Everything is designed to get the most profit per vehicle at the expense of the dumb consumers.
Toyota finally comes clean...
- Thread starter Da Game
- Start date
- Status
Lets get some illumination and clear some smoke .
From ;
............acurazine.com/forums/showthread.php?t=345488
I broke this address so that " link charges etc " will be eliminated .
Add https.......... to make it work .
Like all things toyota , download and print copies - my opinion - the good stuff always disappears .
Search engines/SEARCH ALTERNATIVES/TEXT QUOTES have interesting variances as well .
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
EXTRACTED FROM ;
( roughly 7 - 10 % original text . ) My adds/comments in ( Bold . )
To preview ( short ) and purchase/subscribe / see some nice support material ;
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB115644337137844667.html
Larger extracts and complete copies available all over the Net - many automotive ( NON TOYOTA - mostly ) Forums and Blogs .
Key text ( in my opinion as relates to these engines and Sludge ) has *********** above and below
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WALL STREET JOURNAL 25AUGUST2006
Toyota May Delay New Models
To Address Rising Quality Issues
By NORIHIKO SHIROUZU
August 25 , 2006 Page A1
Toyota Motor Corp., jarred by a surge of recalls and quality problems, ...................................... .................................................................
................................................................................................................................ But the fast-paced expansion has come with a cost: an increasing number of quality problems in North America, Japan and elsewhere ...........................................................................
.................................................................................................................
- So is the number of Toyota vehicles being recalled for quality problems.
Last year ( 2005 ) in the U.S. -- its largest market by volume -- Toyota recalled 2.38 million vehicles, according to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. That's more than the 2.26 million it sold. Overall, the company sold nearly eight million vehicles world-wide.
This year (as of 31JULY2006 ) , the company has recalled 628,000 vehicles in the U.S., and people familiar with the matter say it may soon recall an additional half-million vehicles. ( 885,000 - 1.2M - ??? ACTUAL YR. TOTAL ) The latest recall would affect the current generation of the Sienna minivan, because of concern that poorly designed locking devices for rear seats may fail to securely anchor them to the vehicle floor.............................................................
***********************************************************************************************************************
Recalls also are on the rise in Japan, Toyota's second-largest market, where police and prosecutors are investigating possible professional negligence for shirking recalls ( ALL - NOT just the specific vehicle/balljoint issue - covers 16 - 20 YEARS of production ) for eight years. ( TIME NOT MODEL YEAR )
( ONE OF THE MOST MISUNDERSTOOD/SPUN? STATEMENTS OUT THERE . TWO NOT JUST ONE ( ASPECT(S) ) - OUT OF THREE TOTAL . )
********************************************************************************************************************************
Investigators are ( also ) looking at whether a suspected faulty steering part on the Hilux Surf recreational vehicle may have caused an August 2004 head-on crash that injured five people. ( ASPECT #3 ) The Japanese government has reprimanded the company and called for improved recall practices in the wake of the police probe .................................................
................................................................................................................................. over the past three decades, and the soaring number of recalls has been highly embarrassing for its management ( esp. the guys behind the scenes who have pushed too fast since the 1976 HONDA ACCORD ) . At a news conference last month, Toyota President Katsuaki Watanabe offered an elaborate apology.
"I take this seriously and see it as a crisis," Mr. Watanabe said. He then bowed deeply in front of the cameras, adding, "I want to apologize deeply for the troubles we have caused.".................................................
************************************************************************************************************************
................................................................................................................................
................The ( flawed ) strategy called for engineers to pump out more vehicles to fuel the company's growth around the world. Product-development bosses kept engineers on tight launch schedules. Toyota also began relying more heavily on computer-aided design tools to radically compress vehicle-development times by skipping steps such as making physical prototypes to test componets .
************************************************************************************************************************
Using these high-tech tools, Toyota cut new-model development time to as short as about two years -- compared with three or four years in the past.
According to officials at the Toyota product-development and engineering center in Ann Arbor, Mich., virtual-engineering tools have helped the company slash the number of prototypes it builds per project to fewer than 20 from 60 .
************************************************************************************************************************
But the new approach, which allowed its main advocate Yoshio Shirai, a senior managing director, to gain a seat on Toyota's board,
is now suspected
of contributing to the recent rash of (sludge ? ) embarrassing quality glitches.
*********************************************************************************************************************************
Additionally, Toyota executives and engineers say, some mistakes are happening because computer-aided engineering tools have limitations that allow potential design flaws to slip through
.................................................................................................................
********************************************************************************************************************************
A slowdown would follow a set of actions announced by the company after the Japanese government's reprimand of its recall policies. In a report submitted to the government, Toyota said it would upgrade a new data network for sharing technical information and product-quality reports from customers in order to handle recalls more efficiently. It also will increase staff at its quality-control headquarters.
Earlier this year, Mr. Watanabe named two executive vice presidents -- including Akio Toyoda , a scion of the auto conglomerate's founding family -- as quality chiefs
to oversee various initiatives ( oh yeeass - VARIOUS initiatives FOR SURE !!!
for building more quality into components and vehicle design.
( Of important note ; previous job duties listed include China and INTERNET ( Worldwide - think about that .......
)
.......................................................................................................................
Inside the company, spending more time doing quality-assurance tests on new and redesigned cars under development is seen as vital to
regaining control of quality, say individuals close to the matter. ( So what happened to the 2007 camry ? )
By delaying introductions of some products, Toyota would conduct more quality checks on components and, in some cases, create more prototypes to make sure thousands of parts and systems that comprise a typical car work as intended and verify their durability, these people say.
( Oh , I see .)
************************************************************************************************************************************
Toyota also is accelerating ( better check the battery first - and the oil ) an application of what it describes as "preventive engineering"
-- an approach the auto maker has been implementing since the late 1990s
to forecast problem areas ( Sooooo..................does this mean they KNEW about sludge after ?????? )
based on engineering knowledge ( who , toyota ???? - engine engineering knowledge ????? )
accumulated over the years ( like sludge ?) and using extra caution
in designing those areas.
********************************************************************************************************************************
The approach is based on the idea that most components of today's cars are proven technologies, and that most problems occur when, for example, engineers combine two or more parts to create a component system. ( Gee , would this be like traditionally weak toyota( engine ) short block assembly protocols plus troubled new tech Yamaha CYLINDER HEADS plus nonasbestos headgaskets ? ) Toyota engineers focus most of their attention on those "interface" areas to predict problems that might develop. ( Well .... , I bet they sure do now )
*********************************************************************************************************************************
........................................................................................................................
*************************************************************************************************************************************
Toyota also has made what one engineer describes as a "clear and conscious change" in the way it handles recalls ( NOPE - NOT ALL THE WAY - JUST AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE ) in the wake of
a painful scandal involving an alleged ( fully confessed and known ) coverup of vehicle defects by Japan's Mitsubishi Motors Corp. a few years ago, which crippled sales and drove Mitsubishi to the brink of collapse.
( The above accident / 3 part criminal investigation/Gov. demand to account for/change and reprimand did it )
************************************************************************************************************************
"We used to do quiet recalls called 'service campaigns' to deal with many defects, but we're not going to hide anything any more , " said one senior engineer. " Most of the known defects and issues are now handled through recalls."
************************************************************************************************************************
........................................................ - pace of new-model launches -- and pressure to keep product launches on schedule -- has given rise to what another senior engineer calls " bonehead " mistakes.
( LIKE THE 3MZ - FE 3.0L V6 and the I4 2.2L 5SFE ? Finally , some truth and hope for the future . )
In Japan this year, for instance, Toyota discovered it had made the rear axle of one sport-utility vehicle with the material used for another SUV. Designs for the two rear axles are almost identical, but the metal materials used to produce them are different enough that mixing the parts up caused concern over the strength of the axle. A Toyota spokesman said there was a question of the strength of the axle but declined to elaborate .
From ;
............acurazine.com/forums/showthread.php?t=345488
I broke this address so that " link charges etc " will be eliminated .
Add https.......... to make it work .
Like all things toyota , download and print copies - my opinion - the good stuff always disappears .
Search engines/SEARCH ALTERNATIVES/TEXT QUOTES have interesting variances as well .
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
EXTRACTED FROM ;
( roughly 7 - 10 % original text . ) My adds/comments in ( Bold . )
To preview ( short ) and purchase/subscribe / see some nice support material ;
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB115644337137844667.html
Larger extracts and complete copies available all over the Net - many automotive ( NON TOYOTA - mostly ) Forums and Blogs .
Key text ( in my opinion as relates to these engines and Sludge ) has *********** above and below
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WALL STREET JOURNAL 25AUGUST2006
Toyota May Delay New Models
To Address Rising Quality Issues
By NORIHIKO SHIROUZU
August 25 , 2006 Page A1
Toyota Motor Corp., jarred by a surge of recalls and quality problems, ...................................... .................................................................
................................................................................................................................ But the fast-paced expansion has come with a cost: an increasing number of quality problems in North America, Japan and elsewhere ...........................................................................
.................................................................................................................
- So is the number of Toyota vehicles being recalled for quality problems.
Last year ( 2005 ) in the U.S. -- its largest market by volume -- Toyota recalled 2.38 million vehicles, according to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. That's more than the 2.26 million it sold. Overall, the company sold nearly eight million vehicles world-wide.
This year (as of 31JULY2006 ) , the company has recalled 628,000 vehicles in the U.S., and people familiar with the matter say it may soon recall an additional half-million vehicles. ( 885,000 - 1.2M - ??? ACTUAL YR. TOTAL ) The latest recall would affect the current generation of the Sienna minivan, because of concern that poorly designed locking devices for rear seats may fail to securely anchor them to the vehicle floor.............................................................
***********************************************************************************************************************
Recalls also are on the rise in Japan, Toyota's second-largest market, where police and prosecutors are investigating possible professional negligence for shirking recalls ( ALL - NOT just the specific vehicle/balljoint issue - covers 16 - 20 YEARS of production ) for eight years. ( TIME NOT MODEL YEAR )
( ONE OF THE MOST MISUNDERSTOOD/SPUN? STATEMENTS OUT THERE . TWO NOT JUST ONE ( ASPECT(S) ) - OUT OF THREE TOTAL . )
********************************************************************************************************************************
Investigators are ( also ) looking at whether a suspected faulty steering part on the Hilux Surf recreational vehicle may have caused an August 2004 head-on crash that injured five people. ( ASPECT #3 ) The Japanese government has reprimanded the company and called for improved recall practices in the wake of the police probe .................................................
................................................................................................................................. over the past three decades, and the soaring number of recalls has been highly embarrassing for its management ( esp. the guys behind the scenes who have pushed too fast since the 1976 HONDA ACCORD ) . At a news conference last month, Toyota President Katsuaki Watanabe offered an elaborate apology.
"I take this seriously and see it as a crisis," Mr. Watanabe said. He then bowed deeply in front of the cameras, adding, "I want to apologize deeply for the troubles we have caused.".................................................
************************************************************************************************************************
................................................................................................................................
................The ( flawed ) strategy called for engineers to pump out more vehicles to fuel the company's growth around the world. Product-development bosses kept engineers on tight launch schedules. Toyota also began relying more heavily on computer-aided design tools to radically compress vehicle-development times by skipping steps such as making physical prototypes to test componets .
