Another 737 mishap

[edyvw]

Negative...

There were no air worthy problems with those Boeing aircraft except the manner in which they were handled...

Quote
"After takeoff, Flight ET302 was in the air for just 6 minutes before
slamming into the earth. The BEA narrative lays out how the pilots’
lack of control began during the first 2 minutes of the flight, before
MCAS activated."


The crew did not address the problem. The cockpit voice recording contains no exchange
between the pilots recognizing the airspeed as an issue...

Mercy!!! even student pilots learn to recognize the warning signs
that a stall is imminent and execute the procedures for stall prevention...

1)lower the nose in recognition of decaying airspeed
2)roll wings level
3)add power

Really? That hard to find this?
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Documents/US comments ET302 Report March 2022.pdf

Accidents are never caused by single point failure!

 

[RAVL]

You almost made sense until you made it seem as if the only reason the SW flight didn't crash was because an ex military pilot was the Captain.

For those with zero flying experience ( that's also you, the media ) , you are just as safe flying on any Boeing as you are on any Airbus, even with a pilot with only civilian experience, even during an emergency. Depends on the pilot more than make/where they learned to fly.

I have flown a long time, and I have flown with pilots from various backgrounds ( ex militray , fighter pilots/transport pilots, F18 demo pilots, NATO exchange pilots, aviation college pilots, pilots who learned to fly at flying clubs, etc ) and no group stands out as better than any other.

What I have noticed is that some pilots are better ( hands and feet, decision making , situational awareness, multi tasking, stress tolerance ) than other pilots, regardless of where they learned to fly.

Just heard the other day, a former F18 pilot could not pass his B737 Captain upgrade. Lots of ex military experience ( exchange pilot ).

The new pilot's that U.S airlines train from scratch at their academies will be just as good as any other pilots when they go Captain one day.

I try to stay out of these threads but when I read stuff that's untrue I have to say something given my experience having flown with different groups ( and handling emergencies in the sim ).

My intention was not to offend civilian pilots but my assertion was not tailored carefully and I can see how you could read it to think if Maverick wasn’t your pilot then you aren’t safe. Point taken and apologies for the careless insult. My point was that the training at US airlines is better, and if you have someone who is also a civilian airline pilot and ex military, that pilot, like the SW pilot, would probably be top notch from an experience and training perspective. You saw the same thing when Sullenberger landed on the Hudson in 2009. Again, My point was to assert that US airline pilots are in general better trained than overseas counterparts in second and third world countries. More pointedly, I would assert that with a US crew the second Max crash doesn’t happen. (Perhaps with any competent crew that could be said?)

That leads to my second point, which is to ask why doesn’t that get reported in the news, not to exonerate Boeing but to just be factual or balanced? My contention, given the leanings of current news organizations, is that it was far easier to blame Boeing’s greed than to focus on the errors the second crew made in the crash, given the nationality / ethnicity of the crew.

This is not to exonerate Boeing for the issues with the Max (!) but rather to assert that it is important to stay focused on the facts. One of the reasons we have very safe airlines is because after crashes, typically the NTSB doesn’t do the “pile on.” There is a careful investigation, the reasons and factors are determined as best as they can be given the evidence, and recommendations and changes are made based on the findings. When you are dealing with situations that require almost perfect performance for safety, that is really the approach you want, obviously. But regurgitating nonsense like “profits over people,” as someone here has done, is unlikely to actually uncover what went wrong, and what needs to be fixed. In the latest Max problem with the bolts, the issue seems to be a lack of documentation when this panel was removed, so there was no check that the panel was fully reinstalled. That is a more subtle point, and granular and fixable problem, then asserting simplistic mantras. And when addressed in that non-sensational manner, you will get actual fixes and safer air travel.

 

[4WD]

What is not reported is that the second Max crash was avoidable and largely the result of crew error. It got very little coverage other than the WSJ, which has been on top of the story with Boeing for a number of years.

