Seismic qualification of nuclear plants

OVERKILL

$100 Site Donor 2021
Joined
Apr 28, 2008
Messages
58,094
Location
Ontario, Canada
@goingplacesanddoingstuff and I went seriously OT in the latest Australian battery fire thread so I thought it prudent to turn this into a new discussion.

He's a geologist, so probably has some good insight on this subject.

The two plants we were discussing were the infamous Fukushima Daiichi facility, which suffered a triple meltdown after being unable to obtain cooling water as a result of critical damage to both the feedwater pumps and backup generators, and Diablo Canyon in California, which is located near an active fault that has the potential to trigger a quake that he believes could exceed the design basis of the facility, which is a 7.5. To date, no seismic event has directly led to a significant incident at any nuclear power plant.

On Fukushima:
The pumps were heavily damaged during the tsunami, not adequately shielded by the sea wall, and the backup generators, located at the shore, were flooded and had their fuel tanks washed away.

The plant had successfully SCRAM'd before the tsunami, due to the massive 9.0-9.1 magnitude quake, and was shutdown.

The plant survived the quake, as did all the other plants in Japan.

At Fukushima Daiichi, the units were rated for:
Unit 1: 0.498g
Unit 2-6: 0.42-0.52g

This is equivalent to the lower end of a VIII on the Mercalli scale.

Diablo Canyon was designed around a 7.5 magnitude quake and a ground acceleration of 0.75g, which is the lower end of a IX on the Mercalli scale. It was later validated to be able to withstand 0.83g.

The Tōhoku earthquake (9.0-9.1) was 2.7g and the plant located closest to the epicentre was the Onagawa Nuclear Power Plant which survived the incident, and, following upgrades, Units 2 and 3 have since been restarted.

Onagawa was designed to withstand 0.61g and Unit 2 experienced 0.62g due to its proximity to the quake.

So, given the experience in Japan, how much risk does Diablo Canyon present?

I'm interested to see what he has to say on the matter.
 
Last edited:
Faults
Seismic activity resulting from the sudden release of energy along the surface of faults is inevitable in this part of California, and the potential for significant earthquakes is present. In general, understanding fault systems is difficult, especially without seismic surveys. California's strike-slip system is especially challenging with components of motion along every axis. Moreover, faults may exist both onshore and offshore without surficial expression.

In short, faults are hard to see, hard to understand, hard to predict, and hard to characterize.

Measurement
Most of us are familiar with the Richter scale, a log scale where anything above a 7 is damaging and anything above an 8 is potentially catastrophic, depending on proximity and other factors.

Important to understand is the relationship (or lack thereof) between the Richter scale and another measurement called peak ground acceleration (PGA, expressed in units of acceleration as a percentage of gravity, g), and how those create further uncertainty in safety margins.

Higher magnitude events tend to produce more ground acceleration, but factors such as sediment composition and other geological factors muddle the relationship. Engineering parameters designed around PGA have a loose correlation to magnitude. A shortcoming of PGA is that it only records a value, not direction or duration. Structures can only withstand a certain PGA for a certain duration.

Furthermore, structure damage is better characterized by PGV, peak ground velocity, measured in units of cm/s. Below is a chart adapted from two Wikipedia charts to relate PGV to Richter.

MagnitudeDescriptionPeak Ground Velocity (cm/s)EffectsAvg global freq.
7.0–7.9Major20 – 41.4 or higherCauses damage to most buildings, some to partially or completely collapse or receive severe damage. Well-designed structures are likely to receive damage. Felt across great distances with major damage mostly limited to 250 km from the epicenter.10 to 20 per year
8.0–8.9Great41.4 – 85.8 or higherMajor damage to buildings, and structures likely to be destroyed. Will cause moderate to heavy damage to sturdy or earthquake-resistant buildings. Damaging in large areas. Felt in extremely large regions.One per year
9.0–9.9ExtremeUp to and beyond 178Near total destruction – severe damage or collapse to all buildings. Heavy damage and shaking extend to distant locations. Permanent changes in ground topography.One to three per century

Geoscience and Engineering Intersect
Diablo Canyon can supposedly withstand a PGA of 0.75g and magnitude of 7.5. However, information is lacking on what duration it can sustain, and in which component directions. Information is also lacking on PGV.

