airport and requested "the longest runway." ATC advised that runway 10, which was 10,104 feet long, was still closed due to the equipment on the runway, but that airport personnel were attempting to clear the runway. At about 07:16:03, as the flightcrew lowered the landing gear, the CVR stopped recording.
The captain stated that he could hear the tower on the radio talking to the operations personnel working on runway 10 and he realized that they would not be able to clear that runway in time for the flight to land. The captain then told ATC "we've lost all our instruments, we need a PAR." The captain stated during his interview that he had attitude and compass information but no localizer, and that the screens started to fade during the approach. ATC told the flight that they would provide a no-gyro surveillance approach. The captain did not advise the FO as he continued the descent through the cleared altitude of 2000 feet.
The FO stated that he did not recall if they were cleared to descend out of 2000 feet. According to the ATC recording, the crew reported they "we're at 1000 feet now and we've got water contact, where are we from the airport?" The controller replied that he was at 330 degrees from the airport and said on their present heading they would be "set up for the shoreline 19." After some additional communication with ATC, the captain said "I've got it" and the controller replied "wind 180 at 16 gusts to 20, cleared to land." The captain stated that he landed with full flaps and used the PAPI for vertical guidance.
The captain stated that he landed on the centerline, approximately 1,500 feet down the runway. He also state that he "got on the brakes," used full reverse, and used right rudder to keep the airplane in the center of the runway. The FO stated that on touchdown the cockpit door swung open and that he turned and shouted "remain seated, remain seated." He said that when the engines came out of reverse the captain went to the tiller but the aircraft pulled to the left. The captain had said "I can't control it," and "we're going to evacuate." The airplane continued to veer to the left and the captain indicated he stepped harder on the right brake pedal. The airplane departed the left side of runway 19 approximately 5000 feet from the threshold at a low speed, and the nose gear sank into the soft groundoff the side of the runway.
Once the aircraft came to a stop, the flightcrew used the QRC to conduct the evacuation. The captain set off the evacuation signal and the first officer then silenced it. The first officer said the 1R slide did not inflate and he yelled "go the other way." He went down the 1L slide and began helping the passengers get away from the airplane. The captain came out a few minutes later with a megaphone, which he used to direct the passengers away from the aircraft.
The NTSB analysed:
According to flight data recorder (FDR) data, the Avionics Smoke warning was active at the time the recording began. Since the caution was inactive at power up, it was most likely caused from contaminants detected before the airplane was powered up. Based on this, when the crew arrived at the airplane, they should have had three primary cues alerting them of an Avionics Smoke event, including: a master caution light illuminated amber; an amber AVIONICS SMOKE warning on the upper Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor (ECAM); and Blower and Extract fault lights and Gen 1 Line smoke light illuminated amber on the overhead panel. In addition, when they viewed the status page of the ECAM (as required per the captain's Cockpit Preparation checklist), VENT BLOWER and VENT EXTRACT would have been listed under inoperative systems. It is unlikely that airline personnel would have cleared or canceled this warning without communicating this information with the crew, and the crew stated that they did not cancel the warning. Had the warning been inadvertently cleared or cancelled, the overhead panel lights would have remained illuminated and vent blower and vent extract would have remained inoperative systems. Because the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) did not contain any discussion related to any Avionics Smoke event while on the ground, or after takeoff prior to about 1500 feet (during which time both crewmembers responded with surprise), it is unlikely that the crew had previously seen the warning but purposefully ignored the available cues. It is also possible that the crew did not see the cockpit indications since the captain did not complete at least one step of his cockpit preparation checklist–pushing the recorder ground control switch. Because of this, the CVR and FDR did not begin until the time that the APU started, when it should have started much sooner in the sequence of preflight events. So, the investigation was not able to determine whether the crew completed other checklist items that should have alerted them to the Avionics Smoke warning. Finally, investigators were unable to find any condition in which the caution could be recorded on the FDR but not displayed to the crew. Therefore, although the incident flight crew was not aware of the Avionics Smoke event prior to takeoff, investigators could not determine the reason for this.