More specifically, on the same day the Ethiopian government issued its final findings on the second Max accident in late 2022, the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board issued its own “comment” rebuking the Ethiopian air regulator’s report for “inaccurate” statements, for ignoring the crew’s role, for ignoring how readily the accident should have been avoided.

In the US, this was ignored and the press ran with the “profits over people” line. In reality, while the Max’s software could fairly be said to be a band aid that placed too much burden on the crew, overall the industry, including Boeing, reorganized along profit and loss lines about 50 years ago, in the 1970s, and since that time we have seen enormous increases in airplane safety.

None of this means Boeing has nothing to fix, but profits in the airplane industry are based on engineering excellence, and Boeing is now learning that lesson first hand. Making profit a bad word means that you are consigning people to a second class safety environment. See, for example, Aeroflot. Max assembly will be brought in house and fixes will be made to prevent the assembly line “catch up” work that leads to these problems.

What about this training on iPads story … (Ethiopian) …

 

[mk378]

When the MAX is placed into a climb-out, the thrust angle of the engines tends to continue to push the nose up, and it is prone to stall unless the pilot applies considerable "down" effort to the controls to keep it from pitching up too far. This is different flight characteristics from how previous 737 models, or actually any well-designed airplane, works.

training on iPads

There was no 737 MAX specific simulator available to any airline. Boeing told everyone to fly it like the old 737s. This was a problem, because it does not fly like the old 737s.

 

[edyvw]

My intention was not to offend civilian pilots but my assertion was not tailored carefully and I can see how you could read it to think if Maverick wasn’t your pilot then you aren’t safe. Point taken and apologies for the careless insult. My point was that the training at US airlines is better, and if you have someone who is also a civilian airline pilot and ex military, that pilot, like the SW pilot, would probably be top notch from an experience and training perspective. You saw the same thing when Sullenberger landed on the Hudson in 2009. Again, My point was to assert that US airline pilots are in general better trained than overseas counterparts in second and third world countries. More pointedly, I would assert that with a US crew the second Max crash doesn’t happen. (Perhaps with any competent crew that could be said?)

That leads to my second point, which is to ask why doesn’t that get reported in the news, not to exonerate Boeing but to just be factual or balanced? My contention, given the leanings of current news organizations, is that it was far easier to blame Boeing’s greed than to focus on the errors the second crew made in the crash, given the nationality / ethnicity of the crew.

This is not to exonerate Boeing for the issues with the Max (!) but rather to assert that it is important to stay focused on the facts. One of the reasons we have very safe airlines is because after crashes, typically the NTSB doesn’t do the “pile on.” There is a careful investigation, the reasons and factors are determined as best as they can be given the evidence, and recommendations and changes are made based on the findings. When you are dealing with situations that require almost perfect performance for safety, that is really the approach you want, obviously. But regurgitating nonsense like “profits over people,” as someone here has done, is unlikely to actually uncover what went wrong, and what needs to be fixed. In the latest Max problem with the bolts, the issue seems to be a lack of documentation when this panel was removed, so there was no check that the panel was fully reinstalled. That is a more subtle point, and granular and fixable problem, then asserting simplistic mantras. And when addressed in that non-sensational manner, you will get actual fixes and safer air travel.

Crashes don't happen because of a single point of failure.
For your reference about the Hudson landing, there were other pilots in third-world countries that did the same, in actually more difficult environments. You have Garuda Flight 421 as an example. However, the media did not cover that.

The profit was absolutely before people. No sane person would allow airplane with single AOA to leave the production line, yet almost every decision that was made by Boeing was to push out questionable product into service. The design from the beginning was a problem, the engineers had a problem with pushing model that outlived its usefulness. The engineer at the top of the company did not have a problem with that, because, profit.

NTSB's report about the Ethiopian crash says a lot and does not put the blame on anyone. NTSB'a job is not to be criminal investigator. So when the report says that the AOA was damaged by the bird, the first question is: why airplane does not have a second AOA? In the airline industry, everything is about redundancy.

 

[edyvw]

What about this training on iPads story … (Ethiopian) …

The prime example of profit over people. The iPad story is the most ridiculous thing in the MAX program and tells about true priorities.

