Aircraft automation

[Exhaustgases]

I've been watching the youtube animations of major aircraft disasters as well as the cable tv show that shows the after crash investigations.
In this one video he talks about asking people about automation in aircraft. I say yes it has its place and makes pilots lazy as well. But like in the Max 8, I say there needs to always be a full manual system to fall back on, and a huge 6 inch diameter red button above both pilots heads that can be hit to disengage all the electronic controls in an emergency, and allow fly by cables or mechanical linkage to the control surfaces. I think the A10 has such systems.

 

[CourierDriver]

Maybe we should turn back time to the late 50s or early 60s and bring back the Boeing 707s ,,,IDK

 

[Astro14]

You’re drawing the wrong conclusion from this crash.

The fact that the flight had no MEL (minimum equipment list) and the instructor pilot kept resetting the ELAC 1 and 2 computers led to the loss of pitch control. The ELACs are critical to the flight control system.

In regular operations, you don’t keep resetting the ELACs. You get one reset, then the airplane is grounded and faults traced before it can fly again.

In that regard, this crash is just like Indonesia 8501 - the crew kept resetting a faulty flight control computer, until it caused a failure.

Poor maintenance, lack of maintenance guidelines, and poor decision making led to this crash.

It’s not a design flaw with an airplane when the crew ignores standard practice, manufacturer’s warnings, and recommendations.

 

[BusyLittleShop]

Maybe we should turn back time to the late 50s or early 60s and bring back the Boeing 707s ,,,IDK

Maybe not...
In 1959 a brand new Boeing 707 had 3 engines ripped off 12,000 feet above. Washington State in the US. If that wasn't bad enough they had to shut down the 4th engine and dead stick... its the same pilot error on a good aircraft no matter were in history we focus...

 

[kschachn]

Maybe not...
In 1959 a brand new Boeing 707 had 3 engines ripped off 12,000 feet above. Washington State in the US. If that wasn't bad enough they had to shut down the 4th engine and dead stick... its the same pilot error on a good aircraft no matter were in history we focus...

And yet you post this as if there was something wrong with the airframe, as a reason someone would not wish to fly on the aircraft.

Make stuff up much?

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

The accident was totally preventable and was caused by poor maintenance and the training Captain performing ( multiple ) ELAC resets in flight ( not allowed, ground only and only one reset ....not sure what their QRH reset checklist stated....was it wrong, was the Captain not following it or just doing resets on his own and not using sound judgment ).

They should have landed after the first ELAC warning ( inhibited on take off until 1500 or 2 minutes ). They had multiple ELAC failure warnings and did multiple resets.

The manual back up system worked, they obviously knew they had lost pitch control with the side stick and it was confirmed by the PFD ( primary flight display ) warning ....”man trim only“ and now being in mechanical back mode ( flight deck trim wheel to control pitch via the THS horizontal stabilizer , rudders for lateral control and obviously using the thrust levers as required ). Airbus pilots do not normally ever use the trim wheel in the flight deck ( except to set take off trim in before take off checklist ) except in degraded flight control laws....or in a bad situation like these pilots in mechanical back up. The back up RAT worked ( ram air turbine ) and extended when both engines quit ensuring continued electrics ( battery doing it anyways ) and HYDRAULICS as Airbus cannot fly with no hydraulics, not even in mechanical back up. The RAT drives its own hydraulic pump ( as long as have fluid ). Blue system operates electrically as long as AC power.

It’s like circuit breakers....if they pop in flight, do not reset unless required for the safe completion of the flight and only one reset.

They were lucky to get the aircraft back on the ground ( engine fire warning , engine failure, then total loss of thrust plus a slat/flap issue ).

Its good practice to fly in back up mechanical mode in the simulator but know when is available and when it’s not ( does not work if have complete loss of hydraulics contrary to what many think ).

 

[Cujet]

I prefer "fly by wire" systems. I also prefer "throttle by wire". There are a lot of advantages that simply are not clear to the casual observer. Automation is, and can be, a fantastic thing.

This forum is not really the place to go into all of the reasons why such systems are superb. However, one example is that of a modern twin engine helicopter. With OEI (one engine inoperative) the other engine is automatically managed to produce (up to) 120% torque output. That's notable, because with both engines running, the torque is managed at 60%. Again, in OEI operations, the helicopter performs just as well as it does with both engines running, from the pilot's point of view.

In this example, there is no way a pilot can lose an engine during a critical phase of flight and instantly manage the other engine to 120% safely. When the pilot can't tell the difference in performance upon the loss of an engine, he can concentrate on flying out of danger. Later to worry about what went wrong.

