Don't forget the RR Trents used in A340 and IAE V2500 used in A320 series.
Boeing vs. Airbus + Politics
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MolaKule
Staff member
Superjumbo hits turbulence before it gets off the ground
The Guardian (UK) 03/17/04
author: David Gow
Copyright (C) 2004 The Guardian; Source: World Reporter (TM)
Airbus, the European plane-maker, yesterday began emergency talks with environment watchdogs and port officials in north Wales over plans to dredge
the river Dee to enable it to move huge wings for the new A380 superjumbo out to sea.
The first set of wings, made at the Airbus plant in nearby Broughton and measuring 80 metres tip-to-tip, are due to leave en route for the A380
assembly plant in Toulouse, France, via Bordeaux in mid-April.
Nine pairs are due to be delivered this year, with annual production later ramped up to 50, but the Environment Agency (EA) has objected to plans to
dredge a channel of up to 400,000 cubic metres in the Dee because of the threat to the estuary's natural habitat.
The wings, built to a tight schedule with the first 555-seater plane due to fly next year, will be carried to the Dee on a 96-wheeled, 80ft lorry and then
transported to the port of Mostyn on special barges before being loaded on to a Chinese-built roll-on, roll-off ferry.
EA officials said the agency, the Welsh Assembly and the Department of Transport had all rejected the dredging plans, partly because of the problems
of disposing of the surplus material.
Steve Moore, EA senior manager in north Wales, has asked the port to come up with alternatives such as allowing Airbus to transport the wings only at
high tide in order to limit the scale of dredging.
Iain Gray, Airbus UK managing director, said he was confident the issue would be resolved - largely because Airbus, which has 12,100 staff in Britain,
has invested €750m (£510m) in the past two years and plans a further €175m in 2004.
"We have an aggressive schedule of wing delivery," he said.
The Guardian (UK) 03/17/04
author: David Gow
Copyright (C) 2004 The Guardian; Source: World Reporter (TM)
Airbus, the European plane-maker, yesterday began emergency talks with environment watchdogs and port officials in north Wales over plans to dredge
the river Dee to enable it to move huge wings for the new A380 superjumbo out to sea.
The first set of wings, made at the Airbus plant in nearby Broughton and measuring 80 metres tip-to-tip, are due to leave en route for the A380
assembly plant in Toulouse, France, via Bordeaux in mid-April.
Nine pairs are due to be delivered this year, with annual production later ramped up to 50, but the Environment Agency (EA) has objected to plans to
dredge a channel of up to 400,000 cubic metres in the Dee because of the threat to the estuary's natural habitat.
The wings, built to a tight schedule with the first 555-seater plane due to fly next year, will be carried to the Dee on a 96-wheeled, 80ft lorry and then
transported to the port of Mostyn on special barges before being loaded on to a Chinese-built roll-on, roll-off ferry.
EA officials said the agency, the Welsh Assembly and the Department of Transport had all rejected the dredging plans, partly because of the problems
of disposing of the surplus material.
Steve Moore, EA senior manager in north Wales, has asked the port to come up with alternatives such as allowing Airbus to transport the wings only at
high tide in order to limit the scale of dredging.
Iain Gray, Airbus UK managing director, said he was confident the issue would be resolved - largely because Airbus, which has 12,100 staff in Britain,
has invested €750m (£510m) in the past two years and plans a further €175m in 2004.
"We have an aggressive schedule of wing delivery," he said.
MolaKule
Staff member
Tanker-deal backers go on offensive for Boeing
Seattle Times 05/05/04
author: Alex Fryer
(Copyright 2004)
WASHINGTON -- Boeing and its supporters on Capitol Hill have launched a public-relations offensive this week, hoping to regain momentum for a proposal to use the lagging 767 production line in Everett to build 100 air-refueling tankers.
Much of the effort is designed to neutralize concerns raised in Pentagon reviews and to attack rival Airbus, which wants the U.S. Air Force to reconsider its pending $23.5 billion tanker contract with Boeing.
This week, the Defense Science Board, which advises Defense Department acquisitions officials, is expected to release a report on whether the Air Force truly needs to replace its fleet of Boeing KC-135s, many of them 40 years old.
Sources say the report is likely to recommend the Air Force retire the KC-135s, but may not urge doing do so immediately, as Boeing and Air Force officials hope. It may also question whether the Air Force should explore converting surplus passenger jets mothballed in the Arizona desert.
Last week, about 100 Boeing managers from across the country canvassed Capitol Hill, talking to their representatives about the company's commitment to clean ethics.
Yesterday, Boeing took out full-page ads in newspapers in Washington, D.C., Seattle and Chicago, giving its side of the tanker debate.
Pentagon officials put the proposal to lease 20 tankers and purchase an additional 80 planes on hold in December pending the outcome of several investigations. Congressional committees would have the opportunity to scrutinize the final contract between Boeing and the Air Force.
In a lengthy speech on the Senate floor today, Sen. Patty Murray is expected to charge France-based Airbus and its parent company EADS (European Aeronautic Defence & Space) with orchestrating a misinformation effort against Boeing.
"The Airbus campaign of half-truths is on full display as the company works overtime in Washington, D.C.," reads an advance copy of her statement.
"We are about to surrender our global aerospace leadership because we are sitting on our hands while Europe is doing everything it can to dismantle our aerospace industry," the speech reads.
The European consortium wants the Air Force to let Airbus bid for U.S. tanker work, arguing it can supply tankers based on the Airbus A330 for less money.
Boeing supporters quietly wonder whether there are any connections among Airbus, some of the watchdog groups that have vigorously criticized the tanker deal as government pork, and Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., the deal's toughest adversary on Capitol Hill.
Diane Murphy, vice president of EADS North America, once worked for a political-consulting firm that helped during McCain's 1982 campaign. She said she has spoken with him twice in the past 18 years, and never about tankers.
EADS North America has retained heavyweight lobbying firms, including Quinn Gillespie & Associates, the firm founded by Republican National Committee Chairman Ed Gillespie. Murphy said the company has not lobbied Capitol Hill on the tanker issue.
In March, EADS North America chief executive Ralph Crosby wrote to Murray: "Your assertions that EADS 'has resorted to a campaign of distortion and half-truths in an effort to kill the proposed Air Force tanker lease program,' are simply not true."
McCain laughed when asked last week whether Airbus was fueling congressional skepticism about the tanker deal.
"I find that highly entertaining," he said.
He intimated that Boeing's problems were its own making, referring to last month's guilty plea by former Boeing executive Darleen Druyun, who admitted talking to Boeing about a job during the time she served as an Air Force negotiator on the tanker proposal.
