Airbus flight envelope protection.

[Just a civilian pilot]

If you do an air show , descend to 30 feet, engines at idle, low speed ( 122 knots ) , gear down, landing flaps and and try to climb by pulling back, it won’t climb. Not enough energy. Airbus high angle of attack protection will not let Pilot stall the aircraft in normal law even if you pull full back. Pilot will think there is something wrong with aircraft computers but until the aircraft has enough speed/energy, it will not climb.

If you have the auto thrust off , you will have to manually apply full power. If you kept it on, which is what Airbus prefers, the aircraft will automatically apply full thrust ( once the speed gets too low “ alpha floor, TOGA lock” ) PROVIDED the aircraft is above 100 feet.

If the Airbus didn’t have this angle of attack protection, the pilot could force the nose up higher but it would stall because not enough speed still until engines spooled up.

Do not do low air show passes below 100 feet with engines at idle and expect to climb if obstacles are in front of you. Even worse at 30 feet.



https://www.airbus.com/en/newsroom/stories/2023-02-safety-innovation-7-flight-envelope-protection

 

[wwillson]

https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_296

After reading about the flight into the trees accident, I find it unbelievable that a captain would make such an incredibly junior mistake. It's not even junior, it's like a kindergarten mistake. Low, slow, dirty, and engines at idle, how could it be? There isn't an airline pilot in the world that hasn't applied full power from idle and sat there for that incredibly, painfully long eight seconds it takes for the engines to spool to 100% power. The first time I stalled the 757 and went from idle to full power, my comment to @Astro14 was, "Wow does that seem to take forever for the power to come up!" Eight very long seconds. The captain knew better, but did it anyway with 136 people on board.

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_296

After reading about the flight into the trees accident, I find it unbelievable that a captain would make such an incredibly junior mistake. It's not even junior, it's like a kindergarten mistake. Low, slow, dirty, and engines at idle, how could it be? There isn't an airline pilot in the world that hasn't applied full power from idle and sat there for that incredibly, painfully long eight seconds it takes for the engines to spool to 100% power. The first time I stalled the 757 and went from idle to full power, my comment to @Astro14 was, "Wow does that seem to take forever for the power to come up!" Eight very long seconds. The captain knew better, but did it anyway with 136 people on board.

This Captain was an Airbus superstar, he knew more about the plane than most despite not being a test pilot. He was overconfident ( "Don't worry, I have done this at least 20 times" before ( but not at 30 feet at idle ) was mentioned somewhere in the accident report. Another example ( I have seen two fatal airshow crashes myself ) of a pilot pushing things too far at an airshow.

I don't think he was planning on flying at 30 feet with the engines at idle still, he was planning on "only" ( regulations said not below 170 feet ) descending to 100 feet , and even then, not sure he was planning on idle all the way down to 100 feet. Things didn't work out as planned, plus a forest got in his way ( the original plan was to do it down the runway versus towards the trees ).

I can see a pilot making a mistake but I don't understand ( well, his huge ego ) how he could try and blame the airplane.

Captain went to prison for 10 months IIRC.

Even me, with 26,000 hours, and 22 years on the Airbus ( very comfortable hand-flying with auto thrust off ) , I wouldn't be comfortable trying what he was planning at 100 feet ( high AoA stunt with a full load of passengers ).

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

Interesting video on the accident.

30 feet, 112 knots, idle, dirty and the pilot blames an inaccurate altimeter when both pilots say they never heard the ( it’s on the CVR ) radio altimeter call out every altitude.

When you watch it , remember that the lead investigator was another active Air France pilot ( who was also qualified on Airbus ). If he had any bias, you would think it would be to blame Airbus, not the pilot.

The pilot says the engines took longer than normal ( investigators found nothing wrong with the engines ) to spool up but that’s not an accurate statement considering he had never attempted a go-around from 30 feet, at idle, close to obstacles, so of coarse everything is going to seem to take too long to respond.