I'll add in one example for FBW. It's good to note that a complete failure of the LH aileron control system is not the disaster that it would be with a conventional hydro-mechanical aileron control system. On our G650ER, roll control remains normal with the 7 remaining flight controls associated with roll. (the failed aileron simply remains faired) Furthermore, the rudder, differential engine thrust and differential elevators can be incorporated when appropriate.

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

The Smartlynx video asks people what they think about automation. Automation is great but several accidents have been caused by automation complacency ( humans aren’t the best monitors). Airplanes are increasing complex/automated and and many airlines are increasingly discouraging pilots from hand flying , using manual thrust and raw data. If you don’t use it, you can lose the skill ( pilots are the ultimate back up ).

Made a mistake commenting on the Smartlynx video , they still had conventional roll control ( SEC 3 still working ).

That accident reminds me of the A320 in Pakistan that landed on the runway gear up and took off and both engines quit.

That was probably the most bizarre crash I have ever heard of, I didn’t believe it when I first heard about it.

Truth is stranger than fiction.

 

[CourierDriver]

It is amazing all this automation stuff,,,how did our guys ever get from England to Germany and back on ancient recips and old fashion piston driven aircraft with old fashion navigation,,,,,how did I grow up on 3 on the tree single carb, 6 cylinder cars we had,,how did we do it,,,they did just fine...lol How did we leave Pensacola Naval Air Station in 1968 on a 4 engine prop job, tricycle landing gear, 4 throttles, manual everything,,,how did we do it,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, we had to fly the darn thing....the Navy had real pilots,,,lol oh, it was ancient gas fed,,lol Navagation,,lol,,,can u see the ocean......................
A

 

[Cujet]

Automation is great but several accidents have been caused by automation complacency ( humans aren’t the best monitors).

1) The FAA is addressing the inability of pilots to assess and properly manage failed electronic systems.
2) Despite some notable electronic failures and the associated crashes, the overall affect on safety has been exceptionally positive.

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

1) The FAA is addressing the inability of pilots to assess and properly manage failed electronic systems.
2) Despite some notable electronic failures and the associated crashes, the overall affect on safety has been exceptionally positive.

Agreed. Like I said, automation is great but you have to monitor what’s going on and not get complacent. Flying without all the automation ( when it’s appropriate ) is also very important to keep flying Skills sharp and confidence levels high.

 

[wpod]

.the Navy had real pilots,,, The Navy still does.

 

[mk378]

This report goes into considerable detail.

https://www.ojk.ee/et/system/files/fail/manus/ee0180_es_san_investigation_report.pdf

* Sensor failure on the particular plane causing the ELAC in control to fail out when pilot asserts manual control of the stabilizer. That happened on practically every touch and go cycle since the training pilot manually resets the stabilizer for the "go" takeoff.

* By design, the ELAC error message considered low priority and not necessarily displayed during landing and takeoff. Also the fact that both ELACs needed to be reset may not have been obvious since messages were cleared from the screen.

* Not resetting the #1 ELAC led to the next manual stabilizer activation leaving both ELACs out, so control shifts to one of the two available SEC computers for alternative law flight.

* Bug in SEC system can cause false fail out of both SECs when landing without ELAC (a SEC in control) and the aircraft momentarily bounces off the runway on landing-- which did happen in the last landing. This would not be a fatal or even immediately noticed problem in a regular landing, but became a problem for touch and go.

* Both ELACs and both SECs failed out shifts control to "direct law." Control stick inoperable, though controlled flight is theoretically possible through manual control of the stabilizer, rudder pedals, and throttles.

* Failure of 4 computers during takeoff roll considered so unlikely that pilots are not trained or practiced to take off under direct law.

* After the inadvertently successful takeoff, someone reduced the throttles to idle, causing the plane to descend and scrape the ground with the landing gear up, resulting in one engine on fire and the other one total loss of oil. Throttle returned to get airborne again and turn around, but engines failed before able to reach the airport.

Activating the SEC bug is called a "corner case." Ideally this would be done in a testing program not by regular duty pilots.

 

[Exhaustgases]

Yes all the electronics is great, until it breaks. I would like synthetic vision and IR with millimeter radar vision all in one. But I would still want the good old gyro instruments and cables for back up, just in case. Oh and a nice parachute as well. In this modern age there is zero excuse to die in a plane crash, commercial or otherwise.

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

Yes all the electronics is great, until it breaks. I would like synthetic vision and IR with millimeter radar vision all in one. But I would still want the good old gyro instruments and cables for back up, just in case. Oh and a nice parachute as well. In this modern age there is zero excuse to die in a plane crash, commercial or otherwise.