"I'm sure it was Airbus that motivated Ms. Druyun to negotiate with Boeing for a job. I'm sure they were behind that. I think it's hilarious."
Although Airbus tankers would be assembled in France from mostly European components, the company says the tanker conversion would take place in the United States, creating an unspecified number of jobs.
Airbus also has taken out advertisements saying its new A380 super-jumbo jet supports 120,000 U.S. jobs through U.S. suppliers.
Murray said Airbus job claims are overblown.
While watchdog groups deny any contact with Airbus, they have met with McCain to orchestrate strategy.
It was during one such session last summer that Ken Boehm, chairman of the conservative-leaning National Legal and Policy Center, said he decided to investigate real-estate transactions by Druyun.
He eventually discovered Druyun had sold her $692,000 house to a Boeing executive while she worked for the Air Force. Boehm passed the information to Pentagon investigators.
He said his group became concerned when the tanker deal for 100 leased aircraft was inserted into a 2001 spending bill without any hearings, competition or analysis that the Air Force needed a new tanker fleet.
"I don't think the question is Airbus or Boeing," he said.
"The Air Force has to replace it eventually, and Boeing is probably the one to do it, but what do we lose by not having them jump through the hoops everyone else has to?"
Murray: U.S. sits idly by as Airbus 'creams' Boeing
Seattle Post-Intelligencer 05/05/04
author: Charles Pope
(Copyright 2004)
WASHINGTON -- Resuming an intense feud with Airbus and the Europeans, Sen. Patty Murray says the United States is "sitting on our hands while Europe is doing everything it can to dismantle our aerospace industry."
The remarks that Murray plans to deliver in a Senate floor speech today expand on complaints that Murray and The Boeing Co. have been making about subsidies Airbus receives and their impact on the competition between the worlds' two largest aerospace companies.
Airbus, a consortium of European companies, has made significant strides in the aircraft market and this year surpassed Boeing as the world's leading builder of commercial aircraft.
Murray, however, insists those gains have been won unfairly. Her comments suggest that the Bush administration and to a lesser extent, Congress, deserve the blame for letting it happen.
"We are following a normal business model, and we are getting creamed by the Europeans who are following a social-welfare model where it doesn't matter if they lose money, it doesn't matter if their products fail," Murray says in her prepared text.
Excerpts of the speech were provided ahead of time in the hope that the speech would amplify across the Puget Sound area, where Boeing builds most of its commercial aircraft and where the competition with Airbus is acutely felt.
Not coincidentally, Murray is seeking re-election this year and the Puget Sound area is a crucial source of votes.
"As long as they are employing Europeans and taking over America's market share, they don't care. That's not competition. That's subsidized slaughter, and we have to wake up before it's too late for America's aerospace companies and workers," Murray says.
"I'm here on the Senate floor to say wake up. Wake up to this threat before we lose another American industry. Wake up to this threat before we lose more high-wage, high-skill American jobs. Wake up to this threat before it's too late."
Her comments come on the heels of a similar outburst last month when Murray complained that Airbus was spreading "distortions and half-truths" about a $23 billion deal Boeing struck with the Air Force to supply 767 aerial tankers. That deal is on hold as a series of criminal and Pentagon investigations try to determine whether it violated contract and ethics law.
And although most of her remarks focus on commercial aircraft, Murray also will warn that Airbus is trying take to advantage of Boeing's ethical problems and elbow into the lucrative tanker market.
"EADS and Airbus have launched a deceptive PR and lobbying campaign to convince U.S. government officials and policy-makers that it is essentially an American company," Murray will say, referring to the Airbus' military subsidiary.
"The Airbus campaign of half-truths is on full display as the company works overtime in Washington, D.C., to re-create a competition they already lost to build the next generation refueling tanker for the Air Force."
To address these problems, Murray will once again call on the United States to "hold Europe accountable for their actions and the agreements they've signed with us" and by refusing to reopen the tanker contract.
Airbus did not return phone calls seeking comment about Murray's remarks. Boeing declined to comment.
A spokesman for Rep. George Nethercutt, R-Wash., who is running against Murray, said her comments were disingenuous.
If anyone shoulders the blame for Boeing's sour fortunes, spokesman Alex Conant said, it is Murray.
"A strong defender would not wait until election year to wake up to the fact that Washington's aerospace industry is hurting," he said.
Seattle Times 05/05/04
author: Alex Fryer
(Copyright 2004)
WASHINGTON -- Boeing and its supporters on Capitol Hill have launched a public-relations offensive this week, hoping to regain momentum for a proposal to use the lagging 767 production line in Everett to build 100 air-refueling tankers.
Much of the effort is designed to neutralize concerns raised in Pentagon reviews and to attack rival Airbus, which wants the U.S. Air Force to reconsider its pending $23.5 billion tanker contract with Boeing.
This week, the Defense Science Board, which advises Defense Department acquisitions officials, is expected to release a report on whether the Air Force truly needs to replace its fleet of Boeing KC-135s, many of them 40 years old.
Sources say the report is likely to recommend the Air Force retire the KC-135s, but may not urge doing do so immediately, as Boeing and Air Force officials hope. It may also question whether the Air Force should explore converting surplus passenger jets mothballed in the Arizona desert.
Last week, about 100 Boeing managers from across the country canvassed Capitol Hill, talking to their representatives about the company's commitment to clean ethics.
Yesterday, Boeing took out full-page ads in newspapers in Washington, D.C., Seattle and Chicago, giving its side of the tanker debate.
Pentagon officials put the proposal to lease 20 tankers and purchase an additional 80 planes on hold in December pending the outcome of several investigations. Congressional committees would have the opportunity to scrutinize the final contract between Boeing and the Air Force.
In a lengthy speech on the Senate floor today, Sen. Patty Murray is expected to charge France-based Airbus and its parent company EADS (European Aeronautic Defence & Space) with orchestrating a misinformation effort against Boeing.
"The Airbus campaign of half-truths is on full display as the company works overtime in Washington, D.C.," reads an advance copy of her statement.
"We are about to surrender our global aerospace leadership because we are sitting on our hands while Europe is doing everything it can to dismantle our aerospace industry," the speech reads.
The European consortium wants the Air Force to let Airbus bid for U.S. tanker work, arguing it can supply tankers based on the Airbus A330 for less money.
Boeing supporters quietly wonder whether there are any connections among Airbus, some of the watchdog groups that have vigorously criticized the tanker deal as government pork, and Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., the deal's toughest adversary on Capitol Hill.
Diane Murphy, vice president of EADS North America, once worked for a political-consulting firm that helped during McCain's 1982 campaign. She said she has spoken with him twice in the past 18 years, and never about tankers.
