Air India Flight AI171 (Boeing 787-8) Crash

[Astro14]

So, if someone pulls the thrust levers back to idle after take off, what would happen like with the seat sliding back theory with the pilot yanking back on the control column and thrust levers ?

If the answer is the thrust will automatically increase even with the TL at idle by accident , doesn’t that make the seat sliding back theory impossible ( aside from the PNF unlikely to let things go that far )?

I am o.k with crash theories as long as they make sense.

Boeing isn’t like Airbus - Airbus varies thrust with the throttles in the climb detent. So, you really don’t need your hand on the TLs, you need to pay attention to the TLAs on the engine display.

Boeing throttles (thrust levers) move, thrust is set by the position of the thrust levers. Tactile feedback is more intuitive and more rapid than looking at tiny display information, hands on the TLs provides that feedback, instantly, instinctively. Hands and feet on flight controls and throttles below 2,500 is mandatory at our company, and that includes on takeoff. Captain’s hand comes off at V1, PF hand goes back on at gear up - the airplane is flying, and the pilot needs to be flying it. The Airbus is designed to be hands off, the Boeing hands on. Different design philosophies, different flying styles.

Boeing AFDS (Auto flight direction system) will not allow you to fly below 1.3 x stall speed. The airplane will add thrust to stay out of that regime. IF the airplane exceeds a certain AOA, you get an “ALPHA” FMA (flight mode annunciation) in the thrust column and the throttles advance until the AOA is under control. This is a 757 feature, but not a 767 feature, which uses a stick pusher to lower the nose, but the AFDS will still add thrust at 1.3 stall, and extend leading edge devices at critical AOA, it just won’t go into “ALPHA” mode.

In the 787, you get a very similar thrust response, as well as all the other stall indications. The airplane adds thrust if you get slow, and extends leading edge flaps at a certain AOA. I don’t have the space, here, to discuss all of the envelope protections, but they are extensive, including both flight control and thrust responses and protections.

I’m typed in the A320, 747, 757, and 767, and in reading the 787 flight manual, it’s more sophisticated than the A320, offering more tactile feedback, more envelope protections, more flight control features. It handles yaw on an engine failure for example, and uses aileron and spoiler to increase pitch when landing flaps are extended if the pilot fails to do so, in order to better position the airplane for landing. Again, I can’t regurgitate hundreds of FM pages, but the airplane itself is very well thought out. It’s the latest generation of flight control systems - it’s the apex of airliner design and thinking - and I suspect the A350 is similar. The A320 is the previous generation, just as the 757/767 is the generation prior to that.

Airbus TL at idle results in idle thrust. Boeing TL at idle results in idle thrust. That’s how both airplanes are designed. If you hit alpha floor in the Airbus - you will get TOGA thrust, regardless of thrust lever position, IIRC. I don’t see where the Boeing has an Alpha Floor - type feature, but I haven’t read the entire FM, yet, and I know that the 757 adds thrust above a certain AOA, as does the 767, and I suspect that the 787 is similar - but the throttles move in order to add power - unlike the Airbus.

IF someone is using the TLs as a grab handle because their seat slid back (and I think this theory unlikely), then both airplanes will be at idle (with the alpha floor exception above, which is inhibited below 50 feet in the Airbus).

Both airplanes offer envelope protections that would keep the airplane below stall AOA, which would explain why the airplane was 10-15 degrees ANU all the way to the crash - it was flying slow without quite stalling.

The real question - where was the thrust?

Not the thrust levers, per se, but how much power were the engines producing?

As every Naval Aviator* knows - stick input controls airspeed, and power controls rate of climb/descent.

This airplane was descending, and not stalled - the only explanation was low power output.


*First explained in the outstanding book, “Stick and Rudder” by Wolfgang Langewische in the 1940s. His treatise remains one of the best references on how airplanes fly ever written.