No airbus logic would prevent thrust from being applied once the thrust levers are pushed forward, but they take time to spool up.

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

The Captain had an excuse for everything. Nothing was his fault. He even peddled some conspiracy theories.

The A320 was ( still is very advanced ) an extremely advanced, revolutionary aircraft that was considered complex to operate for those who didn’t fully understand it. It was not like any other aircraft for a pilot transitioning on it when it first came out.

The Captain in this story was not an Airbus test pilot, he was an Air France pilot ( but, he was involved with the introduction introduction of the aircraft to Air France so he would know more than regular Airbus pilots back in the day ). He only had 138 hours total time on the Airbus IIRC.

Not an air show pilot myself , but I would assume they actually fly around the area ( check for threats like towers , power lines, and know where the crowd will be to arrange their flight pattern ) versus just look at some charts.

This Captain even deviated ( not briefed in advanced, thats why he rushed to get down to “100” feet , at idle , dirty ) from the pre flight briefing based on those charts regarding flying over the runway.

Its always easy to criticize others mistakes, but no normal pilot enjoys ( except learning from it ) doing that, but when a pilot makes mistakes and blames the plane , I get really irritated.

There was nothing wrong with the engines or flight computers.

I am done with that story.

Another snow storm, time to fire up the snowblower.

 

[Jetronic]

Pilots are still human, and I've seen people pull stupid stunts that failed, and then blaim their equipment in pretty much any field.

I know I covered up for some of those mistakes, but none of them amounted to much more than an inconvenience and a few dollars. I did takethe issue up with them privately, just gave the boss some equipment to blame rather than an employee. Figured it would look better to the customer aswell considering he would chew them up in front of the customer.

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

Now this was a problem caused by the plane.

No aircraft design is perfect, and this was very serious, but experienced pilots can change the outcome.

Turning two of the three air data computers off gave them full control.

No checklist would have told them to switch off two air data computers. They did that on their own ( or were in contact with maintenance but I doubt it ).

I remember this incident because Airbus had to warn operators and how to deal with it if it happened.

This is the only time that I have heard of Airbus high AoA protection kicking in, pushing the nose down, or overriding pilots stick inputs ( pitch ) when it wasn’t a pilots fault ( aka flying too slow with high AoA and engines at idle ).

2014 incident….

https://avherald.com/h?article=47d74074

 

[wwillson]

Now this was a problem caused by the plane.

No aircraft design is perfect, and this was very serious, but experienced pilots can change the outcome.

Turning two of the three air data computers off gave them full control.

No checklist would have told them to switch off two air data computers. They did that on their own ( or were in contact with maintenance but I doubt it ).

I remember this incident because Airbus had to warn operators and how to deal with it if it happened.

This is the only time that I have heard of Airbus high AoA protection kicking in, pushing the nose down, or overriding pilots stick inputs ( pitch ) when it wasn’t a pilots fault ( aka flying too slow with high AoA and engines at idle ).

2014 incident….

https://avherald.com/h?article=47d74074

Experienced pilots who understood the airplane and overrode the computers, which were getting bad inputs. False AOA data reminiscent of Boeing's MCAS, thankfully the Airbus crew understood how to cut the computers out of the equation.

 

[wpod]

Planes are complicated.

 

[Astro14]

Experienced pilots who understood the airplane and overrode the computers, which were getting bad inputs. False AOA data reminiscent of Boeing's MCAS, thankfully the Airbus crew understood how to cut the computers out of the equation.

I was alluding to this Airbus flight envelope protection in the other thread about Alaska, and while I love the concept behind flight envelope protection, there’s been at least one or two crashes as the result of the pilot either not understanding when Flight envelope protection works, or having the Flight envelope protection override their input.

The Toulouse crash that I was talking about was a demonstration by an Airbus test pilot, and he was expecting the alpha floor mode to engage - which limits the AOA on the aircraft, and sets the throttle to full thrust, regardless of thrust lever position. A great feature for most of the flight envelope, but it is disabled below 100 feet radio altitude so that it does not interfere with the landing flare, you can imagine a gust happening momentarily in the flare, triggering this in the airplane, and then getting stuck at full power.

