Aircraft automation

Agreed but I would argue that pilots are not trained as well as they should be ( some airlines ) and too much emphasis is put on using automation “all the time”. Some airlines do a better job educating and training pilots to recognize and deal with unreliable airspeed problems.

The problem with Air France 447 was that they didn’t understand what was going on or that the airplane was in a ( deep ) stall.

The captain started to figure out it ( “10 degrees pitch“ he said ) when he came back and saw the aircraft with the nose pitched up but dropping like a rock. It was too late by then.

The Finnair accident was complacency ( an, it always controls the speed so why bother checking it ) , AF 447 was a lack of understanding , even when the automation was off.
And why bad training? Why so much reliance on automation? Flying as efficient as possible? It comes down to money in the end. Looking from my perspective and work I do, I think that big thing is also cultural aspect: who are people that are recruited, process, hierarchy etc. I do not think we can take out single variable here and blame it. IMO, there are multiple variables that led to the fact that they did not understand what is going on.
 
And why bad training? Why so much reliance on automation? Flying as efficient as possible? It comes down to money in the end. Looking from my perspective and work I do, I think that big thing is also cultural aspect: who are people that are recruited, process, hierarchy etc. I do not think we can take out single variable here and blame it. IMO, there are multiple variables that led to the fact that they did not understand what is going on.
Do you think that accident was preventable? If your answer is “yes”, what would have made the difference with respect to the pilots being the final back up? It was preventable.

There was something wrong with the aircraft , it caused an unreliable airspeed problem ( without any flight deck warning specially telling them that ) which confused the flight computers, it gave up and said “ you have control” and the pilots failed to figure out was going on at a basic level......the stall warning keeps going off and they should should have realized it was real as the nose was far too high. The more experienced pilot ( Captain ) figured out the pitch was high but it was too late by then.

The “level of automation” had nothing really to do with when you get down to it because a unreliable airspeed problem could happen in any aircraft. I used to fly the B727 ( coffee anymore....night freight ) .....old steam gauges, basic autopilot, 3 person crew ....and if it had an unreliable airspeed problem ( pitot tube blocked ...hit by birds on take off it could just as easily cause massive confusion.

So, if the most advanced aircraft have a blocked pitot tube ( and no cockpit warning ), it will cause problems just like with an old B727.

Training and experience matters. Accident investigators are puzzled why neither pilot said anything about the continuous stall warning IIRC.

My company has a FCTM ( flight crew training manual ) that talks about how to handle unreliable airspeed problems, I bet many don’t.

My company even has a warning in the deice checklist to be careful when operating in snow -5 celcius and below as the melting snow ( cockpit windshield heat ...wish cars had it ) can drip and refreeze near the nose area where the sensors are ( pitot tubes and AOA vanes .....total of 14 on the Airbus....8 on Captain side, 6 FO side ). The refrozen precipitation can ( rare but has occurred ) cause minor airflow disruptions that can cause AF 446 problems .....confusion due to unreliable airspeed plus the auto pilot comimg off and reverting to alternate law, raw data, no autothrust.

How do I know that.....good training. What do I do before every take off ( technique not SOP ) .....look up the pitch and power in the event of a unreliable airspeed problem ( could happen due to melting snow , hitting birds, etc ). In cruise, I write down the Pitch and power for level flight and post it by one of the instruments , just in case.
 
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I do not agree with everything. Airlines that have trained their pilots for unreliable airspeed problems would have possibly fared better ( hopefully understood at least what the problem was ). Unfortunately, the two pilots on AF 447 didn't know what caused the problem. This guy brings up automation again but that has little to do with it IMHO. Whats automation complacency got to do with not recognizing 10 degrees of pitch ( and a stall warning repeatedly going off ) is dangerous in that flight regime.

I am not trying to talk about AF 447 because it was discussed in another thread but its about the automation excuse part versus training and experience.

When you read this, remember, a blocked pitot tube could cause an accident with any airplane, not just highly automated ones....if the pilots do not figure out what's going on and use their training.

I bet you Air France France does training regarding unreliable airspeed today.



Air France Flight 447 Crash 'Didn't Have to Happen,' Expert Says​

French investigators release final report on Air France Flight 447 crash.
By MATT HOSFORD, LAUREN EFFRON and NIKKI BATTISTE
5 July 2012, 12:24
• 7 min read

Air France Report: What Went Wrong







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Air France Report: What Went Wrong
French officials release report on one of the worst airline crashes in history.
July 5, 2012— -- The Air France Flight 447 crash, considered one of the worst aviation disasters in history, could have been avoided, a top-ranking aviation safety expert said.

"Absolutely, this accident didn't have to happen," said William Voss, the president and CEO of the Flight Safety Foundation.