There are significant discrepancies in PG&E's methods of determination of Diablo Canyon's PGA ratings, and the assumptions and methods are more relaxed than Federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) guidelines (NRC 2011). There has in fact been no rigorous regulatory validation of 0.75g or 0.83g. The processes of these ratings were not applied according to NRC standards, and the NRC has allowed the plant to continue in spite of this fact. Moreover, a larger magnitude or lower-PGA/higher duration earthquake is possible in this area, regardless of the actual nominal PGA rating of the facility.

The strike-slip fault system near to Diablo Canyon is potentially insufficiently understood given the proximity of several of the faults, notably Hosgri and Shoreline, the latter of which was only discovered less than a mile away in 2008, a full 40 years after the construction of the facility.

Hardebeck et al. (2010):

The Central Coast is bounded on the east by the San Andreas Fault, the major plate boundary fault, and lies between the greater San Francisco and Los Angeles areas. This coastal region is not as densely instrumented or as tectonically well understood as the San Andreas Fault or the major urban areas.
The identification of new faults, and the reinterpretation of known faults, suggests that further work is necessary to better constrain the seismic hazards of the Central Coast. While the locations and focal mechanisms (the direction of slip in an earthquake and the orientation of the fault on which it occurs) for aftershocks of the 2003 M6.5 San Simeon and 2004 M6.0 Parkfield earthquakes are similar to those found in previous aftershock studies, the seismicity features in the offshore region near San Luis Obispo are sharpened considerably by this study.
The most prominent newly-observed feature is the Shoreline Fault, a ~25 km-long vertical strike-slip fault running parallel to the coastline just offshore of Point Buchon. Several smaller strike-slip seismicity lineations are also observed in Estero Bay, along with a deep reverse structure at the depth of the top of the remnant subducted slab. Strike-slip faulting is observed along the Hosgri-San Simeon Fault system, up to ~10-15 km inland from the Hosgri Fault in Estero Bay and near Point Buchon, and on the onshore Rinconada and West Huasna Faults.
The Shoreline Fault in particular requires further study to better constrain its geometry, how it may connect to the Hosgri Fault or other faults to its east, its slip rate and whether it has produced large earthquakes in the past.
The operating company, PG&E conducted an audit and reported to the NRC in 2011 that the magnitude of potential earthquakes posed by the newly-discovered Shoreline fault were below the threshold of concern for the facility.

We are partnering with the United States Geological Survey (USGS) to update the earthquake hazards along the Central Coast and throughout our service territory. We also study significant global seismic events and apply those lessons learned against the design criteria of Diablo Canyon to verify the basis of its design. Those efforts resulted in the discovery of the Shoreline Fault in 2008. Using updated models of the ground motions gives a ground motion of 0.56 g from the Shoreline fault. PG&E’s evaluation concluded that the existing plant design is adequate to accommodate Shoreline Fault ground motion.

Note the citation of a single PGA value without a duration or direction, and no PGV.

However, Hardebeck (2013) revealed that neither the Shoreline fault nor the greater Shoreline-Hosgri system were sufficiently understood, adding that there is the potential a 7.5 magnitude event, which would potentially exceed even PG&E's optimistic PGA ratings:

The Shoreline fault is a vertical strike‐slip fault running along the coastline near San Luis Obispo, California. Much is unknown about the Shoreline fault, including its slip rate and the details of its geometry.
Here, I study the geometry of the Shoreline fault at seismogenic depth, as well as the adjacent section of the offshore Hosgri fault, using seismicity relocations and earthquake focal mechanisms. The Optimal Anisotropic Dynamic Clustering (OADC) algorithm (Ouillon et al., 2008) is used to objectively identify the simplest planar fault geometry that fits all of the earthquakes to within their location uncertainty.
The OADC results show that the Shoreline fault is a single continuous structure that connects to the Hosgri fault. Discontinuities smaller than about 1 km may be undetected, but would be too small to be barriers to earthquake rupture. The Hosgri fault dips steeply to the east, while the Shoreline fault is essentially vertical, so the Hosgri fault dips towards and under the Shoreline fault as the two faults approach their intersection. The focal mechanisms generally agree with pure right‐lateral strike‐slip on the OADC planes, but suggest a non‐planar Hosgri fault or another structure underlying the northern Shoreline fault.
The Shoreline fault most likely transfers strike‐slip motion between the Hosgri fault and other faults of the Pacific–North America plate boundary system to the east. A hypothetical earthquake rupturing the entire known length of the Shoreline fault would have a moment magnitude of 6.4–6.8. A hypothetical earthquake rupturing the Shoreline fault and the section of the Hosgri fault north of the Hosgri–Shoreline junction would have a moment magnitude of 7.2–7.5.