************************************************************************************************************************
Using these high-tech tools, Toyota cut new-model development time to as short as about two years -- compared with three or four years in the past.
************************************************************************************************************************
But the new approach, which allowed its main advocate Yoshio Shirai, a senior managing director, to gain a seat on Toyota's board,
*********************************************************************************************************************************
Additionally, Toyota executives and engineers say, some mistakes are happening because computer-aided engineering tools have limitations that allow potential design flaws to slip through
********************************************************************************************************************************
A slowdown would follow a set of actions announced by the company after the Japanese government's reprimand of its recall policies. In a report submitted to the government, Toyota said it would upgrade a new data network for sharing technical information and product-quality reports from customers in order to handle recalls more efficiently. It also will increase staff at its quality-control headquarters.
Earlier this year, Mr. Watanabe named two executive vice presidents -- including Akio Toyoda , a scion of the auto conglomerate's founding family -- as quality chiefs
( Of important note ; previous job duties listed include China and INTERNET ( Worldwide - think about that .......
.......................................................................................................................
Inside the company, spending more time doing quality-assurance tests on new and redesigned cars under development is seen as vital to
By delaying introductions of some products, Toyota would conduct more quality checks on components and, in some cases, create more prototypes to make sure thousands of parts and systems that comprise a typical car work as intended and verify their durability, these people say.
( Oh , I see .)
************************************************************************************************************************************
Toyota also is accelerating ( better check the battery first - and the oil ) an application of what it describes as "preventive engineering"
********************************************************************************************************************************
The approach is based on the idea that most components of today's cars are proven technologies, and that most problems occur when, for example, engineers combine two or more parts to create a component system. ( Gee , would this be like traditionally weak toyota( engine ) short block assembly protocols plus troubled new tech Yamaha CYLINDER HEADS plus nonasbestos headgaskets ? ) Toyota engineers focus most of their attention on those "interface" areas to predict problems that might develop. ( Well .... , I bet they sure do now )
*********************************************************************************************************************************
........................................................................................................................
*************************************************************************************************************************************
Toyota also has made what one engineer describes as a "clear and conscious change" in the way it handles recalls ( NOPE - NOT ALL THE WAY - JUST AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE ) in the wake of
( The above accident / 3 part criminal investigation/Gov. demand to account for/change and reprimand did it )
************************************************************************************************************************
"We used to do quiet recalls called 'service campaigns' to deal with many defects, but we're not going to hide anything any more , " said one senior engineer. " Most of the known defects and issues are now handled through recalls."
************************************************************************************************************************
........................................................ - pace of new-model launches -- and pressure to keep product launches on schedule -- has given rise to what another senior engineer calls " bonehead " mistakes.
( LIKE THE 3MZ - FE 3.0L V6 and the I4 2.2L 5SFE ? Finally , some truth and hope for the future . )
In Japan this year, for instance, Toyota discovered it had made the rear axle of one sport-utility vehicle with the material used for another SUV. Designs for the two rear axles are almost identical, but the metal materials used to produce them are different enough that mixing the parts up caused concern over the strength of the axle. A Toyota spokesman said there was a question of the strength of the axle but declined to elaborate .
Last edited:
So you are trying to tell me that they are NOT the "epitome of perfection" that the whole universe seems to think they HAVE TO BE?!?!?
NO, I CANNOT accept that! It just CAN'T be.
Yep .
Still , they are and will be a player , so its in eveyone's interest that they get their act together - that has nothing to do with sales volume up or down , big or small .
Its one thing when they were 1/3 of their present size to have them out of control with their own set of rules and quite another now that they are so large and profitable .
In my mind the choice is clear . Either/or Japan USA is going " help them see the light " or we are all going to end up with 6 -12 toyota " clones " in the worst sense of those words pretty much doing one thing ( shabby ) and saying another with the consumer/enthusiast squeezed in the middle . The sky won't fall , but there are better alternatives available .
Another way to say it - although it sells a lot of people short ( including some at toyota whose voices are not heard ) is they all have tendencies ( and histories to match ) in this direction and as long as one not only gets away with it but is very financially successful while doing it wrong - thats where they all will end up .
Does not have to be , nor should it , end up that way .One set of good rules equally applied , and may the best " win " .
Historically ,the market has always dropped to the lowest common denominator - time to brace them and clean em up - make an example out of it - they've earned it .
You can't really expect it to happen from internal reform alone .
Ultimately , its better for them and their's as well .
Still , they are and will be a player , so its in eveyone's interest that they get their act together - that has nothing to do with sales volume up or down , big or small .
Its one thing when they were 1/3 of their present size to have them out of control with their own set of rules and quite another now that they are so large and profitable .
In my mind the choice is clear . Either/or Japan USA is going " help them see the light " or we are all going to end up with 6 -12 toyota " clones " in the worst sense of those words pretty much doing one thing ( shabby ) and saying another with the consumer/enthusiast squeezed in the middle . The sky won't fall , but there are better alternatives available .
Another way to say it - although it sells a lot of people short ( including some at toyota whose voices are not heard ) is they all have tendencies ( and histories to match ) in this direction and as long as one not only gets away with it but is very financially successful while doing it wrong - thats where they all will end up .
Does not have to be , nor should it , end up that way .One set of good rules equally applied , and may the best " win " .
Historically ,the market has always dropped to the lowest common denominator - time to brace them and clean em up - make an example out of it - they've earned it .
You can't really expect it to happen from internal reform alone .
Ultimately , its better for them and their's as well .
Last edited:
g20ooh, you seem to have a lot of info about Toyota. How about Honda? I've always been a big fan and have had good luck. Just wondered what kind of juicy info you have on them?
don't hate, appreciate
LD ,
When I look at Honda I'm still amazed at the story . One of two independents still left .
We forget here in the USA how unlikely it is that not only Honda has survived and thrived but that they even got out the gate .
Its an imperfect analogy , but if you where around then , its almost as if HD had gone into the car business in the 1940s and ended up BY THE EARLY 1970S just under Ford in our Market .
Now its an imperfect analogy in several ways , one of which is because everbody (Goverment , Banks , Subcontracters , etc ) tried so hard to actively sabatoge their entry .
Sooooo......the first juicy story about Honda is how they got around all that . ( See , guys who understand engines , racetracks , motorcycles , and related things like aircraft have advantages in their thinking sometimes ) .
Now Lou ,I'm kinda old school so I have not , nor will I , post anything thats not somehow in the Public Domain somewhere - and that includes toyota .
So .............thats that for now until something changes .
Back to Honda and published info . Here is but a few to consider .
1 ) Go look up how they financed their first three rounds going into automotive production .
3 ) Go look up how exactly thru intercine warfare and .... threw much of their 3 lap lead away in the 1980s although that didn't hit until the 1990s .
2 ) Go find out who in the private sector ( JDM ) still considers them illegitimate and why . Also find the discussion about how about 50-60% of Hondas sales represents proof positive of toyotas first MAJOR defeat and the rest more at Mitsubishi and Isuzu et al( LEAST DAMAGED NISSAN ) .
I did this one last 'cause I wanted to get back on topic IE toyota . Now if you want to look at an eerily similiar situation , consider the other major player (JDM ) who really made it hard for young Mary Honda . That of course , would be Mitsubishi .
©2006 Center for Auto Safety
Safety Scandal Shames Mitsubishi
New Cover-Up Allegations Hobble Japan's Fourth-Largest Automaker
By Anthony Faiola
Washington Post Foreign Service
Tuesday, July 6, 2004; Page E01
YOKOHAMA, Japan -- Shiho Okamoto was killed while walking home from a neighborhood video store with her two young sons when a 220-pound wheel fell off the front axle of a Mitsubishi truck moving behind her. The wheel crushed Okamoto's skull and spine.
To the Kanagawa Prefecture Police Department in Yokohama, a port city 19 miles south of Tokyo, the detached wheel seemed too odd to write off as an accident. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. -- Japan's fourth-largest automaker -- was implicated in 2000 in a cover-up scandal that resulted in the belated recall of about 600,000 cars and trucks, but company officials said they had resolved problems and repeatedly blamed poor maintenance by the trucks' owners.
Police investigating the January 2002 death of 29-year-old Okamoto, however, said they learned of a similar incident with a Mitsubishi bus in the southern city of Hiroshima and had evidence suggesting that company representatives were fanning out across Japan, replacing parts and begging vehicle owners not to go public with their experiences.
A raid on Mitsubishi offices five months ago yielded the evidence that exploded into one of the largest corporate scandals ever in Japan. Authorities say seized documents, and subsequent admission of fault by Mitsubishi Motors Corp. (MMC) and a spinoff, Mitsubishi Fuso Truck & Bus Co., indicate that since the 1980s, the automakers systematically hid defects involving 800,000 vehicles. Among the hidden flaws were defective front axles on the same type of truck as that involved in Okamoto's death.
"I will never forgive Mitsubishi," Okamoto's mother, Yoko Masudo, 54, said at her lawyer's office in central Yokohama. Mitsubishi Fuso finally admitted responsibility in the Okamoto case in late March. MMC and Mitsubishi Fuso since have also admitted long-hidden defects in clutches, brakes and other car parts collectively involved in dozens of accidents that resulted in several injuries and at least one other death.
"They lied to the public," Masudo said. "They hid defects which they knew about for years. My innocent daughter paid with her life. We still don't know how many more people have been hurt by this company."
Most of the defective vehicles were sold in Japan, but some were shipped to Europe and other parts of Asia. The companies say none of the defective cars or trucks were sent to the United States.
Corporate pride is a pillar of the national identity, and the scandal has shocked Japan. At least 40 prefectures and local governments banned the purchase of Mitsubishi vehicles, and the Japanese press is issuing almost daily reports on fires and accidents involving Mitsubishi cars and trucks. Mitsubishi sales are plummeting, and analysts say the company may not survive.
National regulators, stung by criticism that the discovery of the company's second cover-up in four years came only after an investigation by a local police force, are now randomly stopping Mitsubishi trucks and buses for inspections and demanding weekly updates from the automakers on internal reviews.
Investigators are reviewing data regarding Mitsubishi vehicle accidents -- including some claims that Mitsubishi cars, trucks and SUVs spontaneously caught fire on Japanese roads and highways. Twelve former top Mitsubishi auto executives -- including former chief executive Katsuhiko Kawasoe -- have been arrested on charges of negligence or falsifying documents. Five of the arrests were connected directly to the Okamoto case cover-up.
Mitsubishi officials concede that a culture of cover-up existed at the company. Its revelation is doing more than threaten the survival of a once-venerable automobile brand founded in the midst of Japan's great period of industrialization in the late 19th century. The case also cast a spotlight on the ingrained tradition of corporate conformity and strict obedience to bosses, regardless of their ethics. The tradition lingers even though some companies have moved toward more freedom and innovation as the nation emerges from a 13-year economic slump.
More important, the case raises questions about one of the basic tenants of Japanese-style capitalism -- the cultural emphasis on the prosperity of large corporations at the expense of consumer rights, critics say.