EADS North America has retained heavyweight lobbying firms, including Quinn Gillespie & Associates, the firm founded by Republican National Committee Chairman Ed Gillespie. Murphy said the company has not lobbied Capitol Hill on the tanker issue.
In March, EADS North America chief executive Ralph Crosby wrote to Murray: "Your assertions that EADS 'has resorted to a campaign of distortion and half-truths in an effort to kill the proposed Air Force tanker lease program,' are simply not true."
McCain laughed when asked last week whether Airbus was fueling congressional skepticism about the tanker deal.
"I find that highly entertaining," he said.
He intimated that Boeing's problems were its own making, referring to last month's guilty plea by former Boeing executive Darleen Druyun, who admitted talking to Boeing about a job during the time she served as an Air Force negotiator on the tanker proposal.
"I'm sure it was Airbus that motivated Ms. Druyun to negotiate with Boeing for a job. I'm sure they were behind that. I think it's hilarious."
Although Airbus tankers would be assembled in France from mostly European components, the company says the tanker conversion would take place in the United States, creating an unspecified number of jobs.
Airbus also has taken out advertisements saying its new A380 super-jumbo jet supports 120,000 U.S. jobs through U.S. suppliers.
Murray said Airbus job claims are overblown.
While watchdog groups deny any contact with Airbus, they have met with McCain to orchestrate strategy.
It was during one such session last summer that Ken Boehm, chairman of the conservative-leaning National Legal and Policy Center, said he decided to investigate real-estate transactions by Druyun.
He eventually discovered Druyun had sold her $692,000 house to a Boeing executive while she worked for the Air Force. Boehm passed the information to Pentagon investigators.
He said his group became concerned when the tanker deal for 100 leased aircraft was inserted into a 2001 spending bill without any hearings, competition or analysis that the Air Force needed a new tanker fleet.
"I don't think the question is Airbus or Boeing," he said.
"The Air Force has to replace it eventually, and Boeing is probably the one to do it, but what do we lose by not having them jump through the hoops everyone else has to?"
Murray: U.S. sits idly by as Airbus 'creams' Boeing
Seattle Post-Intelligencer 05/05/04
author: Charles Pope
(Copyright 2004)
WASHINGTON -- Resuming an intense feud with Airbus and the Europeans, Sen. Patty Murray says the United States is "sitting on our hands while Europe is doing everything it can to dismantle our aerospace industry."
The remarks that Murray plans to deliver in a Senate floor speech today expand on complaints that Murray and The Boeing Co. have been making about subsidies Airbus receives and their impact on the competition between the worlds' two largest aerospace companies.
Airbus, a consortium of European companies, has made significant strides in the aircraft market and this year surpassed Boeing as the world's leading builder of commercial aircraft.
Murray, however, insists those gains have been won unfairly. Her comments suggest that the Bush administration and to a lesser extent, Congress, deserve the blame for letting it happen.
"We are following a normal business model, and we are getting creamed by the Europeans who are following a social-welfare model where it doesn't matter if they lose money, it doesn't matter if their products fail," Murray says in her prepared text.
Excerpts of the speech were provided ahead of time in the hope that the speech would amplify across the Puget Sound area, where Boeing builds most of its commercial aircraft and where the competition with Airbus is acutely felt.
Not coincidentally, Murray is seeking re-election this year and the Puget Sound area is a crucial source of votes.
"As long as they are employing Europeans and taking over America's market share, they don't care. That's not competition. That's subsidized slaughter, and we have to wake up before it's too late for America's aerospace companies and workers," Murray says.
"I'm here on the Senate floor to say wake up. Wake up to this threat before we lose another American industry. Wake up to this threat before we lose more high-wage, high-skill American jobs. Wake up to this threat before it's too late."
Her comments come on the heels of a similar outburst last month when Murray complained that Airbus was spreading "distortions and half-truths" about a $23 billion deal Boeing struck with the Air Force to supply 767 aerial tankers. That deal is on hold as a series of criminal and Pentagon investigations try to determine whether it violated contract and ethics law.
And although most of her remarks focus on commercial aircraft, Murray also will warn that Airbus is trying take to advantage of Boeing's ethical problems and elbow into the lucrative tanker market.
"EADS and Airbus have launched a deceptive PR and lobbying campaign to convince U.S. government officials and policy-makers that it is essentially an American company," Murray will say, referring to the Airbus' military subsidiary.
"The Airbus campaign of half-truths is on full display as the company works overtime in Washington, D.C., to re-create a competition they already lost to build the next generation refueling tanker for the Air Force."
To address these problems, Murray will once again call on the United States to "hold Europe accountable for their actions and the agreements they've signed with us" and by refusing to reopen the tanker contract.
Airbus did not return phone calls seeking comment about Murray's remarks. Boeing declined to comment.
A spokesman for Rep. George Nethercutt, R-Wash., who is running against Murray, said her comments were disingenuous.
If anyone shoulders the blame for Boeing's sour fortunes, spokesman Alex Conant said, it is Murray.
"A strong defender would not wait until election year to wake up to the fact that Washington's aerospace industry is hurting," he said.
As a passenger, I can say that I tend to prefer the Airbuses that I regularly fly on. Of, course, they are all in the A319/A320 series, but nonetheless, that is my perception. Overall, regardless of the airline or seating configuration they tend to feel more spacious and offer a more comfortable ride.
My least favorite to fly on is the 757 - such a long, narrow tin can, with no room.
Airlines that have switched all seem to enjoy them too, quoting massive fuel savings and much enhanced reliability over the 737's they typically replace.
Another note on the DC-9's. Northwest Airlines (the local 800 lb gorrilla), was faced with a choice about a decade ago. Their DC-9 fleet was aging and new noise rules were going into effect. The choice was to replace the planes or spend nearly as much to refurbish the DC-9's.
Now a decade after deciding to refurbish the DC-9 fleet, the DC-9's are the most reliable type in the NW fleet! Needless to say, the decision was a good one for the airline - even though most of the planes are older than me! Interesting how an old warhorse still competes effectively today.
My least favorite to fly on is the 757 - such a long, narrow tin can, with no room.
Airlines that have switched all seem to enjoy them too, quoting massive fuel savings and much enhanced reliability over the 737's they typically replace.
Another note on the DC-9's. Northwest Airlines (the local 800 lb gorrilla), was faced with a choice about a decade ago. Their DC-9 fleet was aging and new noise rules were going into effect. The choice was to replace the planes or spend nearly as much to refurbish the DC-9's.
Now a decade after deciding to refurbish the DC-9 fleet, the DC-9's are the most reliable type in the NW fleet! Needless to say, the decision was a good one for the airline - even though most of the planes are older than me! Interesting how an old warhorse still competes effectively today.