At 7:10:08.7, the captain began the after takeoff checklist. Item 3 of that checklist is "ECAM memo…checked." When completing this step, the captain detected the Avionics Smoke event on the upper ECAM. Primary cues available were the Avionics Smoke procedure and an amber LAND ASAP message. Although the crew were surprised when they noticed the alert message, there was no corresponding master caution aural warning during this time, which confirms that the Avionics Smoke alert had been active prior to takeoff. The captain then delegated crew duties, assigning the first officer as the pilot flying and indicated that he would complete the ECAM. At 07:10:30.8, the captain began the Avionics Smoke ECAM procedure and stated, "perceptible smoke", referring to the first conditional statement of the procedure "if perceptible smoke". Airbus stated that completion of the Avionics Smoke procedure is dependent on "direct detection by the crew [and] secondary detection by a detector which is considered as a help." Detection by crew can be by sight or smell. According to the procedure, "If perceptible smoke" is a conditional statement and if the crew did not detect smoke, they were not to continue the procedure. After the incident the first officer stated that if Avionics Smoke was detected by the sensor, then there was Avionics Smoke and he was not going to question that.
About 38 seconds after the flight crew became aware of the Avionics Smoke warning, the captain stated, "hey you lost your autopilot too." The FDR indicated that the crew received an autothrust message. CVR data suggests that the captain became very apprehensive about the situation. The flight crew concluded that the failure of the autopilot meant that their situation was deteriorating and they needed to land the airplane promptly. Likely adding to the captain's apprehension was the LAND ASAP [i.e. as soon as possible] message displayed on the ECAM. Although an amber LAND ASAP message was presented, discussions with instructors and pilots indicated that, to a pilot, land ASAP means land ASAP, regardless of color. After the incident, the captain stated that during his last proficiency training session, in-flight fires were emphasized. Specifically, pilots were told that delaying landing by a few minutes could be the difference between a successful landing and loss of an aircraft, such as Swissair [flight 111, that occurred September 2, 1998] and Valujet [flight 592, that occurred May 11, 1996]. The captain said, "he did not want this to be the next Valujet."
The captain continued with the Avionics Smoke procedure but did not do so with the necessary thoughtfulness and made several missed steps. For example, the procedure states action item "EMER ELEC PWR…MAN ON" followed by the conditional statement "WHEN EMER GEN AVAIL:" and action item "GEN 2…OFF". In this instance, the captain should have turned on the emergency electrical power (i.e., deployed the RAT13), and then when emergency generator power was available turned off generator 2. Data show that the captain did not manually deploy the RAT prior to turning off generator 2. As a result, when generator 2 was turned off prematurely, there was a brief disruption in the power supply and the airplane entered the emergency electrical configuration. The EMER ELEC procedure and a red LAND ASAP message appeared on the ECAM. This configuration caused the RAT to automatically deploy which restored electrical power to the airplane after about 6 seconds. The airplane remained in the emergency electrical configuration. Therefore, the captain became apprehensive about the Avionics Smoke event and hastily performed the ECAM procedure resulting in the airplane entering the emergency electrical configuration.
At 7:12:51.5, the first officer alerted the captain that he had no instruments. Two seconds later the captain took control of the airplane and told the first officer to call the flight attendants. The flight crew did not adequately transfer control of the airplane – the first officer did not brief the captain on the status of the airplane and the captain did not brief the status of the emergency procedures. Over the next two and a half minutes the crew focused primarily on contacting the flight attendants and did not discuss completing the EMER ELEC procedure. About 30 seconds later, the flight crew lowered the landing gear without restoring power to the airplane, per the EMER ELEC procedure, and the airplane began operating on battery power. As a result, the CVR recording ended and no further communications in the cockpit were available with the exception of ATC communications. Completion of the EMER ELEC procedure would have restored power to generators 1 and 2 prior to landing gear extension and maintained electrical power to the airplane. After the incident, the captain said when they lowered the landing gear, operating on battery power was not on his mind.