PG&E's own latest assessment admits a larger earthquake is possible which would exceed their own limits:

The largest earthquake considered in the SSC model is a magnitude M 8.5 on the Hosgri fault source, representing an extremely rare, but plausible, rupture between the offshore Point Arguello south of DCPP and the Mendocino Triple Junction offshore Cape Mendocino in northern California. The postulated rupture would include the entire 410 km (255 mi) length of the Hosgri-San Simeon-San Gregario fault zone and an additional 330 km ( 205 mi) of the northern San Andreas fault north of San Francisco.

Diablo Canyon was scheduled in 2016 to shut down starting in 2024, but due to the energy needs of California, it is planned to remain online. As recently as 2023 a 5-year extension was accepted:

The NRC has determined that the granting of the exemption request involves no significant hazards consideration because allowing the submittal of the license renewal application less than 5 years before the expiration of the existing license and deeming the license in timely renewal under 10 CFR 2.109(b) does not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The reasoning here is essentially, "it's very unlikely anything bad will happen in the next 5 years, and at least we're not making it less safe." This reasoning is not altogether unsound, but is borne of necessity, and brushes aside the geological evidence that the risk is higher than previously thought.

A thorough report from the Union of Concerned Scientists summarizes the issue:

Dr. Michael Peck, then an NRC resident inspector at Diablo Canyon, pointed out numerous deficiencies in PG&E’s evaluation of the Shoreline fault. Peck concluded that more analysis and likely additional modifications would be necessary before anyone could honestly claim that Diablo Canyon was adequately protected from an earthquake originating along the Shoreline fault.
Even if the Diablo Canyon reactors can in fact withstand the level of earthquakes PG&E asserts they can (0.75g), NRC analysis shows that there is roughly a 1-in-6 chance that the reactors will experience an earthquake larger than that over their 40-year lifetime. This suggests that even if the reactors are capable of withstanding 0.75g of ground motion, that may still be inadequate to ensure public safety.

It is also reported that the Federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission recognizes the relatively recent geological hazards and will likely require further upgrades to the plant's mitigation strategy:

"To continue operating Diablo Canyon beyond 2025 would have required a license renewal from the Federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission," CPUC spokesperson Terrie Prosper said in an email. "As part of the renewal PG&E would need to make seismic upgrades. Those upgrades combined with required changes to the cooling systems to comply with state and federal water quality laws would likely cost more than $1 billion."

Summary so Far
There is a lot more to touch on, but I am running out of time tonight. I personally think there is indeed cause for significant concern at Diablo Canyon, and that the necessity of the plant is allowing regulatory laxity in the face of increasing realization of geological risk.

Note, I am not opposed to nuclear in general. I believe all energy sources come with risk that must be mitigated and tolerated to some degree. There is always a trade-off when it comes to energy, and the tolerance for risk has to be a balance between the benefits and the costs. Accurate assessment of risk and cost, however, can be extremely challenging in the face of economic and pragmatic reality.
 
Last edited:
Faults
Seismic activity resulting from the sudden release of energy along the surface of faults is inevitable in this part of California, and the potential for significant earthquakes is present. In general, understanding fault systems is difficult, especially without seismic surveys. California's strike-slip system is especially challenging with components of motion along every axis. Moreover, faults may exist both onshore and offshore without surficial expression.

In short, faults are hard to see, hard to understand, hard to predict, and hard to characterize.

Measurement
Most of us are familiar with the Richter scale, a log scale where anything above a 7 is damaging and anything above an 8 is potentially catastrophic, depending on proximity and other factors.

