How quickly can a commercial plane land?

[Just a civilian pilot]

While I agree on the unlikely recovery if you wait until 10,000 feet (in an Airbus, with a stab trimmed full nose up) it's not exactly zero stress on the airframe. The stall buffet is quite heavy.

That said, the fastest safe way down is Vmo, full speed brakes, idle power, open descent (which we call FLCH in Boeings) in every airliner I have flown.

While I agree on the unlikely recovery if you wait until 10,000 feet (in an Airbus, with a stab trimmed full nose up) it's not exactly zero stress on the airframe. The stall buffet is quite heavy.

That said, the fastest safe way down is Vmo, full speed brakes, idle power, open descent (which we call FLCH in Boeings) in every airliner I have flown.

Since there isn’t any flight test data that I am aware of that proves a commercial airliner can recover from a stall when entered at 40,000 and recovery begins at 10,000, I will refer to Air France 447.

Yes, the aircraft was severely out of trim ( because one of the pilots held the stick full back and the auto trim went full nose up ) , but until someone actually does a stall ( Boeing, Airbus ) from max certified altitude and begins recovery at 10,000 , I am very skeptical.

Deep stall all the way down from 40,000 to 10,000. Full back to the point where the airspeed indicator doesn’t even show any speed, down to 10,000 plus that crazy descent rate.

Try it when you are in the simulator next time and let us know

I will place a bet on that one.

 

[Astro14]

Since there isn’t any flight test data that I am aware of that proves a commercial airliner can recover from a stall when entered at 40,000 and recovery begins at 10,000, I will refer to Air France 447.

Yes, the aircraft was severely out of trim ( because one of the pilots held the stick full back and the auto trim went full nose up ) , but until someone actually does a stall ( Boeing, Airbus ) from max certified altitude and begins recovery at 10,000 , I am very skeptical.

Deep stall all the way down from 40,000 to 10,000. Full back to the point where the airspeed indicator doesn’t even show any speed, down to 10,000 plus that crazy descent rate.

Try it when you are in the simulator next time and let us know

I will place a bet on that one.

I will take that bet. I do it all the time. It’s part of our UPRT training.

Full, deep stall. Airspeed near zero. VSI pegged at -6,000.

Stall recovery in a 757 takes a bit under 3,000 feet. Start at 7,000, and you’re flying by 4,000.

FO Wayne Willson tried it in the 757. Over LAS. We didn’t start recovery until 7,000 - and had lots of altitude left above the 2,000 foot ground level.

Totally different flight control system than the Airbus. Stabilizer doesn't trim into the stall, among other things.

The A-320, at 10,000 feet, in the same condition, is doomed by the 30+ seconds it takes to re-trim the stab.

You need more than 10,000 to recover, at least, according to my counterparts on the Airbus fleet.

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

I will take that bet. I do it all the time. It’s part of our UPRT training.

Full, deep stall. Airspeed near zero. VSI pegged at -6,000.

Stall recovery in a 757 takes a bit under 3,000 feet. Start at 7,000, and you’re flying by 4,000.

FO Wayne Willson tried it in the 757. Over LAS. We didn’t start recovery until 7,000 - and had lots of altitude left above the 2,000 foot ground level.

Totally different flight control system than the Airbus. Stabilizer doesn't trim into the stall, among other things.

The A-320, at 10,000 feet, in the same condition, is doomed by the 30+ seconds it takes to re-trim the stab.

You need more than 10,000 to recover, at least, according to my counterparts on the Airbus

Can you post the B757 stall recovery procedure please ( Boeing )?

Even if the Airbus trim was neutral, the plane is descending at 11,000 FPM ( accident report AF 447 ) and to recover from the stall, the nose has to go down to lower the AoA to recover which will increase the ROD even more.

We are talking about commercial jets, not just the A320 or B757 also. We are also talking about from max cruise altitude ( yes, it reaches terminal velocity at some point descent rate but I don’t know how many feet altitude loss that takes ) to 10,000.