After touchdown, reverser 2 did not deploy, and the airplane veered to the left and exited the runway. The flight crew was not aware that reverser 2 was an inoperative system based on the electrical configuration of the airplane. Had the first officer checked the ECAM status per the Approach Descent Checklist, the inoperative system would have been identified. However, this was not completed likely due to the time constraints. After landing, engine status cues would have alerted the first officer that reverser 2 did not deploy and he should have informed the captain. While it is unknown if the first officer monitored engine status and made the required reverser call out after landing, staff believes it is unlikely because the captain stated in a post incident interview that the airplane departed the runway because of a crosswind. Therefore, the flight crew became distracted by the emergency and focused on landing the airplane without completing necessary checklist items, resulting in the airplane operating on battery power and partial loss of reverse thrust on landing.
It is the captain's responsibility as a leader to set the tone in the cockpit for the entire flight, and this is even more critical when a crew is faced with an abnormal situation. CVR data suggests the tone in the cockpit was very casual. For example, prior to performing the before takeoff checklist, the first officer asks the captain "ready to read em and weep?" And just before takeoff, the first officer stated, "let's get…outta here man." The captain then stated "Brakes released. You got it man. Throttles yours. Whatever you want to do." The casual tone in the cockpit during preflight activities and the taxi did not support the creation of a functional team environment conducive to the crew's subsequent attempts to resolve the abnormal situation. This was manifested in the crew's undisciplined management of the situation in that they failed to adequately assess and understand the situation they were presented with. For example, as the captain completed the after takeoff checklist, he noticed the Avionics Smoke warning on the ECAM; however he failed to announce what the warning was. Instead, he delegated the first officer to fly the airplane and stated he would complete the ECAM. There was no discussion between crewmembers about the situation they were faced with. It is not clear if the first officer was aware of what the warning on the ECAM was. Once the airplane entered the emergency electrical configuration, the captain stopped managing the emergency and the crew's coordination deteriorated further. After the captain stated they were in emergency electrical configuration, the first officer stated "yup confirm. Let's go back." Had the captain been properly managing the abnormal, and now emergency, situation, he should have made the decision to return to the airport rather than the first officer making that decision. In addition, the captain abandoned the EMER ELEC procedure and his pilot monitoring duties. He made radio calls to ATC requesting vectors back to the airport and declaring an emergency. Upon recognizing that the first officer did not have any instruments, the captain assumed control of the airplane. At no point did he delegate the first officer to complete the EMER ELEC procedure but only to inform the flight attendants of the emergency. Completing the EMER ELEC procedure would have resulted in power restoration prior to lowering the landing gear and maintained full use of reverse thrust on landing. After the incident, the first officer stated he did not feel that he had time to be aware of the captain's actions when acting as the pilot flying and said he "took for granted" that the captain completed the ECAM procedure. Finally, during the transfer of flight duties from the first officer to the captain, the first officer stated, "I got the radios", however, subsequent radio communications were made by both crewmembers. Therefore, the captain's failure to set the tone in the cockpit and ineffective management of the emergency resulted in neither crewmember fully understanding the situation they were faced with and subsequent escalation of an abnormal situation to an emergency.
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I remember discussing that exact sequence of events, that flight, during my second time through Airbus school.
There were many things the crew did well, but you’re correct, it was a failure to analyze, a failure to clarify roles and responsibilities and ultimately, they made a bad situation worse by shutting down working electrical systems and degrading their approach capability.
While the outcome was successful (everyone walked away from the landing) - it could have been done better.
The screenshot of Jeppeson FD Pro looks very familiar - depending on the airplane (757 or 767) I might have similar (757) or fewer (767) options.
Our FMS does offer airports for which it has data, but not all of those airports are suitable - so, the FMS isn’t the best tool in an emergency. Neither is the flight plan.
When we plan ETOPS flights, we have ETOPS alternates. Those alternates are the closest suitable airports, based on forecasted weather instrument approach, runway length, etc. It’s a place we could take the airplane if we were to lose an engine way out over the water, and needed the nearest place to land.
But that may not be the most suitable airport. Granted, this entire discussion is about “what would you do with a fire” and “how quickly can you land”, But those scenarios, while urgent, are unlikely. Much more likely is a complex scenario, requiring some complex decision-making.