So, the test pilot was demonstrating this feature, got momentarily below 100 feet and then kept applying aft stick, expecting it to engage and it did not. The airplane got so slow that no amount of thrust could recover it, and it crashed into the trees, killing everyone on board.

I had thought that turning off ELAC 1 and 2 would take you into alternate law and allow full manual control of the aircraft flight path, but perhaps I remember incorrectly, or perhaps the actual checklist is different.

Let me say that I am not bashing Airbus with this post, or my previous post. I think Airbus builds an excellent airplane.

The point is that the pilot/airplane interface is not simple, and design decisions that are made by the manufacturer can have unanticipated consequences when that design is operated in the real world, by real people.

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

I was alluding to this Airbus flight envelope protection in the other thread about Alaska, and while I love the concept behind flight envelope protection, there’s been at least one or two crashes as the result of the pilot either not understanding when Flight envelope protection works, or having the Flight envelope protection override their input.

The Toulouse crash that I was talking about was a demonstration by an Airbus test pilot, and he was expecting the alpha floor mode to engage - which limits the AOA on the aircraft, and sets the throttle to full thrust, regardless of thrust lever position. A great feature for most of the flight envelope, but it is disabled below 100 feet radio altitude so that it does not interfere with the landing flare, you can imagine a gust happening momentarily in the flare, triggering this in the airplane, and then getting stuck at full power.

So, the test pilot was demonstrating this feature, got momentarily below 100 feet and then kept applying aft stick, expecting it to engage and it did not. The airplane got so slow that no amount of thrust could recover it, and it crashed into the trees, killing everyone on board.

I had thought that turning off ELAC 1 and 2 would take you into alternate law and allow full manual control of the aircraft flight path, but perhaps I remember incorrectly, or perhaps the actual checklist is different.

Let me say that I am not bashing Airbus with this post, or my previous post. I think Airbus builds an excellent airplane.

The point is that the pilot/airplane interface is not simple, and design decisions that are made by the manufacturer can have unanticipated consequences when that design is operated in the real world, by real people.

If you are aware of any other incidents or crashes caused by the flight envelope protection, can you please post them? I like learning and I am not aware of any others. I did google searches, but I didn't see any others, and I don't recall any other situations ( AF 447 was not caused by this ).

Many incidents or crashes are caused by by weak ( not all pilots who make mistakes are weak but any pilot who doesn't understand important stuff like flight envelope protection is weak ... it's in the flight crew manual ) pilots, that's not unique to pilots flying Airbus.

If you fly a Boeing 757/767 and have a GPWS go off ( "terrain, terrain, pull up, pull up" ), there is a very good chance the pilot has been descending over high terrain with the speed brakes out. If they forget ( unlike the Airbus, which has auto speed brake retraction when TOGA ) to retract them, manually, when going full thrust ( TOGA ), the aircraft won't climb safely to avoid the terrain ( B757 Cali crash ). The A320 "protections" ( or advanced design ) would protect pilots from forgetting ( 1988 design ).

You mention an Airbus test pilot taking off from the Airbus factory in Toulouse ( 400 miles from the crash that happened with the trees ). I am not aware of any other A320 that crashed at an Airshow. The crash involving the AF line Captain training pilot ( he wasn't an Airbus test pilot, he was an AF training pilot ), was at a small airport, and the flight originated from Charles de Gaul, not Tolouuse. Are we talking about the same crash, even though I am not aware of any similar ones?

Airlines don't let manufacturer test pilots fly their aircraft after they are delivered to the airline ( my airline doesn't allow FAA, Transport Canada, or Airbus pilots to fly our aircraft - except in the sim or during testing after production before the airline gets them ). It was an Air France flight, in AF paint job.