I am going to ask the fleet chief pilots on the Boeing at my company to see if they train for deep stalls ( I doubt it, never seen that before ) and how much altitude it takes to recover ( 787/777 ).

No Airbus pilots knows how much altitude it would take because ( plane is not supposed to be able to stall in normal law ) it’s not published anywhere and nobody trains for it. Maybe Airbus knows due to tests after AF447 in the sim.

Curious why United would do deep stall training ( to the point where there is zero IAS ) when it has a stick shaker?

It’s been confirmed, the narrow body Airbus fleet at the leisure division at my airline ( flying I do ) is being replaced by the B737. I finally have to decide which plane I want to fly. They have up to three years to switch the fleet so I am not sure how fast it will happen.

Maybe I can try one of those 30,000 feet deep stalls in the B777 or 787 now.

 

[zuluplus30]

We use Medlink as well. Great resource. Used them many times - I call dispatch, they phone patch me in with Medlink, we consult, I make the decision.

I’ve always wondered when we get the “we may have a medical emergency” call then 5-10 minutes goes by with no further info.

 

[Astro14]

Can you post the B757 stall recovery procedure please ( Boeing )?

Even if the Airbus trim was neutral, the plane is descending at 11,000 FPM ( accident report AF 447 ) and to recover from the stall, the nose has to go down to lower the AoA to recover which will increase the ROD even more.

We are talking about commercial jets, not just the A320 or B757 also. We are also talking about from max cruise altitude ( yes, it reaches terminal velocity at some point descent rate but I don’t know how many feet altitude loss that takes ) to 10,000.

I am going to ask the fleet chief pilots on the Boeing at my company to see if they train for deep stalls ( I doubt it, never seen that before ) and how much altitude it takes to recover ( 787/777 ).

No Airbus pilots knows how much altitude it would take because ( plane is not supposed to be able to stall in normal law ) it’s not published anywhere and nobody trains for it. Maybe Airbus knows due to tests after AF447 in the sim.

Curious why United would do deep stall training ( to the point where there is zero IAS ) when it has a stick shaker?

It’s been confirmed, the narrow body Airbus fleet at the leisure division at my airline ( flying I do ) is being replaced by the B737. I finally have to decide which plane I want to fly. They have up to three years to switch the fleet so I am not sure how fast it will happen.

Maybe I can try one of those 30,000 feet deep stalls in the B777 or 787 now.

When I am back in the simulator, and have some time, I’ll take a jet from 30,000 to 10,000 feet just like AF 447, and initiate the recovery there. I’ll post back the exact results. Might be a while.

As far as “why do we train to deep stall”? Because taking an airplane to stick shaker and then recovering is the kind of training that the captain at Colgan Air 3407 got.

Minimal. Perfunctory.

He didn’t know what was happening because he wasn’t trained well. You don’t need to go beyond buffet getting a Private Pilot these days, and the requirement to see a spin has been removed. We have dumbed down training and that results in…well…dumbed-down pilots.

The FAA has recognized this - and expanded the requirements for upset recovery training in AC 120-111.

https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_120-111_CHG_1_Ed_Upd_3.pdf

In accordance with that guidance, we updated our UPRT program, for all fleets. We take the airplane (sim) deep into stall. We take it into extremes of bank and pitch. -25 pitch and 135 bank, for example, and we have crews recover.

Focused, comprehensive discussion of aerodynamics, of recognition, of recovery procedures, and then practical application and experience in the simulator. This is a big part of what I do as an evaluator. It is part of our annual training.

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

When I am back in the simulator, and have some time, I’ll take a jet from 30,000 to 10,000 feet just like AF 447, and initiate the recovery there. I’ll post back the exact results. Might be a while.

As far as “why do we train to deep stall”? Because taking an airplane to stick shaker and then recovering is the kind of training that the captain at Colgan Air 3407 got.