 

[BMWTurboDzl]

1. Panel departs.
2. Worker with phone takes a photo.
3. Posts on social media, tags UAL and Boeing.
4. By 7pm we have story about conspiracy and government not telling us “truth.”

In class I teach about terrorism, I use statistics from 60’s and 70’s and how terrorist attacks in Europe were at much higher numbers than last 20yrs. Difference is coverage of today’s attacks and the fact that average person gets news on palm of their hand.

There are on average 19,000 airplanes at any moment in the air on this planet. Panels will fall off, seats won’t work, they will enter turbulent weather etc., etc.,

So true. Hijackings were very popular back then.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_aircraft_hijackings

 

[BusyLittleShop]

Accidents are never caused by single point failure!

True "single point failures" are rare... but the lost of AOA is only an emergency... it is still up to the crew to prevent loss of control...

"Upon liftoff, a key sensor on the left side of the fuselage failed. It
measured the jet’s angle of attack — the angle between the wing and
the oncoming air, a data point that the flight computer uses to
calculate speed and altitude.

"The false angle of attack reading immediately initiated a “stick
shaker” warning, a loud, heavy vibration of the control column,
falsely alerting the pilots that the plane was flying too slowly and
was about to stall.

It also prompted messages on the primary flight displays indicating to
the pilots their speed and altitude readings were now unreliable.

Pilots are trained to response to an “Airspeed Unreliable” message: by
taking manually control away from the automatic systems that govern
flight position and speed, and fly in a control manner to a safe runway.

 

[edyvw]

True "single point failures" are rare... but the lost of AOA is only an emergency... it is still up to the crew to prevent loss of control...

"Upon liftoff, a key sensor on the left side of the fuselage failed. It
measured the jet’s angle of attack — the angle between the wing and
the oncoming air, a data point that the flight computer uses to
calculate speed and altitude.

"The false angle of attack reading immediately initiated a “stick
shaker” warning, a loud, heavy vibration of the control column,
falsely alerting the pilots that the plane was flying too slowly and
was about to stall.

It also prompted messages on the primary flight displays indicating to
the pilots their speed and altitude readings were now unreliable.

Pilots are trained to response to an “Airspeed Unreliable” message: by
taking manually control away from the automatic systems that govern
flight position and speed, and fly in a control manner to a safe runway.

Yes, numerous accidents would have been avoided if the crew had taken over and flown in a controlled manner. But they did not.

 

[BusyLittleShop]

why airplane does not have a second AOA? In the airline industry, everything is about redundancy.

Redundancy didn't save this crew from becoming confused which AOA was
true and which AOA was false believing both AOA were false killing
themselves and 189 passengers... Pilot Error...

On 6 February 1996, Birgenair Flight 301 is scheduled to fly from
Puerto Plata to Frankfurt. On takeoff, the captain finds that his
airspeed indicator is not reading properly, though the co-pilot's
indicator is showing the correct speed. The pilots become confused and
believe that both indicators are malfunctioning, resulting in the
aircraft stalling and crashing into the Atlantic Ocean, killing all
189 people on board.

 

[edyvw]

Redundancy didn't save this crew from becoming confused which AOA was
true and which AOA was false believing both AOA were false killing
themselves and 189 passengers... Pilot Error...

On 6 February 1996, Birgenair Flight 301 is scheduled to fly from
Puerto Plata to Frankfurt. On takeoff, the captain finds that his
airspeed indicator is not reading properly, though the co-pilot's
indicator is showing the correct speed. The pilots become confused and
believe that both indicators are malfunctioning, resulting in the
aircraft stalling and crashing into the Atlantic Ocean, killing all
189 people on board.

The MCAS received input only from a single AOA.