If you have information that shows he was an Airbus test pilot, please post it because I am curious about that ( he should have been fired by Airbus before he went to jail if he was ). Why any Airbus test pilot would be relying on AF dispatch to provide sketchy charts for a flyover and descend below air regulation minimum altitude limits (the pilot planned ahead of time to go to 100 feet, which is even too low ) doesn't make sense. Makes even less sense for an Airbus test pilot to intentionally disable one of the protections - alpha floor.

Alpha floor. If he was an Airbus test pilot, he didn't understand how Alpha floor protection worked because he intentionally, permanently, disabled it when he pushed the auto thrust disconnect buttons for 30 seconds. Once the auto thrust is disabled this way, it doesn't matter what altitude the plane flies too slow ( AoA ), it will never apply full TOGA power, automatically. The Captain was showing off, despite what he says, and should have behaved like a normal line pilot and flew no lower than 100 feet with the auto thrust engaged, lowest airspeed if he wanted. It's not like passengers in the back, or spectators would be less impressed, and the Airbus flight envelope protections would have prevented him from flying into the trees once he pulled back ( but the trees would be below him anyway since they were 40 feet high ). What this pilot did was prove what Airbus said about the main cause of accidents - they are caused by pilots.

Airbus MEL ( minimum equipment list ) warns pilots that alpha floor is not available when the auto thrust is disabled. High AoA protection is always available unless some other system failures downgrade redundancy ( alternate law ). That's why the aircraft would not allow the AF pilot to pull the nose up because it would stall and wouldn't climb ( alpha floor not working because he deactivated the auto thrust ) because the engines took a long time to spool up. If it was a Boeing, he would have stalled short of the trees or while going into the forest. The aircraft did exactly what it was designed to do but the pilot didn't do things the way he was supposed to do ( and I doubt Airbus would think it was smart) things and proved Airbus was right, most accidents are caused by pilot error ( which happens a lot more at airshows ).

Yes, if you turn off ELAC 1 + 2, it will put the aircraft into alternate law BUT you will also lose ailerons ( left and right ) unlike PUSHING two of the 3 ADR buttons off.

I might sound like an Airbus fanboy, but I am not ( strong independent streak... non-partisan airplane brand pilot ). I never had any Airbus stickers on my flight bag when we used to carry flight bags or fancy Airbus stuff on my car license plates.

I have been on it for 22 years with thousands of hours and it's been a great plane to fly. I have no loyalty to it or any plane, and if I decide to change aircraft, it will be because it suits my lifestyle first, then money.

To be honest, one thing I have noticed about pilots who do not like, or even bash, the Airbus - they don't understand it well (general comment ). Some pilots used to avoid attempting their Captain upgrade on it ( never flew it as an FO, senior enough to hold it as new Captain, but bid a lower technology aircraft for first Captain upgrade ).

I am just a line Captain, I do not do any, official, training, by choice ( they don't pay us enough ).

Let me know what you think Astro and we will debate it respectfully.

That was a 3, large coffee post. Time to refill.

 

[Astro14]

If you are aware of any other incidents or crashes caused by the flight envelope protection, can you please post them? I like learning and I am not aware of any others. I did google searches, but I didn't see any others, and I don't recall any other situations ( AF 447 was not caused by this ).

Many incidents or crashes are caused by by weak ( not all pilots who make mistakes are weak but any pilot who doesn't understand important stuff like flight envelope protection is weak ... it's in the flight crew manual ) pilots, that's not unique to pilots flying Airbus.

If you fly a Boeing 757/767 and have a GPWS go off ( "terrain, terrain, pull up, pull up" ), there is a very good chance the pilot has been descending over high terrain with the speed brakes out. If they forget ( unlike the Airbus, which has auto speed brake retraction when TOGA ) to retract them, manually, when going full thrust ( TOGA ), the aircraft won't climb safely to avoid the terrain ( B757 Cali crash ). The A320 "protections" ( or advanced design ) would protect pilots from forgetting ( 1988 design ).