Important to understand is the relationship (or lack thereof) between the Richter scale and another measurement called peak ground acceleration (PGA, expressed in units of acceleration as a percentage of gravity, g), and how those create further uncertainty in safety margins.

Higher magnitude events tend to product mode ground acceleration, but factors such as sediment composition and other geological factors muddle the relationship. Engineering parameters designed around PGA have a loose correlation to magnitude. A shortcoming of PGA is that it only records a value, not direction or duration. Structures can only withstand a certain PGA for a certain duration.

Furthermore, structure damage is better characterized by PGV, peak ground velocity, measured in units of cm/s. Below is a chart adapted from two Wikipedia charts to relate PGV to Richter.

MagnitudeDescriptionPeak Ground Velocity (cm/s)EffectsAvg global freq.
7.0–7.9Major20 – 41.4 or higherCauses damage to most buildings, some to partially or completely collapse or receive severe damage. Well-designed structures are likely to receive damage. Felt across great distances with major damage mostly limited to 250 km from the epicenter.10 to 20 per year
8.0–8.9Great41.4 – 85.8 or higherMajor damage to buildings, and structures likely to be destroyed. Will cause moderate to heavy damage to sturdy or earthquake-resistant buildings. Damaging in large areas. Felt in extremely large regions.One per year
9.0–9.9ExtremeUp to and beyond 178Near total destruction – severe damage or collapse to all buildings. Heavy damage and shaking extend to distant locations. Permanent changes in ground topography.One to three per century

Geoscience and Engineering Intersect
Diablo Canyon can supposedly withstand a PGA of 0.75g and magnitude of 7.5. However, information is lacking on what duration it can sustain, and in which component directions. Information is also lacking on PGV.

There are significant discrepancies in PG&E's methods of determination of Diablo Canyon's PGA ratings, and the assumptions and methods are more relaxed than Federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) guidelines (NRC 2011). There has in fact been no rigorous regulatory validation of 0.75g or 0.83g. The processes of these ratings were not applied according to NRC standards, and the NRC has allowed the plant to continue in spite of this fact. Moreover, a larger magnitude or lower-PGA/higher duration earthquake is possible in this area, regardless of the actual nominal PGA rating of the facility.

The strike-slip fault system near to Diablo Canyon is potentially insufficiently understood given the proximity of several of the faults, notably Hosgri and Shoreline, the latter of which was only discovered less than a mile away in 2008, a full 40 years after the construction of the facility.

Hardebeck et al. (2010):

The Central Coast is bounded on the east by the San Andreas Fault, the major plate boundary fault, and lies between the greater San Francisco and Los Angeles areas. This coastal region is not as densely instrumented or as tectonically well understood as the San Andreas Fault or the major urban areas.
The identification of new faults, and the reinterpretation of known faults, suggests that further work is necessary to better constrain the seismic hazards of the Central Coast. While the locations and focal mechanisms (the direction of slip in an earthquake and the orientation of the fault on which it occurs) for aftershocks of the 2003 M6.5 San Simeon and 2004 M6.0 Parkfield earthquakes are similar to those found in previous aftershock studies, the seismicity features in the offshore region near San Luis Obispo are sharpened considerably by this study.
The most prominent newly-observed feature is the Shoreline Fault, a ~25 km-long vertical strike-slip fault running parallel to the coastline just offshore of Point Buchon. Several smaller strike-slip seismicity lineations are also observed in Estero Bay, along with a deep reverse structure at the depth of the top of the remnant subducted slab. Strike-slip faulting is observed along the Hosgri-San Simeon Fault system, up to ~10-15 km inland from the Hosgri Fault in Estero Bay and near Point Buchon, and on the onshore Rinconada and West Huasna Faults.
The Shoreline Fault in particular requires further study to better constrain its geometry, how it may connect to the Hosgri Fault or other faults to its east, its slip rate and whether it has produced large earthquakes in the past.
The operating company, PG&E conducted an audit and reported to the NRC in 2011 that the magnitude of potential earthquakes posed by the newly-discovered Shoreline fault were below the threshold of concern for the facility.

