Plane crash has occurred in Philidelphia; Jan 2025

[Just a civilian pilot]

The odds of multiple instrument failures, all showing the same erroneous result, are infinitesimally small. I really do not think that was at work here.

But your question, “why don’t pilots trust their artificial horizon“, is a matter of basic human physiology. In order to fly IFR, you have to overcome physiology.

The vestibular input to your brain has been a developed pathway since you were born, when you learned to walk, you learned to rely on the vestibular input for balance, it’s how you determine when you are level, how to put one foot in front of the other.

It’s extraordinarily powerful. Most people have never experienced a disconnect between what their visual input and vestibular input. A lot of pilots who have never flown truly high-performance aircraft have never experienced it, at least, not significantly.

I watched a friend* of mine fly a perfectly good airplane into the water one night. It was March 15, 1996, on the John C. Stennis. You’ve never experienced dark until you’ve been on an aircraft carrier at sea, at night, under a cloud layer. There are no lights. There are no stars. There is absolutely no way to determine where the horizon is because everywhere you look is the same uniform inky blackness. An experienced naval aviator. A pilot with extensive training there was nothing wrong with the airplane, most likely scenario, because the airplane sank in 15,000 feet of water, was that he looked down at a warning light and then looked back up immediately, following a catapult shot. His plane nosed over and descended into the water. I was on the LSO platform at the time, watching the launch, and I grabbed the radio, realized I was on a different frequency than he was, and by the time I had rotated the selector, he was gone.

A significant longitudinal acceleration, like a catapult shot makes you feel that you’ve been tilted backwards. That is the effect of the fluid in your inner ear, rushing backwards under the acceleration. It makes you think that you’ve tilted nose up. You haven’t, of course, but the somatogravic illusion is strong.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sensory_illusions_in_aviation

https://skybrary.aero/articles/somatogravic-and-somatogyral-illusions

Things like a strong acceleration, like a Lear 55 on takeoff, confuse your inner ear, and the effect is more powerful than people realize. I’ve watched it kill an experienced, capable and disciplined crew.

I sincerely doubt that the crew of this Lear 55 had the skills, training, and discipline of my friend, and it is my belief that they simply succumbed to the same illusion that overpowered him.


*LT Don Cioffi, from Freehold, NJ. A good man, a good pilot, and a good LSO.

Moving your head ( aside from the distraction ) up and down when already high risk for spatial disorientation will make the confusion worse.

I think there was another F14 pilot ( test pilot ) who crashed off Virginia Beach because of spatial disorientation in daylight ( they think he also looked down at something and with the poor horizon got disorientated briefly but it was too late when he realized it ).

Not sure if he was a Grumman test pilot or USN.

The best pilots can crash if they don't manage distractions properly, no matter how good the training they have, or how much flying experience they have.

Being a weak pilot, or poorly trained just makes it even more dangerous.

Single pilot just increases the risks.

This conversation has made me remember a crash with two pilots, I forgot about the crash below, I flew for Bradley Air Services.

I did not know the pilots.


https://asn.flightsafety.org/asndb/326394

 

[The_Eric]

Is there equipment to train for the disorienting effects we're talking about here? If it does exist, is it limited to high budget (military) uses?

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

Is there equipment to train for the disorienting effects we're talking about here? If it does exist, is it limited to high budget (military) uses?

I have only received “ unusual attitude” recovery training in the 1980s when getting my commercial licence.

 

[ms21043]

I used to do maintenance on an air ambulance Learjet years ago. Few things I recall about it were how tight things were packed in, and servicing the 02.
Servicing the oxygen was interesting since it had a liquid oxygen system.
Another thing I remember was the climb performance of the airplane. Went on a post maintenance check flight with a couple of pilots who were called in to do it. These guys were doing something else and wanted to get it done ASAP. All they had to do was get it above, I think it was 30k feet, key the mike on HF and make sure they didn't get an engine fire warning.
Anyway, a light on fuel Learjet and a couple of motivated pilots demonstrated how fast it could get up and down. It was impressive.

 

[RedSpider]

Given some of the frustration here some have shown with people discussing the two most recent crashes, I'd thought I'd share some of the colossal ignorance I have encountered on another forum where this crash was being discussed.