You mention an Airbus test pilot taking off from the Airbus factory in Toulouse ( 400 miles from the crash that happened with the trees ). I am not aware of any other A320 that crashed at an Airshow. The crash involving the AF line Captain training pilot ( he wasn't an Airbus test pilot, he was an AF training pilot ), was at a small airport, and the flight originated from Charles de Gaul, not Tolouuse. Are we talking about the same crash, even though I am not aware of any similar ones?

Airlines don't let manufacturer test pilots fly their aircraft after they are delivered to the airline ( my airline doesn't allow FAA, Transport Canada, or Airbus pilots to fly our aircraft - except in the sim or during testing after production before the airline gets them ). It was an Air France flight, in AF paint job.

If you have information that shows he was an Airbus test pilot, please post it because I am curious about that ( he should have been fired by Airbus before he went to jail if he was ). Why any Airbus test pilot would be relying on AF dispatch to provide sketchy charts for a flyover and descend below air regulation minimum altitude limits (the pilot planned ahead of time to go to 100 feet, which is even too low ) doesn't make sense. Makes even less sense for an Airbus test pilot to intentionally disable one of the protections - alpha floor.

Alpha floor. If he was an Airbus test pilot, he didn't understand how Alpha floor protection worked because he intentionally, permanently, disabled it when he pushed the auto thrust disconnect buttons for 30 seconds. Once the auto thrust is disabled this way, it doesn't matter what altitude the plane flies too slow ( AoA ), it will never apply full TOGA power, automatically. The Captain was showing off, despite what he says, and should have behaved like a normal line pilot and flew no lower than 100 feet with the auto thrust engaged, lowest airspeed if he wanted. It's not like passengers in the back, or spectators would be less impressed, and the Airbus flight envelope protections would have prevented him from flying into the trees once he pulled back ( but the trees would be below him anyway since they were 40 feet high ). What this pilot did was prove what Airbus said about the main cause of accidents - they are caused by pilots.

Airbus MEL ( minimum equipment list ) warns pilots that alpha floor is not available when the auto thrust is disabled. High AoA protection is always available unless some other system failures downgrade redundancy ( alternate law ). That's why the aircraft would not allow the AF pilot to pull the nose up because it would stall and wouldn't climb ( alpha floor not working because he deactivated the auto thrust ) because the engines took a long time to spool up. If it was a Boeing, he would have stalled short of the trees or while going into the forest. The aircraft did exactly what it was designed to do but the pilot didn't do things the way he was supposed to do ( and I doubt Airbus would think it was smart) things and proved Airbus was right, most accidents are caused by pilot error ( which happens a lot more at airshows ).

Yes, if you turn off ELAC 1 + 2, it will put the aircraft into alternate law BUT you will also lose ailerons ( left and right ) unlike PUSHING two of the 3 ADR buttons off.

I might sound like an Airbus fanboy, but I am not ( strong independent streak... non-partisan airplane brand pilot ). I never had any Airbus stickers on my flight bag when we used to carry flight bags or fancy Airbus stuff on my car license plates.

I have been on it for 22 years with thousands of hours and it's been a great plane to fly. I have no loyalty to it or any plane, and if I decide to change aircraft, it will be because it suits my lifestyle first, then money.

To be honest, one thing I have noticed about pilots who do not like, or even bash, the Airbus - they don't understand it well.

Let me know what you think Astro and we will debate it respectfully.

That was a 3, large coffee post. Time to refill.

I’m going off memory here, but I thought the accident involving an alpha floor demo was in Toulouse, but it’s clear that this AF 296 fits what I remember. it was an accident that was talked about frequently in Airbus school.

It is not fair to say that the American Airlines accident in Cali would’ve been prevented by retraction of the speed brakes, although retraction of the speed bakes is a memory item for either GPWS or Windshear.