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

Boeing isn’t like Airbus - Airbus varies thrust with the throttles in the climb detent. So, you really don’t need your hand on the TLs, you need to pay attention to the TLAs on the engine display.

Boeing throttles (thrust levers) move, thrust is set by the position of the thrust levers. Tactile feedback is more intuitive and more rapid than looking at tiny display information, hands on the TLs provides that feedback, instantly, instinctively. Hands and feet on flight controls and throttles below 2,500 is mandatory at our company, and that includes on takeoff. Captain’s hand comes off at V1, PF hand goes back on at gear up - the airplane is flying, and the pilot needs to be flying it. The Airbus is designed to be hands off, the Boeing hands on. Different design philosophies, different flying styles.

Boeing AFDS (Auto flight direction system) will not allow you to fly below 1.3 x stall speed. The airplane will add thrust to stay out of that regime. IF the airplane exceeds a certain AOA, you get an “ALPHA” FMA (flight mode annunciation) in the thrust column and the throttles advance until the AOA is under control. This is a 757 feature, but not a 767 feature, which uses a stick pusher to lower the nose, but the AFDS will still add thrust at 1.3 stall, and extend leading edge devices at critical AOA, it just won’t go into “ALPHA” mode.

In the 787, you get a very similar thrust response, as well as all the other stall indications. The airplane adds thrust if you get slow, and extends leading edge flaps at a certain AOA. I don’t have the space, here, to discuss all of the envelope protections, but they are extensive, including both flight control and thrust responses and protections.

I’m typed in the A320, 747, 757, and 767, and in reading the 787 flight manual, it’s more sophisticated than the A320, offering more tactile feedback, more envelope protections, more flight control features. It handles yaw on an engine failure for example, and uses aileron and spoiler to increase pitch when landing flaps are extended if the pilot fails to do so, in order to better position the airplane for landing. Again, I can’t regurgitate hundreds of FM pages, but the airplane itself is very well thought out. It’s the latest generation of flight control systems - it’s the apex of airliner design and thinking - and I suspect the A350 is similar. The A320 is the previous generation, just as the 757/767 is the generation prior to that.

Airbus TL at idle results in idle thrust. Boeing TL at idle results in idle thrust. That’s how both airplanes are designed. If you hit alpha floor in the Airbus - you will get TOGA thrust, regardless of thrust lever position, IIRC. I don’t see where the Boeing has an Alpha Floor - type feature, but I haven’t read the entire FM, yet, and I know that the 757 adds thrust above a certain AOA, as does the 767, and I suspect that the 787 is similar - but the throttles move in order to add power - unlike the Airbus.

IF someone is using the TLs as a grab handle because their seat slid back (and I think this theory unlikely), then both airplanes will be at idle (with the alpha floor exception above, which is inhibited below 50 feet in the Airbus).

Both airplanes offer envelope protections that would keep the airplane below stall AOA, which would explain why the airplane was 10-15 degrees ANU all the way to the crash - it was flying slow without quite stalling.

The real question - where was the thrust?

Not the thrust levers, per se, but how much power were the engines producing?

As every Naval Aviator* knows - stick input controls airspeed, and power controls rate of climb/descent.

This airplane was descending, and not stalled - the only explanation was low power output.


*First explained in the outstanding book, “Stick and Rudder” by Wolfgang Langewische in the 1940s. His treatise remains one of the best references on how airplanes fly ever written.

Can you please show me the information that says Airbus was designed to be flown hands off and Boeing hands on, I have never read or heard that before. It’s a myth. Now does the Airbus handle as well as a B767, no , but it’s designed to be flown manually whenever the pilots wants to do it.

I will agree that Airbus has designed more advanced auto flight systems , but Airbus allows the pilot to decide how much automation to use , just like Boeing. I hand fly all the time , when permitted ( raw data, auto thrust off ).

Pilots who fly Airbus can put the autopilot on when they want, fly raw data if they want ( visual approach ), manual thrust, manual landings , manual braking just like any other aircraft. I just flew into LAS today, raw data, everything off.

