Correct, that's a significant variable too. There are many variables involved. Arguing over whether the amortization of a nuclear power plant takes 30 years vs. "on the order of 50 years" is peak semantics.
Not really.
Nuclear plants, after their CAPEX is run-down, are extremely cheap to operate. That's important. The amortization period determines when this happens. So, going from 30 to 50 years is a huge jump there, that's not semantics. That's why I asked you to cite an example.
Pickering A, here in Ontario, was required to pay for itself in 15 years, it's 51. IIRC, Vogtle 3/4 are using a 30-year period.
Well, my master's degree in geology and my decade and a half of experience as a professional in the energy industry working energy infrastructure and geophysical technology helps.
All I am saying is that it is more cost and more risk putting nuclear power plants in tectonically active areas, and my opinion is that some questionable decisions have been made. There is nothing particularly controversial or inaccurate about this. Also, what the heck is my "agenda"? I think you're reading more into what I am saying than I actually am. I am not anti-nuclear. I am anti-nuclear-in-dumb-places-with-foresight-lacking-regulators-at-the-helm.
It is disingenuous to construe what I am saying as being counter to "teams of engineers, regulators, consultants, and their massive amount of historical data" when Diablo Canyon was constructed without even knowing there was a large fault within 1 mile of the facility. An assessment found it in 2008, 40 years after construction was started, and the NRC concluded, essentially, "We looked into it and it probably wont generate enough g-forces to exceed the limits of the plant." In fact, the system could produce a magnitude of quake up to or exceeding the supposed 7.5 limit for Diablo Canyon.
This margin of safety is not good enough for me. The subsurface has tremendous uncertainty, especially in such highly complex fault systems. The methods by which we determine the maxima of possible events are highly susceptible to error. Humans make mistakes, the first one being the location of Diablo Canyon in the first place. The fact that the facility was even constructed in its location in the first place is evidence in favor of what I am saying: humans are fallible, and there are costlier/riskier places than others, even if mitigation technologies are available. Every time we build a nuclear facility in a tectonically active area, we multiply the factors that must be considered by a very large amount - to such a degree that I, as a geologist, am uncomfortable with the uncertainty.
OK, and I appreciate your experience, but you are one guy, who is disagreeing with a whole collective of people on this particular issue, and it would appear, as it applies to a single facility. The design basis considerations for the plants in Japan, which is an extremely seismically active place, are obviously much more aggressive, yet it didn't drive costs into the "unobtanium" territory that you previously alluded to.
Coming back full circle, this is why the Australian craton is a great place for nuclear.
References:
A new catalog of earthquake locations and focal mechanisms for the California Central Coast underscores the fault complexity of the region and identifies newly observed features offshore near San Luis Obispo.
www.sciencedaily.com
Abstract. The Shoreline fault is a vertical strike‐slip fault running along the coastline near San Luis Obispo, California. Much is unknown about the
pubs.geoscienceworld.org
There are many places where it's a "duh" situation with next to no seismic activity. I think the crux of this issue is when we discuss places like California and Japan, where there is a great degree of seismic activity, is there a history of seismic events directly damaging these facilities and causing disasters? In California, the answer is of course no. In Japan, there is the indirect issue of Fukushima Daiichi, but that wasn't a plant design issue, that was an operator/regulator issue.
Geeze. All this from the phrase "fail to anticipate"? You're using some pretty aggressive techniques here to, again, focus on word choice rather than substance. There was a failure to recognize and mitigate for the risk of tsunami - if you don't like the word "anticipate" as shorthand for this, and if you think that one, single word means I am ignorant of the events, then you're not engaging in good faith.
Words have meanings, you mis-framed or mischaracterized the event to suit the angle you appeared to be pushing. I took issue with that.
Japan has an incredible volume of seismic data and tsunami modelling work that they've done. They were WELL AWARE of the very real risk of a tsumani of that magnitude happening. There was no failure to anticipate the event, let's be clear on that point.
What DID happen was that due to the regulator being captured by industry, despite the presentation of this modelling showing that a massive tsunami was inevitable, and that sea wall height should be upgraded at places like Fukushima Daiichi to prepare for that, AND despite Tepco being told by GE, the designer of the bloody plant, that the backup generators should be moved to behind the facility (from shore level in front of it), as they were at high risk from flooding, Tepco was able to avoid doing both of those things under the grandfather clause because they were part of the regulatory body making the decisions.
It's not that nobody was aware, or anticipated it, it was a deliberate act of avoidance. Not spending money they didn't have to because the regulator lacked the teeth to be able to force the issue, due to it being captured by industry.
To which point are you responding?
- Your knowledge of nuclear power facilities being low? So far you haven't demonstrated anything to make me think otherwise. I've made this judgement based on your mischaracterization of what transpired at Fukushima Daiichi. If I'm wrong, I'd welcome it, I generally enjoy these sorts of discussions when they are based on facts that we agree on.
Due to this, this conversation hasn't been overly productive so far, because it's hard to have a meaningful and fruitful dialogue when one side is having to make corrections about what the circumstances surrounding the event actually were, rather than both parties working with the same facts and being able to delve into the meat and potatoes of the matter so to speak.
And yes, so far that has been problematic, because you are now having to bring up your credentials to defend and explain yourself.
If you'd like to agree that you were erroneous in your characterization of what transpired at Fukushima:
It’s a great example of engineering for one contingency and failing to anticipate another.
Then I think we can move on and discuss your broader point, which I'm generally in agreement with, that efforts to avoid building plants on faults where history dictates there may be problems in the future, should be made.
I think you and I would also agree on regulatory capture being a massive problem that should never have been allowed to happen.