Companies in Japan face relatively low regulatory fines for product defects or cover-ups, and law largely shields them from large punitive damages in consumer lawsuits. The societal shame of a company's brand name on a faulty product is expected to be Japan's most powerful corporate regulator.
That philosophy helped give rise to the mega-conglomerates and industrial groups that fueled Japan's transformation into the world's second-largest economy over the past century. But consumer activists say that same philosophy -- while taking a toll on the Mitsubishi auto brand as customers flee its dealerships -- also allowed the brand's fatal flaws to go unchecked.
"The fact is, there were no serious regulatory or legal penalties the company faced even if they were discovered again," said Masato Nakamura, a legal expert and adviser to Japan's largest consumer activist groups. "There was less risk to their lies."
"It shows us how consumer interests are considered second to a company's interest in Japan," Nakamura said. If Okamoto had not died, "we may never have known about this huge cover-up."
Japanese consumers lack many of the protections provided in the United States and elsewhere. A product-liability law enacted in 1995 lowered somewhat the burden of proof in consumer-protection cases, but, for example, companies accused of making defective products in Japan do not have to disclose product designs or safety records. Financial penalties for cover-ups remain slight.
In July 2000, when 14,000 people in Japan got sick after drinking milk from the Snow Brand dairy that was contaminated by bacteria, the head of the factory that processed the bad milk was fined $1,000 and received a two-year suspended sentence.
The company was fined $4,500 by the Osaka District Court -- an amount consider by consumer-rights groups to be a slap on the wrist.
Also in 2000, Japan's transport ministry exposed Mitsubishi's cover-up after being led by a tipster to where documents marked secret were hidden. Three years later, the maximum fines for falsified reports by auto companies were increased to about $1.8 million. But ministry officials say Mitsubishi may be exempt from paying those higher fines because the "initial decision to cover up the defects" appears to have been made before the new law was enacted.
Although DaimlerChrysler AG bought into Mitsubishi Motors in 2000 with hope of turning the company around, shareholder groups say its corporate culture continued. In a country still struggling with traditions that do not reward those who rock the boat, top executives were viewed as irreproachable figures who easily succeeded in squelching internal criticism or debate that could have prevented the cover-ups or exposed their full scope earlier.
Yoichiro Okazaki, MMC's newly appointed chief executive, apologized for the "great trouble and concern" the company has caused. "The challenge now is if we can continue to exist as an automaker," he said at a shareholder's meeting last week.
Last month, MMC reported a drop of more than 64 percent in domestic sales, after a 56 percent drop in May. The company is cutting executive pay by as much as half and trimming rank-and-file salaries by at least 5 percent. Mitsubishi plans to cut 11,000 jobs worldwide -- a quarter of its workforce -- over the next three years. The company is closing two factories in Japan and moving its headquarters from Tokyo to Kyoto.
DaimlerChrysler backed out of a deal that analysts estimate would have tendered a $1.8 billion lifeline to MMC in April. That left the Mitsubishi Group -- the corporate alliance that was one of Japan's largest family-owned conglomerates dismantled during the U.S. occupation after World War II -- to come to the automaker's rescue with a $2.6 billion aid package.
Bloomberg News reported late Monday that the Japanese government is examining ways to help save the automaker from bankruptcy.
Naoko Nemoto, a banking analyst and director at Standard & Poor's in Japan, called the deal "a ghost of Japan's past," when powerful groups of allied companies protected weaker members whose fates, economists say, are better left to the marketplace.
The Mitsubishi Group -- a collection of more than two dozen companies involved in a wide variety of businesses such as banking, real estate and shipbuilding that still encourages its employees to buy Mitsubishi cars to prove their safety to friends and neighbors -- has defended its decision by saying the bailout is aimed at "implementing sweeping reforms to corporate culture and establishing corporate ethics that can regain the trust of customers and society."
After the way the Mitsubishi auto executives treated customers in Japan, however, some shareholders are questioning whether the brand is worth saving. one unidentified shareholder, speaking at the company's annual meeting in Tokyo last week, rose to his feet and said, "I sometimes wonder if the company should just humbly bow its head and pull out of the auto business."
Hmmmmm ........ I quite counting at 20 similarities , how 'bout you ?
When I look at Honda I'm still amazed at the story . One of two independents still left .
We forget here in the USA how unlikely it is that not only Honda has survived and thrived but that they even got out the gate .
Its an imperfect analogy , but if you where around then , its almost as if HD had gone into the car business in the 1940s and ended up BY THE EARLY 1970S just under Ford in our Market .
Now its an imperfect analogy in several ways , one of which is because everbody (Goverment , Banks , Subcontracters , etc ) tried so hard to actively sabatoge their entry .
Sooooo......the first juicy story about Honda is how they got around all that . ( See , guys who understand engines , racetracks , motorcycles , and related things like aircraft have advantages in their thinking sometimes ) .
Now Lou ,I'm kinda old school so I have not , nor will I , post anything thats not somehow in the Public Domain somewhere - and that includes toyota .
So .............thats that for now until something changes .
Back to Honda and published info . Here is but a few to consider .
1 ) Go look up how they financed their first three rounds going into automotive production .
3 ) Go look up how exactly thru intercine warfare and .... threw much of their 3 lap lead away in the 1980s although that didn't hit until the 1990s .
2 ) Go find out who in the private sector ( JDM ) still considers them illegitimate and why . Also find the discussion about how about 50-60% of Hondas sales represents proof positive of toyotas first MAJOR defeat and the rest more at Mitsubishi and Isuzu et al( LEAST DAMAGED NISSAN ) .
I did this one last 'cause I wanted to get back on topic IE toyota . Now if you want to look at an eerily similiar situation , consider the other major player (JDM ) who really made it hard for young Mary Honda . That of course , would be Mitsubishi .
©2006 Center for Auto Safety
Safety Scandal Shames Mitsubishi
New Cover-Up Allegations Hobble Japan's Fourth-Largest Automaker
By Anthony Faiola
Washington Post Foreign Service
Tuesday, July 6, 2004; Page E01
YOKOHAMA, Japan -- Shiho Okamoto was killed while walking home from a neighborhood video store with her two young sons when a 220-pound wheel fell off the front axle of a Mitsubishi truck moving behind her. The wheel crushed Okamoto's skull and spine.
To the Kanagawa Prefecture Police Department in Yokohama, a port city 19 miles south of Tokyo, the detached wheel seemed too odd to write off as an accident. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. -- Japan's fourth-largest automaker -- was implicated in 2000 in a cover-up scandal that resulted in the belated recall of about 600,000 cars and trucks, but company officials said they had resolved problems and repeatedly blamed poor maintenance by the trucks' owners.
Police investigating the January 2002 death of 29-year-old Okamoto, however, said they learned of a similar incident with a Mitsubishi bus in the southern city of Hiroshima and had evidence suggesting that company representatives were fanning out across Japan, replacing parts and begging vehicle owners not to go public with their experiences.
A raid on Mitsubishi offices five months ago yielded the evidence that exploded into one of the largest corporate scandals ever in Japan. Authorities say seized documents, and subsequent admission of fault by Mitsubishi Motors Corp. (MMC) and a spinoff, Mitsubishi Fuso Truck & Bus Co., indicate that since the 1980s, the automakers systematically hid defects involving 800,000 vehicles. Among the hidden flaws were defective front axles on the same type of truck as that involved in Okamoto's death.
"I will never forgive Mitsubishi," Okamoto's mother, Yoko Masudo, 54, said at her lawyer's office in central Yokohama. Mitsubishi Fuso finally admitted responsibility in the Okamoto case in late March. MMC and Mitsubishi Fuso since have also admitted long-hidden defects in clutches, brakes and other car parts collectively involved in dozens of accidents that resulted in several injuries and at least one other death.
"They lied to the public," Masudo said. "They hid defects which they knew about for years. My innocent daughter paid with her life. We still don't know how many more people have been hurt by this company."
Most of the defective vehicles were sold in Japan, but some were shipped to Europe and other parts of Asia. The companies say none of the defective cars or trucks were sent to the United States.
Corporate pride is a pillar of the national identity, and the scandal has shocked Japan. At least 40 prefectures and local governments banned the purchase of Mitsubishi vehicles, and the Japanese press is issuing almost daily reports on fires and accidents involving Mitsubishi cars and trucks. Mitsubishi sales are plummeting, and analysts say the company may not survive.
National regulators, stung by criticism that the discovery of the company's second cover-up in four years came only after an investigation by a local police force, are now randomly stopping Mitsubishi trucks and buses for inspections and demanding weekly updates from the automakers on internal reviews.
Investigators are reviewing data regarding Mitsubishi vehicle accidents -- including some claims that Mitsubishi cars, trucks and SUVs spontaneously caught fire on Japanese roads and highways. Twelve former top Mitsubishi auto executives -- including former chief executive Katsuhiko Kawasoe -- have been arrested on charges of negligence or falsifying documents. Five of the arrests were connected directly to the Okamoto case cover-up.
Mitsubishi officials concede that a culture of cover-up existed at the company. Its revelation is doing more than threaten the survival of a once-venerable automobile brand founded in the midst of Japan's great period of industrialization in the late 19th century. The case also cast a spotlight on the ingrained tradition of corporate conformity and strict obedience to bosses, regardless of their ethics. The tradition lingers even though some companies have moved toward more freedom and innovation as the nation emerges from a 13-year economic slump.
More important, the case raises questions about one of the basic tenants of Japanese-style capitalism -- the cultural emphasis on the prosperity of large corporations at the expense of consumer rights, critics say.
Companies in Japan face relatively low regulatory fines for product defects or cover-ups, and law largely shields them from large punitive damages in consumer lawsuits. The societal shame of a company's brand name on a faulty product is expected to be Japan's most powerful corporate regulator.
That philosophy helped give rise to the mega-conglomerates and industrial groups that fueled Japan's transformation into the world's second-largest economy over the past century. But consumer activists say that same philosophy -- while taking a toll on the Mitsubishi auto brand as customers flee its dealerships -- also allowed the brand's fatal flaws to go unchecked.
"The fact is, there were no serious regulatory or legal penalties the company faced even if they were discovered again," said Masato Nakamura, a legal expert and adviser to Japan's largest consumer activist groups. "There was less risk to their lies."
"It shows us how consumer interests are considered second to a company's interest in Japan," Nakamura said. If Okamoto had not died, "we may never have known about this huge cover-up."
Japanese consumers lack many of the protections provided in the United States and elsewhere. A product-liability law enacted in 1995 lowered somewhat the burden of proof in consumer-protection cases, but, for example, companies accused of making defective products in Japan do not have to disclose product designs or safety records. Financial penalties for cover-ups remain slight.
In July 2000, when 14,000 people in Japan got sick after drinking milk from the Snow Brand dairy that was contaminated by bacteria, the head of the factory that processed the bad milk was fined $1,000 and received a two-year suspended sentence.
The company was fined $4,500 by the Osaka District Court -- an amount consider by consumer-rights groups to be a slap on the wrist.
Also in 2000, Japan's transport ministry exposed Mitsubishi's cover-up after being led by a tipster to where documents marked secret were hidden. Three years later, the maximum fines for falsified reports by auto companies were increased to about $1.8 million. But ministry officials say Mitsubishi may be exempt from paying those higher fines because the "initial decision to cover up the defects" appears to have been made before the new law was enacted.
