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- Feb 22, 2021
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I am not assuming anything , I have no clue what goes on with other airlines with respect to training.We agree completely on what happened that night. Go back and read my previous posts on the subject.
Fundamentally, they suffered from an amygdala hijack.
So, if we’re gonna reduce the chances of an amygdala hijack in the event of a stall late at night, or any other unreliable, airspeed scenario, because of mis-identification of flight parameters, the best way to do that, is to train, to desensitize, to learn, and to recognize.
So instead of facing a situation with fear, and startle, they face it with experience, familiarity, and confidence, including confidence in the effectiveness of the recovery procedures.
Take a look at the advisory circular, and see how much time we spend on unreliable airspeed, particularly in the determination of reasonable pitch and power.
Everything that you’re bringing up as an objection or omission has been both included and addressed.
And that experience and understanding that training, is exactly what we’re going after. But because I’m not able to share with you everything that we’re doing, you’re assuming that we’re focused in the wrong place.
But our effort includes the areas and concerns that you have brought up.
Every one of them.
What I said was ( because you said not everything that pilots want to practice on their own has real world value flying ) that I don’t personally think doing deep stall training is worth it ( yes, stall training is but recover right away when you see the first indications ). You brought up AF447 after that.
We will never agree on this so I will agree to disagree

More on those simple RNAV approaches on the Airbus tonight ( which you assumed were not complicated )

Edit: The most inexperienced pilot , FO in right seat, definitely suffered from an amygdala hijack but not the more experienced one in the left seat ( sure, he was stressed ). The Captain should have made sure both FO’s knew the more experienced ( he was more senior ) FO was in charge before he left the flight deck for his rest, but he didn’t do that. That said, the senior, more experienced FO should have taken control once it was obvious ( even though neither knew they had an unreliable airspeed problem , the more experienced FO knew the low time FO was over controlling and not reacting properly ).
He should have pushed the red priority control button on his side stick ( held for 40 seconds to cancel the other pilots stick ) and taken control.
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