December 7, 1941

[Tyson]

May we not forget.

On Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service attacked the neutral United States at Naval Station Pearl Harbor near Honolulu, Hawaii, killing 2,403 Americans and injuring 1,178 others. The attack sank four U.S. Navy battleships and damaged four others. It also damaged three cruisers, three destroyers, and one minelayer. Aircraft losses were 188 destroyed and 159 damaged.

Canada declared war on Japan within hours of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the first Western nation to do so. On December 8, the United States declared war on Japan and entered World War II on the side of the Allies. In a speech to Congress, President Franklin D. Roosevelt called the bombing of Pearl Harbor "a date which will live in infamy."

My grandfather and three friends were nursing hangovers with coffee and pie in a cafe in Caldwell, Idaho when the cook came out and made the announcement.

Two days later, all 4 enlisted.

Two didn't return home.

The greatest generation, indeed!

 

[incognito_2u]

God Bless all that made the ultimate sacrifice on that unforgettable day.
May they all Rest In Peace.

 

[Kuato]

Never forget. Greatest Generation: agreed.

However history tells us several things about Pearl Harbor.

First it was a copy of the British raid on Taranto, Italy the year before.

The British Raid on Taranto Harbor

In November 1940, the British Royal Navy carried out a surprise attack on the Italian fleet in Taranto Harbor using carrier aircraft. It was a model for the Japanese air strike on Pearl Harbor a ye…

lflank.wordpress.com

Its success was due in large part to complacency on the part of US forces' command structure in Hawai'i at the time.

And the "sneak attack" would have been a "decisive first strike" had there not been numerous gaffes made in Japanese coordination which included time zone confusion and a late delivery of the war declaration in Washington.

All in all, Yamamoto's statement was correct: that all Pearl Harbor had done was "awaken a sleeping giant", albeit at huge cost.

 

[JohnnyG]

My flag is at Half Staff today.
Kind of a dual pupose with the passing of Bob Dole.

 

[Yah-Tah-Hey]

I wasn't old enough to know the particulars, but I do remember my grandpa and uncle coming to our house and talking to my dad in a serious manner and I knew something bad had happened. And later, an enormous pile of things made out of iron and steel was across the street.

 

[BusyLittleShop]

Nov 28 military planers were directed to undertake reconnaissance they deemed necessary...
discovering the Japanese Carriers approximately 200 miles north from Oahu is an overt act...
***************************************************************************

Army Alert Sent by Chief of Naval Operations:
Nov. 28, 1941

FROM: Chief of Naval Operations

ACTION: Com Pnncf, Com Psncf

INFO: Cincpac Com Pncf

28----

Refer to my 272338. Army has sent following to commander western defense command.

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical
purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese
Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future
action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If
hostilities cannot repeat not be avoided the United States desires
that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not
repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action
that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese
action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other
measures as you deem necessary but these measure should be carried
out so as not repeat not to alarm civil population or disclose
intent. Report measures taken.

A separate message in being sent to G-2, Ninth Corps Area re
subversive activities in the United States. Should hostilities
occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow five so far
as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly
secret information to minimum essential officers. Unquote. WPL 52
is not applicable to Pacific area and will not be placed in effect
in that area except as now in force in southeast Pacific sub area
and Panama naval coastal frontier. Undertake no offensive action
until Japan has committed an overt act. Be prepared to carry out
tasks assigned in WPL-46, so far as they apply to Japan in case
hostilities occur.
********************************************************************


I offer scans from my Dec 1941 Air Progress and Nov 1941 Flying
magazines collect that takes us back in time before December 7 attack
on Pearl Harbor... this was the mindset of our military planners
before they faced the darkest horizons...

Dec 1941 Air Progress

Nov 1941 Flying and Popular Aviation

 

[Malo83]

Have visited the USS Arizona memorial and it is a humbling experience, hard to imagine the over 1100 men entombed below your feet, fuel oil still seeps out of her tanks.

 

[Wolf359]

Never forget. Greatest Generation: agreed.

However history tells us several things about Pearl Harbor.

First it was a copy of the British raid on Taranto, Italy the year before.

The British Raid on Taranto Harbor

In November 1940, the British Royal Navy carried out a surprise attack on the Italian fleet in Taranto Harbor using carrier aircraft. It was a model for the Japanese air strike on Pearl Harbor a ye…

lflank.wordpress.com

Its success was due in large part to complacency on the part of US forces' command structure in Hawai'i at the time.