We are partnering with the United States Geological Survey (USGS) to update the earthquake hazards along the Central Coast and throughout our service territory. We also study significant global seismic events and apply those lessons learned against the design criteria of Diablo Canyon to verify the basis of its design. Those efforts resulted in the discovery of the Shoreline Fault in 2008. Using updated models of the ground motions gives a ground motion of 0.56 g from the Shoreline fault. PG&E’s evaluation concluded that the existing plant design is adequate to accommodate Shoreline Fault ground motion.

Note the citation of a single PGA value without a duration or direction, and no PGV.

However, Hardebeck (2013) revealed that neither the Shoreline fault nor the greater Shoreline-Hosgri system were sufficiently understood, adding that there is the potential a 7.5 magnitude event, which would potentially exceed even PG&E's optimistic PGA ratings:

The Shoreline fault is a vertical strike‐slip fault running along the coastline near San Luis Obispo, California. Much is unknown about the Shoreline fault, including its slip rate and the details of its geometry.
Here, I study the geometry of the Shoreline fault at seismogenic depth, as well as the adjacent section of the offshore Hosgri fault, using seismicity relocations and earthquake focal mechanisms. The Optimal Anisotropic Dynamic Clustering (OADC) algorithm (Ouillon et al., 2008) is used to objectively identify the simplest planar fault geometry that fits all of the earthquakes to within their location uncertainty.
The OADC results show that the Shoreline fault is a single continuous structure that connects to the Hosgri fault. Discontinuities smaller than about 1 km may be undetected, but would be too small to be barriers to earthquake rupture. The Hosgri fault dips steeply to the east, while the Shoreline fault is essentially vertical, so the Hosgri fault dips towards and under the Shoreline fault as the two faults approach their intersection. The focal mechanisms generally agree with pure right‐lateral strike‐slip on the OADC planes, but suggest a non‐planar Hosgri fault or another structure underlying the northern Shoreline fault.
The Shoreline fault most likely transfers strike‐slip motion between the Hosgri fault and other faults of the Pacific–North America plate boundary system to the east. A hypothetical earthquake rupturing the entire known length of the Shoreline fault would have a moment magnitude of 6.4–6.8. A hypothetical earthquake rupturing the Shoreline fault and the section of the Hosgri fault north of the Hosgri–Shoreline junction would have a moment magnitude of 7.2–7.5.

PG&E's own latest assessment admits a larger earthquake is possible which would exceed their own limits:

The largest earthquake considered in the SSC model is a magnitude M 8.5 on the Hosgri fault source, representing an extremely rare, but plausible, rupture between the offshore Point Arguello south of DCPP and the Mendocino Triple Junction offshore Cape Mendocino in northern California. The postulated rupture would include the entire 410 km (255 mi) length of the Hosgri-San Simeon-San Gregario fault zone and an additional 330 km ( 205 mi) of the northern San Andreas fault north of San Francisco.

Diablo Canyon was scheduled in 2016 to shut down starting in 2024, but due to the energy needs of California, it is planned to remain online. As recently as 2023 a 5-year extension was accepted:

The NRC has determined that the granting of the exemption request involves no significant hazards consideration because allowing the submittal of the license renewal application less than 5 years before the expiration of the existing license and deeming the license in timely renewal under 10 CFR 2.109(b) does not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The reasoning here is essentially, "it's very unlikely anything bad will happen in the next 5 years, and at least we're not making it less safe." This reasoning is not altogether unsound, but is borne of necessity, and brushes aside the geological evidence that the risk is higher than previously thought.

A thorough report from the Union of Concerned Scientists summarizes the issue:

Dr. Michael Peck, then an NRC resident inspector at Diablo Canyon, pointed out numerous deficiencies in PG&E’s evaluation of the Shoreline fault. Peck concluded that more analysis and likely additional modifications would be necessary before anyone could honestly claim that Diablo Canyon was adequately protected from an earthquake originating along the Shoreline fault.
Even if the Diablo Canyon reactors can in fact withstand the level of earthquakes PG&E asserts they can (0.75g), NRC analysis shows that there is roughly a 1-in-6 chance that the reactors will experience an earthquake larger than that over their 40-year lifetime. This suggests that even if the reactors are capable of withstanding 0.75g of ground motion, that may still be inadequate to ensure public safety.