Minimal. Perfunctory.

He didn’t know what was happening because he wasn’t trained well. You don’t need to go beyond buffet getting a Private Pilot these days, and the requirement to see a spin has been removed. We have dumbed down training and that results in…well…dumbed-down pilots.

The FAA has recognized this - and expanded the requirements for upset recovery training in AC 120-111.

https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_120-111_CHG_1_Ed_Upd_3.pdf

In accordance with that guidance, we updated our UPRT program, for all fleets. We take the airplane (sim) deep into stall. We take it into extremes of bank and pitch. -25 pitch and 135 bank, for example, and we have crews recover.

Focused, comprehensive discussion of aerodynamics, of recognition, of recovery procedures, and then practical application and experience in the simulator. This is a big part of what I do as an evaluator. It is part of our annual training.

37,000 feet, Clean ( obviously ) , full stall, control column held full back , no IAS ( or at least below 60 KIAS like with AF 447 ), V/S pegged , all the way down to 10,000

IAS below 60.

I can easily see any plane recovering from a deep stall ( no IAS ) at 10,000 if it was with the landing flaps already down ( a lot less speed to regain before it will fly ) , but I cannot see every pilot/type of commercial jet recovering from that.

With all due respect to the FAA, not sure why deep stall training is required because a crew didn't handle a normal stall properly when they heard the stick shaker ( PF pulled back, PM retracted the flaps ). If pilot's do not react properly to the stick shaker and stall , what's the point making pilot's practice deep stalls?

Remember though, I was talking about commercial jets, not just the A320 or B757.

You also have more sim ( you get to practice stuff ) time than most trying things out versus the average line pilot.

I could get a A320 on the ground from 36,000 in 12 minutes , most couldn't do that. I have practiced it in the sim several times.

If I get pushed off the A320 into a Boeing soon, I will try it out in the sim also ( stall )

Edit: to make things more realistic , how about full speed brakes ( temporarily ) on the way down. AF crew had them out during the confusion for a short time.

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

Why is this? Just too much speed and energy to deal with in 10k feet? If you magically had another 5 or 10k feet under you, would that allow enough room to recover?

I answered why responding to Astro.

Might be possible in some commercial jets, depending on the pilot , but I am highly skeptical with just any commercial jet and pilot ( from 37,000, clean obviously, no IAS , coming down at 11,000 FPM VSI pegged ).

 

[Brons2]

Excellent thread, thank you @Astro14 and @Just a civilian pilot.

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

Astro, a full years supply of ST oil If I am wrong.

This kind of spirited discussion makes BITOG interesting and fun ( bonus with any video )

 

[Astro14]

There are many things I have discovered in the simulator, not all of them useful.

The risk, of course, is extrapolation. The simulator represents the airplane accurately in the Flight envelope which it was tested. When you take it outside of that testing envelope, it becomes an extrapolation. It’s not guaranteed that the aircraft will respond exactly the way the extrapolation was built.

So, one has to be careful in drawing conclusions from what you can do in a simulator. However, deep stall is relatively well understood and I think in that instance, you can draw useful conclusions.

Those conclusions might not be as useful at the extremes - for example.

You can fly a 747-400 over the San Mateo bridge heading 280 at 50 feet and VMO, lined up on 28R extended centerline. Pull up at 2.5 G, and full thrust into a loop. While inverted, and heading 100, extend gear flaps 1 and come back to idle, extending flaps as you maintain 1.5 G and decelerate the airplane. Continue flap extension at max speed for each setting. Back up on the power as you get near glideslope, managing speed and altitude as normal. Land on 28R.

Lots of fun.

Can the jet do it? No idea. Is it useful? Nah, not really.

 

[Astro14]

There are many things I have discovered in the simulator, not all of them useful.

The risk, of course, is extrapolation. The simulator represents the airplane accurately in the Flight envelope which it was tested. When you take it outside of that testing envelope, it becomes an extrapolation. It’s not guaranteed that the aircraft will respond exactly the way the extrapolation was built.