MN - I am guessing you have not flown on a 777. Also, I think your comparisons have more to do with age of aircraft, and the carrier, more than the mfg.
No, I haven't flown a 777. No need to on any of the routes I regularly fly on. I have flown on the rest of the current Boeing lineup, from the 717 to the 767.
The comparisons I get on reliability are new versus new A319/32 vs. its 737 cousin. Has nothing to do with age, only performance data.
One airline I regularly fly has a new fleet of 737's, leather seating, etc... I still prefer to fly the Airbuses, regardless of what is considered a nice cabin (and newer to boot).
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I have very sensitive ears. The Airbus is nice and quiet, the 747 seems to offer the smoothest ride. I also want everyone to hear me scream clearly when I fall in whatever plane out of the sky.
If it has wings, you have to tie me up and drag me aboard, but I do not ever fly the MD-80, 767, or 777. Worst Airline I ever flew with was Alitalia.
If it has wings, you have to tie me up and drag me aboard, but I do not ever fly the MD-80, 767, or 777. Worst Airline I ever flew with was Alitalia.
Also, in regards to the Airbus Vstab issue, exactly how many cases of the tail separating do we know of?
My research says one, AA 587 in NYC. Research of planes that have exceeded or neared design loads on the tail turned up a grand total of 6 airframes. None of which lost the tail.
Overall, while there is tons of disagreement in the AA case, the general perception is the Vstab failure was a result of overstress on the structure induced by pilot actions and other conditions.
Beyond that, the reailty is that the safety rate of both manufacturers is pretty stellar. Yes, there are cases for EACH that are good and bad.
With the odds on either, I'm personally not worried for my safety flying either brand. That being said, from personal experience, the airbuses I fly on have provided a better experience than the Boeings.
My research says one, AA 587 in NYC. Research of planes that have exceeded or neared design loads on the tail turned up a grand total of 6 airframes. None of which lost the tail.
Overall, while there is tons of disagreement in the AA case, the general perception is the Vstab failure was a result of overstress on the structure induced by pilot actions and other conditions.
Beyond that, the reailty is that the safety rate of both manufacturers is pretty stellar. Yes, there are cases for EACH that are good and bad.
With the odds on either, I'm personally not worried for my safety flying either brand. That being said, from personal experience, the airbuses I fly on have provided a better experience than the Boeings.
In practice the experience in this country is Airbus low-balls the selling price to beat Boeings sale, then charges way more for parts. While the parts issue is minor compared to total costs, once the airframe is in service for more than4-6 years, the overall maintenance costs for the Airbus become substantially higher than the Boeing. This more than offsets the Airbus advantage of fleet-common pilot training.
it's going to have a swimming pool on board? I want to see the engineering on that!!!!! would have to have somekind of giro to rotate and stablize the thing during rough sky's, takeoff & landings-would be quite a feat to do a barrel roll without spilling a drop of water! Tex Johnson-Airbus needs you for the first test flight!!!(Tex was the fight test pilot that barrel rolled the Boeing 707 at about 500ft over Lake Washington in Seattle in 1955 during a demo flight for the Seafair boat races.)
By: Chris Kilroy
In the first crash of a new 'Fly-By-Wire' aircraft, the Airbus A320-100 impacted trees while performing a fly-by at an airshow and burst into flames. The crew, and Air France maintenance officials, have all been sentenced to probation for manslaughter; the Captain has been imprisoned. Evidence, including photographs, has now been exposed that an Airbus official at the scene switched the Digital Flight Data Recorder before the court hearing.
Since May 1998, it is proven that the Flight Data Recorder was switched after the accident. The Lausanne Institute of Police Forensic Evidence and Criminology (IPSC) comes to the conclusion that the recorder presented to the Court is NOT the one taken from the aircraft after the accident. Details: See below
Contents:
The Crash
The Official Version
The Captain's Version
The OEB's
The Black Boxes
The Engines: CFMI assesses CFMI
Germain Sengelin
Norbert Jacquet
The Forest
Why shouldn't one believe the official version?
The Sentence
The IPSC report: The Flight Data Recorder has been substituted!
The Crash
On Sunday June 26, 1988, the airclub at the airfield of Mulhouse-Habsheim in Alsace/France had organized with Air France a low approach of a brand new Airbus A320 in landing configuration. Michel Asseline was the pilot in command of F-GFKC, Pierre Mazière was his first officer, when the aircraft overflew the airfield at 2 pm in wonderful sunny weather. Some seconds later the aircraft touched the tops of the trees behind the runway and crashed into a forest. 3 passengers died in the accident and about 50 were injured. The accident was filmed by a video amateur and has been shown dozens of times on TV. F-GFKC was the first of a couple of aircraft of this type to be lost in the next few years (see below).
The Black Boxes were taken undamaged from the aircraft 2 hours after the crash, but unfortunately they have been out of control of justice for 10 days, and since May 1998 it is proven that the Flight Data Recorder was substituted during this period. The Lausanne Institute of Police Forensic Evidence and Criminology (IPSC) comes to the conclusion that the Black Boxes used in the trial to declare the pilot guilty are NOT the ones taken from the aircraft.
The aircraft was new, Airbus was waiting for commands, a lack of confidence in the highly computerized aircraft would have meant a commercial disaster - not only for the manufacturer, but also for the French administration, which has a share in the European Airbus consortium.
The Official Version
The French minister of transportation (Louis Mermoz), the company (Air France) and the aircraft manufacturer (Airbus Industry) declared with precipitation shortly after the accident that the aircraft was beyond any doubt. The final report (published 18 months after the accident) comes to the same conclusion, but the authenticity of the data on which the report has always been very doubtful, and since May 1998 it is proven by the report of the Lausanne IPSC that the Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) was substituted after the crash. For 10 years the media have not stopped reporting about the anomalies which have accompanied the technical investigation of the accident from the beginning.
The Captain's Version
Captain Asseline flew the aircraft manually. He had been instructed by Air France to overfly the airfield at 100 ft above ground. When he increased throttle to level off at 100 ft, the engines did not respond. So after some seconds he got worried and thought there was something like a short-circuit in the completely computerized throttle control. So he pulled the throttle back all the way and forth again. By that time the aircraft had touched the trees.
After the accident, Captain Asseline was very astonished when he saw on an amateur video tape that the gear was only 30 ft above ground when the aircraft was passing over the runway. He affirms the altimeter of the Airbus A320 indicated 100 ft.