Just like every other airline and operation, levels of automation at pilots discretion depends on SOPs more than Airbus telling pilots they shouldn’t fly manually.

I can’t hand fly a Cat 3 approach anymore than a B767 Captain can. Full automation and auto land is mandatory.

As for the keeping hands hands on the TL after rotation. Whether or not the TL move ( move on Boeing, don’t move on Airbus ) , it’s not the position of the TL that matters , it’s where the power is and all a pilot has to do is look at the engine instruments and if the reason for pilots keeping their hands on the TL is in case they need power, then the same thing should apply to the Airbus regardless if the TL move but we don’t do that for safety reasons after rotation ( not because the TL don’t move ).

Boeing auto throttles don’t move after the thrust is set on take until climb thrust, just like on the Airbus ( but they never move ).

I won't debate about different airlines SOPS , that’s their business , but I will totally disagree with anyone who says Airbus pilots don’t have to keep their hands on the TL because Airbus designed the plane to keep pilots hands off and because the TL don’t move. If that was the case, why would pilots even bother putting their hands on the TL on final approach until power reduction in the flare.

We keep our hands on the TL on final in case we need to add power, even if the auto thrust is on.

People who even remotely entertained the seat sliding back theory don’t seem to realize that if that happened, any pilot that had their hand on the TL and pulled them back to idle would also do the same with the control column but the nose never increased pitch on those videos , which is what would have happened.

The low speed protections don’t hold the nose where it is, they simply prevent the aircraft from stalling ( if the AoA gets too high ).

The problem today is, regardless what brand of plane pilots fly, they are becoming more dependant on automation and less comfortable manually flying.

What I have noticed, flying for several companies, is that flight operations prefers pilots using full use of automation ( except airplane on good weather days ) , regardless of its a Boeing, Airbus, CRJ, Embraer.

If you don’t use it, you lose it ( skill/ confidence ), not written in any book.

Same with VNAV. Cross check versus let it tell you when to descend or making altitude restrictions.

 

[Astro14]

Can you please show me the information that says Airbus was designed to be flown hands off and Boeing hands on, I have never read or heard that before. It’s a myth. Now does the Airbus handle as well as a B767, no , but it’s designed to be flown manually whenever the pilots wants to do it.

I will agree that Airbus has designed more advanced auto flight systems , but Airbus allows the pilot to decide how much automation to use , just like Boeing. I hand fly all the time , when permitted ( raw data, auto thrust off ).

Pilots who fly Airbus can put the autopilot on when they want, fly raw data if they want ( visual approach ), manual thrust, manual landings , manual braking just like any other aircraft. I just flew into LAS today, raw data, everything off.

Just like every other airline and operation, levels of automation at pilots discretion depends on SOPs more than Airbus telling pilots they shouldn’t fly manually.

I can’t hand fly a Cat 3 approach anymore than a B767 Captain can. Full automation and auto land is mandatory.

As for the keeping hands hands on the TL after rotation. Whether or not the TL move ( move on Boeing, don’t move on Airbus ) , it’s not the position of the TL that matters , it’s where the power is and all a pilot has to do is look at the engine instruments and if the reason for pilots keeping their hands on the TL is in case they need power, then the same thing should apply to the Airbus regardless if the TL move but we don’t do that for safety reasons after rotation ( not because the TL don’t move ).

Boeing auto throttles don’t move after the thrust is set on take until climb thrust, just like on the Airbus ( but they never move ).

I want debate about different airlines SOPS , that’s their business , but I will totally disagree with anyone who says Airbus pilots don’t have to keep their hands on the TL because Airbus designed the plane to keep pilots hands off and because the TL don’t move. If that was the case, why would pilots even bother putting their hands on the TL on final approach until power reduction in the flare.

We keep our hands on the TL on final in case we need to add power, even if the auto thrust is on.