Although DaimlerChrysler AG bought into Mitsubishi Motors in 2000 with hope of turning the company around, shareholder groups say its corporate culture continued. In a country still struggling with traditions that do not reward those who rock the boat, top executives were viewed as irreproachable figures who easily succeeded in squelching internal criticism or debate that could have prevented the cover-ups or exposed their full scope earlier.
Yoichiro Okazaki, MMC's newly appointed chief executive, apologized for the "great trouble and concern" the company has caused. "The challenge now is if we can continue to exist as an automaker," he said at a shareholder's meeting last week.
Last month, MMC reported a drop of more than 64 percent in domestic sales, after a 56 percent drop in May. The company is cutting executive pay by as much as half and trimming rank-and-file salaries by at least 5 percent. Mitsubishi plans to cut 11,000 jobs worldwide -- a quarter of its workforce -- over the next three years. The company is closing two factories in Japan and moving its headquarters from Tokyo to Kyoto.
DaimlerChrysler backed out of a deal that analysts estimate would have tendered a $1.8 billion lifeline to MMC in April. That left the Mitsubishi Group -- the corporate alliance that was one of Japan's largest family-owned conglomerates dismantled during the U.S. occupation after World War II -- to come to the automaker's rescue with a $2.6 billion aid package.
Bloomberg News reported late Monday that the Japanese government is examining ways to help save the automaker from bankruptcy.
Naoko Nemoto, a banking analyst and director at Standard & Poor's in Japan, called the deal "a ghost of Japan's past," when powerful groups of allied companies protected weaker members whose fates, economists say, are better left to the marketplace.
The Mitsubishi Group -- a collection of more than two dozen companies involved in a wide variety of businesses such as banking, real estate and shipbuilding that still encourages its employees to buy Mitsubishi cars to prove their safety to friends and neighbors -- has defended its decision by saying the bailout is aimed at "implementing sweeping reforms to corporate culture and establishing corporate ethics that can regain the trust of customers and society."
After the way the Mitsubishi auto executives treated customers in Japan, however, some shareholders are questioning whether the brand is worth saving. one unidentified shareholder, speaking at the company's annual meeting in Tokyo last week, rose to his feet and said, "I sometimes wonder if the company should just humbly bow its head and pull out of the auto business."
Hmmmmm ........ I quite counting at 20 similarities , how 'bout you ?
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g20ooh, your writing is quite cryptic and arcane to me. Perhaps I should take this offline or do more research.
Sorry 'bout that Lou - the misspells , and all the rest probably don't help either .
If I may suggest , a really top notch library or some of these fancy subscription internet search/information services . A great Library will get you past all the Spin and disappearing information .
On topic ;
So Lou , what do you think about what the WSJ or the Washington Post wrote ?
If I may suggest , a really top notch library or some of these fancy subscription internet search/information services . A great Library will get you past all the Spin and disappearing information .
On topic ;
So Lou , what do you think about what the WSJ or the Washington Post wrote ?
LD ,
I " like " Honda too , but keep in mind I just like really good cars and good engines no matter who puts them together . So I could say the same about any number of others as well . I just don't think in terms of brand preferences
I also think ( realistically ) Honda ( and everybody else including toyota ) could be even better if toyota was fully investigated and held accountable . " Their " model is winning and its dragging the others along with it - just on profitability issues alone .
Here is one that illustrates the difference in the corp charactor of the two .
Main > Insight News > Honda / Toyota Rivalry Aritcle
If you've been following the Honda Insight and Toyota Prius developments for any time, you've no doubt seen some of the negative comparisons and cutting remarks each company has made about their competitor's hybrid car.
One company will say something like 'ours is a real car; theirs is just a science experiment', and the other will respond with something like 'at least it didn't take us three years to get it right'.
It is unfortunate to see the two companies criticizing each other's hybrids, as the Honda Insight and Toyota Prius are both fantastic cars.
Both the Insight and Prius are significant steps beyond what any other major automaker is offering, and yet are quite distinct cars from one another. While Toyota and Honda are spinning these differences as making one superior to the other, in truth these differences are a good thing. Different people look for different things in a car, and in order for hybrids to succeed, there needs to be this variety.
This revealing article sheds some light on the rivalry that has developed between the two companies, and helps to explain some of the negative comments we've seen them make.
September 21, / 2000
The Wall Street Journal
Page A1
(Copyright (c) 2000, Dow Jones & Company, Inc.)
As Honda Chief Executive Hiroyuki Yoshino strolled through the Toyota display at this year's Detroit auto show, what caught his eye wasn't the roster of new Toyotas but a very familiar red race car.
The Toyota Motor Corp. name was clearly emblazoned on the side of the car. But there was no doubt: This was the machine that had been powered by Honda engines and serviced by Honda engineers, until just a year ago. It was the same machine used by race-team owner Chip Ganassi -- under the Honda Motor Co. flag -- before he orchestrated a sensational defection last year and named Toyota as his new engine supplier.
The Toyota display did tout the Ganassi team's four racing championships. What it didn't mention was that Honda was associated with all of those wins. Astounded, a fuming Mr. Yoshino had to be restrained by his subordinates as he began looking around for Toyota's president, Fujio Cho.
The race-car war is just one sign of the increasingly bitter rivalry developing between Toyota and Honda. Globally, Toyota towers over Honda, boasting auto output that is neck and neck with that of Ford Motor Co., General Motors Corp. and DaimlerChrysler AG. But in North America, Toyota and Honda are comparable in size, each controlling slightly less than 10% of the U.S. market. And as a wave of shrewd, edgy marketing helps Honda grow beyond its niche -- small cars for younger buyers -- Toyota is taking big steps to fight back.
Mostly a sedan and coupe maker, Honda entered the minivan and SUV market with a big splash in the mid-1990s, introducing popular vehicles in Japan such as the Step Wgn for young families and the S-MX for twentysomethings. In a popular television ad campaign, Honda used actors playing the Addams family to hammer home the idea that the Odyssey minivan is big enough to seat a large family. The company also positioned the S-MX as a make- out vehicle, launching a series of mellow TV commercials devoted to the theme of love.
While Toyota holds a commanding 40% of the Japanese market, its executives worry that their share will slide if young customers who prefer Hondas now continue to buy Hondas as they age. "Before, people drove Hondas when they're young, and they always came back to us when they grew older and came to their senses," says a Toyota managing director, Hiroyuki Watanabe. "Now they keep on driving Hondas." Honda poses a threat, Mr. Watanabe and others say, in part because Toyota didn't direct much attention in the early 1990s to that younger consumer market.
Toyota declared what amounted to an internal war on Honda in 1996, ( for like the third time ) its executives say. That is the year that marketing data began showing a barrage of disturbing news. The median age of Toyota's customers for its flagship luxury cars was rising at a startling rate. It was getting to the point that "we would've had to sell Crowns and Mark IIs in the cemetery," says Tadaaki Jagawa, a Toyota executive vice president.
Toyota's market share in Japan, which was as high as 43.2% in the mid- 1980s, sank below 40% for the first time in 14 years. Honda, meanwhile, was experiencing runaway success with its new Odyssey minivan and sport- utility vehicles.
So Hiroshi Okuda, the chief at Toyota, set out to pull off one of the auto industry's most ambitious corporate makeovers. As CEO in the mid- 1990s, Mr. Okuda encouraged Toyota subordinates to lighten up. He lured champion race-car teams and drivers away from Honda, convinced that Honda's hipster image had been reinforced by the company's long association with professional car and motorcycle races.
Mr. Okuda pushed product planners and engineers to match every popular Honda model with a corresponding Toyota clone. The company launched a shower of stylish and offbeat small cars with names like Fun Cargo, Vitz and Altezza. A newly created 30-person division called Virtual Venture Co. in Tokyo was charged with specifically marketing to youth. The division came out with a funky small car, called Will Vi, which Mr. Okuda likened to a pumpkin.
Traditionally tame advertising also gave way to funkier campaigns, such as a series of television ads featuring a computer-animated tot, "Dancing Baby," wriggling around a small SUV. It became one of the most recognized car ad campaigns in Japan, according to CM Databank, a Tokyo-based advertising-research company.
Honda executives say Toyota's aggressive moves don't concern them, arguing that their giant rival will have difficulty emulating Honda's unique culture. "All Toyota is doing is aping us and letting their money talk," says Ken Hashimoto, a senior Honda R&D executive.
But if there is one thing Honda worries about, it's Toyota's cash hoard, 2.2 trillion yen ($20.5 billion) as of March 31, 2000. Given enough time, Honda executives fear that Toyota may approximate enough of Honda's youthful appeal to constitute a real problem.
Some of Honda's fears are already playing out. Toyota, in spite of its often-ridiculed "country boy" image, has been proving that it can successfully woo young car buyers, thanks to designers such as Takao Minai. Mr. Minai languished for a long time in Toyota's hierarchical culture but had a sudden leap in responsibilities two years ago. Under Mr. Okuda's guidance, the ponytailed 36-year-old amateur video jockey took charge of developing a dream car for male twentysomethings. Based on a sketch by another young designer, the 11-member team designed a small car shaped like a really clunky box. Toyota dubbed it "bB," short for black Box.
Toyota management encouraged Mr. Minai and his colleagues to be irreverent. Instead of a formal presentation on the bB's design, Mr. Minai treated the executives to a video he created. It included jarring images of a glaring mohawked teen, a glittering bB with hot-rod flames, and hip-hop music in the background.
Toyota executives are known for nitpicking on designs, making them more and more conservative along the way. But the bB team was given the green light with few changes. "Finally, you feel like you're in an environment where you can be a little playful," Mr. Minai says.
Consumers such as Atsushi Maeda, a 27-year-old Tokyo resident who for a long time dismissed Toyota as an "old man's brand," are warming up to the bB. The bB's design was "so unlike Toyota," says Mr. Maeda, who recently joined a bB owners' fan club.
Customers like him are now multiplying, and have made the bB, priced at between 1.3 million yen and 1.6 million yen, an instant hit in Japan. Toyota wants to make a chain of its newly revamped dealers, called "Netz" -- German for network -- that would be filled with bB-like vehicles. Eventually, "with Netz alone, we want to win against all of Honda," says Katsuyuki Kamio, a Toyota director in charge of the Netz operations. In the first eight months this year, the latest figures available, the Netz sold 297,247 cars in Japan, compared with Honda's 290,362.
Honda believes that in the longer term, its best defense against Toyota is to beat it to the marketplace with new products. To do that, Honda has been trying to increase its manufacturing flexibility and hone its ability to develop vehicles unique to North America, Europe and Asia. In Japan, partly to counter Toyota's rapid-fire launches, Honda will shower the market with 20 new or revamped models over three years. The same tactic helped Honda weather a challenge from Yamaha Motor Co. two decades ago when Honda bombarded the market with new motorcycles at a mind-numbing speed of one a week.
Toyota is also bent on chiseling away at another Honda edge: its image as environmentally responsible. In 1996, Mr. Okuda, according to senior Toyota executives, decided to elevate "green" propulsion technology to its core long-term strategy. In a year, Toyota introduced an electric-gasoline hybrid called Prius, which sent Honda engineers scrambling for a comeback. Discouraged by its high costs, Honda had earlier given up a hybrid system, and it had nothing to counter with when Toyota launched the Prius in Japan in December 1997. The move "jolted us," admits Takeo Fukui, head of Honda's R&D arm in Japan.