Here is an example: Big airplane coming back from Europe. Between Greenland and Canada, a medical emergency on board developed. I don’t have a precise flight plan for this, but I put in an Edinburgh to Newark flight just to demonstrate what the ETOPS alternate airports look like, they are Shannon Ireland, Keflavik Iceland, and Goose Bay Labrador.
All three of those airports have sufficient runway, decent instrument approach facilities, and represent a place you could take an airplane that had an engine shut down. We tend to run with 120 minute ETOPS when we’re in the north Atlantic, but there are other protocols, like 132 minute, or 180 minute, depending on the route of flight and the way the winds are working that day. What that means, is for each different time qualification, there are slightly more rigorous requirements, both for alternate weather, as well as aircraft minimum systems.
So, for the folks not used to flight planning, the point is that the airports are calculated in point of time, not distance. It is wind, and single engine cruise speed dependent. So, nearest depends on your airspeed, your configuration, and the winds at your current altitude on that day as well as where the airports are in relation to you. It’s not a simple calculation.
So we select the airports to give us the best ETOPS number. The shortest possible time between suitable airports. If we have suitable airports in a place like goose Bay, Labrador, and Iceland, we’re probably operating at 120 minute protocol. If for example, Iceland was completely snowed in with a blizzard, then the only ETOPS alternates might be Goose Bay labrador, and Shannon Ireland, and we’d be up at 132 minutes ETOPS, or perhaps 180 if we are very far south, or very far north.
Here is what all that looks like:
I’m really oversimplifying a lot of the considerations, but we’re just talking about how we make the decision on where to take the airplane.
So, back to our big airplane coming back from Europe. The ETOPS alternate in this case was Goose Bay Labrador. Again, a perfectly acceptable airport from the standpoint of “Can I land a 777 there with an engine shut down?”. The answer is yes.
But while air traffic control, and dispatch have that in mind as our alternate, should we have a problem when we are past the point of equal time between Iceland and Labrador, that may not be the most suitable airport for a particular situation.
And that is what happened on this night. With the medical emergency, the crew elected to continue on to their planned, filed, alternate airport, it was the nearest airport. And that’s goose Bay.
But goose doesn’t have a hospital. An additional 10 minutes of flying from where this emergency occurred could have gotten the airplane into Gander Newfoundland. Gander is a well equipped airport, which also happens to have a large enough community to have a hospital.
So, nearest - Goose.
Most suitable - Gander
While this scenario is not quite as urgent for the airplane as the “we are on fire” initial query of this thread, I assure you that for that person having a heart attack, the situation was equally urgent, and it’s up to the crew to make the best decision.
And that decision is complex, and it must take into account a multitude of factors, given the scenario.
So, if I were on fire somewhere south of Greenland. We would be heading for goose Bay, as fast as we could get there. And if I thought the airplane was gonna come apart before we made it to goose Bay, then I suppose we try ditching. But that truly is the last resort.
Risk balancing once again, landing the airplane in the water, has a risk. Sully did it on a clear bright morning. On a day when the temperature was above freezing. Doing it in the night, in the north Atlantic, with much larger seas, larger waves and swells, when I can’t see the water, when I can’t judge the flare as he did, it’s not at all certain that the airplane would survive contact with the water.
Furthermore, survival in the winter time in the north Atlantic at night is not sure either.
There were many things the crew did well, but you’re correct, it was a failure to analyze, a failure to clarify roles and responsibilities and ultimately, they made a bad situation worse by shutting down working electrical systems and degrading their approach capability.
While the outcome was successful (everyone walked away from the landing) - it could have been done better.
The screenshot of Jeppeson FD Pro looks very familiar - depending on the airplane (757 or 767) I might have similar (757) or fewer (767) options.
Our FMS does offer airports for which it has data, but not all of those airports are suitable - so, the FMS isn’t the best tool in an emergency. Neither is the flight plan.
When we plan ETOPS flights, we have ETOPS alternates. Those alternates are the closest suitable airports, based on forecasted weather instrument approach, runway length, etc. It’s a place we could take the airplane if we were to lose an engine way out over the water, and needed the nearest place to land.