And the "sneak attack" would have been a "decisive first strike" had there not been numerous gaffes made in Japanese coordination which included time zone confusion and a late delivery of the war declaration in Washington.

All in all, Yamamoto's statement was correct: that all Pearl Harbor had done was "awaken a sleeping giant", albeit at huge cost.

What's kind of astounding is that Clark field in Manila was bombed 9 hours after the Pearl Harbor attack, but McArthur didn't lose his command unlike the ones in Hawaii.

Attack on Clark Field - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[Malo83]

ADM. Kimmel and GEN. Short were scapegoats for the attack, DC had info on the upcoming attack but was not relayed to Pearl until it was too late, there's more to it but that's all I remember reading about.

Commander at Pearl Harbor relieved of his duties | December 17, 1941 | HISTORY

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel was relieved of his command of the U.S. Pacific Fleet as part of a shake-up of officers in the wake of the Pearl Harbor disaster. Admiral Kimmel had enjoyed a successful military career, beginning in 1915 as an aide to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Franklin...

www.history.com

 

[Wolf359]

ADM. Kimmel and GEN. Short were scapegoats for the attack, DC had info on the upcoming attack but was not relayed to Pearl until it was too late, there's more to it but that's all I remember reading about.

Commander at Pearl Harbor relieved of his duties | December 17, 1941 | HISTORY

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel was relieved of his command of the U.S. Pacific Fleet as part of a shake-up of officers in the wake of the Pearl Harbor disaster. Admiral Kimmel had enjoyed a successful military career, beginning in 1915 as an aide to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Franklin...

www.history.com

That is a common thought but if you read many books on it, there was never any evidence that DC knew about the attack ahead of time. It would have come out by now even if it was classified.

 

[Jackson_Slugger]

That is a common thought but if you read many books on it, there was never any evidence that DC knew about the attack ahead of time. It would have come out by now even if it was classified.

I agree that Kimmel and Short were made the goats, but they weren't blameless. There was an overall lackadaisical approach to their commands. But certainly there was plenty of blame to go around. In any case, "DC" did in fact issue a "war warning" on November 28th to all Pacific commands. But no one envisioned a coup de main attack on Hawaii.

The typical US war scenario (Warplan Orange) envisioned the Japanese attacking on the peripheral as in the Philippines and trying to draw the US Navy into a massive mid-ocean battle. MacArthur frustrated the main US "redout" strategy there by attempting to drive the Japanese Army and Naval Infantry back into the sea with inferior forces, which ultimately resulted in the capitulation of Bataan and Corregidor earlier than anticipated. However, after Pearl, it really didn't matter that much and probably was for the better in that it removed any US temptation of trying to relieve them - something that probably would have resulted in a disaster...

 

[KneeGrinder]

Have visited the USS Arizona memorial and it is a humbling experience, hard to imagine the over 1100 men entombed below your feet, fuel oil still seeps out of her tanks.

As you say, it's almost an impossible experience to try and explain to someone. Standing over the U.S.S. Arizona, the water is so clear you can see the Ship because it is in "very" shallow water, it almost looks unreal, like you could almost dive in the water off the side of the Memorial, and you would be able touch it.

If anyone ever goes to Oahu, it is pretty close to the Airport and in the weekday mornings it's not crowded. I would strongly suggest taking the time to pay your respects, you will have an experience you will never forget.

 

[Wolf359]

I agree that Kimmel and Short were made the goats, but they weren't blameless. There was an overall lackadaisical approach to their commands. But certainly there was plenty of blame to go around. In any case, "DC" did in fact issue a "war warning" on November 28th to all Pacific commands. But no one envisioned a coup de main attack on Hawaii.

The typical US war scenario (Warplan Orange) envisioned the Japanese attacking on the peripheral as in the Philippines and trying to draw the US Navy into a massive mid-ocean battle. MacArthur frustrated the main US "redout" strategy there by attempting to drive the Japanese Army and Naval Infantry back into the sea with inferior forces, which ultimately resulted in the capitulation of Bataan and Corregidor earlier than anticipated. However, after Pearl, it really didn't matter that much and probably was for the better in that it removed any US temptation of trying to relieve them - something that probably would have resulted in a disaster...