People who even remotely entertained the seat sliding back theory don’t seem to realize that if that happened, any pilot that had their hand on the TL and pulled them back to idle would also do the same with the control column but the nose never increased pitch on those videos , which is what would have happened.

The low speed protections don’t hold the nose where it is, they simply prevent the aircraft from stalling ( if the AoA gets too high ).

The problem today is, regardless what brand of plane pilots fly, they are becoming more dependant on automation and less comfortable manually flying.

What I have noticed, flying for several companies, is that flight operations prefers pilots using full use of automation ( except airplane on good weather days ) , regardless of its a Boeing, Airbus, CRJ, Embraer.

If you don’t use it, you lose it ( skill/ confidence ), not written in any book.

Same with VNAV. Cross check versus let it tell you when to descend or making altitude restrictions.

I am type-rated, and experienced, in the A-320. I know how it flies and I flew it manually when it was appropriate.

So, I wasn't the one arguing that a pilot's hands don't belong on the thrust levers after rotation. I believe they do. I believe in flying the airplane with hands and feet on the flight controls and throttles when in a critical phase of flight, even if the automation is engaged.

You were quite vocal, in the post below, about keeping hands off TLs after rotation until after thrust reduction - but now you talk about hand flying and being hands on and not relying on automation.

So, which is it that you're advocating? Let the automation work or be a pilot and fly it?

Many foreign carriers do not allow their pilots to hand fly - it's autopilot on as soon as allowed and off as late as allowed.

Wonder where Air India falls on that spectrum?

Curious what their sops say because I have never flown for an airline where the PF puts their hands back on the thrust levers after rotation for safety reasons ( in case your seat slides back or incapacitation ). It’s not allowed at my airline until it’s time to select climb thrust.

That said, I have seen a few pilots try to put their hands on the thrust levers just after rotation ( new hires that used to do it at their previous company according to them when asked why they do it ) but I tell them to take their hands off them until climb thrust as soon as soon as I see their hands move towards them. Makes me very uncomfortable seeing a pilot do that.

Sorry folks, I have a very hard time believing this one and any airline that allows that shouldn’t allow it until thrust reduction altitude.

There is no advantage to keeping you hand on the thrust levers right after rotation and even if you need TOGA for safety reasons ( wind shear ) , it will be be a 1 second delay pushing the thrust levers full forward which is safer in the long run in case the PF , for whatever reason, pulls the thrust levers back.

If the crash was caused by this, which I highly doubt ( accidentally retarded ), it will prove how dangerous it can be.

Seat sliding back/pilot incapacitation is why we don’t allow it.

I can’t see any scenario where a pilots seat sliding back causing the PF to retard both thrust levers to idle causing a plane to crash ( 600 feet is more than high enough for the other pilot to salvage the situation , especially when self preservation kicks in ) could happen with another pilot sitting beside them.

If this did happen, we would have seen a dramatic increase in pitch in those videos but we never saw it.

It’s unsafe to allow pilots to do it ( put hands on TL right after rotation ).

Hopefully any airline that allows it runs a sim scenario where the PF becomes incapacitated right after take off ( with their hands on the TL ) and retards both to idle to see how the other pilot reacts.

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

I am type-rated, and experienced, in the A-320. I know how it flies and I flew it manually when it was appropriate.

So, I wasn't the one arguing that a pilot's hands don't belong on the thrust levers after rotation. I believe they do. I believe in flying the airplane with hands and feet on the flight controls and throttles when in a critical phase of flight, even if the automation is engaged.

You were quite vocal, in the post below, about keeping hands off TLs after rotation until after thrust reduction - but now you talk about hand flying and being hands on and not relying on automation.

So, which is it that you're advocating? Let the automation work or be a pilot and fly it?

Many foreign carriers do not allow their pilots to hand fly - it's autopilot on as soon as allowed and off as late as allowed.

Wonder where Air India falls on that spectrum?