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

My intention was not to offend civilian pilots but my assertion was not tailored carefully and I can see how you could read it to think if Maverick wasn’t your pilot then you aren’t safe. Point taken and apologies for the careless insult. My point was that the training at US airlines is better, and if you have someone who is also a civilian airline pilot and ex military, that pilot, like the SW pilot, would probably be top notch from an experience and training perspective. You saw the same thing when Sullenberger landed on the Hudson in 2009. Again, My point was to assert that US airline pilots are in general better trained than overseas counterparts in second and third world countries. More pointedly, I would assert that with a US crew the second Max crash doesn’t happen. (Perhaps with any competent crew that could be said?)

That leads to my second point, which is to ask why doesn’t that get reported in the news, not to exonerate Boeing but to just be factual or balanced? My contention, given the leanings of current news organizations, is that it was far easier to blame Boeing’s greed than to focus on the errors the second crew made in the crash, given the nationality / ethnicity of the crew.

This is not to exonerate Boeing for the issues with the Max (!) but rather to assert that it is important to stay focused on the facts. One of the reasons we have very safe airlines is because after crashes, typically the NTSB doesn’t do the “pile on.” There is a careful investigation, the reasons and factors are determined as best as they can be given the evidence, and recommendations and changes are made based on the findings. When you are dealing with situations that require almost perfect performance for safety, that is really the approach you want, obviously. But regurgitating nonsense like “profits over people,” as someone here has done, is unlikely to actually uncover what went wrong, and what needs to be fixed. In the latest Max problem with the bolts, the issue seems to be a lack of documentation when this panel was removed, so there was no check that the panel was fully reinstalled. That is a more subtle point, and granular and fixable problem, then asserting simplistic mantras. And when addressed in that non-sensational manner, you will get actual fixes and safer air travel.

I guess I better update my account with BITOG and emphasize I am “ Just a Canadian, civilian pilot ( with 26,000 hours, 40 years experience )”

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

Redundancy didn't save this crew from becoming confused which AOA was
true and which AOA was false believing both AOA were false killing
themselves and 189 passengers... Pilot Error...

On 6 February 1996, Birgenair Flight 301 is scheduled to fly from
Puerto Plata to Frankfurt. On takeoff, the captain finds that his
airspeed indicator is not reading properly, though the co-pilot's
indicator is showing the correct speed. The pilots become confused and
believe that both indicators are malfunctioning, resulting in the
aircraft stalling and crashing into the Atlantic Ocean, killing all
189 people on board.

They knew there was a significant discrepancy between the FO versus CA indicated airspeed and should have rejected the take off.

Pilots cross check their airspeed on every take off ( 100 knots usually ) and when they are not indicating the same speed, reject.

 

[RAVL]

The MCAS received input only from a single AOA.

Again, if this was so obvious at the time, why did the U.S. and other airline safety boards accept the design? Obviously after the fact it is a problem. But why was it not corrected before? What was the chain of events and analysis that allowed the conclusion that this design was ok? What can we learn about that process so we don’t have similar disasters that become clear to self professed experts like you and me only after hundreds of people die? This is the point, not to argue with you, believe it or not.

Again, I do not want to defend Boeing (!!!!!). My point is about staying calm and factual, and not resorting to slogans that accomplish nothing in terms of advancing our understanding of how these disasters happen, and how they can be prevented.

You can continue to argue and yell about profits. That is fine, until I guess (God forbid) Airbus has a crash due to a suboptimal design and then I guess you can take to travel by foot, automobile, and ship.

 

[Astro14]

They knew there was a significant discrepancy between the FO versus CA indicated airspeed and should have rejected the take off.

Pilots cross check their airspeed on every take off ( 100 knots usually ) and when they are not indicating the same speed, reject.

But that reject needs to happen at the crosscheck, not at V1 after fumbling over the decision. That is the exact scenario that happened on a 767 once. At the 100 knot call, the captain’s airspeed (round dial) was in error. Captain’s speed tape on the Primary Flight Display (PFD) was good. Standby was good. FO round dial and PFD were good. So, 4 of 5 good.

I would have taken that flying, sorted it out airborne (may not have been able to do RVSM, for example).

But the Captain waited, rejected above V1, smoked the brakes, blew tires, and caused all sorts of heartaches.