It is also reported that the Federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission recognizes the relatively recent geological hazards and will likely require further upgrades to the plant's mitigation strategy:

"To continue operating Diablo Canyon beyond 2025 would have required a license renewal from the Federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission," CPUC spokesperson Terrie Prosper said in an email. "As part of the renewal PG&E would need to make seismic upgrades. Those upgrades combined with required changes to the cooling systems to comply with state and federal water quality laws would likely cost more than $1 billion."

Summary so Far
There is a lot more to touch on, but I am running out of time tonight. I personally think there is indeed cause for significant concern at Diablo Canyon, and that the necessity of the plant is allowing regulatory laxity in the face of increasing realization of geological risk.

Note, I am not opposed to nuclear in general. I believe all energy sources come with risk that must be mitigated and tolerated to some degree. There is always a trade-off when it comes to energy, and the tolerance for risk has to be a balance between the benefits and the costs. Accurate assessment of risk and cost, however, can be extremely challenging in the face of economic and pragmatic reality.
Thank you for that, great post! And thank you for being willing to take that discussion out of the previous thread and into this one, where I think the dialogue can be a lot more productive.

I do have a question about the re-qualification though, which notes an updated ground motion qualification of 0.83g that the plant was apparently approved for, it's from the paragraph that precedes the quote you posted from the PG&E Audit, and I linked in the OP:

In 1985, with advice from the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), the NRC required four licensing conditions to be resolved to approve the final operating license. This seismic safety reevaluation was named the Long Term Seismic Program (LTSP). During the program, improved earthquake models showed that the maximum earthquake on the Hosgri fault was M 7.2 and improved ground motion models gave a ground motion of up to 0.83 g. The plant structures, systems, and components were shown to have adequate seismic safety margin to withstand ground motions of 0.83 g. The LTSP report and conclusions were approved by the NRC in 1991 (NRC-SSER-34). PG&E and the NRC agreed to make the LTSP a permanent Program as part of the operating license which continually evaluates seismic issues, and applies new information to assure that the plant is seismically safe.

And, how do you think this squares with the Japanese plants, which weren't seismically qualified for the same amount of ground motion, but seemed to fair OK?

I assume you would be a proponent of seismic upgrades at Diablo Canyon, like they've been doing in Japan, to harden the plant against larger potential quakes if its operating license is significantly extended, like we've seen with other US plants?
 
It should be noted that there are different types of earthquakes. I don’t know all the names right off but the Great East Japan Earthquake was labeled as a mega thrust earthquake which is extremely destructive.

Having spent a number of years in Asia and in particular the Philippines I got to experience several earthquakes. Some were a side to side swaying type. Imagine sitting at a computer desk and suddenly everything moves three feet one way than back the other way. That was from a regional earthquake but not close.

We were twenty kilometers from the epicenter of this one. A person could not stand on their own during the temblor.




There are so many factors involved including geology and directions of faults and so on. Duration is a big factor. The earthquake we experienced in 2013 was about thirty seconds. The Tōhoku quake was around six minutes. We can build things to be quake resistant but sometimes the earth has other plans.
 
OP, what happened at Fukushima it's not something that you can call surviving an earthquake. Surviving an earthquake means no release of radioactive material and no cleanup involved afterward. And even better would be to also still be 100% operational. Fukushima failed on all three of these criteria. I don't think that the government that has to foot the bill for the results would call what happened at Fukushima surviving the incident. And I don't think that anybody that lives near it or has form land downwind from it would call it surviving the incident.
 
OP, what happened at Fukushima it's not something that you can call surviving an earthquake. Surviving an earthquake means no release of radioactive material and no cleanup involved afterward. And even better would be to also still be 100% operational. Fukushima failed on all three of these criteria. I don't think that the government that has to foot the bill for the results would call what happened at Fukushima surviving the incident. And I don't think that anybody that lives near it or has form land downwind from it would call it surviving the incident.
You seemed to have missed the point. Fundamentally, what transpired at the plant was not a direct result of the earthquake. The plant weathered the actual quake just fine, SCRAM'd and didn't experience any significant structural or safety issues.

But, that quake produced a massive tsunami, something the facility was not sufficiently hardened against due to grandfathering regulations that allowed Tepco to skip-out on making what would end up being absolutely necessary upgrades.