It will be no different as cars become more automated. Just read another story about some guy not monitoring his Tesla autopilot and crashing into a police car. I would never fully trust a car with an autopilot. Same in planes, you have to monitor wants going on as it may be functioning perfectly but “garbage in, garbage out” due to a wrong button being pushed or not pushed or flight management programming error.

I fly with the ...”rumour versus fact” mentality. After pushing that button, pulling that knob , programming the flight management system to do something....is the aircraft actually doing what I told it to do? it’s all rumour until monitoring proves it’s a fact.

many years ago a DC10 ( Finnair I believe ) went off the runway in Boston due to automation complacency. The auto throttle failed to maintain the proper speed and the aircraft landed at some ridiculously high airspeed that THREE pilots ( second officer ) failed to notice due to poor monitoring.

 

[edyvw]

It will be no different as cars become more automated. Just read another story about some guy not monitoring his Tesla autopilot and crashing into a police car. I would never fully trust a car with an autopilot. Same in planes, you have to monitor wants going on as it may be functioning perfectly but “garbage in, garbage out” due to a wrong button being pushed or not pushed or flight management programming error.

I fly with the ...”rumour versus fact” mentality. After pushing that button, pulling that knob , programming the flight management system to do something....is the aircraft actually doing what I told it to do? it’s all rumour until monitoring proves it’s a fact.

many years ago a DC10 ( Finnair I believe ) went off the runway in Boston due to automation complacency. The auto throttle failed to maintain the proper speed and the aircraft landed at some ridiculously high airspeed that THREE pilots ( second officer ) failed to notice due to poor monitoring.

I think this is still best article about that subject:

Should Airplanes Be Flying Themselves?

William Langewiesche explores how a series of small errors can turn a state-of-the-art cockpit into a death trap.

www.vanityfair.com

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

I think this is still best article about that subject:

Should Airplanes Be Flying Themselves?

William Langewiesche explores how a series of small errors can turn a state-of-the-art cockpit into a death trap.

www.vanityfair.com

The problem with the “should airplanes be flying themselves” title of that article is that the airplane was smart enough to tell the pilots it had no clue what was going on so it gave up control and gave it to the pilots. The pilots ended up not being able to figure out what was going on and it crashed....with them flying it.

The aircraft gave the pilots control by disconnecting the autopilot, auto thrust and going into “alternate law” with zero flight envelope protections.

The “stall, stall, stall” warning kept going off but neither pilot mentioned it and the pilot flying ( think he was the least experienced and the captain was sleeping in the cabin on break initially ) kept full up elevator. Neither pilot ( until the captain woke up, entered the flight deck and said ...” 10 degrees pitch” or something like that ) noticed they had the nose too high ( AOA ).

The aircraft was in a deep stall and crashed while the pilot was “ in control”.

Its important that pilots be aware of what Pitch ( nose up attitude , or down ) attitude is normal for the flight regime they are in. 10 degree’s nose up pitch ( especially with a stall warning going off repeatedly ) in cruise is WAY too high ( worse the higher the aircraft is ) and that’s where the “monitoring” the situation failed when the Airbus flight computers ( 7 of them ) gave up and passed control over to the pilots who are the ultimate back up.

They probably didn’t believe the stall warning ( not possible to stall an Airbus in “normal law” ...but they were now in “alternate law” and it can stall ) but they should have far lived it was accurate given the high pitch attitude.

Astro has a picture ( F14 questions ) of his flight deck instruments in the B767 .....even climbing, the pitch is around 2.5 degree’s ( climbing through flight level 254 ).

normal pitch on the Airbus in cruise is around 2.5 degree’s.

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

Here is another one caused by an unreliable airspeed problem. Sometimes ( Airbus ) you get an electronic warning ( ”ADR check pro” ) , other times you don’t like AF 447 ( they got other warnings but not the primary cause....blocked pitot tube ).

Status:	Final
Date:	Tuesday 6 February 1996
Time:	23:47
Type:	Boeing 757-225
Operating for:	Alas Nacionales
Leased from:	Birgenair
Registration:	TC-GEN
C/n / msn:	22206/31
First flight:	1984-02-03 (12 years )
Total airframe hrs:	29269
Cycles:	13499
Engines:	2 Rolls-Royce RB211-535E4
Crew:	Fatalities: 13 / Occupants: 13
Passengers:	Fatalities: 176 / Occupants: 176
Total:	Fatalities: 189 / Occupants: 189
Aircraft damage:	Destroyed
Aircraft fate:	Written off (damaged beyond repair)
Location:	26 km (16.3 mls) NE off Puerto Plata, Dominican Republic ( Atlantic Ocean)
Phase:	En route (ENR)
Nature:	Int'l Non Scheduled Passenger
Departure airport:	Puerto Plata-La Union International Airport (POP/MDPP), Dominican Republic
Destination airport:	Gander Airport, NL (YQX/CYQX), Canada
Flightnumber:	ALW301