But that may not be the most suitable airport. Granted, this entire discussion is about “what would you do with a fire” and “how quickly can you land”, But those scenarios, while urgent, are unlikely. Much more likely is a complex scenario, requiring some complex decision-making.
Here is an example: Big airplane coming back from Europe. Between Greenland and Canada, a medical emergency on board developed. I don’t have a precise flight plan for this, but I put in an Edinburgh to Newark flight just to demonstrate what the ETOPS alternate airports look like, they are Shannon Ireland, Keflavik Iceland, and Goose Bay Labrador.
All three of those airports have sufficient runway, decent instrument approach facilities, and represent a place you could take an airplane that had an engine shut down. We tend to run with 120 minute ETOPS when we’re in the north Atlantic, but there are other protocols, like 132 minute, or 180 minute, depending on the route of flight and the way the winds are working that day. What that means, is for each different time qualification, there are slightly more rigorous requirements, both for alternate weather, as well as aircraft minimum systems.
So, for the folks not used to flight planning, the point is that the airports are calculated in point of time, not distance. It is wind, and single engine cruise speed dependent. So, nearest depends on your airspeed, your configuration, and the winds at your current altitude on that day as well as where the airports are in relation to you. It’s not a simple calculation.
So we select the airports to give us the best ETOPS number. The shortest possible time between suitable airports. If we have suitable airports in a place like goose Bay, Labrador, and Iceland, we’re probably operating at 120 minute protocol. If for example, Iceland was completely snowed in with a blizzard, then the only ETOPS alternates might be Goose Bay labrador, and Shannon Ireland, and we’d be up at 132 minutes ETOPS, or perhaps 180 if we are very far south, or very far north.
Here is what all that looks like:
I’m really oversimplifying a lot of the considerations, but we’re just talking about how we make the decision on where to take the airplane.
So, back to our big airplane coming back from Europe. The ETOPS alternate in this case was Goose Bay Labrador. Again, a perfectly acceptable airport from the standpoint of “Can I land a 777 there with an engine shut down?”. The answer is yes.
But while air traffic control, and dispatch have that in mind as our alternate, should we have a problem when we are past the point of equal time between Iceland and Labrador, that may not be the most suitable airport for a particular situation.
And that is what happened on this night. With the medical emergency, the crew elected to continue on to their planned, filed, alternate airport, it was the nearest airport. And that’s goose Bay.
But goose doesn’t have a hospital. An additional 10 minutes of flying from where this emergency occurred could have gotten the airplane into Gander Newfoundland. Gander is a well equipped airport, which also happens to have a large enough community to have a hospital.
So, nearest - Goose.
Most suitable - Gander
While this scenario is not quite as urgent for the airplane as the “we are on fire” initial query of this thread, I assure you that for that person having a heart attack, the situation was equally urgent, and it’s up to the crew to make the best decision.
And that decision is complex, and it must take into account a multitude of factors, given the scenario.
So, if I were on fire somewhere south of Greenland. We would be heading for goose Bay, as fast as we could get there. And if I thought the airplane was gonna come apart before we made it to goose Bay, then I suppose we try ditching. But that truly is the last resort.
Risk balancing once again, landing the airplane in the water, has a risk. Sully did it on a clear bright morning. On a day when the temperature was above freezing. Doing it in the night, in the north Atlantic, with much larger seas, larger waves and swells, when I can’t see the water, when I can’t judge the flare as he did, it’s not at all certain that the airplane would survive contact with the water.
Furthermore, survival in the winter time in the north Atlantic at night is not sure either.
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Look up Mentour Pilot on youtube, you'll never watch that trash show (in comparison) again.
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If a pilot upgrading to Captain had the exact same situation in a command upgrade sim and they handled it that way they would fail.
Even though nobody was really hurt, it was dangerous.
Conversely, we have had many pilots fail for taking too long to get the aircraft on the ground fast enough in time critical scenarios.
In this particular instance, the captain did not consult with dispatch, which is an egregious error.
