Hawaii 777 nose dive

You appear to be correct from the analysis above.

I worked on WPR (Weather Prediction Radar) algorithms at Collins to predict wind shear and microbursts always keeping in mind the Aug. 2, 1985, Delta Flight 191 crash.

While Delta 191 was a microburst incident upon landing, we also developed warning algorithms for takeoff (windshear and microbursts) and flight conditions as per the weather radar returns.

Some descriptions: "Unique to MultiScan ThreatTrack is its patented Predictive OverFlight™ Protection, which tracks thunderstorm cells ahead of and below the aircraft, measures growth rate, predicts bow-wave turbulence and indicates potential threats in the aircraft’s flight path. MultiScan ThreatTrack provides flight crews with a more defined picture of potentially disruptive weather threats."

https://www.collinsaerospace.com/wh...ght-deck/surveillance/multiscan-weather-radar

"Accurately depicting the weather is critical to safety and comfort. Our advanced weather radar solutions enhance your situational awareness with advanced weather avoidance technology, so you’re always aware of potential weather threats. With detection ranges of up to 320 nm and available Doppler™ turbulence detection at ranges of up to 50 nm, our MultiScan family of weather radars give you real-time information on the smoothest, most efficient routes around dangerous weather systems."

Search Terms: WXR-2100 and RTA-4100 MultiScan ThreatTrack Radar

Honeywell and Thales have similar systems.
Thanks.

WRT 2100 & RDR 4000 are great weather radars ( just picked my way through thunderstorms coming from Cancún with the RDR 4000 ).

I have never had a real reactive or predictive wind shear except in the sim.

All our aircraft have reactive wind shear but only a few have PWS.

Crazy year for thunderstorms.
 
Thanks.

WRT 2100 & RDR 4000 are great weather radars ( just picked my way through thunderstorms coming from Cancún with the RDR 4000 ).

I have never had a real reactive or predictive wind shear except in the sim.

All our aircraft have reactive wind shear but only a few have PWS.

Crazy year for thunderstorms.
Really?

Every one of our airplanes has PWS.

Even our 757/767 fleet, which has some airframes approaching 30 years in service.

Every one.
 
Really?

Every one of our airplanes has PWS.

Even our 757/767 fleet, which has some airframes approaching 30 years in service.

Every one.
Why would I not be for real?

Even if the aircraft has PWS ( all have RWS ) , we aren’t allowed to take off ( or do the approach ) if LLWS exceeds certain limits.

Makes sense to me.
 
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Why would I not be for real?

Even if the aircraft has PWS ( all have RWS ) , we aren’t allowed to take off ( or do the approach ) if LLWS exceeds certain limits.

Makes sense to me.
We are pretty far off topic here, since I don’t think this incident had anything to do with a microburst. But since we’ve started comparing notes… and I think the rest of BITOG might take an interest...pressing on…So, first, I am not suggesting you’re not representing the truth, please don’t take this as a personal criticism.

We have the same operating restrictions on operating with LLWS/microburst, etc. asked in the shift/gust that is reported. That’s common. My peers at DAL and SWA have the same operating limitations.

But PWS is an important safety capability. Introduced 25 years ago. Not replaced by avoidance, or reactive wind shear notification.

Far better to get 30-60 seconds of notice on a microburst, than to wait that long until GPWS Mode 7 (RWS) squawks. 30-60 seconds of full thrust (or rejecting the takeoff) before the encounter makes an enormous difference in the outcome. Turns a potentially fatal counter into a minor event.

I’m simply expressing my surprise that a major airline, 25 years after the introduction of that technology, hasn’t outfitted the whole fleet with what is now, standard, wind shear detection and avoidance capability. I can see the regionals and other low cost operations skimping on safety equipment. Some of them don’t have EGPWS, either.

PWS cautions and warnings have saved my bacon twice in Denver. Twice, when it was legal to depart, or land, using the LLWS guidelines, the PWS detected something that tower didn’t yet know. An airplane without PWS would’ve simply flown into the actual microburst, since the gust was still being reported as only 15 knots.