The mountain into which that flight turned was simply too steep for any airplane to escape, speed brakes in, or not, even the 757 would not have been able to top it. So, the root cause, and the only action to prevent it, was the navigation failure that you mentioned. Once they turned into the mountain, the flight was doomed.

Air Inter Flight 148 was an example I was remembering as well, but it was more a Mode Control Panel issue - setting the wrong flight path angle, not understanding now the FPA worked on a non-precision approach. Again, the interface between the pilot and a sophisticated piece of engineering, doesn’t always work the way the engineers expect. Not a Flight envelope protection issue, but an example of how even the most sophisticated airplane systems can be misunderstood, and misused.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Inter_Flight_148

In many respects, similar to the UPS crash in Birmingham, mis-management of flight path, and trusting the FMC when the FMC should not be trusted.

Lufthansa flight 2904 was partly blamed on aircraft system and flight control design, despite touching down where they needed to, the jet would not allow deployment of the reversers or application of the brakes until it had more weight on wheels, delaying braking and causing a runway overrun. Not entirely envelope protection, because the crew made mistakes in not correctly landing, in not going around, and the tower was no help in reporting inaccurate wind conditions, but still, a different weight on wheels logic would have had a different outcome.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lufthansa_Flight_2904

Gulf Air Flight 72 was blamed largely on spatial disorientation - but the airplane didn’t help - because TOGA thrust is a LOT of power (Boeing FMS will direct a 2,000 FPM climb when TOGA is activated Once, and full TOGA thrust if it is selected a second time). To get the A320 into a go around mode, you have to select TOGA power on the throttles, and that level of acceleration is disorienting, and in most cases, not needed. So, not flight envelope protection exactly, but a design decision (TOGA throttle position) that was contributory.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulf_Air_Flight_072

Iberia 1456 was the one that I was recalling as well - flight envelope protection kicked in during a windshear landing, preventing a go around. The airplane hit hard, and crashed, collapsing the gear. Software was re-written to prevent it from happening again.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iberia_Flight_1456

So, relying on my memory fo certain events isn’t completely perfect, but there are two cases of envelope protections causing a crash, Iberia and Air France - though we may disagree on the Air France, I think the reliance on the envelope protections and the failure to understand them, was causal. As with most crashes, there are several contributory factors, including the ones that you mention.

I went through Airbus school over 20 years ago. Envelope protection was thoroughly discussed. Clearly, I don’t remember it correctly in terms of the contributions to crashes, but I think at my core, as a pilot, I prefer the F/A-18 or Boeing approach - give the pilot what they want, as opposed to the F-16 or Airbus approach - protect the airplane from the pilot.

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

I’m going off memory here, but I thought the accident involving an alpha floor demo was in Toulouse, but it’s clear that this AF 296 fits what I remember. it was an accident that was talked about frequently in Airbus school.

It is not fair to say that the American Airlines accident in Cali would’ve been prevented by retraction of the speed brakes, although retraction of the speed bakes is a memory item for either GPWS or Windshear.

The mountain into which that flight turned was simply too steep for any airplane to escape, speed brakes in, or not, even the 757 would not have been able to top it. So, the root cause, and the only action to prevent it, was the navigation failure that you mentioned. Once they turned into the mountain, the flight was doomed.

Air Inter Flight 148 was an example I was remembering as well, but it was more a Mode Control Panel issue - setting the wrong flight path angle, not understanding now the FPA worked on a non-precision approach. Again, the interface between the pilot and a sophisticated piece of engineering, doesn’t always work the way the engineers expect. Not a Flight envelope protection issue, but an example of how even the most sophisticated airplane systems can be misunderstood, and misused.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Inter_Flight_148

In many respects, similar to the UPS crash in Birmingham, mis-management of flight path, and trusting the FMC when the FMC should not be trusted.