The way you were explaining the Airbus you would think I never flew it. I have flown it for 23 years. If you talk down to other experienced pilots, expect pushback. I am not a student.

Please let me know when you find information that says Airbus designed the plane to be hands off as opposed to other makes.

I guarantee you, pilots who fly the B787 use automation the same amount as any Airbus pilots. They put the autopilot on at the same altitude on average , take it off at the same stage on the approach , use the automation , auto throttles and auto brake , just the same way any Airbus pilot does. Same for other planes.

We will disagree with the hands on the TL part after rotation.

Any airline I have worked for, the critical phase of flight is below 10,000 and nobody keeps their hands on the TL , or control column from take off to 10,000 and the opposite on the way down if we are talking about the critical phase of flight. So, any pilot concerned about the critical phase of flight should be keeping their hands on both below 10,000 but they don’t ( except after take off and on the approach with some airlines ).

You are very vocal and opinionated yourself.

For those interested in what the critical phase of flight is:

https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/publications/directline/dl4_sterile.htm

 

[Astro14]

The way you were explaining the Airbus you would think I never flew it. I have flown it for 23 years. If you talk down to other experienced pilots, expect pushback. I am not a student.

Please let me know when you find information that says Airbus designed the plane to be hands off as opposed to other makes.

I guarantee you, pilots who fly the B787 use automation the same amount as any Airbus pilots. They put the autopilot on at the same altitude on average , take it off at the same stage on the approach , use the automation , auto throttles and auto brake , just the same way any Airbus pilot does. Same for other planes.

We will disagree with the hands on the TL part after rotation.

Any airline I have worked for, the critical phase of flight is below 10,000 and nobody keeps their hands on the TL , or control column from take off to 10,000 and the opposite on the way down if we are talking about the critical phase of flight. So, any pilot concerned about the critical phase of flight should be keeping their hands on both below 10,000 but they don’t ( except after take off and on the approach with some airlines ).

You are very vocal and opinionated yourself.

For those interested in what the critical phase of flight is:

https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/publications/directline/dl4_sterile.htm

I don’t write all of my posts just for you. There is a broad audience reading this thread, and you’ve been providing Airbus answers to Boeing questions, and I am clarifying some of the points.

We disagree on thrust levers and hand flying. I am bound by company policy, just as you are, and I think the hands on requirement below 2,500 is a good one. I meant critical phase of flight as take off and landing. I know the FAA definition, just as you do. Not what I meant.

This crash has some interesting aspects to it, and I suspect that one of the investigation points will be the lack of hand flying skills in a highly automated airplane. Not uncommon in foreign carriers.

As a pilot who advocates for flying without automation, as I do, I am surprised at the inconsistency - you turn the auto thrust off to hand fly but you won’t allow other pilots to even touch the TLs when you don’t think it’s appropriate. You argue against even touching them in airplanes you have not ever flown, without knowing how those systems work, and how other airplanes might operate.

What you advocate is very different than how I flew the A-320. Hands and feet were required to be on the flight controls, including rudders and TLs, below 2,500 and that included immediately after takeoff.

The airplane is clearly meant to be flown by the computers - managed speed, thrust levers that don’t move, a stick that filters pilot inputs through 7 flight control computers - and many pilots are comfortable with that, and many companies require that - but I hand flew the jet, just as you do, only I hand flew it more completely - with my hands on the TLs.

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

I don’t write all of my posts just for you. There is a broad audience reading this thread, and you’ve been providing Airbus answers to Boeing questions, and I am clarifying some of the points.

We disagree on thrust levers and hand flying. I am bound by company policy, just as you are, and I think the hands on requirement below 2,500 is a good one. I meant critical phase of flight as take off and landing. I know the FAA definition, just as you do. Not what I meant.

This crash has some interesting aspects to it, and I suspect that one of the investigation points will be the lack of hand flying skills in a highly automated airplane. Not uncommon in foreign carriers.