One Einstein said:

"There is no way they are going to figure out why this plane crashed. I read they hit the ground almost vertical at 11,000 feet per minute. Thats over 250 mph. Thats only a few miles per hour shy of Mach 1. No way are the black boxes going to survive that."

I told them they were the stupidest person I had ever encountered on a forum and they shouldnt be talking about this crash or any other if for no other reason than their horrific math skills. I may have been banned for my comment, I dont know, I havent gone back to check.....

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

Given some of the frustration here some have shown with people discussing the two most recent crashes, I'd thought I'd share some of the colossal ignorance I have encountered on another forum where this crash was being discussed.

One Einstein said:

"There is no way they are going to figure out why this plane crashed. I read they hit the ground almost vertical at 11,000 feet per minute. Thats over 250 mph. Thats only a few miles per hour shy of Mach 1. No way are the black boxes going to survive that."

I told them they were the stupidest person I had ever encountered on a forum and they shouldnt be talking about this crash or any other if for no other reason than their horrific math skills. I may have been banned for my comment, I dont know, I havent gone back to check.....

Agreed but I have to admit, until I heard that this Learjet had a CVR, and the NTSB had found it, I was skeptical that they would ever really be able to know what happened, or have a very educated guess.

Hopefully they get useful information from that CVR.

 

[Astro14]

Is there equipment to train for the disorienting effects we're talking about here? If it does exist, is it limited to high budget (military) uses?

You experience the effects the first time that you are “under the hood” or in IMC and cannot see the outside world while flying an actual airplane.

Most people only get their instrument training in a simulator. The simulator trains you to read and believe your instruments, but it cannot, even with motion, create the accelerations necessary to induce vestibular phenomena like somatogravic illusion. That illusion is so strong that you cannot follow your instruments, because your amygdala takes over, dumps adrenaline into your body, and primal instincts for balance and survival over-ride what your eyes are seeing on little dials or screens.

However…

In the Navy, we flew the simulator, and then the airplane while the canopy was covered from the inside, and we did it in T-34s, T-2s, and the A-4. We even did acrobatics while “under the bag” in the A-4. The instructor up front would give the student, who was in back seat, control of the airplane, on a cardinal heading, at 450 knots, at 10,000 feet.

The student (me, for example) would do the following maneuvers, all in one smooth, continuous flow: loop, Immelman, split-S, half Cuban eight. Then give the airplane back to the instructor on the reciprocal heading, at 10,000 feet, 450 knots. We called it “The Squirrel Cage”.

Those maneuvers involve rolls, strong acceleration (4G), and excursions throughout the flight envelope as the top of the loop, Immelman, split S and half Cuban eight were all up around 18,000 feet and 200 knots.

By comparison, a takeoff and turn in a Lear 55 is child’s play.

And for that matter, so is flying around in a trainer, with modest climb rate, while never exceeding 30 degrees angle of bank. The training that most people receive is in a benign training airplane, then in a simulator.

So, when I tell you that LT Don Cioffi succumbed to the illusion, after demonstrating the Squirrel Cage in an A-4, I promise that someone without his training can fall prey to the same thing.

 

[wwillson]

I have had spacial disorientation so bad that without the knowledge that my inner ear was lying to me and the discipline to understand that the instruments were going to save my life, I wouldn't be here. I was flying with an instrument student (me being the instructor) in IMC (in the clouds) and picking up ice. Ice is very serious business in any airplane, but in a small single engine airplane with no de/anti ice, it's life for death. I had crooned my neck so I could see how much ice was on the outside air temperature probe. Simultaneously, the student pilot was letting the airplane turn and descend to the left. When I got my attention back inside, I saw things were going sideways. To make things worse, I said, "MY AIRPLANE" and he wouldn't let go. I literally had to slap his arm hard to get him to let go. His inner ear told him something was wrong, but he didn't understand what was wrong or how to fix it, so he froze on the controls. By the time I got control of the airplane we were entering a spiral in the clouds and I had very little time to correct the situation, as we were 1500' AGL being vectored to the ILS. My inner ear was so screwed up that I felt like we were climbing with wings level, but we where turning to the left and descending. It took all my power to look at the instruments and do exactly as they were telling me, because my inner ear was telling me otherwise. I am alive today not because I had great training, but because I took the time to really understand what spacial disorientation is and can do and when I trained primary students for unusual attitude recovery, I would really mess with their inner ear for a while before letting them have the airplane back. This did as much for me as it did for them. I did this hundreds of times in the previous year before the above incident happened. The key is I had recent repetitive experience dealing with spacial disorientation. It probably saved my life.