The main reason that they didn't envision a Pearl attack was that they felt the water was going to be too shallow for torpedoes to work. But the Japanese designed torpedoes to work in the shallow waters of Pearl. They just didn't finish the job with the third wave to destroy the repair docks and the oil storage tanks. That would have pushed the US back to the west coast. You could blame that on Nagumo though, it was his call. Nagumo was also in charge during their loss at Midway. He could have launched against the ships with the torpedo planes that were ready but waited while the rest of the planes with bombs were switched out for torpedos and that's when the Americans caught him. In both instances, he didn't do what Yamamoto wanted him to do.

 

[KneeGrinder]

From what has been told to me by some of the now elderly that were young back in that day, Japan was hours to maybe a few days at the most from existing upon the surface of the earth.

Japan flew the white flag, and it has long been thought that Harry S. Truman was responsible for instilling fear in the Japanese people and military leaders, which he did, by dropping 2 bombs on Japan. 1 on Hiroshima, and a plutonium-type bomb detonated over Nagasaki which was a much stronger blast. The bombs would have continued till Japan was underwater, but what really got them to surrender was Russia entering the war against Japan.


Nuclear weapons shocked Japan into surrendering at the end of World War II—except they didn't. Japan surrendered because the Soviet Union entered the war. Japanese leaders said the bomb forced them to surrender because it was less embarrassing to say they had been defeated by a miracle weapon.

 

[Al]

God bless those who served

 

[BusyLittleShop]

Nov. communicate shows Kimmel received "hostel action possible at any moment" and "directed to undertake such reconnaissance."

ADM Kimmel's charges generally pointed to errors in judgment, such as
the misuse of radar, failure to coordinate and pass on intelligence,
failure to use reconnaissance aircraft properly, and failure to read
staff estimates of the situation. He was also criticized for
underestimating the potential for a Japanese attack among other
errors...

After all 6 Carriers of the Japanese fleet got within 200 miles
undetected and gained complete surprise successfully hitting
their intended targets because no reconnaissance aircraft under
Kimmel's command were up scouting Dec 7...

 

[Jackson_Slugger]

The main reason that they didn't envision a Pearl attack was that they felt the water was going to be too shallow for torpedoes to work. But the Japanese designed torpedoes to work in the shallow waters of Pearl.

A couple things here. yes the wooden slats made the torpedoes run, but I doubt the brains at Pearl were worried about aviation, probably more submarines getting past the nets. Of course some midget subs did get in on December 7th, but were marginal if they did anything at all...

They just didn't finish the job with the third wave to destroy the repair docks and the oil storage tanks. That would have pushed the US back to the west coast.

The "Third Wave" thing is a bit of a "hindsight" mythos of Pearl Harbor. The Japanese IJN aircrews were already exhausted. A third wave meant another jolt at Pearl with largely undefended carriers swapping ordnance and fuel on deck. It also meant that the IJN naval aviators would landing at night, something they never trained for! Also, the US AAA marksmanship had grown exponentially from the first to the second wave, where most of the 30 or so Japanese strike force aircraft were shot down. That doesn't sound like a huge loss, but the 64 highly trained and irreplaceable aircrew were a real loss. A third wave, and you might be getting to losses that almost equal the Americans'. And the largest factor was the missing US carriers. What if they had actually been around and detected the IJN flotilla instead of delivering planes to Midway and Wake? It would have been Midway in December 1941...

The tanks thing is also vastly overblown. They were not tanks but "fuel bunkers", okay it was a tank farm. But the fuel was difficult to ignite and was contained in individual cells making any strategic loss impossible. It would have taken a sustained strategic bombing campaign to have had a real affect. The "repair docks'? You might've well asked the IJN pilots to bomb the Henderson Airfield landfill!

You could blame that on Nagumo though, it was his call. Nagumo was also in charge during their loss at Midway. He could have launched against the ships with the torpedo planes that were ready but waited while the rest of the planes with bombs were switched out for torpedos and that's when the Americans caught him. In both instances, he didn't do what Yamamoto wanted him to do.

Nagumo gets the Short/Kimmel treatment of scapgoatery. Pearl was Yamamoto's plan, not Nagumo. There was no "third wave" strike plan at Pearl. And was it Nagumo's fault that the US military had partially broken the Imperial Japanese code by Midway?