Air India Flight AI171 (Boeing 787-8) Crash

Well, reading your post, let’s examine what he actually called for:

It was cameras in the cockpit of small turbine airplanes that did not have FDRs or CVRs.

So, very different airplane. And this is a poor man substitute for a CVR or FDR.

Hardly applicable to this case.

In fact, it looks like an admission that the FDR and CVR are the superior instruments

That was only the first time it was suggested by the NTSB. Since then there’s been several recommendations that the technology was there where the NTSB suggested such a requirement for commercial aviation.
 
I'm smart enough to know I have nothing of value to add to a discussion about commercial aviation but I'm deeply troubled by the idea that 260 people died because 2 switches in the cockpit were moved to the off position, whether accidentally or intentionally, and for whatever reason it wasn't possible to correct it in time to prevent the crash.

@Astro14 , a couple of questions:

If the switches were installed incorrectly or were not functioning correctly in regard to the detent feature and deliberate motion needed to turn on and off would it have been reported by a previous crew and would that ground the airplane?

In the preliminary report it says one pilot was heard to ask the other why he did the cutoff and the other pilot responded he did not do so. Is it known exactly who is speaking on these recordings and not reported at this time? If not wouldn't it be important to know who said what?

In this report the exact time the switches were transitioned from RUN to CUTOFF is known. If a hand was seen moving to that center area at that exact time stamp if there were a video would that be important to the investigation? A video might have shown one hand turning the switches off and preventing another hand from turning them back on for 10 seconds.

In another crash, maybe the one at San Francisco when the jet was too low and hit the edge of the filled land there was talk of cultural differences where a first officer would be hesitant to point out an error to the captain because it wasn't acceptable behavior to correct a superior. I don't remember the nationality and it may be the wrong crash but it was a talking point. Are you familiar with this?
 
I'm smart enough to know I have nothing of value to add to a discussion about commercial aviation but I'm deeply troubled by the idea that 260 people died because 2 switches in the cockpit were moved to the off position, whether accidentally or intentionally, and for whatever reason it wasn't possible to correct it in time to prevent the crash.

@Astro14 , a couple of questions:

If the switches were installed incorrectly or were not functioning correctly in regard to the detent feature and deliberate motion needed to turn on and off would it have been reported by a previous crew and would that ground the airplane?

In the preliminary report it says one pilot was heard to ask the other why he did the cutoff and the other pilot responded he did not do so. Is it known exactly who is speaking on these recordings and not reported at this time? If not wouldn't it be important to know who said what?

In this report the exact time the switches were transitioned from RUN to CUTOFF is known. If a hand was seen moving to that center area at that exact time stamp if there were a video would that be important to the investigation? A video might have shown one hand turning the switches off and preventing another hand from turning them back on for 10 seconds.

In another crash, maybe the one at San Francisco when the jet was too low and hit the edge of the filled land there was talk of cultural differences where a first officer would be hesitant to point out an error to the captain because it wasn't acceptable behavior to correct a superior. I don't remember the nationality and it may be the wrong crash but it was a talking point. Are you familiar with this?
Was the last one Asiana 214 ? I have flown them several times …
 
Was the last one Asiana 214 ? I have flown them several times …

Yeah - that was Asiana 214. The really odd thing about that one was that it had three pilots in the cockpit, including a relief pilot in the jumpseat. Also two captains seated at the controls, although the senior (instructor) captain was in the right seat. I would think as the senior captain, he wouldn't have hesitated since he had more seniority.
 
In another crash, maybe the one at San Francisco when the jet was too low and hit the edge of the filled land there was talk of cultural differences where a first officer would be hesitant to point out an error to the captain because it wasn't acceptable behavior to correct a superior. I don't remember the nationality and it may be the wrong crash but it was a talking point. Are you familiar with this?

You can look it up, but it was a more senior instructor captain in the right seat and a captain in the left seat. If there was any cultural issue, it would have been about mutual respect where he might not have wanted to embarrass his colleague regardless of seniority or rank.
 
I'm smart enough to know I have nothing of value to add to a discussion about commercial aviation but I'm deeply troubled by the idea that 260 people died because 2 switches in the cockpit were moved to the off position, whether accidentally or intentionally, and for whatever reason it wasn't possible to correct it in time to prevent the crash.