This is a quote of mine from a previous post where I described spacial disorientation:

Most of the time, you don't suffer from spacial disorientation, but when you do it is a very very powerful force within you. You have to recognize that you are disoriented and have the discipline to understand that the instruments are correct and know that your brain is screaming lies to you. To take it a step further, you also have to be able to do this when you have a single instrument failure or multiple instrument failures. The failed instruments may all also be telling you a lie. It's not easy and those who aren't proficient are in serious trouble.

My point is that without good and recent training on how to recognize and deal with spacial disorientation, even experienced crews can succumb to its evils. The pilot not flying was almost certainly not watching the instruments, because he was busy with ATC and the radios. The pilot flying was likely disoriented.

 

[JimPghPA]

People well versed in avaition know to wait for the final investigation report. Often until that report is released, everything else is speculation.

There are many possable causes. The investigators will carefully look over all they can.

Just a very long shot possable cause idea:

At that phase of flight, there are a few routine things the pilots would be doing, such as retracting wheels and retracting flaps, in the correct order, and at apropiate speeds. Each of those creates demands of the hydraulic systems. Sudden pressure changes in hydraulic systems can be when a worn component fails. Or a related component fails. What would happen if a flap failed to operate properly during retract? Just a long shot speculation, and probably less than a 1% chance that is the cause. Asemertic lift would explain the rool.

There's literaly hundreds of things the investigators will have to look at. The recording box(es) will help.

And as already mentioned, entering clouds quickly after takeoff and losing visual of ground can be disorienting and require a lot of IFR skill set.

Again, until the final report, it's just speculation.

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

NTSB said the preliminary report will be out in about a month.

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

People well versed in avaition know to wait for the final investigation report. Often until that report is released, everything else is speculation.

There are many possable causes. The investigators will carefully look over all they can.

Just a very long shot possable cause idea:

At that phase of flight, there are a few routine things the pilots would be doing, such as retracting wheels and retracting flaps, in the correct order, and at apropiate speeds. Each of those creates demands of the hydraulic systems. Sudden pressure changes in hydraulic systems can be when a worn component fails. Or a related component fails. What would happen if a flap failed to operate properly during retract? Just a long shot speculation, and probably less than a 1% chance that is the cause. Asemertic lift would explain the rool.

There's literaly hundreds of things the investigators will have to look at. The recording box(es) will help.

And as already mentioned, entering clouds quickly after takeoff and losing visual of ground can be disorienting and require a lot of IFR skill set.

Again, until the final report, it's just speculation.

The flap system has asymmetry protection in case one of the flaps doesn’t retract, or extend symmetrically.

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

What’s the best way to avoid losing control when flying in clouds?

Get an Instrument rating, and stay current.

You’re not supposed to be in the clouds if you don’t have one anyways and you will kill yourself ( JFK ).

In all my years of flying, I do not recall getting vertigo ( airline pilots ) and I haven’t flown with any pilots who have either.

You don’t need fancy training to be able to keep control of any civilian plane.

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

Forgot to mention, IMHO, pilots are a lot more dependant on automation than in the past and while automation is great, it can lead to being uncomfortable when it’s not available, which is rare in airline ops.

If your used to putting the AP right after take off, all the time, and keeping it on until close to minimums ( even if you see the runway 10 miles out ) , you can become dependant on it and not feel comfortable hand flying.

When you hand fly, you have to keep your instrument scan going at a higher level , particularly if not using the auto thrust.

Not being overly dependant on automation ( when it’s allowed, when it’s appropriate ) is a “ training tool” you can do yourself to be a better pilot and improve your scan.

We are required to monitor what the plane us doing and scan the instruments when the automation is on but I find you really watch what’s going on more when not too dependant on it as a training proficiency tool when it’s allowed, appropriate and doesn’t increase pilot workload.

All pilots that fly airlines ( or corporate , Air Ambulance ) obviously have to have an IFR rating but staying current ( not an issue with commercial pilots who fly IFR ) and proficient is the way to keep control and avoid disorientation.

That said, if you feel you’re not comfortable with your scan ( can feel that weird feeling of disorientation ), put the AP on ( that Learjet had to have an AP ).