So, one has to be careful in drawing conclusions from what you can do in a simulator. However, deep stall is relatively well understood and I think in that instance, you can draw useful conclusions.

Those conclusions might be useful is at the extremes?

Astro, a full years supply of ST oil If I am wrong.

This kind of spirited discussion makes BITOG interesting and fun ( bonus with any video )

You’re aware of all those cars in my signature, right?

A bottle of Macallan would be way cheaper…

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

There are many things I have discovered in the simulator, not all of them useful.

The risk, of course, is extrapolation. The simulator represents the airplane accurately in the Flight envelope which it was tested. When you take it outside of that testing envelope, it becomes an extrapolation. It’s not guaranteed that the aircraft will respond exactly the way the extrapolation was built.

So, one has to be careful in drawing conclusions from what you can do in a simulator. However, deep stall is relatively well understood and I think in that instance, you can draw useful conclusions.

Those conclusions might not be as useful at the extremes - for example.

You can fly a 747-400 over the San Mateo bridge heading 280 at 50 feet and VMO, lined up on 28R extended centerline. Pull up at 2.5 G, and full thrust into a loop. While inverted, and heading 100, extend gear flaps 1 and come back to idle, extending flaps as you maintain 1.5 G and decelerate the airplane. Continue flap extension at max speed for each setting. Back up on the power as you get near glideslope, managing speed and altitude as normal. Land on 28R.

Lots of fun.

Can the jet do it? No idea. Is it useful? Nah, not really.

But it's very useful to see how quick you can get a jet on the runway if you had to, it builds confidence.

I only like to try stuff out in the sim that will help me in the real world.

With all due respect, I don't agree that its well known how a plane put in a deep stall at 36,000 , zero IAS, clean of coarse, some speed brakes out ( if you want to replicate the AF 447 stall ), coming down at 11,000 FPM will react at 10,000 because nobody has tried it before.

Even if you can do it, does it mean the average line pilot could do it, no.

Are those deep stalls you do coming down at 11,000 FPM ( VSI pegged doesn't tell you how fast it's coming down ) , nobody knows.

You will be the first that I am aware of when you try it in the sim.

I have never seen a deep stall ( clean, zero IAS , pull full back, VSI pegged coming down ) in my 26,000 career ( even on the B727, CRJ, other aircraft ).

Different airlines prioritize different things.

We do SE NPA RNAV approaches EVERY sim , United doesn't. United does deep stall recovery in the sim, I have never seen that in my career ( we just recover when we see signs we are in a stall ).

I am very comfortable doing SE RNAV approaches to Mins, because I have practiced it in the sim, many times.

To me , to be honest, it is more important than practicing deep stalls ( because pilots should recover right away if they are trained properly ).

Not trying to poke any sticks in the eyes but hopefully you see my point.

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

There are many things I have discovered in the simulator, not all of them useful.

The risk, of course, is extrapolation. The simulator represents the airplane accurately in the Flight envelope which it was tested. When you take it outside of that testing envelope, it becomes an extrapolation. It’s not guaranteed that the aircraft will respond exactly the way the extrapolation was built.

So, one has to be careful in drawing conclusions from what you can do in a simulator. However, deep stall is relatively well understood and I think in that instance, you can draw useful conclusions.

Those conclusions might be useful is at the extremes?

You’re aware of all those cars in my signature, right?

A bottle of Macallan would be way cheaper…

I was planning on non synthetic ST oil.

I will get my wife ( 15 years max security prison guard….she will order me to carry more out than I can normally carry ) and son help me carry out all those cases of ST oil.

I hate WM but I will do it for you.

 

[Astro14]

We have since added the single engine RNAV to our training syllabus.

At that time, the time in which my anecdote took place, however, we had not, and I was among those that suggested that it was essential.

So, I totally agree with your point.