So Mr. Fukui quickly re-started the hybrid project. His goal was to beat Toyota to the U.S. and other overseas markets. In late 1999, Honda launched the Insight -- a hybrid that gets 61 to 70 miles per gallon depending on driving conditions -- almost simultaneously in Japan, Europe and the U.S. Toyota matched the Honda hybrid in the U.S. only in July of this year, unveiling a version of its Prius, a 45- to 51-mpg sedan.
Toyota executives consider their slower entry into the U.S. market as no particular setback. They deem the two-seat Insight "a gimmicky rush job" to catch up with Toyota, says Toyota's Mr. Jagawa -- a claim Mr. Fukui partly concedes. Mr. Fukui says Honda wanted to make the Insight a family sedan with four seats but ran out of time while focusing on delivering a big number in fuel economy to top the Prius's performance.
The Insight, with an all-aluminum body and other pricey technologies, is also so expensive that Honda is, ironically, holding back on its marketing push to keep sales from taking off, says one Honda official.
Honda is planning to unleash a blizzard of new products to contain Toyota's push, including a four-seater Civic hybrid that the company is rushing to deliver to the U.S., Japan and other markets by next year. It wants to expand the hybrid system rapidly to other models. Honda R&D executive Mr. Hashimoto says he believes about 1.5 million U.S. customers, or 10% of the market, may buy electric-gasoline hybrids as early as 2005 as long as they don't pose any additional financial burden to consumers.
Of all Toyota's attacks, what infuriates Honda executives most is the way its rival has outfoxed them on the race circuit. Toyota began racing in America's CART (Championship Auto Racing Teams) series in 1996, its first foray into the top echelon of American motor sports. One key objective, says Tsutomu Tomita, the Toyota director in charge of racing, is to gain the kind of youthful image that has helped Honda so powerfully. Yet, for their first four years, Toyota-powered engines conked out race after race, blowing the engines, spewing smoke, spilling oil and sometimes dropping broken parts on the track, interrupting the races. Drivers and their teams complained Toyota engines were a danger to their safety and told Toyota to put diapers on its engines so that its cars wouldn't spill on the racetrack. The board that runs the sport told Toyota to go back to the drawing boards and retest its powertrains. Spectators moaned Toyota was making the race boring.
Once a laughingstock, this year Toyota engines suddenly began shining. In June a Toyota-powered car won a race in Milwaukee, giving Toyota its first victory in 78 races. Toyota's Mr. Tomita says that the company came up with several modifications in engine technology. After 17 races this season, Toyota now ranks as the third engine supplier behind Ford and Honda.
Honda concedes that improved engines have helped Toyota on the racetrack. But it also says Toyota got a huge boost from the new team of champion drivers it stole from Honda: the team owned by Chip Ganassi, which racked up 30 wins in a total of 72 races with Honda engines from 1996 to 1999. Mr. Ganassi says he received compensation in the range of "$3 to $5 million" for switching to Toyota -- an unusual development in the low-key and generally small-bucks CART world. Toyota's Mr. Tomita confirms that Toyota paid Mr. Ganassi but won't specify details. Mr. Ganassi says that he felt the future is more secure with Toyota as an engine supplier. "Comparatively speaking, Honda just doesn't have the resources that Toyota has," he says.
Once the Ganassi team began using its engines, Toyota quickly launched a TV ad campaign that irritated Honda. Like the Detroit auto show display, Toyota billed the Ganassi team as its own four-time CART champion team, without mentioning that all those four times the team was driving Honda- powered machines. "The ads are absolutely misleading; we would never resort to a stunt like that," says Mr. Fukui. "We have pride."
On a recent Saturday as he watched Paul Tracy race one of the Honda- powered cars in a preliminary session to take the pole position in Sunday's final, Mr. Fukui boasted that Honda won't yield its leadership position in racing to Toyota. "We have to pound them down now," Mr. Fukui said, "before they get all encouraged."
I " like " Honda too , but keep in mind I just like really good cars and good engines no matter who puts them together . So I could say the same about any number of others as well . I just don't think in terms of brand preferences
I also think ( realistically ) Honda ( and everybody else including toyota ) could be even better if toyota was fully investigated and held accountable . " Their " model is winning and its dragging the others along with it - just on profitability issues alone .
Here is one that illustrates the difference in the corp charactor of the two .
Main > Insight News > Honda / Toyota Rivalry Aritcle
If you've been following the Honda Insight and Toyota Prius developments for any time, you've no doubt seen some of the negative comparisons and cutting remarks each company has made about their competitor's hybrid car.
One company will say something like 'ours is a real car; theirs is just a science experiment', and the other will respond with something like 'at least it didn't take us three years to get it right'.
It is unfortunate to see the two companies criticizing each other's hybrids, as the Honda Insight and Toyota Prius are both fantastic cars.
Both the Insight and Prius are significant steps beyond what any other major automaker is offering, and yet are quite distinct cars from one another. While Toyota and Honda are spinning these differences as making one superior to the other, in truth these differences are a good thing. Different people look for different things in a car, and in order for hybrids to succeed, there needs to be this variety.
This revealing article sheds some light on the rivalry that has developed between the two companies, and helps to explain some of the negative comments we've seen them make.
September 21, / 2000
The Wall Street Journal
Page A1
(Copyright (c) 2000, Dow Jones & Company, Inc.)
As Honda Chief Executive Hiroyuki Yoshino strolled through the Toyota display at this year's Detroit auto show, what caught his eye wasn't the roster of new Toyotas but a very familiar red race car.
The Toyota Motor Corp. name was clearly emblazoned on the side of the car. But there was no doubt: This was the machine that had been powered by Honda engines and serviced by Honda engineers, until just a year ago. It was the same machine used by race-team owner Chip Ganassi -- under the Honda Motor Co. flag -- before he orchestrated a sensational defection last year and named Toyota as his new engine supplier.
The Toyota display did tout the Ganassi team's four racing championships. What it didn't mention was that Honda was associated with all of those wins. Astounded, a fuming Mr. Yoshino had to be restrained by his subordinates as he began looking around for Toyota's president, Fujio Cho.
The race-car war is just one sign of the increasingly bitter rivalry developing between Toyota and Honda. Globally, Toyota towers over Honda, boasting auto output that is neck and neck with that of Ford Motor Co., General Motors Corp. and DaimlerChrysler AG. But in North America, Toyota and Honda are comparable in size, each controlling slightly less than 10% of the U.S. market. And as a wave of shrewd, edgy marketing helps Honda grow beyond its niche -- small cars for younger buyers -- Toyota is taking big steps to fight back.
Mostly a sedan and coupe maker, Honda entered the minivan and SUV market with a big splash in the mid-1990s, introducing popular vehicles in Japan such as the Step Wgn for young families and the S-MX for twentysomethings. In a popular television ad campaign, Honda used actors playing the Addams family to hammer home the idea that the Odyssey minivan is big enough to seat a large family. The company also positioned the S-MX as a make- out vehicle, launching a series of mellow TV commercials devoted to the theme of love.
While Toyota holds a commanding 40% of the Japanese market, its executives worry that their share will slide if young customers who prefer Hondas now continue to buy Hondas as they age. "Before, people drove Hondas when they're young, and they always came back to us when they grew older and came to their senses," says a Toyota managing director, Hiroyuki Watanabe. "Now they keep on driving Hondas." Honda poses a threat, Mr. Watanabe and others say, in part because Toyota didn't direct much attention in the early 1990s to that younger consumer market.
Toyota declared what amounted to an internal war on Honda in 1996, ( for like the third time ) its executives say. That is the year that marketing data began showing a barrage of disturbing news. The median age of Toyota's customers for its flagship luxury cars was rising at a startling rate. It was getting to the point that "we would've had to sell Crowns and Mark IIs in the cemetery," says Tadaaki Jagawa, a Toyota executive vice president.
Toyota's market share in Japan, which was as high as 43.2% in the mid- 1980s, sank below 40% for the first time in 14 years. Honda, meanwhile, was experiencing runaway success with its new Odyssey minivan and sport- utility vehicles.
So Hiroshi Okuda, the chief at Toyota, set out to pull off one of the auto industry's most ambitious corporate makeovers. As CEO in the mid- 1990s, Mr. Okuda encouraged Toyota subordinates to lighten up. He lured champion race-car teams and drivers away from Honda, convinced that Honda's hipster image had been reinforced by the company's long association with professional car and motorcycle races.
Mr. Okuda pushed product planners and engineers to match every popular Honda model with a corresponding Toyota clone. The company launched a shower of stylish and offbeat small cars with names like Fun Cargo, Vitz and Altezza. A newly created 30-person division called Virtual Venture Co. in Tokyo was charged with specifically marketing to youth. The division came out with a funky small car, called Will Vi, which Mr. Okuda likened to a pumpkin.
Traditionally tame advertising also gave way to funkier campaigns, such as a series of television ads featuring a computer-animated tot, "Dancing Baby," wriggling around a small SUV. It became one of the most recognized car ad campaigns in Japan, according to CM Databank, a Tokyo-based advertising-research company.
Honda executives say Toyota's aggressive moves don't concern them, arguing that their giant rival will have difficulty emulating Honda's unique culture. "All Toyota is doing is aping us and letting their money talk," says Ken Hashimoto, a senior Honda R&D executive.
But if there is one thing Honda worries about, it's Toyota's cash hoard, 2.2 trillion yen ($20.5 billion) as of March 31, 2000. Given enough time, Honda executives fear that Toyota may approximate enough of Honda's youthful appeal to constitute a real problem.
Some of Honda's fears are already playing out. Toyota, in spite of its often-ridiculed "country boy" image, has been proving that it can successfully woo young car buyers, thanks to designers such as Takao Minai. Mr. Minai languished for a long time in Toyota's hierarchical culture but had a sudden leap in responsibilities two years ago. Under Mr. Okuda's guidance, the ponytailed 36-year-old amateur video jockey took charge of developing a dream car for male twentysomethings. Based on a sketch by another young designer, the 11-member team designed a small car shaped like a really clunky box. Toyota dubbed it "bB," short for black Box.
Toyota management encouraged Mr. Minai and his colleagues to be irreverent. Instead of a formal presentation on the bB's design, Mr. Minai treated the executives to a video he created. It included jarring images of a glaring mohawked teen, a glittering bB with hot-rod flames, and hip-hop music in the background.
Toyota executives are known for nitpicking on designs, making them more and more conservative along the way. But the bB team was given the green light with few changes. "Finally, you feel like you're in an environment where you can be a little playful," Mr. Minai says.
Consumers such as Atsushi Maeda, a 27-year-old Tokyo resident who for a long time dismissed Toyota as an "old man's brand," are warming up to the bB. The bB's design was "so unlike Toyota," says Mr. Maeda, who recently joined a bB owners' fan club.