BEA, the French government's official accident investigators, conducted a three-year investigation into the crash, which killed all 228 people on board, including one married couple from Louisiana, when the Airbus A330 slammed into the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of Brazil in 2009.

PHOTOS: Air France Flight 447 Crash Wreckage Recovered

In the agency's final report, which was released today, investigators determined that a combination of technical failures and mistakes made by inadequately trained pilots was responsible for the crash. They recommended that pilots be better trained to manually fly commercial aircraft at high altitudes and called for stricter plane certification rules.

"Our investigation is a no-blame investigation. It is just a safety investigation," Jean-Paul Troadec, the director of BEA, told ABC News. "What appears in the crew behavior is that most probably, a different crew should have done the same action. So, we cannot blame this crew. What we can say is that most probably this crew and most crews were not prepared to face such an event."

But the report went on to say that there were at least 12 other instances where pilots encountered this issue and the flights continued normally without problems. Voss said the Air France pilots didn't seem prepared for the situation they found themselves in the night of the crash.

"[The pilots] seemed to have trouble looking past the automation they were accustomed to and not really able to continue with the old raw information that pilots used to depend on," he said. "Clearly the report shows that there was a lot of difficult communication on the flight deck, a lot of incomplete thoughts, a lot of confusion."


According to the report, a speed sensor on board the plane, called a pitot tube, stopped functioning after becoming clogged with ice at high-altitude while the plane was flying through a thunderstorm. This caused the auto-pilot to disengage and shift the controls back to the pilots. While flying in heavy turbulence, the pilots failed to properly diagnose the severity of the problem because the pitot tube, a critical piece of equipment to the aircraft, was sending inaccurate data to the cockpit, the report said. The pilots put the plane into a devastating stall and it fell rapidly from the sky, before pancake-ing into the ocean.

"Despite these persistent symptoms, the crew never understood that they were stalling and consequently never applied a recovery maneuver," the report said.

Investigators noted that there was no possibility of surviving the accident.

"The crew's failure to diagnose the stall situation and consequently a lack of inputs that would have made it possible to recover from [the accident]" was a contributing factor, it concluded.

Airbus said in a statement to ABC News that it has been working to improve the pitot tubes and is taking measures to avoid such accidents in the future. Air France also has stressed the equipment problems and insisted the pilots "acted in line with the information provided by the cockpit instruments and systems. .... The reading of the various data did not enable them to apply the appropriate action."

Air France Flight 447 from Rio to Paris​

Air France Flight 447 was en route from Rio de Janeiro to Paris on May 31, 2009 on an overnight trip when it vanished. The plane crashed into the Atlantic Ocean in the early morning hours of June 1, 2009 -- nearly four hours after take-off.

As "Nightline" previously reported, black box tapes recovered from the wreckage in April 2011 revealed that almost four hours into the flight, the plane was 800 miles off the coast of Brazil, and Captain Marc Dubois left the cockpit for a scheduled nap. At the time, the plane was about to fly into a thunderstorm, one that other flights that night had steered around.

According to the tapes, First Officer Cedric Bonin, a 32-year-old pilot who had fewer than 5,000 flight hours under his belt, was at the controls but had never been in this situation before at high-altitude. Bonin made the fatal mistake of pulling the plane's nose up, which caused it to go into a deep stall.

As Flight 447 went deeper into its catastrophic stall, the stall alarm cut in and out intermittently, the black box tapes revealed. Airbus had previously claimed the stall alarm on Flight 447 "was performing as designed," but critics charged the pilots would have been confused by the mixed signals.

It was not until the final three seconds before the plane hit the Atlantic that the pilots even realized they were going to crash, the black box tapes revealed.

VIDEO: What It Was Like in the Flight 447 Cockpit

About 180 victims' family members have sued Air France and Airbus over the crash. The family of one of the victims, Eithna Walls, has settled its lawsuit.

The A330, considered among the safest in the skies, has flown over 800 million passengers across the world and there are 865 planes in operation today, according to Airbus's website. But in modern aviation, large commercial jets almost fly themselves. Voss said that on any given flight, pilots are manually flying the plane for only three minutes -- one minute and 30 seconds each for take-off and landing.

"The fact is there aren't many opportunities for a pilot to hand fly the aircraft anymore," he said. "The truth is it's only a few minutes during each flight, maybe until they climb up to altitude. Many airplanes don't even allow the hand flying for that long."

At the heart of the heated debate over so-called "automation addiction," which is when pilots are overly dependent on computers to fly their planes, is the question of whether pilots are actually learning how to properly fly large commercial aircraft.

"Because of this sophistication and the ability of airplane to fly themselves, they don't have as many people to actually fly the airplane, to actually exercise their stick and rudder capabilities," Bill Bozin, the vice president of safety and technical affairs at Airbus, told "Nightline" in June.