The PWS radar saw it differently. Allowed reaction to a real threat when tower, and GPWS, and operating guidelines, all said everything was fine.

To discover that an international air carrier operates without this capability for early detection, without PWS, this many years after the technology was introduced, is, well, surprising.

Merely avoiding LLWS after a certain threshold was reported fails to cover the gap between when the microburst starts, and when it is detected. That delay, that gap between air moving and airplanes, or wind comparators, detecting the motion, has caused hard landing and injuries, and in some cases, fatalities.

Among other things, PWS covers that gap. Gives you the extra time to react that GPWS/RWS does not. Particularly in this crazy year, having the advance warning can be the critical difference in outcome.
 
We are pretty far off topic here, since I don’t think this incident had anything to do with a microburst. But since we’ve started comparing notes… and I think the rest of BITOG might take an interest...pressing on…So, first, I am not suggesting you’re not representing the truth, please don’t take this as a personal criticism.

We have the same operating restrictions on operating with LLWS/microburst, etc. asked in the shift/gust that is reported. That’s common. My peers at DAL and SWA have the same operating limitations.

But PWS is an important safety capability. Introduced 25 years ago. Not replaced by avoidance, or reactive wind shear notification.

Far better to get 30-60 seconds of notice on a microburst, than to wait that long until GPWS Mode 7 (RWS) squawks. 30-60 seconds of full thrust (or rejecting the takeoff) before the encounter makes an enormous difference in the outcome. Turns a potentially fatal counter into a minor event.

I’m simply expressing my surprise that a major airline, 25 years after the introduction of that technology, hasn’t outfitted the whole fleet with what is now, standard, wind shear detection and avoidance capability. I can see the regionals and other low cost operations skimping on safety equipment. Some of them don’t have EGPWS, either.

PWS cautions and warnings have saved my bacon twice in Denver. Twice, when it was legal to depart, or land, using the LLWS guidelines, the PWS detected something that tower didn’t yet know. An airplane without PWS would’ve simply flown into the actual microburst, since the gust was still being reported as only 15 knots.

The PWS radar saw it differently. Allowed reaction to a real threat when tower, and GPWS, and operating guidelines, all said everything was fine.

To discover that an international air carrier operates without this capability for early detection, without PWS, this many years after the technology was introduced, is, well, surprising.

Merely avoiding LLWS after a certain threshold was reported fails to cover the gap between when the microburst starts, and when it is detected. That delay, that gap between air moving and airplanes, or wind comparators, detecting the motion, has caused hard landing and injuries, and in some cases, fatalities.

Among other things, PWS covers that gap. Gives you the extra time to react that GPWS/RWS does not. Particularly in this crazy year, having the advance warning can be the critical difference in outcome.
I never compared notes, I just responded to another member's comment about PWS. You compared notes.

Feel free to correct anything I ever say that's untrue, please.

Agreed, microburst had nothing to do with that incident, the pilot error did and we are drifting off-topic. The topic is what happened on that flight versus PWS. You haven't commented on the report.

The safest thing in an airplane is the pilot, not the equipment. Experience, judgment, etc.

I have flown for a long time and have never had problems flying without PWS. I have no problems flying a plane with no PWS either as long as it has RWS ( cannot fly without it ). All the airports we fly to have TDWR and issue reports ( sure, it can be u/s ).

Reactive wind shear will detect wind shear once in it and provide guidance out of it. That said, the safest thing is to not take off.

You once even shared a story about taking off out of Denver with a tower wind shear report and said the RWS went off. I am sure you followed its guidance and it obviously worked.

Our airline would feel it's unsafe to take off in known wind shear ( more than 15 knots ) while others do it. I think thats unsafe.

What is the topic is what happened on that flight and I am surprised by how they handled it plus some other stuff.

I would say the same if it was my airline.

Same for me, it's not personal, it's just part of the topic and discussion.
 
I’m impressed with your memory.

Yes, I did take off (full precautions taken, including max thrust and increased VR, which you and I have discussed before) with LLWS advisories and a reported airspeed loss within limits.