Customers like him are now multiplying, and have made the bB, priced at between 1.3 million yen and 1.6 million yen, an instant hit in Japan. Toyota wants to make a chain of its newly revamped dealers, called "Netz" -- German for network -- that would be filled with bB-like vehicles. Eventually, "with Netz alone, we want to win against all of Honda," says Katsuyuki Kamio, a Toyota director in charge of the Netz operations. In the first eight months this year, the latest figures available, the Netz sold 297,247 cars in Japan, compared with Honda's 290,362.
Honda believes that in the longer term, its best defense against Toyota is to beat it to the marketplace with new products. To do that, Honda has been trying to increase its manufacturing flexibility and hone its ability to develop vehicles unique to North America, Europe and Asia. In Japan, partly to counter Toyota's rapid-fire launches, Honda will shower the market with 20 new or revamped models over three years. The same tactic helped Honda weather a challenge from Yamaha Motor Co. two decades ago when Honda bombarded the market with new motorcycles at a mind-numbing speed of one a week.
Toyota is also bent on chiseling away at another Honda edge: its image as environmentally responsible. In 1996, Mr. Okuda, according to senior Toyota executives, decided to elevate "green" propulsion technology to its core long-term strategy. In a year, Toyota introduced an electric-gasoline hybrid called Prius, which sent Honda engineers scrambling for a comeback. Discouraged by its high costs, Honda had earlier given up a hybrid system, and it had nothing to counter with when Toyota launched the Prius in Japan in December 1997. The move "jolted us," admits Takeo Fukui, head of Honda's R&D arm in Japan.
So Mr. Fukui quickly re-started the hybrid project. His goal was to beat Toyota to the U.S. and other overseas markets. In late 1999, Honda launched the Insight -- a hybrid that gets 61 to 70 miles per gallon depending on driving conditions -- almost simultaneously in Japan, Europe and the U.S. Toyota matched the Honda hybrid in the U.S. only in July of this year, unveiling a version of its Prius, a 45- to 51-mpg sedan.
Toyota executives consider their slower entry into the U.S. market as no particular setback. They deem the two-seat Insight "a gimmicky rush job" to catch up with Toyota, says Toyota's Mr. Jagawa -- a claim Mr. Fukui partly concedes. Mr. Fukui says Honda wanted to make the Insight a family sedan with four seats but ran out of time while focusing on delivering a big number in fuel economy to top the Prius's performance.
The Insight, with an all-aluminum body and other pricey technologies, is also so expensive that Honda is, ironically, holding back on its marketing push to keep sales from taking off, says one Honda official.
Honda is planning to unleash a blizzard of new products to contain Toyota's push, including a four-seater Civic hybrid that the company is rushing to deliver to the U.S., Japan and other markets by next year. It wants to expand the hybrid system rapidly to other models. Honda R&D executive Mr. Hashimoto says he believes about 1.5 million U.S. customers, or 10% of the market, may buy electric-gasoline hybrids as early as 2005 as long as they don't pose any additional financial burden to consumers.
Of all Toyota's attacks, what infuriates Honda executives most is the way its rival has outfoxed them on the race circuit. Toyota began racing in America's CART (Championship Auto Racing Teams) series in 1996, its first foray into the top echelon of American motor sports. One key objective, says Tsutomu Tomita, the Toyota director in charge of racing, is to gain the kind of youthful image that has helped Honda so powerfully. Yet, for their first four years, Toyota-powered engines conked out race after race, blowing the engines, spewing smoke, spilling oil and sometimes dropping broken parts on the track, interrupting the races. Drivers and their teams complained Toyota engines were a danger to their safety and told Toyota to put diapers on its engines so that its cars wouldn't spill on the racetrack. The board that runs the sport told Toyota to go back to the drawing boards and retest its powertrains. Spectators moaned Toyota was making the race boring.
Once a laughingstock, this year Toyota engines suddenly began shining. In June a Toyota-powered car won a race in Milwaukee, giving Toyota its first victory in 78 races. Toyota's Mr. Tomita says that the company came up with several modifications in engine technology. After 17 races this season, Toyota now ranks as the third engine supplier behind Ford and Honda.
Honda concedes that improved engines have helped Toyota on the racetrack. But it also says Toyota got a huge boost from the new team of champion drivers it stole from Honda: the team owned by Chip Ganassi, which racked up 30 wins in a total of 72 races with Honda engines from 1996 to 1999. Mr. Ganassi says he received compensation in the range of "$3 to $5 million" for switching to Toyota -- an unusual development in the low-key and generally small-bucks CART world. Toyota's Mr. Tomita confirms that Toyota paid Mr. Ganassi but won't specify details. Mr. Ganassi says that he felt the future is more secure with Toyota as an engine supplier. "Comparatively speaking, Honda just doesn't have the resources that Toyota has," he says.
Once the Ganassi team began using its engines, Toyota quickly launched a TV ad campaign that irritated Honda. Like the Detroit auto show display, Toyota billed the Ganassi team as its own four-time CART champion team, without mentioning that all those four times the team was driving Honda- powered machines. "The ads are absolutely misleading; we would never resort to a stunt like that," says Mr. Fukui. "We have pride."
On a recent Saturday as he watched Paul Tracy race one of the Honda- powered cars in a preliminary session to take the pole position in Sunday's final, Mr. Fukui boasted that Honda won't yield its leadership position in racing to Toyota. "We have to pound them down now," Mr. Fukui said, "before they get all encouraged."
Quote:
Sorry 'bout that Lou - the misspells , and all the rest probably don't help either .
If I may suggest , a really top notch library or some of these fancy subscription internet search/information services . A great Library will get you past all the Spin and disappearing information .
On topic ;
So Lou , what do you think about what the WSJ or the Washington Post wrote ?
The article on Mitsubishi is depressing. I used to work for Mitsubishi Materials (not Automotive) and there was a lot of company and corporate pride. It's shocking to see such a pervasive cover-up mentality. Makes one wonder if it's restricted to triple-diamonds.
As for the Toyota v. Honda situation, I'm obviously a big fan of Honda based on my own experiences with them. But to be fair, I haven't owned a Toyota. But they've had more than their share of negative publicity of late.
I guess my overriding thought after noodling on this for a couple of days is that the Japanese automakers may not necessarily be that "shining city on the hill" that we once thought.
I will stay tuned...
Thanks for the great information!
Hello LouDawg ,
I want to respond better to your post - but things are a little out of wack right now so do more tomorrow .
" I guess my overriding thought after noodling on this for a couple of days is that the Japanese automakers may not necessarily be that "shining city on the hill" that we once thought. "
Double Yep - but who really is these days ? Who really ever was for more than 8 - 20 years in a row ?
Having said that two things ;
1 ) I think the first real American automobile ( industry and consumer ) tragedy was the loss of the approx 700 - 750 alternative producers we had before the Great Depression .
In other words , what would things have been like if between Canada/USA we had somehow held onto 11 Companies of our own ( ala Japan ) ?
Since we didn't .........well............. , on a positive note at the very least I like the diversity the Asian OEMS represent although I really wish the UK , FR , IT , ETC still played here .
2 ) When it comes to things automotive and dark toyota is the worst of the worst by far , by every measure , in every market so until things change that distinction is always worth making and keeping .
Anyway , heres some related - around - the - edges - stuff .
Translate 日本語Leading National Dailies
Report Everything is Not Rosy at Toyota
May, 14. 2006
Toyota announced its annual results for the year ending March 2006 on May 10.
While Toyota has reported highest ever turnover and profitability, all the leading national dailies carried articles on May 11 that pose many-a-questions before Toyota management for the future.
These articles were entitled as under;
(1)Collapse of the “ Toyota myth ” ( MAKE SURE YOU CATCH BOTH PARTS OF THIS IE " COLLAPSE " AND " MYTH " ) due to large numbers of recalls
(2)HR crisis caused by sudden business expansion
(3)Sexual harassment lawsuit against former Toyota’s North American Chief Executive
(4)High cost management owing to huge investments in plant and equipment
1) Quality Control-Toyota’s biggest asset- takes a turn for the worse
All the dailies ( newspapers ) talked of loss of faith in the Toyota brand due to recalling of vehicles.
In October 2005, as many as 1.28 million vehicles-the largest ever in Toyota’s history were recalled due to abnormality in the light switch. ( JDM only )
Even Lexus (11,000 numbers) whose USP is high quality had to be recalled due to manufacturing defect in the seat belt.
Yomiuri wrote “One gets a feeling that quality control that Toyota boasts of as its biggest asset has taken a turn for the worse.”
It further writes
2 ) “In the background are inability to keep pace on HR training with the rapid expansion of production and sales and degeneration of the manufacturing shop floor including the components manufacturers.”
In this regard, Sankei points that the shop floor is unable to keep pace with the increase in production and quotes a manufacturing executive that “Many of us are busy with overseas projects and domestically we are somehow managing the show with limited hands.”
*** Mainichi writes that cost reduction, on the contrary, has proved counterproductive and remarks “Recalls usually increase when standard parts are developed. Abnormality with one component affects many models.” ***
Nikkei also quotes a remark by the Managing Director Watanabe. “We shall take up quality control as the foremost theme in the new financial year.”
3 ) In addition, suing of Toyota’s North American Chief Executive for sexual harassment could lead to tarnishing of Toyota’s image in America-the largest profit center for Toyota.
Sankei carries a comment by a former Toyota employee saying “It is nothing but slackening of crisis management.”
*** Mainichi cites the example of a similar problem that happened at the American subsidiary of Mitsubishi Motors in the 1990s that began with a protest from the human rights group but eventually escalated into boycotting of Mitsubishi vehicles. ***
It warns “If taken lightly, it may not just remain confined to loss of faith but can trigger bashing of Japanese cars as earlier.”
Nikkei carries a comment by Toyota CEO Watanabe wherein he says that “It has had no adverse impact on sales.” ( can't say that now , can we vv JDM )
4 ) Concern over decline in the selling power in the domestic market
It was Asahi that highlighted the decline in the selling power of Toyota in the domestic market. In spite of Toyota’s attempt to attract customers through lavish publicity, individualistic models and décor at the Netz dealerships, it could not achieve its annual sales target of 600,000 vehicles.
Lexus dealerships had the style of a luxury hotel but the customers, on the contrary, felt it to be a threshold too high to cross and even half of the sales target could not be reached.
Asahi carries the comment by a sales executive that “Company paid too much attention to the décor of the dealerships and the basic sales activities were ignored.” The news also points to high dissatisfaction among dealers due to reduction in domestic sales incentives and inability to offer discounts as the company wants to offset overseas discounts by cutting down on discounts in the domestic market.
Nikkei talks of decline in the profitability due to massive investments in production increase. Depreciation expense for 2006 is at its highest of \ 930 billion due to investment in plant and equipment. Ratio of Sales to Profit has declined by 0.4 points over the previous term to 8.5% and has worsened for 3 years in a row.
The news carries a comment by a Toyota executive that “We will continue to invest in plant and equipment to the tune of \1.3 trillion to \1.5 trillion for the next 10 years.”
However, Nikkei observes that it is doubtful that Toyota, beset with aforesaid problems, will actually be able to bear such risk of high cost over a long period of time.
Copyright (c) J-CAST Co.,Ltd. 2006. All rights reserved. - Corporate Overview
Now think about all that might have happened ( not the least of which would have been this kind of articule - 10 -20 years earlier ) if toyota had been honest prevously .