In the wake of the Air France crash, Voss said "many airlines" were retraining their pilots on flying manually, but that much more needs to be done to overhaul pilot training programs around the world.

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"I think there's a training gap that still exists," he said. "There have been hundreds of incremental changes to the way we fly aircraft but there haven't been any changes in the training program that reflect that."

"The fact is aircraft are going to become more automated," Voss added. "There's no way to even tell how many lives have been saved by the automation that are in aircraft. So it's a good thing and it's going to continue to progress. What we have to continue to do is keep the human side up to speed with what the automation is doing."
 
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I agree, but question is: is training lacking bcs. over reliance on automation? That automation is cost effective solution to expensive training etc. You asked me whether accident was preventable? I do not think it is an easy answer as there are too many variables. Not long a go student asked me to explain her why the US DoD has such large budget, but to explain her like she is in kindergarten. There is no such explanation of such complex issues or systems. That is why I said earlier there are many variables here that led to underperformance. Is training itself issue? Perhaps. Is recruitment issue? Perhaps. There are too many "perhaps" same like in Challenger or Columbia disasters in 1986 and 2003. Maybe problem is organization itself in general, not just part of that organization that relates to training and recruitment.
 
I agree, but question is: is training lacking bcs. over reliance on automation? That automation is cost effective solution to expensive training etc. You asked me whether accident was preventable? I do not think it is an easy answer as there are too many variables. Not long a go student asked me to explain her why the US DoD has such large budget, but to explain her like she is in kindergarten. There is no such explanation of such complex issues or systems. That is why I said earlier there are many variables here that led to underperformance. Is training itself issue? Perhaps. Is recruitment issue? Perhaps. There are too many "perhaps" same like in Challenger or Columbia disasters in 1986 and 2003. Maybe problem is organization itself in general, not just part of that organization that relates to training and recruitment.

I guess what we have these days include a lot of touchscreen menus, and one really needs proper training to be able to reliably use that.

Still - there are incidents such as Asiana 214 where all the investigations showed a culture where both reliance on automated landing was too much, and deference to superiors was seen as highly important.
 
I agree, but question is: is training lacking bcs. over reliance on automation? That automation is cost effective solution to expensive training etc. You asked me whether accident was preventable? I do not think it is an easy answer as there are too many variables. Not long a go student asked me to explain her why the US DoD has such large budget, but to explain her like she is in kindergarten. There is no such explanation of such complex issues or systems. That is why I said earlier there are many variables here that led to underperformance. Is training itself issue? Perhaps. Is recruitment issue? Perhaps. There are too many "perhaps" same like in Challenger or Columbia disasters in 1986 and 2003. Maybe problem is organization itself in general, not just part of that organization that relates to training and recruitment.
I agree, but question is: is training lacking bcs. over reliance on automation? That automation is cost effective solution to expensive training etc. You asked me whether accident was preventable? I do not think it is an easy answer as there are too many variables. Not long a go student asked me to explain her why the US DoD has such large budget, but to explain her like she is in kindergarten. There is no such explanation of such complex issues or systems. That is why I said earlier there are many variables here that led to underperformance. Is training itself issue? Perhaps. Is recruitment issue? Perhaps. There are too many "perhaps" same like in Challenger or Columbia disasters in 1986 and 2003. Maybe problem is organization itself in general, not just part of that organization that relates to training and recruitment.

What I mean by better training is understanding the aircraft ( deep ) and following standard operating procedures ( discipline ).

On the Airbus, you don’t just end up with the auto pilot/auto thrust disengaging and being in alternate law without a computer warning indicating why, 99% of the time.

A pilot should have been suspicious what caused the problem and be particularly vigilant whether there was a problem with the probes as they can cause an unreliable airspeed problem with or without a warning. They did not get a direct warning. Assuming Air France had a checklist for unreliable airspeed, they should have taken a look at it ( bad training if they never had that checklist ).


Both Pilots were holding onto their side sticks and trying to fly it even though the more senior one told the junior FO ...” I have control“ and every pilot in the world knows that
means let go and let the other pilot fly it, but he never let go. Since he never let go, the senior FO inputs were screwed up and they got a “dual input” aural warning ( but they never figured it out ) when the senior FO should have pushed the emergency take over button. Lack of knowledge and SOP discipline.

The senior FO seemed to have a better understanding what was going wrong and should have taken control earlier and reacted to the dual input warning by pressing the emergency take over button for 40 seconds to lock out the nervous junior FO who was a weak pilot.

The senior FO should have taken over as soon as he saw the pitch going up when the junior FO pulled all the way back and the plane was climbing at over 7000 feet a minute.

I have read different accounts but IIRC, the junior FO pulled the thrust levers to idle. Nose up, power At idle......above 30,000 feet.

Crew coordination ( CRM ) was weak.
 
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