Operational Engineering Bulletins
No fewer than 52 provisional flight notices have been published by Airbus Industry between April 1988 and April 1989. Hardly any new aircraft type has manifested such a large number of malfunctions. An OEB (Operational Engineering Bulletin) is a temporary notice sent out by the manufacturer to the users of an aircraft. They form a list of anomalies or simply functional features which do not appear in the users' manual. 2 OEBs are particularly interesting in relation with the Habsheim crash:
OEB 19/1 (May 1988): Engine Acceleration Deficiency at Low Altitude. This means that it was already known before the accident that the engines sometimes did not respond normally to the pilot's commands on the Airbus A320. However Air France did not inform their pilots about this anomaly. After the Habsheim accident, the engines have been modified (OEB 19/2, August 1988).
OEB 06/2 (May 1988): Baro-Setting Cross Check. It stated that the current design for barometric altitude indication on the Airbus A320 did not comply with airworthiness. This could be a hint why the aircraft was as low as 30 ft (9 m) above the runway whereas Asseline affirms that the altimeter indicated 100 ft (30 m).
These OEBs were sent to the company (Air France), but they had not been handed to the pilots. In fact both the engines and the altimetric system have been modified after the crash, which indicates that they did not function correctly at that time, but Airbus Industries was not held responsible of anything by the French Court, the whole responsibility was given to the pilots and to the organizers of the airshow.
The Black Boxes
The Black Boxes (the DFDR and the CVR), major pieces of evidence, have been out of control of the investigating court at Mulhouse for 10 days. The CVR (Cockpit Voice Recorder) records the pilots' voices. The Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) records the flight parameters, for example the altitude, speed, acceleration/deceleration, engine speed etc. According to the French Penal Procedure the police should have confiscated the black boxes immediately after the accident for further examination by independent experts. Instead the black boxes have been illegitimately in possession of the DGAC (Direction Génerale de l'Aviation Civile) from June 26 (the day of the accident) to July 6, when Germain Sengelin, investigating magistrate at Mulhouse, had ordered their confiscation.
The Black Boxes from which the official report has been made show a series of anomalies, which has led a lot of critical people since 1988 to call in question their authenticity:
The black boxes have been physically opened, the magnetic tape has been cut. Normally you put the black boxes into a reading machine without opening them - the same way you read a cassette in a video recorder.
8 seconds are missing in the recording, 4 seconds are missing just before the impact. That means that the DFDR would have stopped accidentally just before the impact.
The DFDR and the CVR are 4 seconds out of synchronization during the last part of the recording.
There is no indication of longitudinal deceleration at the impact. This might be expected in a collision with a mountain, but in Habsheim the recorders should have been able to operate until the aircraft disintegrated. Any crash which could be survived by all but 3 passengers should not have caused an abrupt stop in the DFDR recording.
Due to these anomalies, and the fact that the Black Boxes were in the hands of the DGAC, it has always been supposed, and is finally proven since May 1998, that the Flight Data Recorder confiscated on July 5 from the DGAC is NOT the one which was taken from the aircraft after the crash.
The Engines: CFMI assesses CFMI
The engines of the crashed aircraft have been examinated by the manufacturer (CFMI/SNECMA) himself instead of independent experts. An Operational Bulletin (OEB 19/1) about Engine acceleration deficiency at low altitude was sent out before the accident, in May 1988 (but Air France didn't pass it to its Airbus A320 pilots) and was modified in August (OEB 19/2). The engines, too, were modified after the accident.
Germain Sengelin
Germain Sengelin, investigating magistrate at Mulhouse, was amazed that the Black Boxes had been out of control of justice for 10 days. On Tuesday July 5 1988 at 12.30 pm he ordered the recorders to be confiscated at Paris. His order ought to have been executed before 5 pm; in fact, for some reason, it was not executed before Wednesday July 6 8.00 am: This is another anomaly.
Norbert Jacquet
Norbert Jacquet, an Air France pilot who spoke out in Asseline's support, was suspended from duty and had his licence withdrawn by Air France on the grounds of "mental instability". Meanwhile he has got five psychiatric certificates which unanimously state that he is completely sane and does not have any signs of mental trouble. One understands that co-pilot Pierre Mazière, who has continued to fly for Air France after the accident, cannot dare to express himself on the subject.
The Forest
When the aircraft hit the trees, its wings made an aisle in the forest - a valuable source of evidence. However the forest has been razed with precipitation within 3 days after the accident. The order to cut the trees was given by Mr Mangane and Mr Villeneuve from the Accident Investigation Bureau. While going down, the aircraft cut the trees at a height of 11 m (36 ft) on the left and 8.5 m (28 ft) on the right side. This difference might indicate that the engines were not running at the same speed. That has not been taken into account in the final report.
Why shouldn't one believe the official version?
Consider the following argument: If anything was OK with the aircraft, why did the DGAC withhold the tapes until the police confiscated them? Why are there several seconds missing in the recordings, just before the impact? Why have the Black Boxes been substituted? The people interested in the success of the aircraft would be stupid if they aroused unnecessarily suspicion and rumours.
Why should someone who has a clear conscience behave in a suspicious way? That's why I think it's difficult to believe that the investigation was in order.
The Sentence
5 persons have been accused for injury and manslaughter by the Court of Colmar/France:
Captain Michel Asseline
First Officer Pierre Mazière
the president of the Habsheim airclub
a Security Officer of Air France
a Director of Flight Operation of Air France
In 1996, the court refused a request of Asseline's defense for annulment of the flight-data recordings. On March 14, 1997, the Court of Colmar pronounced its judgment under the presidency of judge Christian Riss: Asseline gets 6 months of imprisonment plus 12 suspended on probation. The other 4 accused all get prison sentences suspended on probation. So the Court gives the major responsibility to Captain Asseline. Asseline announced he would make appeal, if necessary he will appeal to the European Court of Human Rights. Mazière said he accepted the judgment. Anyway Mazière never comments the accident - he is still flying for Air France.
The appeal process startet in January 1998, again at the Appeals Court of Colmar, under the presidency of judge Claudine Krieger-Bour. On April 9, 1998, the Court declared Asseline guilty of manslaughter and bodily harm, again on the basis of the doubtful recordings, and increased the original sentence to 10 months of imprisonment plus 10 months on probation.
Asseline walked free from the court and said he would appeal to France's Supreme Court, the Cour de Cassation. The arrest will become valid in about one year, and according to French law, Asseline must declare himself prisoner before his appeal is examined by the Court.
So the French Justice fails to confiscate in due time pieces of evidence, which could possibly prove the innocence of an accused, and nevertheless uses these pieces against him after 8 years.
The IPSC report: The Flight Data Recorder has been substituted!