Every sim ( not part of any airline training ) , I ASK to practice stuff to try and learn and stay as sharp as possible.

RVR 600 ( we are allowed down to RVR 250 but no airport in Canada allows that …all minimum RVR 600 ) take off, night with no flight directors and an engine failure at V1 and rotate into the darkness/clouds while the other pilot does the drill and requires me to look and confirm which thrust lever he wants to retard and fire push button to push overhead.

Great way to practice instrument flying.


The easy way is to put the AP on at 100 feet.

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

The odds of multiple instrument failures, all showing the same erroneous result, are infinitesimally small. I really do not think that was at work here.

But your question, “why don’t pilots trust their artificial horizon“, is a matter of basic human physiology. In order to fly IFR, you have to overcome physiology.

The vestibular input to your brain has been a developed pathway since you were born, when you learned to walk, you learned to rely on the vestibular input for balance, it’s how you determine when you are level, how to put one foot in front of the other.

It’s extraordinarily powerful. Most people have never experienced a disconnect between what their visual input and vestibular input. A lot of pilots who have never flown truly high-performance aircraft have never experienced it, at least, not significantly.

I watched a friend* of mine fly a perfectly good airplane into the water one night. It was March 15, 1996, on the John C. Stennis. You’ve never experienced dark until you’ve been on an aircraft carrier at sea, at night, under a cloud layer. There are no lights. There are no stars. There is absolutely no way to determine where the horizon is because everywhere you look is the same uniform inky blackness. An experienced naval aviator. A pilot with extensive training - there was nothing wrong with the airplane. Most likely scenario, because the airplane sank in 15,000 feet of water, was that he looked down at a warning light and then looked back up immediately, following a catapult shot. His plane nosed over and descended into the water. I was on the LSO platform at the time, watching the launch, and I grabbed the radio, realized I was on a different frequency than he was, and by the time I had rotated the selector, he was gone.

A significant longitudinal acceleration, like a catapult shot makes you feel that you’ve been tilted backwards. That is the effect of the fluid in your inner ear, rushing backwards under the acceleration. It makes you think that you’ve tilted nose up. You haven’t, of course, but the somatogravic illusion is strong.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sensory_illusions_in_aviation

https://skybrary.aero/articles/somatogravic-and-somatogyral-illusions

Things like a strong acceleration, like a Lear 55 on takeoff, confuse your inner ear, and the effect is more powerful than people realize. I’ve watched it kill an experienced, capable and disciplined crew.

I sincerely doubt that the crew of this Lear 55 had the skills, training, and discipline of my friend, and it is my belief that they simply succumbed to the same illusion that overpowered him.


*LT Don Cioffi, from Freehold, NJ. A good man, a good pilot, and a good LSO.

2 pilot S3 Viking. Captain and co pilot.

Very deep water off Puerto Rico.

https://www.tampabay.com/archive/19...or-2-pilots-lost-in-crash-of-training-flight/

 

[Astro14]

2 pilot S3 Viking. Captain and co pilot.

Very deep water off Puerto Rico.

https://www.tampabay.com/archive/19...or-2-pilots-lost-in-crash-of-training-flight/

Yep. That was them. Though, as I recall, Tom Wilcox was an NFO, so Don Cioffi was the only pilot flying. The S-3 generally flew with an NFO in the right seat during that era.They were launched as a the recovery tanker, just before we started landing airplanes.

I will not ever forget that night.

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

Yep. That was them. Though, as I recall, Tom Wilcox was an NFO, so Don Cioffi was the only pilot flying. The S-3 generally flew with an NFO in the right seat during that era.They were launched as a the recovery tanker, just before we started landing airplanes.

I will not ever forget that night.

I read they crashed about 1 mile from the ship after it was launched.

The ultimate “ critical phase of flight “.

But those NFO’s must watch carefully what’s going on during launches given they sit up front, right beside the pilot and must have some instruments in front of them ( Viking ).

Sad story. Even worse for families when remains cannot be found and the cause of the accident cannot be determined.

 

[Astro14]

I read they crashed about 1 mile from the ship after it was launched.

The ultimate “ critical phase of flight “.

But those NFO’s must watch carefully what’s going on during launches given they sit up front, right beside the pilot and must have some instruments in front of them ( Viking ).

Sad story. Even worse for families when remains cannot be found and the cause of the accident cannot be determined.