So, yes, reject at low speed. Up to 100. In the high speed regime? I would take it flying. Sort it airborne. High speed rejects carry an entirely new set of risks.

The fumbling over the decision is unacceptable.

One of the things I emphasize in training, checking, and of course, flying, is a precise brief. The brief itself is a mental rehearsal. I loathe pilots who say things like “Reject is standard”. That is a failure to prepare, a failure to harmonize understanding across the crew. That kind of brief gets an unsat from me.

A rejected takeoff brief should start with something like this, “If you see something below 100 knots, call it out, I will either say continue or reject. I will reject below 100 for any critical system failure, be it hydraulic, electric, fuel, engine, or flight control. Above 100, I will only reject for engine failure, any fire, windshear, or the airplane is unable or unsafe to fly*”. “If I announce reject, I will go throttle idle, disconnect, speed brakes first, then reverse, above 85 knots, the autobrakes should engage. Back me up on speedbrake extension and auto brake engagement. Tell tower we are rejecting, and the runway we are on. If we reject above 100 knots, have them roll crash fire rescue. As we bring the airplane to a stop, tell the people to remain seated, then, regardless of the reason for the reject, we will do the rejected takeoff QRC from the card.”

Clear. Concise. Detailed expectations. Mental rehearsal as I point to the throttles, speedbrake, autobrakes, and QRC location. We, as a crew, now know exactly how we will execute this, and why.

Back to airspeed. Loss of one of 5 isn’t a big deal.

But BirgenAir 301 took it flying. Taking it flying is not a bad decision, but it is only a good decision if the crew can handle the emergency correctly, and they, frankly, did not. This is an accident involving a 757, so, I talk about it with crews. The airplane had sat for three weeks and did not have pitot covers for part of that time. Mud daubers built a nest. The Captain’s airspeed became an altimeter (which is what happens when a pitot tube is blocked), but the FO’s indicator was OK.

They failed to identify the accurate information. Lots of clues exist, IRS ground speed, standby instruments, trim, handling. They focused on systems (resetting breakers) instead of the critical task of flying the airplane manually. They kept climbing, which makes the airspeed discrepancy worse. They stalled it, and crashed.

In fairness to them, we now spend much more time training this scenario. It is required training. Crews are quick to recognize and analyze the situation. Training works.

A sea story from “back in the day”. I was flying through build ups, at night, off the carrier. Absolutely black night. No horizon. We flew though one particularly heavy rain shower while trying to find another airplane on radar - The airplane was about 350 knots, about 2 degrees nose up, wings level, and I had the throttles about halfway up.

Our airspeed went to zero while we were in the rain. I asked my RIO, “Hey, Ferris, what do you show for airspeed?” He said, “zero”. I replied, “That can’t be right. We were flying a second ago, and I haven’t changed anything.” He replied, “Our INS ground speed is 400”. “So, something happened to our airspeed indicators, then.” I said.

We didn’t touch anything. Kept wings level, 2 degrees, same power. A minute or two later, as we flew into clear air, the airspeed started working again. We were still about 300-350 knots.

Point is: you have to analyze. You have to determine what is real, what is accurate, and what is not. You absolutely must avoid panic. You absolutely must control the flight path of the airplane first, before starting to troubleshoot. Just like Ferris and I did that night.


*Unsafe to fly encompasses things like an airplane crossing the runway, flight control malfunction, failure to accelerate, loss of directional control, as examples, again, it need to be thought about and briefed at the gate, not at 100 knots.

 

[edyvw]

Again, if this was so obvious at the time, why did the U.S. and other airline safety boards accept the design? Obviously after the fact it is a problem. But why was it not corrected before? What was the chain of events and analysis that allowed the conclusion that this design was ok? What can we learn about that process so we don’t have similar disasters that become clear to self professed experts like you and me only after hundreds of people die? This is the point, not to argue with you, believe it or not.

Again, I do not want to defend Boeing (!!!!!). My point is about staying calm and factual, and not resorting to slogans that accomplish nothing in terms of advancing our understanding of how these disasters happen, and how they can be prevented.

