I don’t disagree with you; this is why I said these types of loans should require higher capital charges.
There is one thing I would tell folks though, having worked in finance and law for a long time - it’s that the bigger firms have for a long time tied the compensation of pretty much anyone who can implicate risk to how the tails of those risks work out. To take some old and older but well known examples: when Long Term Capital Management went under and had to be rescued in the late 90s the principals of the firm - highly experienced and knowing their business very well - lost everything. Similarly when Lehman failed, management and again anyone in trading, risk management, etc. had almost all their compensation and most of their net worth tied to the fortunes of the firm. Post GFC, firms have become even stricter about this. There is no one at a mid size or large commercial bank or investment bank who is going to cash out of their investment or banking clients and leave the firm with the losses, it just doesn’t work that way, particularly not in the last 15 years. Even a recent failure like Credit Suisse was much more about 10 plus years of bad risk management that ruined the franchise.
Where you still will find poor risk management is at the smaller community banks and what not. Many of the firms may be credit unions or local banks, perhaps state regulated, where such practices are not adequately discouraged by capital penalties (ie requiring the bank to hold more capital against higher risk, under collateralized loans).
But the reality is that when politicians talk about measures to make sure banks don’t refuse to do business with, or otherwise “discriminate” against certain groups or neighborhoods, they are often encouraging banks, via weak capital and
Liquidity requirements, to make high risk loans. To some degree the housing crisis of 08 really began years earlier when the government started taking steps to make it affordable for everyone to own a home. It would be inaccurate to blame that factor alone as there were also holes in the regulatory framework, but the push for everyone to own a home certainly got the ball rolling towards a disaster 10 or so years later.
Long was of saying there is more to it than tying risk taking to incentives. That’s been done already, for a long time in fact.