That approach is far more likely than an Air France scenario.

However, Air France 447 killed over 100 people, and no one has yet crashed an airplane doing a single engine RNAV, so when we look at the risk analysis, and where to apply training dollars, a case can be made that understanding, and recognizing the stall, as well as appropriate recovery procedures, gains you more risk mitigation.

Certainly that is where the FAA went with the advisory circular.

Edit: please allow me to add that an RNAV Approach is a more complicated set up in a Boeing that it is in an Airbus. It’s not a matter of simply hitting the Approach button and setting up an Approach NAV Approach.

Several preconditions have to be met for a Boeing to be able to follow the vertical path on an approach using VNAV. I was shocked at how easily the Airbus handles that type of approach. This is part of why I thought the extra training was needed on Boeing fleets.

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

We have since added the single engine RNAV to our training syllabus.

At that time, the time in which my anecdote took place, however, we had not, and I was among those that suggested that it was essential.

So, I totally agree with your point.

That approach is far more likely than an Air France scenario.

However, Air France 447 killed over 100 people, and no one has yet crashed an airplane doing a single engine RNAV, so when we look at the risk analysis, and where to apply training dollars, a case can be made that understanding, and recognizing the stall, as well as appropriate recovery procedures, gains you more risk mitigation.

Certainly that is where the FAA went with the advisory circular.

Edit: please allow me to add that an RNAV Approach is a more complicated set up in a Boeing that it is in an Airbus. It’s not a matter of simply hitting the Approach button and setting up an Approach NAV Approach.

Several preconditions have to be met for a Boeing to be able to follow the vertical path on an approach using VNAV. I was shocked at how easily the Airbus handles that type of approach. This is part of why I thought the extra training was needed on Boeing fleets.

The problem with AF447 had nothing to do with the crew not understanding how to recover from a deep stall, it had everything to do with them not understanding what was going on and this caused them to stall the aircraft. All the deep stall training in the world would not have prevented that crash. The crew ignored repeated “ stall, stall stall ” warnings ( went away when the IAS dropped below 60…that’s how slow they got going down ).

Properly understanding unreliable airspeed procedures was what would have saved the day, not stall training.

The crew failed to realize they had an unreliable airspeed problem ( as advanced as the Airbus is, it won’t always tell pilots that they have an unreliable airspeed problem depending what causes it ) and the plane gave control over to them because it could not figure it out ( AP kicked off, auto thrust disengaged, alternate law which means it can now be stalled like any other aircraft ).

The alerts they received on the ECAM were the symptoms, not the cause of those problems. They failed to analyze what was happening properly and crashed.

Don’t tell me Boeing is more complicated than the A320 with regard to RNAV approaches

They can be very complicated ( because we deal with cold weather more and cannot always just “ push a button” to fly them just like an ILS with the approach button ) on the A320. Just understanding how you are allowed to fly them can be very confusing to many pilots ( I guarantee you, if I asked pilots, many would be confused ).

We often have to fly an RNAV approach without just pushing a button.

They can be flown in “ final app” ( push the approach button like an ILS ) but only if the surface temperature is acceptable and this would also affect the type of RNAV approach itself ( LNAV or LNAV/VNAV mins ) we could fly.

To make things even more confusing, if the temperature is too low, we cannot use that easy push button and have to fly it NAV FPA.

Edit: FAA mandated deep stall training because of that tragic Q400 turbo prop crash at Buffalo.

Let’s face it, if a crew doesn’t react properly when the stick shaker first goes off ( Captain pulled BACK and the FO retracted the flaps ) , what purpose is deep stall training ever going to do. Nothing.

 

[Astro14]

That temperature being about -15C. I remember.

I cannot possibly share the complexity and detail of our UPRT training in this forum. The manual alone is over 100 pages, and aerodynamics for naval aviators is a referenced material source.

We focus a great deal on the recognition part precisely because Air France failed to recognize the signs of a stall.