N°1: Photograph taken from a helicopter by journalists of SIPA-Press on the accident site N°2: Enlargement of photograph N°1 showing Mr. Gérard carrying the Black Boxes: the CVR on the left, the DFDR on the right
N°3: Black Boxes photographed at the Court of Colmar (the DFDR being in the foreground) N°4: Enlargement of photograph N°2, showing the visible side of the CVR
The Institute of Police Forensic Evidence and Criminology (Institut de Police Scientifique et Criminologique, IPSC) based at Lausanne/Switzerland has analyzed photographs from the site of the accident showing a man carrying the Black Boxes. The Black Boxes are equipped with white stripes so that they can more easily be detected under water.
The IPSC has determined that the DFDR from the aircraft has straight stripes on its side (perpendicular to the edges), whereas the DFDR presented at the trial has angled lines. The IPSC comes to the conclusion that:
either Mr. Gérard is NOT carrying the DFDR of the crashed Airbus A320 on the photograph
or the DFDR presented at the trial is NOT the one from the crashed Airbus A320.
Read the detailed report on the IPSC report on the site of the French Airline Pilots' Association www.snpl.com/habsheim.html (in French)
The Air Bulletin writes:
The black box of an Airbus that crashed during an air show in France in 1988 was replaced with another after the accident, a report shows. Three people died when an A320 airliner piloted by Michel Asseline ploughed into a forest and burst into flames after a low pass over an airfield near the eastern French city of Mulhouse. Mr. Asseline, a former Air France pilot, was sentenced to ten months in jail by an appeal's court for manslaughter and bodily harm over the crash, but he always maintained that the flight data used by investigators and displayed at the trial was a fabrication.
Acting on Mr. Asseline's request, the renowned Institute of Police Forensic Evidence and Criminology (IPSC) of Lausanne (Switzerland) examined documents from the crash and the trials and concluded that the black box of the aircraft had been switched after the accident. Along with its report, the IPSC published photographs of a French Directorate General for Civil Aviation (DGAC) official retrieving the black box from the wreckage of the aircraft. After enlarging, a photograph shows straight white stripes on the side of the black box. The black box presented at Mr. Asseline's trials as the original one had angled white lines on its side.
The report is expected to be a boost in Mr. Asseline's attempt to have his conviction overturned. Mr. Asseline has already exhausted all appeal procedures and has now filed a claim with France's highest court, which rules only on legal technicalities and will not look into the crash again, to have the first trial annulled for evidence tampering. Until the report from the IPSC, Mr. Asseline's claim that the black box had been switched after the crash had no solid proof, but there were doubts on the integrity of the crash investigation because of a one week delay between the time the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) and the Cockpit Data Recorder (CDR) were retrieved from the wreckage and the day they were handed over to investigators. To this date, it is not clear exactly who held the black box for a week and why.
In the first crash of a new 'Fly-By-Wire' aircraft, the Airbus A320-100 impacted trees while performing a fly-by at an airshow and burst into flames. The crew, and Air France maintenance officials, have all been sentenced to probation for manslaughter; the Captain has been imprisoned. Evidence, including photographs, has now been exposed that an Airbus official at the scene switched the Digital Flight Data Recorder before the court hearing.
Since May 1998, it is proven that the Flight Data Recorder was switched after the accident. The Lausanne Institute of Police Forensic Evidence and Criminology (IPSC) comes to the conclusion that the recorder presented to the Court is NOT the one taken from the aircraft after the accident. Details: See below
Contents:
The Crash
The Official Version
The Captain's Version
The OEB's
The Black Boxes
The Engines: CFMI assesses CFMI
Germain Sengelin
Norbert Jacquet
The Forest
Why shouldn't one believe the official version?
The Sentence
The IPSC report: The Flight Data Recorder has been substituted!
The Crash
On Sunday June 26, 1988, the airclub at the airfield of Mulhouse-Habsheim in Alsace/France had organized with Air France a low approach of a brand new Airbus A320 in landing configuration. Michel Asseline was the pilot in command of F-GFKC, Pierre Mazière was his first officer, when the aircraft overflew the airfield at 2 pm in wonderful sunny weather. Some seconds later the aircraft touched the tops of the trees behind the runway and crashed into a forest. 3 passengers died in the accident and about 50 were injured. The accident was filmed by a video amateur and has been shown dozens of times on TV. F-GFKC was the first of a couple of aircraft of this type to be lost in the next few years (see below).
The Black Boxes were taken undamaged from the aircraft 2 hours after the crash, but unfortunately they have been out of control of justice for 10 days, and since May 1998 it is proven that the Flight Data Recorder was substituted during this period. The Lausanne Institute of Police Forensic Evidence and Criminology (IPSC) comes to the conclusion that the Black Boxes used in the trial to declare the pilot guilty are NOT the ones taken from the aircraft.
The aircraft was new, Airbus was waiting for commands, a lack of confidence in the highly computerized aircraft would have meant a commercial disaster - not only for the manufacturer, but also for the French administration, which has a share in the European Airbus consortium.
The Official Version
The French minister of transportation (Louis Mermoz), the company (Air France) and the aircraft manufacturer (Airbus Industry) declared with precipitation shortly after the accident that the aircraft was beyond any doubt. The final report (published 18 months after the accident) comes to the same conclusion, but the authenticity of the data on which the report has always been very doubtful, and since May 1998 it is proven by the report of the Lausanne IPSC that the Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) was substituted after the crash. For 10 years the media have not stopped reporting about the anomalies which have accompanied the technical investigation of the accident from the beginning.
The Captain's Version
Captain Asseline flew the aircraft manually. He had been instructed by Air France to overfly the airfield at 100 ft above ground. When he increased throttle to level off at 100 ft, the engines did not respond. So after some seconds he got worried and thought there was something like a short-circuit in the completely computerized throttle control. So he pulled the throttle back all the way and forth again. By that time the aircraft had touched the trees.
After the accident, Captain Asseline was very astonished when he saw on an amateur video tape that the gear was only 30 ft above ground when the aircraft was passing over the runway. He affirms the altimeter of the Airbus A320 indicated 100 ft.
Operational Engineering Bulletins
No fewer than 52 provisional flight notices have been published by Airbus Industry between April 1988 and April 1989. Hardly any new aircraft type has manifested such a large number of malfunctions. An OEB (Operational Engineering Bulletin) is a temporary notice sent out by the manufacturer to the users of an aircraft. They form a list of anomalies or simply functional features which do not appear in the users' manual. 2 OEBs are particularly interesting in relation with the Habsheim crash:
OEB 19/1 (May 1988): Engine Acceleration Deficiency at Low Altitude. This means that it was already known before the accident that the engines sometimes did not respond normally to the pilot's commands on the Airbus A320. However Air France did not inform their pilots about this anomaly. After the Habsheim accident, the engines have been modified (OEB 19/2, August 1988).