Also notice the similarities yet again between Mitsu (auto ) and toyota . I call them the " terrible two " when it comes to truth in the auto industry .
I've found its useful to construct a timeline for both articules and content .
Also 3/4 of explanations given for problems are still complete spin . ( Includes the best )
I want to respond better to your post - but things are a little out of wack right now so do more tomorrow .
" I guess my overriding thought after noodling on this for a couple of days is that the Japanese automakers may not necessarily be that "shining city on the hill" that we once thought. "
Double Yep - but who really is these days ? Who really ever was for more than 8 - 20 years in a row ?
Having said that two things ;
1 ) I think the first real American automobile ( industry and consumer ) tragedy was the loss of the approx 700 - 750 alternative producers we had before the Great Depression .
In other words , what would things have been like if between Canada/USA we had somehow held onto 11 Companies of our own ( ala Japan ) ?
Since we didn't .........well............. , on a positive note at the very least I like the diversity the Asian OEMS represent although I really wish the UK , FR , IT , ETC still played here .
2 ) When it comes to things automotive and dark toyota is the worst of the worst by far , by every measure , in every market so until things change that distinction is always worth making and keeping .
Anyway , heres some related - around - the - edges - stuff .
Translate 日本語Leading National Dailies
Report Everything is Not Rosy at Toyota
May, 14. 2006
Toyota announced its annual results for the year ending March 2006 on May 10.
While Toyota has reported highest ever turnover and profitability, all the leading national dailies carried articles on May 11 that pose many-a-questions before Toyota management for the future.
These articles were entitled as under;
(1)Collapse of the “ Toyota myth ” ( MAKE SURE YOU CATCH BOTH PARTS OF THIS IE " COLLAPSE " AND " MYTH " ) due to large numbers of recalls
(2)HR crisis caused by sudden business expansion
(3)Sexual harassment lawsuit against former Toyota’s North American Chief Executive
(4)High cost management owing to huge investments in plant and equipment
1) Quality Control-Toyota’s biggest asset- takes a turn for the worse
All the dailies ( newspapers ) talked of loss of faith in the Toyota brand due to recalling of vehicles.
In October 2005, as many as 1.28 million vehicles-the largest ever in Toyota’s history were recalled due to abnormality in the light switch. ( JDM only )
Even Lexus (11,000 numbers) whose USP is high quality had to be recalled due to manufacturing defect in the seat belt.
Yomiuri wrote “One gets a feeling that quality control that Toyota boasts of as its biggest asset has taken a turn for the worse.”
It further writes
2 ) “In the background are inability to keep pace on HR training with the rapid expansion of production and sales and degeneration of the manufacturing shop floor including the components manufacturers.”
In this regard, Sankei points that the shop floor is unable to keep pace with the increase in production and quotes a manufacturing executive that “Many of us are busy with overseas projects and domestically we are somehow managing the show with limited hands.”
*** Mainichi writes that cost reduction, on the contrary, has proved counterproductive and remarks “Recalls usually increase when standard parts are developed. Abnormality with one component affects many models.” ***
Nikkei also quotes a remark by the Managing Director Watanabe. “We shall take up quality control as the foremost theme in the new financial year.”
3 ) In addition, suing of Toyota’s North American Chief Executive for sexual harassment could lead to tarnishing of Toyota’s image in America-the largest profit center for Toyota.
Sankei carries a comment by a former Toyota employee saying “It is nothing but slackening of crisis management.”
*** Mainichi cites the example of a similar problem that happened at the American subsidiary of Mitsubishi Motors in the 1990s that began with a protest from the human rights group but eventually escalated into boycotting of Mitsubishi vehicles. ***
It warns “If taken lightly, it may not just remain confined to loss of faith but can trigger bashing of Japanese cars as earlier.”
Nikkei carries a comment by Toyota CEO Watanabe wherein he says that “It has had no adverse impact on sales.” ( can't say that now , can we vv JDM )
4 ) Concern over decline in the selling power in the domestic market
It was Asahi that highlighted the decline in the selling power of Toyota in the domestic market. In spite of Toyota’s attempt to attract customers through lavish publicity, individualistic models and décor at the Netz dealerships, it could not achieve its annual sales target of 600,000 vehicles.
Lexus dealerships had the style of a luxury hotel but the customers, on the contrary, felt it to be a threshold too high to cross and even half of the sales target could not be reached.
Asahi carries the comment by a sales executive that “Company paid too much attention to the décor of the dealerships and the basic sales activities were ignored.” The news also points to high dissatisfaction among dealers due to reduction in domestic sales incentives and inability to offer discounts as the company wants to offset overseas discounts by cutting down on discounts in the domestic market.
Nikkei talks of decline in the profitability due to massive investments in production increase. Depreciation expense for 2006 is at its highest of \ 930 billion due to investment in plant and equipment. Ratio of Sales to Profit has declined by 0.4 points over the previous term to 8.5% and has worsened for 3 years in a row.
The news carries a comment by a Toyota executive that “We will continue to invest in plant and equipment to the tune of \1.3 trillion to \1.5 trillion for the next 10 years.”
However, Nikkei observes that it is doubtful that Toyota, beset with aforesaid problems, will actually be able to bear such risk of high cost over a long period of time.
Copyright (c) J-CAST Co.,Ltd. 2006. All rights reserved. - Corporate Overview
Now think about all that might have happened ( not the least of which would have been this kind of articule - 10 -20 years earlier ) if toyota had been honest prevously .
Also notice the similarities yet again between Mitsu (auto ) and toyota . I call them the " terrible two " when it comes to truth in the auto industry .
I've found its useful to construct a timeline for both articules and content .
Also 3/4 of explanations given for problems are still complete spin . ( Includes the best )
Anybody remember George C. Scott in Dr. Strangelove ?
You know , about 1/2 way thru the movie with the Russian Ambassador either on the way in or just arrived . Anyway , its the bit where he says " Mr. President , I'm beginning to smell a great big Commie rat " that I allude to .
Well , on topic , there appears to be a great deal of confusion in regards to this settlement both on and off the Internet . It seems to center around two main issues ; the relevant deadlines for individual vehicles and their owners ( past/present ) and what incidental expenses under what circumstances are covered .
A friend of mine asked me to check it out - complaining of this and that . I did , and I see where he is coming from .
The confusion seems to stem from two sources or really one , depending on your point of view ; the website and the information contained there in , and the Media and their reporting of it . Since thats what we have to work with here , lets start there first .As an example , lets look at Automotive News and the Wall Street Journal .
In the AN article that started this thread they said ;
" Damages that can be recovered include loss in value of the vehicle and incidental costs, such as rental cars. Past lawyers' fees, mental anguish and bodily injuries are not covered. "
The WSJ article dated 30JAN2007 suggests something different ;
( This is a two paragraph excert out of 10.5 - you can obtain a full copy from the WSJ or on many Automotive Blogs and Forums )
Toyota Agrees to Sludge Pact
The Wall Street Journal
By Jonathan Welsh
Jan. 30, 2007
In an important legal precedent for car owners, Toyota Motor Corp.'s U.S. sales unit agreed to settle with thousands of consumers who say oil-sludge build-up ruined their car engines even though they followed maintenance guidelines.
( KEY PARAGRAPH IN FULL ) Under the pending agreement between Toyota Motor Sales and motorists who are part of a class-action lawsuit, the Japanese car maker will compensate owners of sludge-damaged cars for engine-repair costs and related expenses from towing and storage charges to rental cars, attorney fees and "inconvenience, annoyance, anxiety and aggravation," according to the settlement agreement filed this month in Louisiana state court in Jefferson Parish. A judge is expected to approve the agreement in a Feb. 7 hearing.
Now , of course the final arbitrator of this is the Court Approved Settlement itself .This Settlement Agreement is one of six major links and three nested links contained in the " OFFICIAL COURT " site . There you will observe many , many interesting things . To the point here would be page 12 which under III BENEFITS TO SETTLEMENT CLASS MEMBERS - item 2b suggests the WSJ is in fact " more " correct than AN although its not completely one way . What this page and another 6/7 relevant paragraphs suggest to me ( I'm not a lawyer so check it out yourself ) is that previously incurred damages and expenses as per WSJ are covered where as some types of incidental expenses will not be covered after the Settlement is " Finalized " ( Court Approved ) . That date was 7FEB2007 . To understand all this its a good idea to read all the documentation on the website .I'm rushing this post - gotta go more on related later . The date thing is easy to clear up . There is more however , than just these two questions .
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Holy cow...I can't even begin to read any of this without my head hurting
And yes I own a Toyota but I do not drink their Kool-Aid....I just turn the key and it has started every morning and gotten me to work 50 miles away and back home again.
Goose
And yes I own a Toyota but I do not drink their Kool-Aid....I just turn the key and it has started every morning and gotten me to work 50 miles away and back home again.
Goose
So.... the other thing from the AN article as quoted here ;
Owners of damaged vehicles have eight years plus 120 days from the original purchase date to file a complaint
Again , partially correct .
For plaintiffs who took delivery ( or more accurately have/had a vehicle in service date ) between XX YYY 1996 THRU 15 NOV 1998 AND had sludge related expenses between their in service date and eight years after - now have until 15 MARCH 2007 to submit their claim . This provision is to cover those early owners who already are past the 8 year +120 day rule which applies to all others .
As an example ( early ) , suppose you bought a 1997 camry with an in service date of 5 Sept 1996 . If you had sludge related expenses between 5 Sept 1996 and 5 Sept 2004 then you have until 15 March 2007 ( don't wait ) to submit .
Going the other way ( late ) , if you have a 2002 camry with an in service date of say , 15 December 2002 then you are covered for sludge related expenses between 15 December 2002 and 15 December 2010 as long as you submit no later than 14 April 2011 .
Obviously , there are people and cars who are SOL because of vehicle age/date of malfunction .
Make sure you know what toyota considers your vehicles in service date . Make a calender .
BTW , the toyota spin/spokesperson quoted here , there , and everywhere couldn't be more misleading if he tried . This is a substantially better program than existed previously .In fact , since the Legal documents always refer to a separate equally important additional entity throughout and a superior whole as a result I'm comfortable calling as it is - beyond spin and just an outright lie .
Nothing has changed over there as far as their struggle with truth which is one of their three corp charactor flaws that got them into this situation to begin with .
Owners of damaged vehicles have eight years plus 120 days from the original purchase date to file a complaint
Again , partially correct .
For plaintiffs who took delivery ( or more accurately have/had a vehicle in service date ) between XX YYY 1996 THRU 15 NOV 1998 AND had sludge related expenses between their in service date and eight years after - now have until 15 MARCH 2007 to submit their claim . This provision is to cover those early owners who already are past the 8 year +120 day rule which applies to all others .
As an example ( early ) , suppose you bought a 1997 camry with an in service date of 5 Sept 1996 . If you had sludge related expenses between 5 Sept 1996 and 5 Sept 2004 then you have until 15 March 2007 ( don't wait ) to submit .
Going the other way ( late ) , if you have a 2002 camry with an in service date of say , 15 December 2002 then you are covered for sludge related expenses between 15 December 2002 and 15 December 2010 as long as you submit no later than 14 April 2011 .