So, you popping in here and saying that the plant didn't survive the earthquake, then listing everything that transpired as a result of the tsunami as evidence is not the winning argument you might think it is.
 
The building and systems resonance frequencies is probably quite important as well. I don't know if a fault line tends to have similar oscillations with varying magnitude events, but it would be a good exercise to try to model the plants resonance and identify which frequencies will do maximum damage even at low intensity earthquakes, and take some measures to reduce vulnerability to likely earth quake frequencies.
 
You seemed to have missed the point. Fundamentally, what transpired at the plant was not a direct result of the earthquake. The plant weathered the actual quake just fine, SCRAM'd and didn't experience any significant structural or safety issues.

But, that quake produced a massive tsunami, something the facility was not sufficiently hardened against due to grandfathering regulations that allowed Tepco to skip-out on making what would end up being absolutely necessary upgrades.

So, you popping in here and saying that the plant didn't survive the earthquake, then listing everything that transpired as a result of the tsunami as evidence is not the winning argument you might think it is.


And just to add, the tsunami hit the shore within about 30 minutes so it all happened very fast. That’s not to say the plant would not have fared any differently if the tsunami had struck later.
 
SLO County has a public alarm system and free iodine pills - all the protection we need. (sarcasm)
Somewhat OT, but our city has a former GE factory that was considered a target of significance during WWII and the Cold War. So, there were air raid sirens positioned all over town as a result.

During the Cold War era, they used to do drills and test the system. Later, when I was a kid, the system was basically abandoned, the fall of the Berlin Wall marked the end of the utility of this system. Well, it fell into disrepair and started randomly going off by itself, so we'd be out on the playground and all of a sudden "the Soviets are coming!" as the air raid sirens lit-off, their seemingly tireless wailing cutting through the air, seizing control of your eardrums, blocking out the boring everyday background noise of this retirement destination, hauling back to the surface what must have been pretty raw memories for many of those destination residents who had served.

Back to the topic at hand. So, we have a similar policy, where, if you live in proximity to any of the nuclear plants, you can get iodine pills. They updated the emergency alert system to use cellphones and a few years ago now, some trainee was inadvertently using the live system rather than the training system and sent out an emergency alert about Pickering! There was a bit of pandemonium and folks scrambled to find out what was going on, and then they had to send out another emergency alert to indicate that the previous one had been sent in error. What a gong show!

I made this meme at the time, lol:
7071500A-0F8B-4CC7-A596-C79231ACEACD_1_105_c.jpeg


Folks who were working at the plant were like "wait, what?" lol.
 
And just to add, the tsunami hit the shore within about 30 minutes so it all happened very fast. That’s not to say the plant would not have fared any differently if the tsunami had struck later.
Yes, and the tsunami caused considerable loss of life. Local residents at Onagawa, the facility closest to the epicentre, actually sheltered at the plant.
 
You seemed to have missed the point. Fundamentally, what transpired at the plant was not a direct result of the earthquake. The plant weathered the actual quake just fine, SCRAM'd and didn't experience any significant structural or safety issues.

But, that quake produced a massive tsunami, something the facility was not sufficiently hardened against due to grandfathering regulations that allowed Tepco to skip-out on making what would end up being absolutely necessary upgrades.

So, you popping in here and saying that the plant didn't survive the earthquake, then listing everything that transpired as a result of the tsunami as evidence is not the winning argument you might think it is.
This is kinda mind bending, but a tsunami is a just wave in water, and an earthquake is just a wave in rock. In a sense, it’s not invalid to consider them much the same phenomenon with the same root cause, just in different physical media and propagating at very different velocities.

In each case damage is caused when the wave meets a physical transition.
 
While I see your point, and it is true that the plants survived the forces exerted on them directly from the g-forces of the earthquake, it can hardly be argued that these plants survive the event. If one were to construct a nuclear power plant at the bottom of a huge mountain and an earthquake occurred and the plant survived the g-forces from the earthquake but an ensuing landslide created from the earthquake were to take out the plant causing a catastrophic failure and release of large amounts of radioactive material I would not call that surviving an earthquake either. Engineering for survival of events must take into account everything that that event would cause to happen.

So yes the Fukushima power plants survived the g-forces of the event but did not survive the event itself.