And yes, the RWS detected the performance loss not long after takeoff, triggering the warning.

The 757-200, in full thrust mode, shrugged it off. Love that jet.

But that’s a decision I’ve second-guessed many times. Should I have waited? Even with the thrust/weight of my airplane,
Shear causes a performance loss.

Now, it wasn’t a microburst, it was clear skies and an actual shear from a frontal passage and the loss was about 700 feet AFE - so there was much less risk than a microburst and I had plenty of altitude.

But I rolled down the runway without knowing it would be the same for me as it was for the previous airplane that reported the loss. I trusted that the PWS would react (and it should) to anything worse than a 15 knot loss, and I trusted the performance of my airplane.

But I wonder if I could’ve waited a bit longer - let the PWS scan a couple more sweeps - just to be certain the situation hadn’t deteriorated from the previous report.
 
We are pretty far off topic here, since I don’t think this incident had anything to do with a microburst. But since we’ve started comparing notes… and I think the rest of BITOG might take an interest...pressing on…So, first, I am not suggesting you’re not representing the truth, please don’t take this as a personal criticism.

We have the same operating restrictions on operating with LLWS/microburst, etc. asked in the shift/gust that is reported. That’s common. My peers at DAL and SWA have the same operating limitations.

But PWS is an important safety capability. Introduced 25 years ago. Not replaced by avoidance, or reactive wind shear notification.

Far better to get 30-60 seconds of notice on a microburst, than to wait that long until GPWS Mode 7 (RWS) squawks. 30-60 seconds of full thrust (or rejecting the takeoff) before the encounter makes an enormous difference in the outcome. Turns a potentially fatal counter into a minor event.

I’m simply expressing my surprise that a major airline, 25 years after the introduction of that technology, hasn’t outfitted the whole fleet with what is now, standard, wind shear detection and avoidance capability. I can see the regionals and other low cost operations skimping on safety equipment. Some of them don’t have EGPWS, either.

PWS cautions and warnings have saved my bacon twice in Denver. Twice, when it was legal to depart, or land, using the LLWS guidelines, the PWS detected something that tower didn’t yet know. An airplane without PWS would’ve simply flown into the actual microburst, since the gust was still being reported as only 15 knots.

The PWS radar saw it differently. Allowed reaction to a real threat when tower, and GPWS, and operating guidelines, all said everything was fine.

To discover that an international air carrier operates without this capability for early detection, without PWS, this many years after the technology was introduced, is, well, surprising.

Merely avoiding LLWS after a certain threshold was reported fails to cover the gap between when the microburst starts, and when it is detected. That delay, that gap between air moving and airplanes, or wind comparators, detecting the motion, has caused hard landing and injuries, and in some cases, fatalities.

Among other things, PWS covers that gap. Gives you the extra time to react that GPWS/RWS does not. Particularly in this crazy year, having the advance warning can be the critical difference in outcome.
Zero issues with no PWS but flying with no Enhanced GPWS is nuts.
GPWS ( even more so with enhanced) is one of the greatest inventions in aviation.

TDWS is another great innovation at airports that detects microbursts.

I have flown lots with PWS but never had even a caution let alone a warning but I have had several flights delayed ( hold ) because of airport microbursts ( MCO aka Orlando ) warnings by ATC.
 
I’m impressed with your memory.

Yes, I did take off (full precautions taken, including max thrust and increased VR, which you and I have discussed before) with LLWS advisories and a reported airspeed loss within limits.

And yes, the RWS detected the performance loss not long after takeoff, triggering the warning.

The 757-200, in full thrust mode, shrugged it off. Love that jet.

But that’s a decision I’ve second-guessed many times. Should I have waited? Even with the thrust/weight of my airplane,
Shear causes a performance loss.

Now, it wasn’t a microburst, it was clear skies and an actual shear from a frontal passage and the loss was about 700 feet AFE - so there was much less risk than a microburst and I had plenty of altitude.

But I rolled down the runway without knowing it would be the same for me as it was for the previous airplane that reported the loss. I trusted that the PWS would react (and it should) to anything worse than a 15 knot loss, and I trusted the performance of my airplane.