OEB 06/2 (May 1988): Baro-Setting Cross Check. It stated that the current design for barometric altitude indication on the Airbus A320 did not comply with airworthiness. This could be a hint why the aircraft was as low as 30 ft (9 m) above the runway whereas Asseline affirms that the altimeter indicated 100 ft (30 m).
These OEBs were sent to the company (Air France), but they had not been handed to the pilots. In fact both the engines and the altimetric system have been modified after the crash, which indicates that they did not function correctly at that time, but Airbus Industries was not held responsible of anything by the French Court, the whole responsibility was given to the pilots and to the organizers of the airshow.
The Black Boxes
The Black Boxes (the DFDR and the CVR), major pieces of evidence, have been out of control of the investigating court at Mulhouse for 10 days. The CVR (Cockpit Voice Recorder) records the pilots' voices. The Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) records the flight parameters, for example the altitude, speed, acceleration/deceleration, engine speed etc. According to the French Penal Procedure the police should have confiscated the black boxes immediately after the accident for further examination by independent experts. Instead the black boxes have been illegitimately in possession of the DGAC (Direction Génerale de l'Aviation Civile) from June 26 (the day of the accident) to July 6, when Germain Sengelin, investigating magistrate at Mulhouse, had ordered their confiscation.
The Black Boxes from which the official report has been made show a series of anomalies, which has led a lot of critical people since 1988 to call in question their authenticity:
The black boxes have been physically opened, the magnetic tape has been cut. Normally you put the black boxes into a reading machine without opening them - the same way you read a cassette in a video recorder.
8 seconds are missing in the recording, 4 seconds are missing just before the impact. That means that the DFDR would have stopped accidentally just before the impact.
The DFDR and the CVR are 4 seconds out of synchronization during the last part of the recording.
There is no indication of longitudinal deceleration at the impact. This might be expected in a collision with a mountain, but in Habsheim the recorders should have been able to operate until the aircraft disintegrated. Any crash which could be survived by all but 3 passengers should not have caused an abrupt stop in the DFDR recording.
Due to these anomalies, and the fact that the Black Boxes were in the hands of the DGAC, it has always been supposed, and is finally proven since May 1998, that the Flight Data Recorder confiscated on July 5 from the DGAC is NOT the one which was taken from the aircraft after the crash.
The Engines: CFMI assesses CFMI
The engines of the crashed aircraft have been examinated by the manufacturer (CFMI/SNECMA) himself instead of independent experts. An Operational Bulletin (OEB 19/1) about Engine acceleration deficiency at low altitude was sent out before the accident, in May 1988 (but Air France didn't pass it to its Airbus A320 pilots) and was modified in August (OEB 19/2). The engines, too, were modified after the accident.
Germain Sengelin
Germain Sengelin, investigating magistrate at Mulhouse, was amazed that the Black Boxes had been out of control of justice for 10 days. On Tuesday July 5 1988 at 12.30 pm he ordered the recorders to be confiscated at Paris. His order ought to have been executed before 5 pm; in fact, for some reason, it was not executed before Wednesday July 6 8.00 am: This is another anomaly.
Norbert Jacquet
Norbert Jacquet, an Air France pilot who spoke out in Asseline's support, was suspended from duty and had his licence withdrawn by Air France on the grounds of "mental instability". Meanwhile he has got five psychiatric certificates which unanimously state that he is completely sane and does not have any signs of mental trouble. One understands that co-pilot Pierre Mazière, who has continued to fly for Air France after the accident, cannot dare to express himself on the subject.
The Forest
When the aircraft hit the trees, its wings made an aisle in the forest - a valuable source of evidence. However the forest has been razed with precipitation within 3 days after the accident. The order to cut the trees was given by Mr Mangane and Mr Villeneuve from the Accident Investigation Bureau. While going down, the aircraft cut the trees at a height of 11 m (36 ft) on the left and 8.5 m (28 ft) on the right side. This difference might indicate that the engines were not running at the same speed. That has not been taken into account in the final report.
Why shouldn't one believe the official version?
Consider the following argument: If anything was OK with the aircraft, why did the DGAC withhold the tapes until the police confiscated them? Why are there several seconds missing in the recordings, just before the impact? Why have the Black Boxes been substituted? The people interested in the success of the aircraft would be stupid if they aroused unnecessarily suspicion and rumours.
Why should someone who has a clear conscience behave in a suspicious way? That's why I think it's difficult to believe that the investigation was in order.
The Sentence
5 persons have been accused for injury and manslaughter by the Court of Colmar/France:
Captain Michel Asseline
First Officer Pierre Mazière
the president of the Habsheim airclub
a Security Officer of Air France
a Director of Flight Operation of Air France
In 1996, the court refused a request of Asseline's defense for annulment of the flight-data recordings. On March 14, 1997, the Court of Colmar pronounced its judgment under the presidency of judge Christian Riss: Asseline gets 6 months of imprisonment plus 12 suspended on probation. The other 4 accused all get prison sentences suspended on probation. So the Court gives the major responsibility to Captain Asseline. Asseline announced he would make appeal, if necessary he will appeal to the European Court of Human Rights. Mazière said he accepted the judgment. Anyway Mazière never comments the accident - he is still flying for Air France.
The appeal process startet in January 1998, again at the Appeals Court of Colmar, under the presidency of judge Claudine Krieger-Bour. On April 9, 1998, the Court declared Asseline guilty of manslaughter and bodily harm, again on the basis of the doubtful recordings, and increased the original sentence to 10 months of imprisonment plus 10 months on probation.
Asseline walked free from the court and said he would appeal to France's Supreme Court, the Cour de Cassation. The arrest will become valid in about one year, and according to French law, Asseline must declare himself prisoner before his appeal is examined by the Court.
So the French Justice fails to confiscate in due time pieces of evidence, which could possibly prove the innocence of an accused, and nevertheless uses these pieces against him after 8 years.
The IPSC report: The Flight Data Recorder has been substituted!
N°1: Photograph taken from a helicopter by journalists of SIPA-Press on the accident site N°2: Enlargement of photograph N°1 showing Mr. Gérard carrying the Black Boxes: the CVR on the left, the DFDR on the right
N°3: Black Boxes photographed at the Court of Colmar (the DFDR being in the foreground) N°4: Enlargement of photograph N°2, showing the visible side of the CVR
The Institute of Police Forensic Evidence and Criminology (Institut de Police Scientifique et Criminologique, IPSC) based at Lausanne/Switzerland has analyzed photographs from the site of the accident showing a man carrying the Black Boxes. The Black Boxes are equipped with white stripes so that they can more easily be detected under water.