You can continue to argue and yell about profits. That is fine, until I guess (God forbid) Airbus has a crash due to a suboptimal design and then I guess you can take to travel by foot, automobile, and ship.

Accepted design? Did you sleep over the whole thing, or just found out about this few days ago? In either case, you have a lot to catch up with.

 

[RAVL]

Accepted design? Did you sleep over the whole thing, or just found out about this few days ago? In either case, you have a lot to catch up with.

Before the plane was certified/approved to fly. You cannot just build a plane and fly it. It needs to be reviewed / approved by regulators.

I am done responding to you. Another tough guy behind the keyboard. It is unfortunate because you are intelligent but incapable of discussing anything in a polite tone. Take care.

 

[edyvw]

Before the plane was certified/approved to fly. You cannot just build a plane and fly it. It needs to be reviewed / approved by regulators.

I am done responding to you. Another tough guy behind the keyboard. It is unfortunate because you are intelligent but incapable of discussing anything in a polite tone. Take care.

Again, go back and review the whole MAX thing! I am not going to spend time here telling you what happen because you are lazy to do it yourself.

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

But that reject needs to happen at the crosscheck, not at V1 after fumbling over the decision. That is the exact scenario that happened on a 767 once. At the 100 knot call, the captain’s airspeed (round dial) was in error. Captain’s speed tape on the Primary Flight Display (PFD) was good. Standby was good. FO round dial and PFD were good. So, 4 of 5 good.

I would have taken that flying, sorted it out airborne (may not have been able to do RVSM, for example).

But the Captain waited, rejected above V1, smoked the brakes, blew tires, and caused all sorts of heartaches.

So, yes, reject at low speed. Up to 100. In the high speed regime? I would take it flying. Sort it airborne. High speed rejects carry an entirely new set of risks.

The fumbling over the decision is unacceptable.

One of the things I emphasize in training, checking, and of course, flying, is a precise brief. The brief itself is a mental rehearsal. I loathe pilots who say things like “Reject is standard”. That is a failure to prepare, a failure to harmonize understanding across the crew. That kind of brief gets an unsat from me.

A rejected takeoff brief should start with something like this, “If you see something below 100 knots, call it out, I will either say continue or reject. I will reject below 100 for any critical system failure, be it hydraulic, electric, fuel, engine, or flight control. Above 100, I will only reject for engine failure, any fire, windshear, or the airplane is unable or unsafe to fly*”. “If I announce reject, I will go throttle idle, disconnect, speed brakes first, then reverse, above 85 knots, the autobrakes should engage. Back me up on speedbrake extension and auto brake engagement. Tell tower we are rejecting, and the runway we are on. If we reject above 100 knots, have them roll crash fire rescue. As we bring the airplane to a stop, tell the people to remain seated, then, regardless of the reason for the reject, we will do the rejected takeoff QRC from the card.”

Clear. Concise. Detailed expectations. Mental rehearsal as I point to the throttles, speedbrake, autobrakes, and QRC location. We, as a crew, now know exactly how we will execute this, and why.

Back to airspeed. Loss of one of 5 isn’t a big deal.

But BirgenAir 301 took it flying. Taking it flying is not a bad decision, but it is only a good decision if the crew can handle the emergency correctly, and they, frankly, did not. This is an accident involving a 757, so, I talk about it with crews. The airplane had sat for three weeks and did not have pitot covers for part of that time. Mud daubers built a nest. The Captain’s airspeed became an altimeter (which is what happens when a pitot tube is blocked), but the FO’s indicator was OK.

They failed to identify the accurate information. Lots of clues exist, IRS ground speed, standby instruments, trim, handling. They focused on systems (resetting breakers) instead of the critical task of flying the airplane manually. They kept climbing, which makes the airspeed discrepancy worse. They stalled it, and crashed.

In fairness to them, we now spend much more time training this scenario. It is required training. Crews are quick to recognize and analyze the situation. Training works.