As a captain, I am familiar with every airport, but I cannot memorize all of the facilities and resources at everyone of literally hundreds of airports that apply to my flying. However, dispatch, on the ground, surrounded by medical experts, aircraft maintenance folks, and others can almost instantly assess all of those types of considerations.
Ultimately, the decision belongs to the captain. That’s why there is a captain.
But making that sort of decision without an availing yourself of all the resources open to you, is a failure in leadership and decision-making.
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When you say he didn't consult with dispatch, are you referring to after take off or before take off, or both?
About 35 years ago, I flew an Olympic Airlines 737 from Athens to Santorini. Its a short hop. The flight is like a shuttle.
As we approached Santorini, I thought I was in a Stuka dive bomber.
As we approached Santorini, I thought I was in a Stuka dive bomber.
In the moment. We always consult with dispatch on an international, or ETOPS, flight.
But in the moment - it’s pretty easy to SATCOM - I’ve done it. Phone rings, about twice, dispatcher answers, and we talk.
Easy-peezy.
In fact, I make students call dispatch as part of OE.
I’ve even called ATC (Oakland Oceanic) on SATCOM. Far faster and more effective than CPDLC. Plain English. Quick.
We got new Satcom radio tuning panels on the 767-300s we bought from Hawaiian. They are now standard, but the first time I saw one was at the gate in Heathrow.
I looked at my crew, “anyone seen one of these before?” “Nope”. “So, we are going to make a call on this before we leave the gate…I want to know how it works, now, at zero knots, instead of when I’m in the bunk and a crisis brews…”
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I could not agree more. Talking directly to either flight dispatch, or maintenance control in Toronto via radio ( SATCOM for you, ARINC ground frequency for me because we don’t have SATCOM or CPDLC ) is faster, better than ACARS, etc.
Just want to be clear though, you are not suggesting that A320 Captain should have contacted flight dispatch after take off when they received the ( false ) avionics smoke warning?
Sure, he should have contacted flight dispatch ( to get a patch to maintenance control ) before pushback, but the Captain is on his own after take off in that type of situation.
He should have done a flight warning computer reset ( at the gate ) to clear the avionics smoke warning but because they didn’t , that warning popped up again ( inhibited on take off until 1500 ) right at thrust reduction altitude after take off.
Interesting final report.
https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/78757/pdf
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Yeah, he is o.k.
I find I can’t watch anything if the persons ego is too big but he doesn’t rub me the wrong way.
You can learn stuff watching “Captain Joe” also but his ego ( and wearing the uniform ) rubs me the wrong way.
I was on an A380 from YVR to LHR back in 2016 that had to divert to Goose Bay due to a heart attack on board. Took probably 45 minutes to land after the captain announced we were diverting, so it wasn't exactly fast but I think the normal route is quite far north. Two hours on the ground and we were off again but landed at LHR about 4:15 late.
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Big difference the way pilots would deal with a medical emergency versus other time critical emergencies.
If you have smoke in the cockpit , you want to land as soon as possible or everyone might get killed if bad enough ( Swiss Air 111 ) due to fire hazards and losing systems.
If we have a medical emergency on board ( after consultation with flight dispatch and the aviation medical professional at a ground facility ) and ( nobody can order the Captain….they give us advice and recommendations but we have the final say ….but we have to answer for our decisions ) its agreed upon this passenger needs to get on the ground as soon as safely possible, we would NOT rush and jeopardize everyone else’s life to get one passenger on the ground as soon as possible.
I have never had to divert for an in flight medical emergency, so far.
We take more time dealing with those types of situations.
If you have smoke in the cockpit , you want to land as soon as possible or everyone might get killed if bad enough ( Swiss Air 111 ) due to fire hazards and losing systems.
If we have a medical emergency on board ( after consultation with flight dispatch and the aviation medical professional at a ground facility ) and ( nobody can order the Captain….they give us advice and recommendations but we have the final say ….but we have to answer for our decisions ) its agreed upon this passenger needs to get on the ground as soon as safely possible, we would NOT rush and jeopardize everyone else’s life to get one passenger on the ground as soon as possible.
I have never had to divert for an in flight medical emergency, so far.
We take more time dealing with those types of situations.