@Astro14 , a couple of questions:

If the switches were installed incorrectly or were not functioning correctly in regard to the detent feature and deliberate motion needed to turn on and off would it have been reported by a previous crew and would that ground the airplane?

In the preliminary report it says one pilot was heard to ask the other why he did the cutoff and the other pilot responded he did not do so. Is it known exactly who is speaking on these recordings and not reported at this time? If not wouldn't it be important to know who said what?

In this report the exact time the switches were transitioned from RUN to CUTOFF is known. If a hand was seen moving to that center area at that exact time stamp if there were a video would that be important to the investigation? A video might have shown one hand turning the switches off and preventing another hand from turning them back on for 10 seconds.

In another crash, maybe the one at San Francisco when the jet was too low and hit the edge of the filled land there was talk of cultural differences where a first officer would be hesitant to point out an error to the captain because it wasn't acceptable behavior to correct a superior. I don't remember the nationality and it may be the wrong crash but it was a talking point. Are you familiar with this?
I feel the same way you do about the fact that the movement of these switches from RUN to CUTOFF caused this crash, regardless of HOW or WHY they were moved.

At first, I thought, like we've discussed earlier in the thread, that there were only 2 possibilities, with regard to how these switches got turned off:

1. Failure of one of the engines, resulting in one of the pilots turning off fuel to the wrong engine (pilot error).

2. One of the pilots turning off both switches, deliberately, with malicious intent.

Now, I'm not so sure.

I'm not familiar with Boeing aircraft - I work on the Embraer ERJ, which doesn't have these "fuel cutoff switches". There are only a couple of ways to shut down an engine in flight on the ERJ:

A) Pull the fire handle, located on the ceiling control panel, which closes the engine fuel shutoff valve.

OR

B) Turn the engine START/STOP switch (located on center control pedestal) to STOP, which sends a signal to the FADEC to close the engine fuel metering valve. However, these switches are covered by a spring-loaded cover which must be opened to gain access to the switch. There is no way to bump it. Furthermore, it'll only shut the engine down if the throttle levers are at idle.


So, in the ERJ, very deliberate action would be required to shut an engine down in the air. In fact, I'd go so far as to say that it would be nearly impossible for an engine to be shut down accidentally, in the Embraer, due to the design.

Before this Air India 787 accident, I'm sure it would have seemed quite unlikely to everyone that the fuel cutoff switches in the 787 could have been accidentally switched off in flight. After all, they have the guards on the outboard sides to prevent inadvertent contact, and, they're equipped with the detents, which, *if operating correctly*, require pulling the switch UP AND OVER the detent in order to change the position of the switch.

However, now we've all heard that there are reports of these fuel cutoff switches having their detents broken (on the 737, but it's the same switch, right?), which, theoretically, would allow the switches to be bumped down to the cutoff position by a hand, wrist, or arm.

So, I think it still seems unlikely that the position of the cutoff switches in the Air India 787 could have been accidentally moved.

But is it possible?

I'd like to hear the opinions of the guys here who fly Boeings and have actually used these switches.
 
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These switches require deliberate movement to shut down the engines. They are designed this way so they cannot accidentally be inadvertently shut off.

Much like the ignition switch on your steering column. You would never "accidentally" switch it off, while trying to do something else, because it requires a specific intentional movement to do so.

I just can't see how this could be done accidentally. Especially to BOTH switches, one after the other. You would have to use BOTH hands simultaneously to shut both switches off or on at the same time. This because the switch itself has to be lifted in order to be placed in the OFF position.
 
These switches require deliberate movement to shut down the engines. They are designed this way so they cannot accidentally be inadvertently shut off.

Much like the ignition switch on your steering column. You would never "accidentally" switch it off, while trying to do something else, because it requires a specific intentional movement to do so.

I just can't see how this could be done accidentally. Especially to BOTH switches, one after the other. You would have to use BOTH hands simultaneously to shut both switches off or on at the same time. This because the switch itself has to be lifted in order to be placed in the OFF position.
Not if the detent/locking feature is broken or somehow disengaged.
 
https://simpleflying.com/faa-boeing-reassurance-787-fuel-switch-locks-safe/#:~:text=In December 2018, the FAA,fuel control switch locking feature.”