As a pilot who advocates for flying without automation, as I do, I am surprised at the inconsistency - you turn the auto thrust off to hand fly but you won’t allow other pilots to even touch the TLs when you don’t think it’s appropriate. You argue against even touching them in airplanes you have not ever flown, without knowing how those systems work, and how other airplanes might operate.

What you advocate is very different than how I flew the A-320. Hands and feet were required to be on the flight controls, including rudders and TLs, below 2,500 and that included immediately after takeoff.

The airplane is clearly meant to be flown by the computers - managed speed, thrust levers that don’t move, a stick that filters pilot inputs through 7 flight control computers - and many pilots are comfortable with that, and many companies require that - but I hand flew the jet, just as you do, only I hand flew it more completely - with my hands on the TLs.

Astro,

I find you don’t properly read what people say at times.

Did you not hear me say that it’s company policy to not touch the TL after the Captain takes their hand off the TL until thrust reduction altitude if it’s the FO’s leg?

It’s not up to me, it’s what company SOPs say.

I am one of the few Captains that lets pilots take the auto thrust for landing ( the only other but who let pilots do it just went on the B787 ) partly because it’s allowed , and I am comfortable ( it’s not hard to tell if a pilot cannot keep the speed within limits on final ).

I fail to see any inconsistency if you read what I said.

I know how pilot incapacitation works , and the risks of seats sliding back. You said yourself that United had an upset due a pilots seat sliding back. That’s a ( especially incapacitation ) enough knowledge for me to feel it’s not with the risk if it was left up to me.

I wish I could share a scary pilot incapacitation story but I am not allowed to talk about it but they happen as rare as they are.

Do you know why the TL don’t move on the Airbus, because they always work, perfectly, always. I have never, ever seen a problem with auto thrust on the Airbus. There is no need to have them move to see what’s going on, it works perfectly. No need to give the TL a small push forward , ever. That’s why they don’t move.

Once again, pilots who fly the B787, 767 , B777 at my airline fly with the same level of automation as any Airbus pilot does. I know, I have talked to them about.

As far as not properly understanding systems , or the Airbus which you said you are type rated on, I have heard you say several inaccurate things at times and if you want to know what , let me know. I have a good memory.

BTW, I fly just as “completely” as any other pilot whether my hands are on the stick/TL or not.

 

[Astro14]

Astro,

I find you don’t properly read what people say at times.

Did you not hear me say that it’s company policy to not touch the TL after the Captain takes their hand off the TL until thrust reduction altitude if it’s the FO’s leg?

It’s not up to me, it’s what company SOPs say.

I am one of the few Captains that lets pilots take the auto thrust for landing ( the only other but who let pilots do it just went on the B787 ) partly because it’s allowed , and I am comfortable ( it’s not hard to tell if a pilot cannot keep the speed within limits on final ).

I fail to see any inconsistency if you read what I said.

I know how pilot incapacitation works , and the risks of seats sliding back. You said yourself that United had an upset due a pilots seat sliding back. That’s a ( especially incapacitation ) enough knowledge for me to feel it’s not with the risk if it was left up to me.

I wish I could share a scary pilot incapacitation story but I am not allowed to talk about it but they happen as rare as they are.

Do you know why the TL don’t move on the Airbus, because they always work, perfectly, always. I have never, ever seen a problem with auto thrust on the Airbus. There is no need to have them move to see what’s going on, it works perfectly. No need to give the TL a small push forward , ever. That’s why they don’t move.

Once again, pilots who fly the B787, 767 , B777 at my airline fly with the same level of automation as any Airbus pilot does. I know, I have talked to them about.

As far as not properly understanding systems , or the Airbus which you said you are type rated on, I have heard you say several inaccurate things at times and if you want to know what , let me know. I have a good memory.

BTW, I fly just as “completely” as any other pilot whether my hands are on the stick/TL or not.