Then we focus on the recovery part. But a simulator examination of both the signs of a stall, as well as recovery, requires that you get deeply into a stall. One of the key criteria, and the one that we didn’t talk about early on in my airline career, is the inability to arrest a descent rate.

Sure, everyone knows about buffet, heavy buffet, sluggish pitch and roll response, stick shaker, stick pusher and other warnings, but the inability to arrest a decent rate while at a normal pitch attitude - that’s a critical point of understanding.

One that Air France 447 lacked on that night.

Unreliable airspeed training, and the response to that is an integral part of our UPRT. Because I’m unable to convey the complexity of how this is weaved throughout our qualification, and continuing qualification, training, you’re failing to appreciate how powerful, and effective it truly is.

I encourage you to read the advisory circular that I linked. It’s relatively short at about 45 pages. It outlines what airlines must do to train.

We have not overlooked anything that you seem to suggest.

 

[wpod]

There are many things I have discovered in the simulator, not all of them useful.

The risk, of course, is extrapolation. The simulator represents the airplane accurately in the Flight envelope which it was tested. When you take it outside of that testing envelope, it becomes an extrapolation. It’s not guaranteed that the aircraft will respond exactly the way the extrapolation was built.

So, one has to be careful in drawing conclusions from what you can do in a simulator. However, deep stall is relatively well understood and I think in that instance, you can draw useful conclusions.

Those conclusions might not be as useful at the extremes - for example.

You can fly a 747-400 over the San Mateo bridge heading 280 at 50 feet and VMO, lined up on 28R extended centerline. Pull up at 2.5 G, and full thrust into a loop. While inverted, and heading 100, extend gear flaps 1 and come back to idle, extending flaps as you maintain 1.5 G and decelerate the airplane. Continue flap extension at max speed for each setting. Back up on the power as you get near glideslope, managing speed and altitude as normal. Land on 28R.

Lots of fun.

Can the jet do it? No idea. Is it useful? Nah, not really.

Can you fly the simulator under the San Mateo Bridge? [You can fly a 747-400 over the San Mateo bridge heading 280 at 50 feet and VMO, lined up on 28R extended centerline. Pull up at 2.5 G, and full thrust into a loop. While inverted, and heading 100, extend gear flaps 1 and come back to idle, extending flaps as you maintain 1.5 G and decelerate the airplane. Continue flap extension at max speed for each setting. Back up on the power as you get near glideslope, managing speed and altitude as normal. Land on 28R.] That is fighter pilot dog fight stuff no???

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

That temperature being about -15C. I remember.

I cannot possibly share the complexity and detail of our UPRT training in this forum. The manual alone is over 100 pages, and aerodynamics for naval aviators is a referenced material source.

We focus a great deal on the recognition part precisely because Air France failed to recognize the signs of a stall.

Then we focus on the recovery part. But a simulator examination of both the signs of a stall, as well as recovery, requires that you get deeply into a stall. One of the key criteria, and the one that we didn’t talk about early on in my airline career, is the inability to arrest a descent rate.

Sure, everyone knows about buffet, heavy buffet, sluggish pitch and roll response, stick shaker, stick pusher and other warnings, but the inability to arrest a decent rate while at a normal pitch attitude - that’s a critical point of understanding.

One that Air France 447 lacked on that night.

Unreliable airspeed training, and the response to that is an integral part of our UPRT. Because I’m unable to convey the complexity of how this is weaved throughout our qualification, and continuing qualification, training, you’re failing to appreciate how powerful, and effective it truly is.

I encourage you to read the advisory circular that I linked. It’s relatively short at about 45 pages. It outlines what airlines must do to train.

We have not overlooked anything that you seem to suggest.

Sorry , I can’t agree, not at all.

The pilots in the Af crash were too confused to understand what was going on PLUS I don’t think they even believed what they were being told ( stall warning ).