Narrative:
Alas Nacionales flight 301 departed Puerto Plata for a charter flight to Frankfurt via Gander and Berlin at 23:42 LT. At 80 knots on takeoff the captain found out that his air speed indicator (ASI) wasn't working properly. The co-pilot's indicator seemed to work fine. While climbing through 4700 feet the captain's ASI read 350 knots (real speed was about 220 kts); this resulted in an autopilot/autothrottle reaction to increase the pitch-up attitude and a power reduction in order to lower the airspeed. At that time the crew got 'Rudder ratio' and 'Mach airspeed' advisory warnings. Both pilots got confused when the co-pilot stated that his ASI read 200 knots decreasing while getting an excessive speed-warning, followed by a stick shaker warning. This led the pilots to believe that both ASIs were unreliable.
Finally realizing that they were losing speed and altitude they disconnected the autopilot. The autopilot, fed by the captain's faulty ASI, had reduced the speed close to the stall speed. Full thrust was then applied. At 23:47:17 an aural GPWS warning sounded. Eight seconds later the aircraft struck the ocean.
The incorrect ASI readings were probably caused by the obstruction of the pitot system by mud and/or debris from a small insect that was introduced in the pitot tube during the time the aircraft was on the ground. The aircraft was not flown for 20 days before the crash and was returned for service without a verification of the pitot-static system as recommended by Boeing.


Probable Cause:

PROBABLE CAUSE: "The crew's failure to recognize the activation of the stick shaker as a warning of imminent entrance to the stall, and the failure of the crew to execute the procedures for recovery from the onset of loss of control."

 

[edyvw]

The problem with the “should airplanes be flying themselves” title of that article is that the airplane was smart enough to tell the pilots it had no clue what was going on so it gave up control and gave it to the pilots. The pilots ended up not being able to figure out what was going on and it crashed....with them flying it.

The aircraft gave the pilots control by disconnecting the autopilot, auto thrust and going into “alternate law” with zero flight envelope protections.

The “stall, stall, stall” warning kept going off but neither pilot mentioned it and the pilot flying ( think he was the least experienced and the captain was sleeping in the cabin on break initially ) kept full up elevator. Neither pilot ( until the captain woke up, entered the flight deck and said ...” 10 degrees pitch” or something like that ) noticed they had the nose too high ( AOA ).

The aircraft was in a deep stall and crashed while the pilot was “ in control”.

Its important that pilots be aware of what Pitch ( nose up attitude , or down ) attitude is normal for the flight regime they are in. 10 degree’s nose up pitch ( especially with a stall warning going off repeatedly ) in cruise is WAY too high ( worse the higher the aircraft is ) and that’s where the “monitoring” the situation failed when the Airbus flight computers ( 7 of them ) gave up and passed control over to the pilots who are the ultimate back up.

They probably didn’t believe the stall warning ( not possible to stall an Airbus in “normal law” ...but they were now in “alternate law” and it can stall ) but they should have far lived it was accurate given the high pitch attitude.

Astro has a picture ( F14 questions ) of his flight deck instruments in the B767 .....even climbing, the pitch is around 2.5 degree’s ( climbing through flight level 254 ).

normal pitch on the Airbus in cruise is around 2.5 degree’s.

I know, and title is probably misleading (IMO, author did really bad job later explaining MAX problems in article two years ago). But what he indicates is what you mention before: complacency. How you keep pilots skills in check with such automation? He touches I think a lot of good points here, from technical to cultural. And I agree, in the end it is pilots that are to blame, but what led to such behavior? That is why I think article is good read.

 

[Just a civilian pilot]

I know, and title is probably misleading (IMO, author did really bad job later explaining MAX problems in article two years ago). But what he indicates is what you mention before: complacency. How you keep pilots skills in check with such automation? He touches I think a lot of good points here, from technical to cultural. And I agree, in the end it is pilots that are to blame, but what led to such behavior? That is why I think article is good read.

Agreed but I would argue that pilots are not trained as well as they should be ( some airlines ) and too much emphasis is put on using automation “all the time”. Some airlines do a better job educating and training pilots to recognize and deal with unreliable airspeed problems.

The problem with Air France 447 was that they didn’t understand what was going on or that the airplane was in a ( deep ) stall.

The captain started to figure out it ( “10 degrees pitch“ he said ) when he came back and saw the aircraft with the nose pitched up but dropping like a rock. It was too late by then.

The Finnair accident was complacency ( an, it always controls the speed so why bother checking it ) , AF 447 was a lack of understanding , even when the automation was off.