MolaKule
Staff member
quote:
Keeping Cargo Safe From Terror
Hong Kong Port Project Scans All Containers; U.S. Doesn't See the Need
The Wall Street Journal 07/29/05
author: Alex Ortolani
author: Robert Block
(Copyright (c) 2005, Dow Jones & Company, Inc.)
How do you keep a terrorist from smuggling a radiation-filled "dirty bomb" or other weapon in one of the seven million-plus shipping containers that arrive at U.S. ports each year? That question has dogged policy makers, customs agents and counterterrorism experts ever since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.
Until now, U.S. Customs and Border Protection has sought to secure global shipping by relying on intelligence and scrutinizing suspicious cargo manifests -- such as an unrefrigerated container full of "frozen fish" -- to identify potentially dangerous shipments long before they reach American shores.
But critics say this method is flawed because the information on shipping documents if often vague and unreliable, and intelligence is spotty, particularly from remote corners of the world. Currently, fewer than 6% of the containers headed for American ports are deemed "high risk" by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and pulled aside for examination by Customs inspectors.
Now, port officials in Hong Kong, the world's second-busiest port after Singapore, are testing a strategy that electronically scrutinizes every container full of sneakers, toys, gadgets or other contents. Proponents contend it better secures the global shipping system -- without unacceptably slowing the flow of commerce.
Over the past year, the Hong Kong Terminal Operators Association, which includes several private companies, has deployed scanning machines supplied by Science Applications International Corp. of San Diego. Trucks haul each container passing through the port through two of the giant scanners. One checks for nuclear radiation, while the other uses gamma rays to seek out any dense, suspicious object made of steel or lead inside the containers that could shield a bomb from the nuclear detector.
In a tiny room in the offices of closely held Modern Terminals Ltd., one of the port operators, four flat-screen monitors display the scanning operations. X-ray-like images of the passing containers pop up on the screens and are stored on a computer server. The tracking code found on the side of each container is also recorded.
Those images and codes could be passed along to customs services in other cities to help them identify suspicious cargo before it gets loaded onto a ship, or at any point along its journey. Such a database also could prove invaluable if a container that had originated in Hong Kong later was involved in terrorism.
Stephen Flynn, a respected maritime-security expert and consultant to Science Applications, which hopes to sell its machines to ports around the world based on the Hong Kong installation, said the system promises to revolutionize port security. He said it is the best way to ensure that a container is carrying, say, shoes, and not "a large black box that could go boom in the night."
In the event that a bomb got through in one container, Mr. Flynn said, U.S. officials could use the stored images and information to track a shipment back to its source. They could then selectively stop ships transporting other containers from the same source or whose scans had results similar to the one with the bomb. This could prevent the need to shut down international shipping, which would slam the global economy and sow panic -- presumably the aim of a terrorist group employing such a weapon.
"My worst nightmare is that a shipment gets into Memphis or Chicago by rail and goes off, and they don't know where it came from or how it got there," Mr. Flynn said. So far, Mr. Flynn said, the Hong Kong project would cost shippers an additional $6.50 a container if its costs were passed on to them. That is a fraction of what it costs to transport a container: about $1,900 to send a 20-foot container from Hong Kong to Los Angeles.
To date, Hong Kong has stored more than 250,000 container scans, many for cargo that was shipped to U.S. ports. However, none of the scans have formally been requested by U.S. authorities. In fact, until Tuesday, Washington had shown little enthusiasm for the project, saying that its efforts to beef up maritime surveillance and screening were sufficient.
In its first public statement on the Hong Kong project, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, part of the Department of Homeland Security, said this week that it would work with that city's port authorities to continue to develop the screening project, which the DHS said holds the promise "to play a formidable role in blunting the terrorist threat." But the agency stopped short of saying whether it would consider such a system at U.S. ports.
The response came after Hong Kong Terminal Operators sent a letter July 21 to Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff requesting feedback on the project in the hope that the U.S. would back it, justifying the $7 million the terminal operators group has spent so far. The project would most likely have closed in 90 days if the U.S. failed to give its support, said Sean Kelly, managing director of Modern Terminals.
In part, U.S. Custom's lack of enthusiasm for the screening system reflects a difference in philosophy. U.S. officials believe security can be maintained by checking only select containers that may be suspect, based on shipping manifests and intelligence the government receives. Moving to a system that scanned all incoming containers might represent a costly change in approach, these officials say.
U.S. Customs already uses scanning technology at scores of American ports as well as many land border crossings. It also provides hand-held radiation scanners to officials at every major U.S. port. But these scans are used only on containers that have been deemed by Customs as high risk. They are an alternative or precursor to physical inspections and the scan images are never stored.
Billions of dollars have been spent buying, running and maintaining the myriad security methods available to U.S. Customs, said Al Gina, executive director of the Container Security Initiative at U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
Much of this money has gone into Customs and Border Protection's National Targeting Center in Reston, Va., where U.S. agents use a computer program known as ATS, or automated targeting system, to hunt for potential terrorists or terrorist weapons in the advance information provided under law by airlines and shipping agents. The system checks the information against government databases and looks for anomalies to determine what cargo or passengers are "high risk," whether they require scrutiny at the port of entry or overseas, or whether they should be barred from the U.S. entirely.
But the effectiveness of the systems has been called into question. During congressional testimony last year, the former Homeland Security inspector general, Clark Kent Ervin, said a preliminary examination of National Targeting Center's work in Fort Lauderdale, Fla., suggested that random inspections of ships were better at uncovering smuggling activities than ATS.
Customs officials vehemently disagree, saying ATS has been a vital part of its security strategy and is crucial to programs like the Container Security Initiative, which is active at 35 international ports where U.S. Customs officers work with local counterparts to identify suspicious containers before they are sent to the U.S.
Lawrence M. Wein, a professor of management science at Stanford University Business School who has studied homeland security systems, said he would like to see the Hong Kong project used globally. The U.S. approach, Mr. Wein said, offers only a single layer of security.
If a smuggler or terrorist manages to escape detection by Customs, which many drug traffickers do now routinely, then their shipments will enter the U.S. unimpeded. "We need at least another layer. The Hong Kong project is a first strong step in that direction," Mr. Wein said.