But I wonder if I could’ve waited a bit longer - let the PWS scan a couple more sweeps - just to be certain the situation hadn’t deteriorated from the previous report.
I have a good memory, just ask my wife ( and it's not just about anniversary dates ) and Fo's.

PWS we have only detects wind shear if it's raining ( doppler ).
 
Airbus has a unique feature called “ ground speed mini” to maintain a constant energy state.

It knows what surface winds are ( pilots loaded it in the FMS ) and height above ground winds on the approach ( on its own using ADIRS data aka wind vector ).

When it’s windy, we often see the aircraft IAS vary considerably ( auto thrust does this for us automatically ) versus the final , over threshold landing speed.

Applicable to approaches , not take off.

https://www.smartcockpit.com/docs/A320-Ground_Speed_Mini_Function.pdf
 
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Airbus has a unique feature called “ ground speed mini” to maintain a constant energy state.

It knows what surface winds are ( pilots loaded it in the FMS ) and height above ground winds on the approach ( on its own using ADIRS data aka wind vector ).

When it’s windy, we often see the aircraft IAS vary considerably ( auto thrust does this for us automatically ) versus the final , over threshold landing speed.

Applicable to approaches , not take off.

https://www.smartcockpit.com/docs/A320-Ground_Speed_Mini_Function.pdf
Mini ground speed was one of the great features on the A -320. One stormy night in LGA, though, it kept us too fast to select flaps full, and we had to fly at flaps three. On a wet, short runway, full would’ve been my choice.
 
Mini ground speed was one of the great features on the A -320. One stormy night in LGA, though, it kept us too fast to select flaps full, and we had to fly at flaps three. On a wet, short runway, full would’ve been my choice.
Yes, I have heard of that before, albeit rare.

I am lucky and it’s never “flown too fast” for flaps full ( uses 500 feet more runway, wet, with just flaps 3 ) which is VFE ( max flap speed ) 177 for flaps full ( 35 degrees ) versus VFE 185 knots for flap 3.

I would pull “speed select” , override it ( managed FMGC speed ) , stay in selected speed temporarily, select an IAS just below 177, select flaps full, wait until lower and push managed speed again.

Flying in selected speed, you can still see the minimum safe speed as you dial the speed back to slow for flaps full ( 177 ).

Every airline has their own stabilized approach ( and landing ) gates but I would continue below the 1000 foot gate without final flaps but not below 500 feet in order to land with a slower speed provided by flap full.

I can’t see a scenario where that would not work.

If it’s still that windy at 500, it shouldn’t be an issue with flap three since that would mean the headwinds must be very strong right down to the runway anyways.

GS mini only kicks in with headwinds on final, not crosswinds for non pilots trying to follow its logic.

That’s why I tell people , If the crosswind is really strong, and landing distance supports it, add extra speed. Up to VLS + 15 because GS mini doesn’t help in those situations.
 
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Last night, on final approach, winds were very strong on the east coast ( upper and surface ) which resulted in “ ground speed mini “ managing ( IAS controlled by FMS ….and auto thrust ) the IAS well above what we normally see, even close to 1000 AGL. Although the IAS was slightly below final flap speed limit ( short runway , wet ) of 177, I pulled selected speed, to override, because of turbulence to avoid flap over speed , then selected 160 IAS , and called for the final flap setting, then pushed managed speed again.

GS mini was holding 170 IAS on long final ( above 1000 feet )

GS bled off as designed , stable at 500 feet and touched down at 131 knots, as planned.
 
It seems the automation opens another big door for failure. It seems most problems are because of the automation The more plumbing there is the easier it is to clog up the pipes. The pilots need to fly the plane ,that is what they do.
Isn't that what Scotty said in Star Trek 3 about the Excelsior
 
FO had never seen this before, he learned how to deal ( I was flying, he is brand new ) with this “ automation” challenge.

Automation is fine , as long as you monitor it , know how/when to intervene if required and not get lazy depending on it too much.

Pilots are the backup system, use it ( skills plus not afraid of the plane ) or lose it.
 
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