So, you don’t like what I say, and attack both my personality and reading comprehension?

And then you say, “United had an upset…” when 1. I absolutely did not say that , and 2. It was LATAM. Clearly, a reading comprehension issue, unless you’re intentionally misrepresenting my post, for some other purpose.

You’re clearly concerned with pilot incapacitation and argue against a pilot touching the engine controls - which simply bolsters my contention, developed from years of flying the Airbus, that the airplane is designed to fly hands off. You’re advocating hands off TL in certain flight regimes, like the one in this crash, and then arguing that the airplane is not designed to be flown hands off.

But that is based on your experience with one airplane at one airline.

It’s not necessarily extensible to other aircraft types, and other airline SOPs. If the manufacturer, aircraft flight manual, or airline SOP require hands on, then that’s how it should be flown. Personally, I think a pilot should 1. Know how to fly manually, and 2. have their hands and feet on the flight controls and TLs below a certain critical altitude. That’s based on witnessing LOCI events in the simulator from pilots who did not adhere to that SOP (and it is an SOP here).

So, I am basing my position both on my own airline SOP and on actual experience, not imagined threat.

And in imaging that threat, you are, again, providing an Airbus answer to a Boeing question, or more precisely, an Air Canada Airbus answer to an Air India 787 question. Interesting, but tangential at best and, at worst, distracting.

And since you want to disagree with my points by making the Ad Hominem argument, then I am out of this thread.

I chose not to play your game.

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

So, you don’t like what I say, and attack both my personality and reading comprehension?

And then you say, “United had an upset…” when 1. I absolutely did not say that , and 2. It was LATAM. Clearly, a reading comprehension issue, unless you’re intentionally misrepresenting my post, for some other purpose.

You’re clearly concerned with pilot incapacitation and argue against a pilot touching the engine controls - which simply bolsters my contention, developed from years of flying the Airbus, that the airplane is designed to fly hands off. You’re advocating hands off TL in certain flight regimes, like the one in this crash, and then arguing that the airplane is not designed to be flown hands off.

But that is based on your experience with one airplane at one airline.

It’s not necessarily extensible to other aircraft types, and other airline SOPs. If the manufacturer, aircraft flight manual, or airline SOP require hands on, then that’s how it should be flown. Personally, I think a pilot should 1. Know how to fly manually, and 2. have their hands and feet on the flight controls and TLs below a certain critical altitude. That’s based on witnessing LOCI events in the simulator from pilots who did not adhere to that SOP (and it is an SOP here).

So, I am basing my position both on my own airline SOP and on actual experience, not imagined threat.

And in imaging that threat, you are, again, providing an Airbus answer to a Boeing question, or more precisely, an Air Canada Airbus answer to an Air India 787 question. Interesting, but tangential at best and, at worst, distracting.

And since you want to disagree with my points by making the Ad Hominem argument, then I am out of this thread.

I chose not to play your game.

Astro,

This is not a game.

Anyone who says “ spare us your bravado” on a previous thread because an Airline pilot ( Captain ) feels the safest thing to do is land when dealing with an extreme emergency ( closest place is a restricted military base ) is nit what I would call dealing with other people, and experienced professional pilots, respectfully and that’s getting personal.

A few years ago, you bragged about taking off from Denver ( while you put down my airline for not having predictive windshear on all aircraft ) , with a student flying with a 20 knot windshear loss reported.

You bragged about how the B757 “ never lost any altitude ( yeah, what happens if you lost an engine and there is never any guarantee the next flight won’t lose more than 20 knots ) while the reactive windshear warning went off ( ne er heard tbst go off in my career …..except in the sim ).

Despite me shaking my professional head someone would mention that on a public forum ( and the student flying ) and thinking it was unsafe, I never accused you of bragging about it ( bravado ). If I had said that, I can only imagine what you would have said.

If you think people are getting personal with you, please think twice what you say to other people.