From the article linked above:

"In December 2018, the FAA issued a Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) for owners and operators of the 717, 737 Next Generation, 737 MAX, 747-400, 747-8, 757, 767, 787, MD-11, and MD-90 aircraft, warning “the potential for disengagement of the fuel control switch locking feature.”

However, at the time, the United States regulator said that, with limited data available, “the airworthiness concern is not an unsafe condition that would warrant” an AD. Providing background about the bulletin, the FAA said that Boeing had received reports from operators of the 737 that the fuel control switches were installed with the locking feature disabled. The switches’ locking feature prevents inadvertent movement of the switches, with the pilots having to lift the switches in order to move them. Without the locking feature, flight crews can freely move the switches, exposing them to potential inadvertent movement, which could result in an in-flight engine shutdown, the FAA warned."


So, it wasn't considered an acute enough problem to warrant an airworthiness directive (AD) to immediately address the issue. But it was thought to be enough of an issue that FAA issued a "Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin" (SAIB) on the matter.

If the locking feature on the switches wasn't working, it's plausible that the switches could have possibly been bumped down to "CUTOFF".
 
Was the last one Asiana 214 ? I have flown them several times …
I believe that I have talked at length about Asiana 214 on this site.

Asiana 214 struck the seawall because the Captain, who was under training at the time, did not understand how the auto Flight system worked. He had selected a mode (flight level change) that put the throttles at idle, like an open descent in the Airbus. This was a poor choice, poor use of auto flight, and he had both hands on the yoke, instead of one hand on the throttles, or he would have known they were at approach idle the entire time.

It works the same in all Boeing. And every Boeing I’ve flown has a big warning, in red letters, highlighted and indented on the page - that use is prohibited below 1000 feet.

It is in the limitation section of the aircraft flight manual.

Use of FLCH below 1,000 feet is prohibited.

But he selected it, nobody corrected him, and nobody pointed out that his airspeed, got to more than 30 knots below the target. OVER THIRTY KNOTS SLOW - and no one said anything. A cultural problem - nobody wanted to embarrass the Captain.

God love the 777, though, it was still flying at 103 knots - when it struck the seawall and was strong enough to remain intact despite the impact.

It was 100% pilot error. Asiana tried to blame Boeing - who pointed to the flight manual prohibition - and that protest died the ignominious death it should have. If the manufacturer specifically prohibits you from doing something, you can’t blame them when a crash results from you doing the prohibited thing.

Back to the fuel control switches on the 787 - They’re the same as every other Boeing.

You have to pull hard against a spring, to lift the switch over a locking lug, to move them. They are protected, physically, by “ears” on the center pedestal, from being bumped but even if you were to pound them with your fist, they would not move to “CUTOFF” because of that lock.

The lock is mechanical, external, and not easily overcome. I doubt a hammer blow would move those switches. They must be pulled out, then moved. It’s a safety feature that has been on Boeing Airplanes for many, many decades. You can’t “bump” the engines off.
 
https://simpleflying.com/faa-boeing-reassurance-787-fuel-switch-locks-safe/#:~:text=In December 2018, the FAA,fuel control switch locking feature.”

From the article linked above:

"In December 2018, the FAA issued a Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) for owners and operators of the 717, 737 Next Generation, 737 MAX, 747-400, 747-8, 757, 767, 787, MD-11, and MD-90 aircraft, warning “the potential for disengagement of the fuel control switch locking feature.”

However, at the time, the United States regulator said that, with limited data available, “the airworthiness concern is not an unsafe condition that would warrant” an AD. Providing background about the bulletin, the FAA said that Boeing had received reports from operators of the 737 that the fuel control switches were installed with the locking feature disabled. The switches’ locking feature prevents inadvertent movement of the switches, with the pilots having to lift the switches in order to move them. Without the locking feature, flight crews can freely move the switches, exposing them to potential inadvertent movement, which could result in an in-flight engine shutdown, the FAA warned."


So, it wasn't considered an acute enough problem to warrant an airworthiness directive (AD) to immediately address the issue. But it was thought to be enough of an issue that FAA issued a "Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin" (SAIB) on the matter.