I have flown the Viking. There’s a complete set of instruments, flight controls, throttles, everything, in the right hand seat. You can fly the aircraft from the right seat, just like an airliner.

Because we never found the wreckage, and the Navy doesn’t search for wreckage in water that deep, unless there is external influence, as there was in the case of Kara Hultgreen, we never got a definitive answer.

But, we did have a couple of clues. From a careful examination of the PLAT footage that was tracking their launch, we could see that both engines were running. The single tail light remained illuminated, which meant that the aircraft had electrical power, at least the DC essential, which would illuminate and power the pilot’s flight instruments. We could see that flap retraction was normal, and the wings remained level. We also know that the aircraft had a history of the APU door warning on the cat shot. Maintenance had adjusted the micro switch on the APU door, but each successive shot dislodged the door, or the micro switch, causing a warning. The APU door warning was on the center console, and the master caution was in front of the pilot.

So, an experienced crew launches on a dark night, and during the catapult shot ( which is several times the acceleration of a Lear 55 at full thrust) a warning illuminates on the center console. Two sets of eyeballs look to see what the warning was, and when they look back forward, the instruments don’t make sense, because clearly they are climbing rapidly, so pushing forward on the stick makes sense...

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

I have flown the Viking. There’s a complete set of instruments, flight controls, throttles, everything, in the right hand seat. You can fly the aircraft from the right seat, just like an airliner.

Because we never found the wreckage, and the Navy doesn’t search for wreckage in water that deep, unless there is external influence, as there was in the case of Kara Hultgreen, we never got a definitive answer.

But, we did have a couple of clues. From a careful examination of the PLAT footage that was tracking their launch, we could see that both engines were running. The single tail light remained illuminated, which meant that the aircraft had electrical power, at least the DC essential, which would illuminate and power the pilot’s flight instruments. We could see that flap retraction was normal, and the wings remained level. We also know that the aircraft had a history of the APU door warning on the cat shot. Maintenance had adjusted the micro switch on the APU door, but each successive shot dislodged the door, or the micro switch, causing a warning. The APU door warning was on the center console, and the master caution was in front of the pilot.

So, an experienced crew launches on a dark night, and during the catapult shot ( which is several times the acceleration of a Lear 55 at full thrust) a warning illuminates on the center console. Two sets of eyeballs look to see what the warning was, and when they look back forward, the instruments don’t make sense, because clearly they are climbing rapidly, so pushing forward on the stick makes sense...

Would the crew have known this aircraft had this history and how it would trigger a warning light during a CAT launch?

Do Navy pilots check any type of logbooks that Airline pilots check before pushback?

I am not being critical, I am curious.

Do they do any threat mitigation briefings ( "this aircraft has a known history of....if we get a warning..." ).

Yesterday, my sharp FO noticed a cut in one of the tires ( hard to see, near the bottom ) so we called maintenance to take a look. They said we were good to go but it would get replaced that evening when in the hangar for an inspection.

While we always do the emergency review briefings, I talked about what we will do ( in our our books but we never talk about this part ) if the tire blows on take off.

If it blows within 20 knots of V1, we will continue. Obviously, if it blows prior to that speed, we will reject if it blows.

Same with other maintenance issues that , despite being fixed , have had a history in the aircraft defect logbook. If there is a history , we talk about it in case we get a caution after 1500 ( only serious things are not inhibited from 80 knots until 1500 after take off ) climbing out.

So Kara Hultgreen got special consideration, again.

The deepest part of the Atlantic Ocean is off the coast of Puerto Rico ( 27, 493 feet deep ).

 

[Astro14]

Would the crew have known this aircraft had this history and how it would trigger a warning light during a CAT launch?

Do Navy pilots check any type of logbooks that Airline pilots check before pushback?

I am not being critical, I am curious.

Do they do any threat mitigation briefings ( "this aircraft has a known history of....if we get a warning..." ).

Yesterday, my sharp FO noticed a cut in one of the tires ( hard to see, near the bottom ) so we called maintenance to take a look. They said we were good to go but it would get replaced that evening when in the hangar for an inspection.

While we always do the emergency review briefings, I talked about what we will do ( in our our books but we never talk about this part ) if the tire blows on take off.

If it blows within 20 knots of V1, we will continue. Obviously, if it blows prior to that speed, we will reject if it blows.