I don’t put up with anyone in our training department not being careful with how they talk to pilots , I am well known for it. Debrief us, don’t try and talk down or make us look stupid.

I apologize for saying it was a United flight but it furthers my point about the risk of a seat sliding back on take off/climb out.

Btw, you said the Airbus was meant to be flown by computers, that’s exactly how the B787 is designed - fly by wire.

That said, even with all those computers, the plane will fly and respond based on what inputs the pilot manually tells it to do.

 

[MolaKule]

After 16 pages and no definitive data from the Indian or NTSB groups, we still have no probable cause, etc.

So let's take a break shall we?

 

[Dave Hess]

I wonder if Boeing is very worried about the CVR showing glitches in their software ?

Alarms not going off…… or critical warnings not being triggered ?

 

[fdcg27]

I wonder if Boeing is very worried about the CVR showing glitches in their software ?

Alarms not going off…… or critical warnings not being triggered ?

At this stage, I'm sure that both Boeing and GE are going through everything as part of an internal investigation.
Right now I'm sure everyone including Boeing, GE, Air India and the last MRO to do heavy maintenance on the accident aircraft are worried about what the investigation will reveal.

 

[Dave Hess]

At this stage, I'm sure that both Boeing and GE are going through everything as part of an internal investigation.
Right now I'm sure everyone including Boeing, GE, Air India and the last MRO to do heavy maintenance on the accident aircraft are worried about what the investigation will reveal.

I asked this question before.

Who / which agency is analyzing the CVR ?

I’m sure some are worried about the data on there. Maybe some of the data accidentally gets erased.

 

[dkryan]

I asked this question before.

Who / which agency is analyzing the CVR ?

I’m sure some are worried about the data on there. Maybe some of the data accidentally gets erased.

The flight recorders are physically at the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau in New Delhi, India.

Purportedly data has been downloaded from both devices and is being studied to determine a cause.

The AAIB is being assisted by the U.S. NTSB, Boeing, and GE Aerospace.

 

[dkryan]

India government officials claim all data extraction and analysis is being handled using newly acquired digital forensics infrastructure.

 

[dkryan]

Oddly enough, though, those same government officials denied a request from the United Nations to allow an ICAO-appointed aviation investigator to participate in the probe.

ICAO standards dictate a preliminary finding must be published within thirty days of the crash. That puts a report as being due in mid-July.

Those same government officials said the report publication is on schedule.

 

[Dave Hess]

Hopefully no hush money gets involved and malfeasance happens.

 

[fdcg27]

Hopefully no hush money gets involved and malfeasance happens.

Since US NTSB, Boeing and GE are already involved, I'd doubt that there would be much chance of a coverup even were anyone in the Indian investigation team so inclined.
My guess is that the ICAO was seen as playing no useful role and were thus not invited to observe.

 

[GON]

Since US NTSB, Boeing and GE are already involved, I'd doubt that there would be much chance of a coverup even were anyone in the Indian investigation team so inclined.
My guess is that the ICAO was seen as playing no useful role and were thus not invited to observe.

Thats a very good point.

What value was ICAO bringing to the investigation? I see so many people show up to things that bring no value, what does the ICAO bring that the NTSB, Boeing, and GE are not fluent at.

 

[y_p_w]

Since US NTSB, Boeing and GE are already involved, I'd doubt that there would be much chance of a coverup even were anyone in the Indian investigation team so inclined.
My guess is that the ICAO was seen as playing no useful role and were thus not invited to observe.

I’m guessing one conspiracy theory is that since GE is looking at the possibility of engine (or engine control) issues, they might have an incentive to send in people from their flight recorder division to fake the data.

 

[DirectRejection]

I saw a theory today that makes sense. One engine failed and the pilot completely shut down the wrong engine, the one that was working. Tragic pilot error. Every other theory involves redundancy to ostensibly avoid failure and thus is not plausable. Liability would cause a slow walk in announcing what really happened.