If the locking feature on the switches wasn't working, it's plausible that the switches could have possibly been bumped down to "CUTOFF".
I have been flying Boeings for 28 years and I have NEVER seen an airplane without the locking mechanism on the switch in perfect working order.

This keeps getting repeated where this accident gets discussed. People keep dredging it up. Basically, with this air worthiness directive directs, is an inspection of the switch itself to make sure that the locking mechanism isn’t broken. That the internal spring that holds the switch forward, is still working, to require that lifting to move the switch.

The throttle quadrant on the mishap aircraft was replaced in 2023. I’m certain that it came out of the factory with working locks, and it’s ridiculously unlikely that both locking mechanisms failed in 2 years. I’m flying 29 year old Boeings with the original switches, and they still work just as intended.
 
I have been flying Boeings for 28 years and I have NEVER seen an airplane without the locking mechanism on the switch in perfect working order.

This keeps getting repeated where this accident gets discussed. People keep dredging it up. Basically, with this air worthiness directive directs, is an inspection of the switch itself to make sure that the locking mechanism isn’t broken. That the internal spring that holds the switch forward, is still working, to require that lifting to move the switch.

The throttle quadrant on the mishap aircraft was replaced in 2023. I’m certain that it came out of the factory with working locks, and it’s ridiculously unlikely that both locking mechanisms failed in 2 years. I’m flying 29 year old Boeings with the original switches, and they still work just as intended.
So, it's your opinion that it would be all but impossible for the fuel cutoff switch position to be changed inadvertently.

That means one of the pilots deliberately moved them to CUTOFF.

And since the switches were moved to CUTOFF 3 seconds after liftoff, and there's no evidence of any engine failure or thrust deficit, doesn't the process of elimination leave malicious intent as the only option?
 
I believe that I have talked at length about Asiana 214 on this site.

Asiana 214 struck the seawall because the Captain, who was under training at the time, did not understand how the auto Flight system worked. He had selected a mode (flight level change) that put the throttles at idle, like an open descent in the Airbus. This was a poor choice, poor use of auto flight, and he had both hands on the yoke, instead of one hand on the throttles, or he would have known they were at approach idle the entire time.

It works the same in all Boeing. And every Boeing I’ve flown has a big warning, in red letters, highlighted and indented on the page - that use is prohibited below 1000 feet.

It is in the limitation section of the aircraft flight manual.

Use of FLCH below 1,000 feet is prohibited.

But he selected it, nobody corrected him, and nobody pointed out that his airspeed, got to more than 30 knots below the target. OVER THIRTY KNOTS SLOW - and no one said anything. A cultural problem - nobody wanted to embarrass the Captain.

God love the 777, though, it was still flying at 103 knots - when it struck the seawall and was strong enough to remain intact despite the impact.

It was 100% pilot error. Asiana tried to blame Boeing - who pointed to the flight manual prohibition - and that protest died the ignominious death it should have. If the manufacturer specifically prohibits you from doing something, you can’t blame them when a crash results from you doing the prohibited thing.

Back to the fuel control switches on the 787 - They’re the same as every other Boeing.

You have to pull hard against a spring, to lift the switch over a locking lug, to move them. They are protected, physically, by “ears” on the center pedestal, from being bumped but even if you were to pound them with your fist, they would not move to “CUTOFF” because of that lock.

The lock is mechanical, external, and not easily overcome. I doubt a hammer blow would move those switches. They must be pulled out, then moved. It’s a safety feature that has been on Boeing Airplanes for many, many decades. You can’t “bump” the engines off.
IIRC, 1 of 3 lost was hit by a firetruck - indeed the Triple 7 has been the work horse of modern times …
 
Agree. But as was mentioned before, wouldn't that have been reported as a maintenance issue by a proceeding crew?
Maybe, maybe not.

But, as I said, I’m not familiar with Boeings and although I am familiar with guarded switches and switches that have a “hump” that they have to be lifted over in order for their position to be changed, I haven’t operated this particular switch.

Astro said he thinks it almost impossible that these switches could be inadvertently bumped off, so I trust his opinion.

To me, unless someone can present another viable theory, that leaves malicious intent as pretty much the only option here, since there’s no indication that there was dual engine failure, the restart procedure for which would have called for movement of the switches.
 
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