Why else would any pilot hold the stick full back ( and 15 degrees nose up at some points ….crazy high pitch at high altitude ) all the down to the ground?

At one point, they had the speed brakes out with the nose up.

None of the pilots even commented on the stall warning blaring all the way down until they got so slow it went away because the speed was so low.

They were so stressed, confused they weren’t even thinking ( or listening to the repeated stall warnings ) about anything except ….” What the heck is going on, how is this even possible” . The Captain made a remark …” this isn’t possible” I am pretty sure.

All I am saying is that there are better things to be practicing in the sim than deep stalls ( as opposed to recovering at the first indication ) IMHO.

How about unreliable airspeed problems which caused that plane to crash because the crew didn’t understand it properly.

If pilots understand what’s going on, they are less likely to be confused to the point where they crash.

How many pilots have ignored GPWS warnings , too many.

No point knowing the memory items for a GPWS if you don’t believe it and are convinced it’s a false alarm.

That’s all I am saying.

 

[Astro14]

Sorry , I can’t agree, not at all.

The pilots in the Af crash were too confused to understand what was going on PLUS I don’t think they even believed what they were being told ( stall warning ).

Why else would any pilot hold the stick full back ( and 15 degrees nose up at some points ….crazy high pitch at high altitude ) all the down to the ground?

At one point, they had the speed brakes out with the nose up.

None of the pilots even commented on the stall warning blaring all the way down until they got so slow it went away because the speed was so low.

They were so stressed, confused they weren’t even thinking ( or listening to the repeated stall warnings ) about anything except ….” What the heck is going on, how is this even possible” . The Captain made a remark …” this isn’t possible” I am pretty sure.

All I am saying is that there are better things to be practicing in the sim than deep stalls ( as opposed to recovering at the first indication ) IMHO.

How about unreliable airspeed problems which caused that plane to crash because the crew didn’t understand it properly.

If pilots understand what’s going on, they are less likely to be confused to the point where they crash.

How many pilots have ignored GPWS warnings , too many.

No point knowing the memory items for a GPWS if you don’t believe it and are convinced it’s a false alarm.

That’s all I am saying.

We agree completely on what happened that night. Go back and read my previous posts on the subject.

Fundamentally, they suffered from an amygdala hijack.

So, if we’re gonna reduce the chances of an amygdala hijack in the event of a stall late at night, or any other unreliable, airspeed scenario, because of mis-identification of flight parameters, the best way to do that, is to train, to desensitize, to learn, and to recognize.

So instead of facing a situation with fear, and startle, they face it with experience, familiarity, and confidence, including confidence in the effectiveness of the recovery procedures.

Take a look at the advisory circular, and see how much time we spend on unreliable airspeed, particularly in the determination of reasonable pitch and power.

Everything that you’re bringing up as an objection or omission has been both included and addressed.

And that experience and understanding that training, is exactly what we’re going after. But because I’m not able to share with you everything that we’re doing, you’re assuming that we’re focused in the wrong place.

But our effort includes the areas and concerns that you have brought up.

Every one of them.

We do deep stalls as one tiny portion of a comprehensive program. Please stop focusing on deep stalls, it’s like focusing on the forks in your meal service, while ignoring everything else the flight attendants do. Forks matter, they are important, but they are not the sole focus.

We don’t keep the airplane in a deep stall from Cruise altitude all the way down to 10,000 feet, but we do initiate the stall it just above 10,000 feet, get the airplane deeply stalled, and then recover.

And I do it in Las Vegas because our scenario has us finish up the evaluation portion of the simulator in Las Vegas, and it simply easier to reposition the airplane overhead the field.

Recovery procedure is effective enough that you have no problem recovering with plenty of altitude above the ground, even though the ground elevation is approximately 1900 feet.

Again, please read the advisory circular in its entirety. Once you understand the big picture, then you and I can talk about particulars.

 

[chamfer]

For anyone wanting to follow along with an analysis and animation of Air France 447: