Originally Posted by Exhaustgases
I heard on the news today that the pilots had received specialized training on the mcas. So wonder if we will ever know the truth if the black box shows, or switches were found turned off or on. And how do these switches actually do their jobs? Are they a direct connection carrying many amps to that jack-screw motor or do they go through a solid state or mechanical relay? I would like to see actual construction photos showing the purported control cables.
Oh and what other systems do the computers automatically just take command of on these planes? A case of typical modern engineering, having one input for attitude control, there are many other inputs available, like airspeed, rate of climb, altitude, heading and the conditions shown with an artificial horizon. So I guess computers just can't handle all the inputs a human can??
For many pilots, the training for the MAX was a video on an iPad*. They were already qualified on the 737, so, this was only "differences" training. There have been some very contentious meetings between pilot groups (particularly SWA and AA) and Boeing executives. The iPad/computer video simply was insufficient and did not describe MCAS operation.
As with all mishaps, there are a multitude of causes. I said it in an earlier post, but Boeing bears some responsibility for installing this system and failing to tell pilots about it.
I imagine that there is now plenty of discussion on the MCAS in the MAX in 737 circles.
As far as the MCAS/trim failures in the US, my source was an experienced 737 Captain at another (not my own) airline. A friend from my first squadron. I trust his information, he's pretty high up in the union at that airline and has flown only 737 for the last 24 years. He knows his stuff.
Stab trim runaway is a training event. So is unreliable airspeed. We see those malfunctions in the simulator. The Stab Trim malfunction is easy in a Boeing - throw the switches. Runaway stops. And an MCAS failure would be stopped the same way.
Unreliable airspeed is more challenging. You have to be able to understand what's accurate, and what's not. For example, AF-447 was pulling up at cruise altitude to 10 degrees of pitch, in a rapid climb, while airspeed was increasing and the power was coming back. Only airplane I've ever flown that can accelerate like that had afterburners. Airliners at cruise simply can't climb, even at full thrust, at 10 degrees nose up. So, right there, an experienced pilot would know that at least one of the parameters couldn't be true. In their case, it was airspeed, it showed increasing, when in fact, it was decreasing, due to the iced up probe.
But, as I said in our discussion on that event, the airplane was telling the pilots that the airspeed was excessive (beyond redline) and the correct response was to pull up and slow down to avoid damage. That's how they were trained. When the airplane stopped climbing, it's because it was deeply stalled, but the instruments didn't show that. As it fell from the sky, they applied stall recovery procedures, again, as they were trained to do.
Those procedures only work when the airplane is in normal law. And they never noticed, among the cascade of failures and warnings, the one message that said, "Alternate Law". Or, if they did see it, failed to understand what that meant for stall recovery, perhaps they were never taught that.
Or, perhaps, sometime after midnight, 1,000 miles over the ocean, when they were startled by all the warnings, including multiple sirens and horns, red lights, yellow annunciations and messages on various displays, they just couldn't remember that bit as they struggled to figure out what was happening and how to control the airplane.
Engineers are great. Good at math. But what they build doesn't always work, or fail, the way they anticipate. Each warning, or logic tree, makes perfect sense when it is viewed by itself, in a well-lit office, between the hours of 9 to 5, when you're at zero knots and 1 G, perhaps while sipping on your coffee.
It's another thing entirely when the failure and warning is presented in difficult operating circumstances, like night, terrain, or over water, and in conjunction with other warnings, other failures, in a sudden surprise, with your life and others riding on the outcome, where there may not be a simple answer.
I have to smile at those who think that because they have flown a simple airplane, that they understand flying. Sure.
If you can ride a moped, you're ready for SuperBike or MotoGP racing. The basics of riding are the same, right?
Not much different, really.... Moped, and race bike? You can ride a moped on a quiet street, it's just like being in a race at 180 MPH on a 200 HP machine...
The speed, complexity, handling and operational environment of an airliner bear zero resemblance to bumping around the pattern in a Cessna. Sure, they're both technically flying, but they have little in common.
*Pilot training takes many forms.
We have video training 3 times a year, about 6 hours of coursework in each session on "hot topics" or reviews of systems, procedures, etc. For example, we will get a winter operations (de-icing procedures, contaminated runway operations, holdover time calculation) review in the fall, along with a review of systems, current operational focus areas. About a dozen videos each, three times per year.
We get in the simulator every 9 months. It's either a two day, or a three day event. During each training event, we will work with Flight Attendants on operating doors and emergency equipment and cover our responses to things like passenger misconduct, suspect device on board, preparing the cabin for evacuation. We get a systems review and test. We get briefed on current operational focus areas, then review normal and emergency procedures and then fly the simulator in a 4 hour session. They are very long days, about 12 hours each, with some classroom and some flying each day.
New information comes to us via Flight Manual changes, Operations Manual Changes, Bulletins, Ops Alerts, email messages, Fleet newsletters, messages in our crew log-in screen, and, of course NOTAM and other external sources. It can be daunting to stay abreast of all the changes, and all the updates.
I can see the frustration of 737 pilots.
Buried in that avalanche of different information sources, was a video on your new airplane, and the video didn't explain that there was a new system in the MAX that would trim the elevator down in certain circumstances. In checking the Flight Manual, to try and consolidate your updated understanding, if you didn't find anything on MCAS (as was true at several airlines), then you, as a pilot, have every right to be upset with how the information was disseminated.