Lufthansa flight 2904 was partly blamed on aircraft system and flight control design, despite touching down where they needed to, the jet would not allow deployment of the reversers or application of the brakes until it had more weight on wheels, delaying braking and causing a runway overrun. Not entirely envelope protection, because the crew made mistakes in not correctly landing, in not going around, and the tower was no help in reporting inaccurate wind conditions, but still, a different weight on wheels logic would have had a different outcome.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lufthansa_Flight_2904

Gulf Air Flight 72 was blamed largely on spatial disorientation - but the airplane didn’t help - because TOGA thrust is a LOT of power (Boeing FMS will direct a 2,000 FPM climb when TOGA is activated Once, and full TOGA thrust if it is selected a second time). To get the A320 into a go around mode, you have to select TOGA power on the throttles, and that level of acceleration is disorienting, and in most cases, not needed. So, not flight envelope protection exactly, but a design decision (TOGA throttle position) that was contributory.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulf_Air_Flight_072

Iberia 1456 was the one that I was recalling as well - flight envelope protection kicked in during a windshear landing, preventing a go around. The airplane hit hard, and crashed, collapsing the gear. Software was re-written to prevent it from happening again.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iberia_Flight_1456

So, relying on my memory fo certain events isn’t completely perfect, but there are two cases of envelope protections causing a crash, Iberia and Air France - though we may disagree on the Air France, I think the reliance on the envelope protections and the failure to understand them, was causal. As with most crashes, there are several contributory factors, including the ones that you mention.

I went through Airbus school over 20 years ago. Envelope protection was thoroughly discussed. Clearly, I don’t remember it correctly in terms of the contributions to crashes, but I think at my core, as a pilot, I prefer the F/A-18 or Boeing approach - give the pilot what they want, as opposed to the F-16 or Airbus approach - protect the airplane from the pilot.

No aircraft will climb as intended if they leave the speed brakes out during a GPWS (I didn't say they would have missed the hill, I said it won't climb safely aka properly ). That's a fair statement to make. I am unaware of aircraft being unable to avoid terrain once they receive a GPWS warning, provided they follow the proper procedure ( like TCAS, obey what it says, not what ATC says once you get an RA ). That warning is based on the closure rate.

It wasn't a fair comment to suggest the pilot at the airshow was not 100% responsible, he was.

I entirely agree that the accident involving the Iberia Airbus WAS 101% the fault of Airbus flight envelope protection overriding the pilot ( was not aware of that one, thanks ) inputs.

The other crashes were caused by pilot error ( setting -3300 feet per minute versus -3.3 DEGREE flight path angle for descent on a non-precision approach and the other crashes had nothing to do with Airbus, it was pilot error ).

We all have our preferences ( like oil and filters, thick and thin ) , both Boeing and Airbus have had design issues with their planes but it's how the companies deal with them that also matters ( MCAS ).

I would say Airbus dealt with that problem ( the Iberia accident that required Airbus to tweak the flight envelope protection ) better than Boeing to be honest ( I have never commented on that MCAS stuff before ).

The experience level ( and training... initial, recurrent AND not being a lazy pilot and not maintaining your own high standards reviewing more than the minimum required ) ) of pilots should be a far greater concern to nervous flyers than whether it's an Airbus or Boeing.

The Gulf Air crash. Captain had 83 hours as Captain, and the FO had total time 608 hours. Combine that inexperience with flying way too fast, being high, unstable, and ignoring the GPWS, it's unfortunate, but not surprising, that they crashed. They even messed up the "orbit" to lose height and ended up in that Go Around that wasn't handled properly. It was VERY hazy ( loss of visual reference ) , curious if the pilot was hand flying also.

Last thing, Airbus tails are just as strong as Boeing's ( they are not designed for pilot-induced full rudder reversal oscillations ). Since tails are not tested like wings ( until the break ) , we will never know who builds stronger tails.

Edit: Gulf air crash.

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

To be fair and accurate, aircraft that didn't have EGPWS installed ( not sure when it came out ), were not ensured they would miss high terrain if they received a terrain alert ( because the terrain was measured by radio altimeter and rising terrain would show up too quick and the GPWS wouldn't have advanced knowledge it was coming up unlike aircraft with database EGPWS ).

