Fukushima was a much larger event than Chornobyl, a triple meltdown, but had a fraction of the contamination because the units, despite being primitive GE BWR's, were equipped with containment.
Yes, but TMI was also a non-event where the unit just bricked itself.
In the end, but they were very close to melting down. And it was operator error from my limited understanding - ignoring a faulty valve basically - not a design issue.
The Canadian CANDU reactors cannot experience the same type/magnitude of failures as the poor designs you referenced did. Not all nuclear plants are mortal enemies to human life, nor are they all “ticking time bombs” like the Russian designs are.
It was a partial meltdown (some core damage) due to a faulty sensor IIRC, that said the valve was in one state, when it was in the other.
Agreed, and the partially completed units are AP1000's, so it's likely worth looking into.
The issue was instrumentation (something I do know something about). There was a light that the operators thought meant the valve was closed - or open, I don't remember. In fact it simply meant the valve was powered on. So it was human error - both the designer - that didn't have clear redundant positive control / alarm on a critical valve, and operators misunderstanding what the light actually meant.
Yep, that's why stuff has to be designed with redundancies for when that happens, lol.
I think we recognize the flaws of the RBMK, which is why we don't have them here.
That particular vulnerability of the B&W design had been discovered just prior to the TMI incident and had gone out as an industry memo, but was not distributed to operators. (I'm pretty sure it was Davis Besse that had a close call and put out the memo.) That incident lead to the industry communication systems and regulations we have today.
And, even given the limitations of the early BWR, it wasn't a flaw with the reactors that led to the meltdowns at Fukushima Daiichi, it was the inability to cool them, a direct result of the backup generators not being relocated to behind the plant as had been advised by GE years earlier, and the upgrade of the seawall, something Tepco had also been advised to do, but were able to avoid due to grandfathering regulation, because they chaired the board of the bloody regulator.
Great as long as your willing to have it built in your back yard!
Graphite has been safe in the UK, their AGR reactors, which are gas cooled. Graphite + water has a record of being a bad combo. The problem with graphite is that it has a finite lifespan and can't readily be replaced, which is why the whole AGR fleet is being retired, as the graphite is cracking, spelling its end of life.
I wouldn't want an RBMK in my backyard, but with 7 units still operating, plenty of people do.
Holtec SMR-160 and NuScale are both PWR are two top candidates for the US market. Molten salt is being proposed for some breeders but that's a different animal.
Pardon my misinformation. It appears the Holtec 300 is the one to watch. I also meant to say "to of the top candidates."
That’s a gross misinterpretation of what happened in both of those accidents.
I see his response to your insightful comments is the "braying like a jackass" react emoji, which I think tells us all we need to know about his knowledge and faith of engagement on this subject.