A sea story from “back in the day”. I was flying through build ups, at night, off the carrier. Absolutely black night. No horizon. We flew though one particularly heavy rain shower while trying to find another airplane on radar - The airplane was about 350 knots, about 2 degrees nose up, wings level, and I had the throttles about halfway up.

Our airspeed went to zero while we were in the rain. I asked my RIO, “Hey, Ferris, what do you show for airspeed?” He said, “zero”. I replied, “That can’t be right. We were flying a second ago, and I haven’t changed anything.” He replied, “Our INS ground speed is 400”. “So, something happened to our airspeed indicators, then.” I said.

We didn’t touch anything. Kept wings level, 2 degrees, same power. A minute or two later, as we flew into clear air, the airspeed started working again. We were still about 300-350 knots.

Point is: you have to analyze. You have to determine what is real, what is accurate, and what is not. You absolutely must avoid panic. You absolutely must control the flight path of the airplane first, before starting to troubleshoot. Just like Ferris and I did that night.


*Unsafe to fly encompasses things like an airplane crossing the runway, flight control malfunction, failure to accelerate, loss of directional control, as examples, again, it need to be thought about and briefed at the gate, not at 100 knots.

I would definitely not stop at, or above, V1, but these types of unreliable indicated speed problems normally become apparent well below V1.

The Captain on the 757 taking off from the Dominican Republic was aware of problems with his airspeed indicator 3 seconds after the FO called “ 80 knots”.

Any type of pitot obstruction ( bugs, pitot tube covers mistakenly not removed prior to flight ) will show up as soon as the take off begins.

On the Airbus, unreliable airspeed problems MAY be accompanied with a “ NAV ADR disagree “ or “ IAS discrepancy” caution , but many have happened without any cockpit warnings except that there is a noticeable difference in speed between both pilots airspeed indications at the 100 knot call.

Airbus says pilots should reject for any amber caution, or red warning ( NAV ADR disagree, and IAS discrepancy alerts are amber cautions ) below 100 knots. Above 100 knots, they say to rejects only for any red warnings or for the following amber cautions: side stick fault, thrust reverser fault, thrust lever angle fault.

Any pilot who decides to continue the take off after becoming aware of significant airspeed variations better make sure they are 100% sure about how to deal with unreliable airspeed problems ( more so taking off at night ) or else it will be much more dangerous than trying to stop on the runway despite how dangerous that can be approaching V1 ( well above that 100 knot airspeed cross check call ).

Today, because of some high profile unreliable airspeed accidents/incidents, aircraft manufacturers ( and memory items ) have published unreliable airspeed procedures unlike when this flight crashed. He should have stopped, even if at very high speed as it was obvious they became overwhelmed ( aircraft engine stalled due to high AOA , rolled over on its back, and entered a spin all the way to the ocean ) and lost control.

Even today, despite unreliable airspeed being a memory item on the Airbus, I make sure to point out where that exact checklist is in the QRH ( weird how stress makes people forget where checklists are when something happens ) , and what safe altitude we will use after take off if we have a problem and what type of equipment we have ( some Fins have a BUSS, some don’t and it’s just pitch and power ).

Airflow disruptions ( very small amounts of frozen water ) around the nose of the aircraft can cause serious unreliable airspeed problems. EVERY time we take off ( like the big winter storm yesterday ) in the winter , during a storm, I make sure to brief the procedure in greater detail than we are obliged , just in case. Melted snow ( windshield heat ) can refreeze below the windshield while taxiing out and cause unreliable airspeed problems on take off. It’s rare but it has happened.

The flight below knew they had speed indication problems at 57 knots but decided to continue when they should have stopped.

https://safetyfirst.airbus.com/unreliable-airspeed-at-takeoff/

https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/213551


https://www.caa.co.uk/media/4n3bpi3y/atsb-pre-flight-preparation-a330-18-07-18.pdf

https://safetyfirst.airbus.com/look-out-for-ice-ridges-on-the-lower-nose-fuselage/

https://simpleflying.com/aeroperu-flight-603-crash-anniversary/

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

Very good video regarding Malaysian 134 unreliable airspeed incident.