A paragraph stating that they survived the event is too broad of a statement and paints an inaccurate picture. The reality is they did not survive the event. They survived the shock forces from the event but not the event itself.
 
If one were two construct a nuclear power plant on a fault line, said plant designed to withstand the maximum g-forces that such a fault line could ever generate and then some, and the fault line were to rupture resulting in a giant crack that caused a section of the plant to fall into said crack resulting in catastrophic failure of the plant on a scale equal to or exceeding Fukushima it would not be appropriate to say that such a plant survived that incident.

It was known in advance that earthquakes in that vicinity can generate tsunamis and the plant was not adequately built to withstand it.

It is also known in advance that earthquakes along fault lines can cause giant ruptures of the earth resulting in giant cracks and that if something is built where said crack were to happen it could fall into it. If such an event were to happen and the plant were to survive the g-forces of the earthquake yet catastrophically fail I would hardly argue that it would have surved the event.
 
Btw, I'm not trying to be Pro nuclear or anti-nuclear in any way. I'm simply looking at this from the perspective of doing total engineering for what you have to put up with at a specific site with a specific problem.
 
The outermost containment walls of nuclear power plants for the reactor section are designed to withstand the impact of a passenger jet, irrespectively with regard to whether that passenger jet would have been a hijacked jet or simply an accident. It was deemed necessary to design them with that safety precaution. People who designed such units think of the possibilities of what can go wrong and what can be done to safeguard against it.

Designing with areas that require special considerations maybe possible in some cases and in some cases the best solution may be to choose a different location that does not require some of the design safeties that such a site requires.

--------------

Personally, I'd like to see many of the Westinghouse ap1000 systems built in the United States, but I would not care to see any of them built near or on a fault line.
 
This is kinda mind bending, but a tsunami is a just wave in water, and an earthquake is just a wave in rock. In a sense, it’s not invalid to consider them much the same phenomenon with the same root cause, just in different physical media and propagating at very different velocities.

In each case damage is caused when the wave meets a physical transition.
Sure, but an earthquake doesn't always spawn a tsunami, just like an ice storm doesn't always knock down trees. If there's an ice storm and a tree falls on my car, do I say my car failed to weather the ice storm or do I say it failed to handle a tree falling on it?

Cause and effect right? Sure, the ice storm may have caused the tree to fall, but it wasn't the ice storm that damaged the vehicle, it was the tree. And there were plenty of vehicles during that same storm, perhaps some that experienced a much more severe part of the storm, that weren't crushed by trees.
 
While I see your point, and it is true that the plants survived the forces exerted on them directly from the g-forces of the earthquake, it can hardly be argued that these plants survive the event.
Go back and read the OP, I said the plant survived the QUAKE.
If one were to construct a nuclear power plant at the bottom of a huge mountain and an earthquake occurred and the plant survived the g-forces from the earthquake but an ensuing landslide created from the earthquake were to take out the plant causing a catastrophic failure and release of large amounts of radioactive material I would not call that surviving an earthquake either. Engineering for survival of events must take into account everything that that event would cause to happen.
And, if absolutely zero preparation was made for handling a landslide, maybe you'd have a point, but in this case there were design-basis decisions made, specifically, for handling a tsunami. And, there were recommendations (they couldn't be enforcements due to the regulator lacking teeth, being captured by industry) to both upgrade the sea wall, due to better updated modelling, that showed that the existing seawall was inadequate, and, advising relocation of the backup generators to behind the facility, where they weren't vulnerable.

Neither of those upgrades were made.

So, it's an important distinction to note that what the plant failed to survive was the tsunami, because this highlights an issue not with the seismic qualification of the facility, but with the capture of the regulator, whose board was populated by industry, that enabled the avoidance of the recommended upgrades to the seawall that would have prevented the disaster.
A paragraph stating that they survived the event is too broad of a statement and paints an inaccurate picture. The reality is they did not survive the event. They survived the shock forces from the event but not the event itself.
Are you serious? A paragraph dissecting the event and noting that there were two distinct components here, highlighting that the plant was successfully able to weather the first component (quake) but not the 2nd (tsunami) is, in your eyes, inaccurate, but broad brushing the whole bloody thing as a failure of the plant to survive the quake is A-OK? Get out of here.
 
Back
Top