So, if the B757 only had GPWS, I was wrong to assume they might have been able to avoid the hill ( less chance with speed brakes out )

Now, with EGPWS, I cannot see how any aircraft can hit terrain because the system knows where the high terrain is well before the radio altimeter does. Even then, if you leave the speed brakes out, not sure if it will miss it.

IIRC, a terrain warning ( pull up, pull up ) is 30 seconds from the terrain. 60 seconds after getting a terrain caution ( "terrain, terrain" but no pull-up order )

 

[Astro14]

Your next to last statement was both the point I was trying to make last week, and exactly what I said in the Airbus vs. Boeing discussion in the Alaska thread. We completely agree, even if there are members of the flying public who engage in specious determinations based on news reports.

Post in thread 'Alaska Airlines AS1282 door blow out!'
https://bobistheoilguy.com/forums/threads/alaska-airlines-as1282-door-blow-out.377808/post-6751424

Forgive me if I overstepped in my criticism of Airbus, I was trying to show that Airbus is not immune from design issues, and did not have a perfect safety record, either. The tail comment was not fair, but it is often repeated among Boeing guys.

Back to AA965 - it was, fundamentally, a matter of lost SA and in particular, a loss of terrain awareness in the days before EGPWS. It was caused by an FMC error, among other errors.

They did not have EGPWS - so, I appreciate the edit on your conclusion. They reacted to the GPWS based on RADALT terrain closure.

Would they have hit the mounting if they had retracted the speed brakes? It remains inconclusive. The 757-200 with RB-211s has impressive climb, and will climb very well with Speedbrakes extended. The crew reacted within 2 seconds of the GPWS, that alone is an above average reaction time. Estimates in the report suggest that it would have hit, perhaps 100 feet higher up, perhaps 300 feet higher up, and perhaps would have cleared the mountain. But it is not definitive and the airplane did climb several thousand feet with the speed brakes extended.

https://reports.aviation-safety.net/1995/19951220-1_B752_N651AA.pdf

We will never know, certainly, the failure to retract them was an error.

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

Your next to last statement was both the point I was trying to make last week, and exactly what I said in the Airbus vs. Boeing discussion in the Alaska thread. We completely agree, even if there are members of the flying public who engage in specious determinations based on news reports.

Post in thread 'Alaska Airlines AS1282 door blow out!'
https://bobistheoilguy.com/forums/threads/alaska-airlines-as1282-door-blow-out.377808/post-6751424

Back to AA965 - it was, fundamentally, a matter of lost SA and in particular, a loss of terrain awareness in the days before EGPWS. It was caused by an FMC error, among other errors.

They did not have EGPWS - so, I appreciate the edit on your conclusion. They reacted to the GPWS based on RADALT terrain closure.

Would they have hit the mounting if they had retracted the speed brakes? It remains inconclusive. The 757-200 with RB-211s has impressive climb, and will climb very well with Speedbrakes extended. The crew reacted within 2 seconds of the GPWS, that alone is an above average reaction time. Estimates in the report suggest that it would have hit, perhaps 100 feet higher up, perhaps 300 feet higher up, and perhaps would have cleared the mountain. But it is not definitive and the airplane did climb several thousand feet with the speed brakes extended.

https://reports.aviation-safety.net/1995/19951220-1_B752_N651AA.pdf

We will never know, certainly, the failure to retract them was an error.

Agreed on all but the AA crew accepted a last-minute runway option IIRC and rushed to get down.

The FMS turned the aircraft to another similar waypoint IIRC, and being rushed exacerbated the loss of SA.

FMS aircraft are great but they can be a major distraction, more so when reprogramming in a rush and being high, at night, in clouds, with mountains around ( and nonradar)

Yes, we will never know (missed the hill ).

ANY pilot, ANY, can make mistakes. Unfortunately ( or fortunately but sounds bad ) , we try to learn from those mistakes.

RIP.