Obviously , there are people and cars who are SOL because of vehicle age/date of malfunction .
Make sure you know what toyota considers your vehicles in service date . Make a calender .
BTW , the toyota spin/spokesperson quoted here , there , and everywhere couldn't be more misleading if he tried . This is a substantially better program than existed previously .In fact , since the Legal documents always refer to a separate equally important additional entity throughout and a superior whole as a result I'm comfortable calling as it is - beyond spin and just an outright lie .
Nothing has changed over there as far as their struggle with truth which is one of their three corp charactor flaws that got them into this situation to begin with .
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http://www.busrep.co.za/index.php?fArticleId=3636284
Think I'm hard on them - maybe unfair ? Think again .
HOME
Toyota Motor buys pig iron from firm using slaves
January 21, 2007
By Michael Smith and David Voreacos
New York - Toyota Motor's trading company bought pig iron, a key steel making ingredient, from a firm that used charcoal made by Brazilian slaves, said government reports.
Toyota Tsusho's US unit bought at least seven shipments of pig iron from Usina Siderurgica de Maraba (Usimar) last year, US Customs records showed. Usimar purchased charcoal from a camp where Brazilian inspectors in May found 22 people, including three children, who were not being paid for their work. They were living in squalid shacks without electricity and plumbing, and drinking unsanitary water, government inspectors reported.
Toyota Tsusho sold steel to Toyota Motor, said its spokesperson, Morimasa Konishi. However, Toyota Motor's spokesperson, Dan Sieger, denied that Toyota bought pig iron or steel from Toyota Tsusho.( See that ingrained toyota impulse to deny , deny , deny , or as my generation called it - to lie . Thats a toyota spokesperson against US customs and their OWN subsidiary's spokesperson . )
Toyota Motor did not join Ford Motor, DaimlerChrysler, General Motors and Honda Motor on December 4 when those companies announced plans to work together to train suppliers to avoid buying materials made by slaves. Ford stopped buying slave- tainted pig iron when asked about Bloomberg's findings in October.
Toyota Tsusho America, which is known as TAI, imported at least two pig iron shipments from Usimar after Bloomberg reported that car companies in the US used pig iron produced with charcoal made by slaves in Brazil.
US Customs' records showed that TAI was named as the importer of 13 699 tons of pig iron from Usimar on November 4. TAI imported another shipment - 11 831 tons of pig iron - from Usimar on December 26, US records showed. Between March 29 and December 26, TAI had received seven shipments totalling 80 378 tons of pig iron from Usimar.
TAI's senior vice-president, Mike Lavender, said his company had written assurances from its Brazilian pig iron suppliers, including Usimar, that they did not buy charcoal from slave camps.
Usimar had dropped out of a Brazilian association of pig iron producers sponsoring programmes to combat slavery in charcoal camps, said Marta de Lima Cavalcanti, a spokesperson for the industry group.
In the past decade, Brazilian labour inspectors and prosecutors had freed hundreds of slaves working in charcoal camps, government records showed. Brazilian law defines slavery as work in degrading or inhumane conditions.
The Brazilian task force discovered the Carvoaria do Mineiro charcoal camp after a group of workers fled on May 16 last year. The inspectors found the camp supplied charcoal to Usimar. Among the workers were three boys aged 12, 14 and 17.
After three days at Carvoaria do Mineiro, the inspectors concluded that the workers had to be rescued and paid. - Bloomberg
Think I'm hard on them - maybe unfair ? Think again .
HOME
Toyota Motor buys pig iron from firm using slaves
January 21, 2007
By Michael Smith and David Voreacos
New York - Toyota Motor's trading company bought pig iron, a key steel making ingredient, from a firm that used charcoal made by Brazilian slaves, said government reports.
Toyota Tsusho's US unit bought at least seven shipments of pig iron from Usina Siderurgica de Maraba (Usimar) last year, US Customs records showed. Usimar purchased charcoal from a camp where Brazilian inspectors in May found 22 people, including three children, who were not being paid for their work. They were living in squalid shacks without electricity and plumbing, and drinking unsanitary water, government inspectors reported.
Toyota Tsusho sold steel to Toyota Motor, said its spokesperson, Morimasa Konishi. However, Toyota Motor's spokesperson, Dan Sieger, denied that Toyota bought pig iron or steel from Toyota Tsusho.( See that ingrained toyota impulse to deny , deny , deny , or as my generation called it - to lie . Thats a toyota spokesperson against US customs and their OWN subsidiary's spokesperson . )
Toyota Motor did not join Ford Motor, DaimlerChrysler, General Motors and Honda Motor on December 4 when those companies announced plans to work together to train suppliers to avoid buying materials made by slaves. Ford stopped buying slave- tainted pig iron when asked about Bloomberg's findings in October.
Toyota Tsusho America, which is known as TAI, imported at least two pig iron shipments from Usimar after Bloomberg reported that car companies in the US used pig iron produced with charcoal made by slaves in Brazil.
US Customs' records showed that TAI was named as the importer of 13 699 tons of pig iron from Usimar on November 4. TAI imported another shipment - 11 831 tons of pig iron - from Usimar on December 26, US records showed. Between March 29 and December 26, TAI had received seven shipments totalling 80 378 tons of pig iron from Usimar.
TAI's senior vice-president, Mike Lavender, said his company had written assurances from its Brazilian pig iron suppliers, including Usimar, that they did not buy charcoal from slave camps.
Usimar had dropped out of a Brazilian association of pig iron producers sponsoring programmes to combat slavery in charcoal camps, said Marta de Lima Cavalcanti, a spokesperson for the industry group.
In the past decade, Brazilian labour inspectors and prosecutors had freed hundreds of slaves working in charcoal camps, government records showed. Brazilian law defines slavery as work in degrading or inhumane conditions.
The Brazilian task force discovered the Carvoaria do Mineiro charcoal camp after a group of workers fled on May 16 last year. The inspectors found the camp supplied charcoal to Usimar. Among the workers were three boys aged 12, 14 and 17.
After three days at Carvoaria do Mineiro, the inspectors concluded that the workers had to be rescued and paid. - Bloomberg
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I think your axe must be ground down to a nub by now.
I didn't hear about this sludge problem until I read it in the newspaper, but then again we don't drive Toyotas here in Detroit.
Oh heck no ( although I think we are done here ) - as far as the real story we have hardly scratched the surface . There are many ways to try and organise whats relevant and hasn't even been mentioned - and to expand / develop what we have barely touched on here.
Here is but a partial list - not even an outline .
RELEVANT BACKGROUND .
.....Toyoda clan history
......Toyota Corp. history
......Toyota Engine history
From this you could then distill the following ;
Toyota traditions :
...............Business ethics and practices . Also methods and motivations.
...............Engine design shortcomings (traditional - right from day one.Identical to their licensed/unlicensed copies of specific British/American engines esp British.
( Then you need the two other later shortcomings groups to be complete .)
See , these engines and their story have been a looooong time in the making . ( Really part of something muuuch bigger ) You could write a very big book - probably even a best seller .
Well , as I said lots of subheadings ( relevant topics ) , fascinating story thru out but the plot really does thicken from say 1962 - 1972 - 1976 - 1980 - 1982 - 1984/5 forward .........
..........Of course it accelerates even more from 1984 - 1989 - 1992 - ........... to the present day .
( Many , many , subheadings within the subheadings right up to and then beyond when the Class Action Lawsuit was filed .)
And that would be ......hmmmmm ..... well that sure is strange .
So far , I've only found one reference on the net , and gee , no mention anywhere on the incomplete/ poorly constructed " Offical Court " website (and for that matter the overwhelmed/ inadequately administered 1 +2 phone # program itself . )
http://www.detnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070210/BIZ/702100380/1148/AUTO01
Key sentence ;
Toyota agreed to settle the 2001 class-action suit last fall,
Soooo.......if this is accurate or even close ............ lots more to talk about .
Personally I think some of the hundreds of relevant topics would be ;
1 )Why not have expanded the Suit to include defective engine design/headgasket " performance " and then included the earlier 3VZ - E 3.0L V6 AND the 5vz - fe 3.4l V6 as well .
I know , I know , you could try and make it even bigger - because there are just so many issues with so many engines and of course how its all been handled but you gotta draw the line somewhere - if filed in 2001 as the article states these would have been the easiest pick me ups - would have dovetailed nicely with the other two .
2) Now an equally fascinating and relevant topic would be in terms of large organisations who knew of this suit when and what did they do and where did they do it after they knew .
Then there is how things have been handled from say , Sept 2006 - thru today .
I will say one thing , toyota sure knows how to " fight the net . "
When I look at how the Media/World has handled this and the company in general , I'll bet they pay well too .
Can you possibly imagine how all of this would have played out in the Media if this had been anybody else ? ( except Honda - maybe Nissan ) ?
Here is but a partial list - not even an outline .
RELEVANT BACKGROUND .
.....Toyoda clan history
......Toyota Corp. history
......Toyota Engine history
From this you could then distill the following ;
Toyota traditions :
...............Business ethics and practices . Also methods and motivations.
...............Engine design shortcomings (traditional - right from day one.Identical to their licensed/unlicensed copies of specific British/American engines esp British.
( Then you need the two other later shortcomings groups to be complete .)
See , these engines and their story have been a looooong time in the making . ( Really part of something muuuch bigger ) You could write a very big book - probably even a best seller .
Well , as I said lots of subheadings ( relevant topics ) , fascinating story thru out but the plot really does thicken from say 1962 - 1972 - 1976 - 1980 - 1982 - 1984/5 forward .........
..........Of course it accelerates even more from 1984 - 1989 - 1992 - ........... to the present day .
( Many , many , subheadings within the subheadings right up to and then beyond when the Class Action Lawsuit was filed .)
And that would be ......hmmmmm ..... well that sure is strange .
So far , I've only found one reference on the net , and gee , no mention anywhere on the incomplete/ poorly constructed " Offical Court " website (and for that matter the overwhelmed/ inadequately administered 1 +2 phone # program itself . )
http://www.detnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070210/BIZ/702100380/1148/AUTO01
Key sentence ;
Toyota agreed to settle the 2001 class-action suit last fall,
Soooo.......if this is accurate or even close ............ lots more to talk about .
Personally I think some of the hundreds of relevant topics would be ;
1 )Why not have expanded the Suit to include defective engine design/headgasket " performance " and then included the earlier 3VZ - E 3.0L V6 AND the 5vz - fe 3.4l V6 as well .
I know , I know , you could try and make it even bigger - because there are just so many issues with so many engines and of course how its all been handled but you gotta draw the line somewhere - if filed in 2001 as the article states these would have been the easiest pick me ups - would have dovetailed nicely with the other two .
2) Now an equally fascinating and relevant topic would be in terms of large organisations who knew of this suit when and what did they do and where did they do it after they knew .
Then there is how things have been handled from say , Sept 2006 - thru today .
I will say one thing , toyota sure knows how to " fight the net . "
When I look at how the Media/World has handled this and the company in general , I'll bet they pay well too .
Can you possibly imagine how all of this would have played out in the Media if this had been anybody else ? ( except Honda - maybe Nissan ) ?
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