Same with other maintenance issues that , despite being fixed , have had a history in the aircraft defect logbook. If there is a history , we talk about it in case we get a caution after 1500 ( only serious things are not inhibited from 80 knots until 1500 after take off ) climbing out.

So Kara Hultgreen got special consideration, again.

The deepest part of the Atlantic Ocean is off the coast of Puerto Rico ( 27, 493 feet deep ).

This crash took place in the north Puerto Rican Op Area. So, yeah. Deep water.

The crew would’ve reviewed the logbook and known the log history, including every single gripe and every single sign off.

Much of what the Airlines now take for granted came from the military. The idea of quality assurance inspectors, for maintenance procedures, a second, independent, mechanic who checks and signs off the work of the mechanics that actually did the repair - that came first from Naval aviation in the early 1960s.

A Navy crew will cover every emergency procedure, as well as tactics, mission, and intelligence for the flight, but unlike the Airlines, the memory items are far more rigorous and detailed. There are several immediate action, memory item procedures for the 767, but there were over 30 for the F-14. About the same for the F/A-18. The brief is also hours long - not like an airline flight. Threats, for a tactical jet crew, are, again, nothing like an airline flight, there are so many more dimensions of threat in a tactical flight.

6 blank pages were on the memory item test. You had to take the test every two weeks. It was closed book, no notes, and you filled out every memory item on the test, you had to get the spelling, precise wording, numbering and punctuation correct - or it was a fail.

The S-3 didn’t have caution inhibits like an airliner. Not that I remember. But it’s been 30 years since I flew one. The F-14 was similar - no inhibits - though you could cancel a Master Caution light by pressing it.

Not only did we brief every contingency, and cover emergency procedures, in the ready room as we briefed, most of us would recite the engine failure bold face (memory items) as we crossed the jet blast deflector onto the catapult.

From memory, 28 years after I last flew the F-14:

Single-Engine Failure Field/Catapult

1. Set 10 degree pitch attitude (14 units AOA, maximum )
2. Rudder - Opposite Roll/Yaw Supplemented by Stick.
3. Both throttles - As required for a positive rate of climb.
4. Landing gear - UP
5. Jettison - If Required.

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

This crash took place in the north Puerto Rican Op Area. So, yeah. Deep water.

The crew would’ve reviewed the logbook and known the log history, including every single grip and every single sign off.

Much of what the Airlines now take for granted came from the military. The idea of quality assurance inspectors, for maintenance procedures, a second, independent, mechanic who checks and signs off the work of the mechanics that actually did the repair - that came first from Naval aviation in the early 1960s.

A Navy crew will cover every emergency procedure, as well as tactics, mission, and intelligence for the flight, but unlike the Airlines, the memory items are far more rigorous and detailed. There are several immediate action, memory item procedures for the 767, but there were over 30 for the F-14. About the same for the F/A-18. The brief is also hours long - not like an airline flight. Threats, for a tactical jet crew, are, again, nothing like an airline flight, there are so many more dimensions of threat in a tactical flight.

6 blank pages were on the memory item test. You had to take the test every two weeks. It was closed book, no notes, and you filled out every memory item on the test, you had to get the spelling, precise wording, numbering and punctuation correct - or it was a fail.

The S-3 didn’t have caution inhibits like an airliner. Not that I remember. But it’s been 30 years since I flew one. The F-14 was similar - no inhibits - though you could cancel a Master Caution light by pressing it.

Not only did we brief every contingency, and cover emergency procedures, in the ready room as we briefed, most of us would recite the engine failure bold face (memory items) as we crossed the jet blast deflector onto the catapult.

From memory, 28 years after I last flew the F-14:

Single-Engine Failure Field/Catapult

1. Set 10 degree pitch attitude (14 units AOA, maximum )
2. Rudder - Opposite Roll/Yaw Supplemented by Stick.
3. Both throttles - As required for a positive rate of climb.
4. Landing gear - UP
5. Jettison - If Required.

So, both crew members on that Viking knew the plane had a history of a warning light going off triggered by the catapult launch because it had happened several times before.

Distractions are a huge threat.

I fly ( not as much anymore ) with former CF18 pilots , they have talked about the numerous, detailed memory items that they have to know. Yep, they also talk about having to write them down , exactly the way it’s supposed to be worded.

I review a few time critical emergencies in my car before I park for work.