The IPSC has determined that the DFDR from the aircraft has straight stripes on its side (perpendicular to the edges), whereas the DFDR presented at the trial has angled lines. The IPSC comes to the conclusion that:
either Mr. Gérard is NOT carrying the DFDR of the crashed Airbus A320 on the photograph
or the DFDR presented at the trial is NOT the one from the crashed Airbus A320.
Read the detailed report on the IPSC report on the site of the French Airline Pilots' Association www.snpl.com/habsheim.html (in French)
The Air Bulletin writes:
The black box of an Airbus that crashed during an air show in France in 1988 was replaced with another after the accident, a report shows. Three people died when an A320 airliner piloted by Michel Asseline ploughed into a forest and burst into flames after a low pass over an airfield near the eastern French city of Mulhouse. Mr. Asseline, a former Air France pilot, was sentenced to ten months in jail by an appeal's court for manslaughter and bodily harm over the crash, but he always maintained that the flight data used by investigators and displayed at the trial was a fabrication.
Acting on Mr. Asseline's request, the renowned Institute of Police Forensic Evidence and Criminology (IPSC) of Lausanne (Switzerland) examined documents from the crash and the trials and concluded that the black box of the aircraft had been switched after the accident. Along with its report, the IPSC published photographs of a French Directorate General for Civil Aviation (DGAC) official retrieving the black box from the wreckage of the aircraft. After enlarging, a photograph shows straight white stripes on the side of the black box. The black box presented at Mr. Asseline's trials as the original one had angled white lines on its side.
The report is expected to be a boost in Mr. Asseline's attempt to have his conviction overturned. Mr. Asseline has already exhausted all appeal procedures and has now filed a claim with France's highest court, which rules only on legal technicalities and will not look into the crash again, to have the first trial annulled for evidence tampering. Until the report from the IPSC, Mr. Asseline's claim that the black box had been switched after the crash had no solid proof, but there were doubts on the integrity of the crash investigation because of a one week delay between the time the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) and the Cockpit Data Recorder (CDR) were retrieved from the wreckage and the day they were handed over to investigators. To this date, it is not clear exactly who held the black box for a week and why.
Just flew a A319 from ORD into Sacramento last night. Prev flight was on a 737 into SLC last month. I paid attention to see if the Airbus is "smoother than the Boeing. By smoother, I assume you are referring to vibrations and noise, and not turbulance. Anyway, I think the Airbus may have an advantage over the 737. However, my seat was very uncomfortable, but not sure if this is a UAL thing, or an Airbus thing. I did have the increased leg room of the "economy plus" seating, which is a function of UAL, which really was a lot nicer (I don't travel enough to get the first class upgrades).
The Airbus also had the LCD displays on both sides of the plane, which worked well, where the 737 has the CRTs hanging down in the aisle. I assume this is a funciton of a newer plane, but not sure.
Back in the 1960's Douglas built a DC-8 for a middle-eastern government with a solid gold bathtub on board. It was placed near the CG point and there was a lot of modified structure, since the mass has to be multiplied by certification g-loads times a (usually) 1.5 safety factor.
MolaKule
Staff member
I kinda think the swimming pool thing on the A380 is a pipe dream.
A hot tub would be better, have less weight, but still present design problems. Just the pump and heater would pose a real power problem by itself. I guess one could put preheated water in the hottub and then filter and maintain heat with less power once airborne. Putting a lid on the hottub would prevent sloshing and changes in CG.
The other problem I see is corrosion from the vapors of the hot tub (or pool). I have seen chlorine and other chemicals literally eat through structural and non-structural aluminum members.
Hmm, wonder if they need a new metal coating to prevent chemical attack? Let's see, metal coatings made of organic compounds.....
A hot tub would be better, have less weight, but still present design problems. Just the pump and heater would pose a real power problem by itself. I guess one could put preheated water in the hottub and then filter and maintain heat with less power once airborne. Putting a lid on the hottub would prevent sloshing and changes in CG.
The other problem I see is corrosion from the vapors of the hot tub (or pool). I have seen chlorine and other chemicals literally eat through structural and non-structural aluminum members.
Hmm, wonder if they need a new metal coating to prevent chemical attack? Let's see, metal coatings made of organic compounds.....
I couldn't believe how little attention the press gave to the mfr on that one!
I will never fly on an Airbus either!!
I don't like the idea of composite materials on CRTITICAL junctions, not enough flexibilty or fatiuge resisitance for my taste. No give...it's there one minute then SNAP it's gone. Sure it may have higher tensile and probably some other properties.... still seems like an accident waiting to happen!! Oh wait, it DID happen already.
Not to mention fly by wire with no mechanical backup. Scary stuff.
MolaKule
Staff member
As to the Airbus that lost the vertical stabilizer, I think (IMHO) the FAA tried to hush the criticism of this design because they gave the type certificate to a flawed design.
The NTSB attempted to be critcal, but PC types didn't want to make any waves.
The only time I recall a vertical stabilizer shearing off, was on a B52 but it wasn't caused by pilot commands, it was caused by a "rotator" shearing it off. A rotator is a horizontal tornado. It landed safely, BTW, by assymetrically thrusting the engines.
I think the "pilot commands" report stuff was really hokey. When a pilot "commands" a rudder to deflect, by gosh it should deflect without shearing off the whole vertical stabilizer. I don't recall a vertical stabilizer ever shearing off an MDC, Douglas, Boeing, Lockheed, or Convair airframe due to "pilot commands."
The NTSB attempted to be critcal, but PC types didn't want to make any waves.
The only time I recall a vertical stabilizer shearing off, was on a B52 but it wasn't caused by pilot commands, it was caused by a "rotator" shearing it off. A rotator is a horizontal tornado. It landed safely, BTW, by assymetrically thrusting the engines.
I think the "pilot commands" report stuff was really hokey. When a pilot "commands" a rudder to deflect, by gosh it should deflect without shearing off the whole vertical stabilizer. I don't recall a vertical stabilizer ever shearing off an MDC, Douglas, Boeing, Lockheed, or Convair airframe due to "pilot commands."
I remember a pilot describing an incident to me in which a 707 rudder was kicked to hard in flight by an inexperienced pilot. The result was the shearing off of one of the 4 engines.
The amount of interelated detail in the A300 vertical stabilizer case does not lend itself for a quick recap here but the rudder control system and related feedback forces had more to do with the loss of the tail than the actual structural members involved.
As far as fly-by-wire and composite materials are concerned- the military has been using them both far longer than the guys in commercial aviation.
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